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ABSTRACT
This report clarifies many technical issues being analyzed by the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) 
program, including Inert Matrix Fuel (IMF) versus Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel, single-pass versus multi-
pass recycling, thermal versus fast reactors, the need to recycle Np-Pu-Am to meet established AFCI 
objectives, the borderline case of Cm, the potential need for transmutation of technetium and iodine, and 
the value of separating cesium and strontium.  This report represents the first attempt to calculate a full 
range of metrics, spanning all four AFCI program objectives [DOE2005a, DOE2005, DOE2006] - waste 
management, proliferation resistance, energy recovery, and systematic management/economics/safety - 
using a combination of “static” calculations and a system dynamic model, DYMOND.[Moisseytsev2001,
Yacout2005a]  (In late FY2006, DYMOND is being replaced with the VISION model.)  In many cases, 
we examine the same issue both dynamically and statically to determine the robustness of the 
observations.  All analyses are for the U.S. reactor fleet.
This is a technical report, not intended for a policy-level audience.  A wide range of options are studied to 
provide the technical basis for identifying the most attractive options and potential improvements.  No 
single fixed strategy guarantees optimal performance at all times in all possible futures.  Instead, the 
objective in the next few decades should be to cost-effectively develop the tools to deal with the 
circumstances at that point in time.  Technical maturity and readiness to deploy were outside the scope of 
this report. 
Many dynamic simulations of option deployment are included.  There are few “control knobs” for driving
or piloting the fuel cycle system into the future, even though it is dark and raining (uncertain) and controls 
are sluggish with slow time response: what types of reactors are built, what types of fuels are used, and 
the capacity of separation and fabrication plants. Driving responsibilities are distributed among utilities, 
government, and regulators, compounding the challenge of making the entire system work and respond to
changing circumstances.  We identify approaches that would increase our ability to drive the fuel cycle
system: (1) have a recycle strategy that could be implemented before the 2030-2050 approximate period 
when current reactors retire so that replacement reactors fit into the strategy, (2) establish an option such 
as multi-pass blended-core IMF as a downward plutonium control knob and accumulate waste 
management benefits early, (3) establish fast reactors with flexible conversion ratio as a future control 
knob that becomes available as fast reactors are added to the fleet, and (4) expand exploration of blended 
assemblies/cores and targets, which appear to have advantages and agility.
Results suggest multi-pass full-core MOX appears to be a less effective way than multi-pass blended core 
IMF to manage the fuel cycle system because it requires higher TRU throughput while more slowly 
accruing waste management benefits.  Single-pass recycle approaches for LWRs do not meet AFCI 
program objectives and could be considered a “dead end.”  (We did not study the VHTR.)  Fast reactors 
are effective but a significant number of fast reactors must be deployed before the benefits of that 
technology can be observed.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report clarifies many technical issues being analyzed by the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) 
program, including Inert Matrix Fuel (IMF) versus Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel, single-pass versus multi-
pass recycling, thermal versus fast reactors, the need to recycle Np-Pu-Am to meet established AFCI 
objectives, the borderline case of Cm, the potential need for transmutation of technetium and iodine, and 
the value of separating cesium and strontium.  This report represents the first attempt to calculate a full 
range of metrics, spanning all four AFCI program objectives [DOE2005a, DOE2005, DOE2006] - waste 
management, proliferation resistance, energy recovery, and systematic management/economics/safety - 
using a combination of “static” calculations and a system dynamic model, DYMOND.[Moisseytsev2001,
Yacout2005a]  (In late FY2006, DYMOND is being replaced with the VISION model.)  All analyses are 
for the U.S. reactor fleet. 
The report’s analyses were produced by INL, ANL, and SNL personnel under their Simulation,
Evaluation, and Trade Study (SETS) work packages during FY2005 with followup work in FY2006.
This is a technical report, not intended for a policy-level audience.  A wide range of options are studied to 
provide the technical basis for identifying the most attractive options and potential improvements.
Indeed, we do not believe that any of the specific options presented here are the most optimum or 
economically feasible.  Technical maturity and readiness to deploy were outside the scope of this report. 
Options Considered in this Study
The range of fuel cycle options can be divided into two broad categories: (1) throw-away and (2) recycle.
The throw-away, or once-through, approach does not meet the AFCI program objectives; indeed it leaves 
nuclear power vulnerable to nearer-term constraints of geologic repository capacity and longer-term
uranium resource limits.  Therefore, it is prudent and appropriate to determine the feasibility and
attractiveness among recycle options. 
The recycle options (strategy 2) can be usefully categorized by the type of reactors that consume recycled
transuranic material: 
2a. Thermal reactors
2b. Both thermal and fast reactors
2c. Fast reactors in consumer (burner) mode
2d. Fast reactors in breeder mode
This report includes several cases within each of these categories, see Table 1.  Strategies 1, 2a, 2b, and 
2c use thermal reactors; in this study, the light water reactor (LWR) is used as the thermal reactor.  In this 
categorization scheme, the proposed technology for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) is 
within strategy 2c; recycle is done in consumer fast reactors (CFR) but not thermal reactors.  Strategies 2c 
and 2d both use fast reactors.  Strategy 2c uses fast reactors in consumer or burner mode (conversion ratio 
less than 1) so that thermal reactors continue to be used as the source of transuranic fuel for the fast 
reactors.  Strategy 2d uses fast reactors in breeder mode (conversion ratio greater than 1) so that thermal 
reactors are phased out.  We do not claim that any of the specific cases is “optimum” within that category.
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Table 1. Throw-away versus recycle strategies considered in this study 
Strategy Cases in this study
1. Throw away (once through) LWR with UOX fuel (at burnups of 33, 51, and 100 MW-day/kg-
HM)
2a. Recycle in thermal reactors LWR with IMF-NpPuAm fuel (blended core, ¾ UOX, ¼ IMF) 
LWR with MOX-NpPuAm fuel (full core MOX) 
2b. Sustainable recycle in thermal 
& fast reactors
LWR with IMF-NpPu & consumer FR (conversion ratio 0.25) 
LWR with MOX-NpPu & consumer FR (conversion ratio 0.25) 
2c. Sustainable recycle in burner 
fast reactors 
LWR with UOX & consumer FR (conversion ratio 0.25) 
2d. Sustainable recycle in breeder 
fast reactors 
Breeder FR 
Limitations
There are four major limitations of this study.  First, thermal reactors (TR) are always represented by
Light Water Reactors (LWR) and both consumer fast reactors (CFR) and breeder fast reactors (BFR) are
always represented by Sodium Fast Reactors (SFR).  (We are aware many colleagues use the phrase 
“burner fast reactor;” however, this report uses “consumer” so the acronym (CFR) differs from BFR and 
minimizes the chance of misinterpretation of “burn” in the chemical reaction sense.)  Processing of 
thermal reactor fuel is performed at centralized plants using UREX+ technology.  Processing of fast 
reactor fuel is performed at power plants using pyrochemical technology.  To first order, we do not
believe the conclusions in this report would differ substantially for other thermal or fast reactor options 
based on the AFCI evaluation of Generation IV transmutation impacts.[Taiwo2005]  We have not 
considered ultra-high burnup with the Very High Temperature Reactor (VHTR) concept. 
Second, no attempt has been made to include economics per se.  Instead, economic indicators are used 
such as separation and fuel fabrication throughputs and the relative amount of fuels that require remote
handling (those including americium or curium), glovebox operation (those including plutonium), or 
current hands-on fabrication (uranium only).
The third assumption is that all options studied are technically feasible and available at the time indicated 
in various deployment scenarios (typically 2025), which implies the necessary underlying research, 
development, and demonstration have been completed.  Thus, in this report, there is no analysis on the 
basis of technological maturity or readiness to deploy. Similarly, there is no analysis on the basis of R&D 
costs.
The fourth is that detailed fuel cycle data are only available for a finite subset of specific recycle cases.
Although great care has been taken to assure the fuel cycle performance for each case has been analyzed
in a consistent manner, not all promising options have been considered.  In future work, the scenario 
evaluations will be utilized to define additional cases for detailed analyses; and new fuel cycle
transmutation data on specific options will be incorporated into the dynamic model, as available.
Major Conclusions 
Table 2 summarizes key results in this report.  These results address the four AFCI objectives: 
[DOE2005a, DOE2005b, DOE2006]
1. Reduce the long-term environmental burden of nuclear energy through more efficient disposal of 
waste materials.
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2. Enhance overall nuclear fuel cycle proliferation resistance via improved technologies for used 
fuel management. 
3. Enhance energy security by extracting energy recoverable from used fuel and depleted uranium,
ensuring that uranium resources do not become a limiting factor for nuclear power. 
4. Improve fuel cycle management, while continuing competitive fuel cycle economics and 
excellent safety performance of the entire nuclear fuel cycle system.
Table 2. Key Results that Clarify Selection among Recycle Options
Goal 2a.
LWR with
MOX
2a.
LWR with
IMF
2b.
Consumer
FR + IMF in 
LWR
2c.
Consumer
FR + UOX
in LWR
2d.
Breeder FR 
Reduce long-term heat (LTH) to
increase geologic repository
capacity by 10-50x
~2x ~3x >50x >50x >50x
Reduce long-term hypothetical
dose (LTD) by 10-50x at peak
dose (500,000 yrs)
~2x ~3x >50x >50x >50x
Reduce long-term radiotoxicity
(LTR) by 100x at 1,000 yrs so
waste is less toxic than uranium
ore
~2x ~3x ~100 ~100 ~100
Ensure recycling is sustainable Number of recycles is limited
by accumulation of higher
TRU isotopes
Use of adequate number of FR ensures that 
recycling can be sustained indefinitely
Minimize weapon-usable
inventory
Intermediate
values
Minimum of
cases studied 
Close to
minimum
Intermediate
values
Will
eventually
exceed once-
through
Improve use of uranium ore by
50x in the long-term
~1.2x ~1.2x ~1.4x ~1.4x >100x
Minimize TRU throughput,
tonnes/yr per GWe to separation
plant
0.94 at 5
cycles
0.34 at 5
cycles
0.85 at
equilibrium
0.76 at
equilibrium
1.45 at
equilibrium
Minimize percent of fleet that
must be fast reactors, which are
yet unproven in the marketplace
None needed None needed 19% at 
equilibrium
27% at 
equilibrium
100%
Maximize percent of fuel in the
system that can be fabricated
hands-on (UOX)
80% 75% 71% 73% None
Minimize percent of fuel
requiring remote fabrication
20% = MOX
-NpPuAm
2% = Am
targets (a) 
19% = FR
fuel with
NpPuAmCm
(b)
27% = FR
fuel with
NpPuAmCm
100% = FR
fuel with
NpPuAmCm
Minimize number of new
fuels/reactor types needed (to 
minimize R&D risk)
1 / 0 1-2 / 0
“2” if use
separate Am
targets
2 / 1
Need both 
IMF and FR 
fuel
1 / 1 1 / 1
Color code Pink
Option does not meet goal
Yellow
Option partially meets goal
Green
Option meets goal 
(a)  Also, 23% of the fuel is IMF with NpPu, requiring glovebox fabrication
(b) Also, 11% of the fuel is IMF with NpPu, requiring glovebox fabrication.
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Objective 1. Reduce the long-term environmental burden of nuclear energy through more efficient 
disposal of waste materials.
We considered objective 1 using three primary metrics:
x Long-term heat (LTH) – the heat generated by waste in the time period from repository
ventilation stoppage (minimum 50 yrs) to 1500 years.  This has been calibrated versus detailed 
repository heat response calculations by Wigeland [Wigeland2003, 2004a, 2004b, 2006;
Stillman2004c] so that it is a good indicator of heat-limited repository capacity.
x Long-term dose (LTD) – the hypothetical peak dose to the maximum exposed individual of the
public scaled from 2004-vintage results for Yucca Mountain assuming linearity.  In most cases, 
peak dose would occur at ~500,000 yrs after emplacement.  The time that dose peaks can shift to 
other time periods if TRU are well recovered but U and Tc-I are not.  LTD incorporates the 
relative mobility of species in that geochemical environment.  If LTD is reduced by as much as 
LTH is, then there is no net increase in hypothetical dose from adoption of recycling.
x Long-term radiotoxicity (LTR) – the radiotoxicity of waste, independent of mobility and 
transport.  LTR focuses on 1,000 years after discharge; a reduction of 100x relative to the throw-
away fuel cycle means that the waste would be less radiotoxic than the equivalent initial uranium
ore.
LTH and LTD are indicators of repository technical capacity.  LTR has no regulatory or capacity value,
but does help frame the hazard of the waste. 
An AFCI program goal is to increase geologic repository utilization by factors of 10 to 50 so that the need 
for a second repository is deferred for a century or more.[DOE2005a, DOE2005b, DOE2006]  The 
strategies with a fast reactor (2b, 2c, 2d) can accomplish this; the strategies without a fast reactor (1, 2a) 
cannot.  Without fast reactors, transuranic material eventually accumulates and must be disposed.  This 
limits the increase in repository utilization to ~2x to ~3x for strategy 2a, recycle in thermal reactors only.
We denote that strategies 2b, 2c, and 2d are “sustainable” recycling.  Strategy 2a can defer a second
repository, but recycling is not sustainable.
Figure 1 compares heat-limit repository capacity improvements for multi-pass cases, either calculated 
here or in an earlier report.[Stillman2004c]  The two MOX-NpPuAm cases match; the earlier report used 
actual thermal transient calculations; in this report we used the simpler LTH metric.  CORAIL is a MOX-
type approach with a different blending strategy than the MOX case used here and in Stillman2004c.
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ey observations from Figure 1 include:
x Even after 5 recycles, none of the cases achieve the AFCI program objective of 10-50x 
improvement in heat-limited repository capacity.  Thus, sustained recycle is required. 
x Full-core MOX does substantially worse than either blended core IMF or FR cases. 
x 1-pass, full core IMF-NpPuAm is the highest after the first recycle, but at the cost of creating a 
residue that is very difficult to continue to use in an LWR.  That curve stops at 2 cycles because
then the accumulated TRU must be discarded. The blended core IMF case in this study more
modestly burns TRU in the first recycle, but the approach can continue for additional recycles.
The same trends occur for long-term dose and long-term radiotoxicity.  We find the following:
x Overall, sustained recycle of ~99.5% of Np-Pu-Am is required. 
x In addition to 99.5% recovery of Np-Pu-Am, recovery of ~99% of Cs-Sr for independent heat 
management is required to meet LTH objectives.
x In addition to 99% recovery of Np-Pu-Am, LTD reduction can be constrained by Tc-I and 
uranium.  Over 90% recovery of Tc-I, followed by tailored waste forms or transmutation appears 
needed.  At least 90% recovery of uranium appears needed. 
x In addition to >99% recovery of Np-Pu-Am, LTR reduction can be constrained by Cm as Cm and
its daughters contribute ~1% to LTR at 1,000 years.
Regarding geologic repositories, we can rank order the strategies as follows: 
century, but at some point 
Figure 1. Comparison of multi-pass cases with 75-year ventilation in the repository. Cases mar
“ANL” were calculated in [Stillman2004c].
K
x Throw-away [1] is least attractive as the cost of repositories increases.
x Recycle in thermal reactors [2a] defers the need for additional geologic repositories until the next
accumulated TRU will lead to several repositories being needed. 
x Recycle in fast reactors (with or without thermal reactors) [2b, 2c, 2d] can be sustained
indefinitely and the need for additional repositories deferred for a considerable period of time.
So, the rank order is 1 < 2a < 2b/c/d (best). 
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Objective 2. Enhance overall nuclear fuel cycle proliferation resistance via improved technologie
for used fuel management.
We considered several indicators, such as the weapon-usable (WU) inventory measured in Pu239
equivalent masses (normalized by bare sphere critical mass).  Figure 2 shows the WU inventory for a few 
of the cases studied.
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Figure 2. Comparison of weapon-usable system inventory for throw-away, blended core multi-
NpPuAm, and full core, multi-pass MOX-NpPuAm.
The low conversion ratio systems – IMF and CFR – naturally minimize WU inventory.  The blended c
IM
r t consumption per unit mass flow. 
An issue for the proliferation experts is how to view the intrinsic protective attributes of blended core
approaches.  For example, we considered an IMF-NpPuAm blended core approach with fuel assemblies
with 75% UOX, 23% IMF-NpPu, and 1.5% Am targets.  The transmutation effectiveness was similar
(slightly better) than 75% UOX, 25% IMF-NpPuAm. UOX pellets/pins would be made hands-on; N
may te fabrication. qualify for glovebox fabrication; Am-containing fuels and targets would require remo
co centration of Am into targets means that fewer fuel pellets and pins would have to be made
Am targets would be lower, because the otely.  The dose rate from the completed assembly with
targets would be inside; in contrast, the IMF-NpPuAm pins are on the outside of each assembly.
lthough these are economic benefits, are there proliferation risk penalties from separating Am fromA
NpPu?  For now, the rank order is unclear. 
Objective 3. Enhance energy security by extracting energy recoverable from used fuel and deple
uranium, ensuring that uranium resources do not become a limiting factor for nuclear power. 
Regarding uranium ore utilization, we can rank order the strategies as follows: 
x Throw-away [1] is least attractive as uranium cost increases
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x Recycle in thermal reactors or consumer fast reactors [2a, 2b, 2c] offers slight improvement, up t
40% relative to throw-away. 
o
x Only becycle in breeder fast reactors [2d] offers major improvement, ~100x. 
d
hrough systems the more likely abnormal
e. Throughput is also everal
to UO nd IMF-NpPuAm are shown in the case
TRU is discarde le; we do not know exactly when TRU
accumulation will require TRU disc
IMF/CFR are equilibrium symbiotic sumes TRU from the thermal systems.  The 
 is 100% fast reactors.  At CR=1.1, it has the highest recalculating inventory.
So, the rank order is 1 < 2a/b/c < 2d (best). 
Objective 4. Improve fuel cycle management, while continuing competitive fuel cycle economics an
excellent safety performance of the entire nuclear fuel cycle system.
One safety indicator is throughput – the more material flowing t
conditions aris an economic indicator.  Figure 3 shows the throughput for s
multi-pass systems, compared X-51. MOX-NpPuAm a
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Figure 3. TRU throughput for selected systems, unlimited processing capacity
The strategies can also be rank ordered with regard to the relative importance of fast versus thermal
reactor costs.  In particular, as the cost of fast reactors relative to thermal reactors increases, one would
xpect recycle in thermal reactors [2a] to be superior to recycle in thermal+fast reactors [2b], in turn 
trategy 2a requires no fast reactors, 100% LWRs 
e
superior to recycle in fast reactors [2c]. Assuming fast reactors at CR=0.25, at equilibrium … 
x Strategy 2c requires 27% fast reactors, 73% LWRs (all of the LWRs burn UOX) 
x Strategy 2b requires 19% fast reactors, 81% LWRs (LWRs use a mix of UOX and IMF) 
x S
So, the rank order if fast reactors are much more expensive than LWRs is 2d < 2c < 2b < 2a/1 (best). 
Another Objective - Managing the Fuel Cycle System in spite of Uncertainties
Managing the fuel cycle system in a real-time fashion will not be easy. There is the potential to “out
drive” our headlights.  Consider that managing the fuel cycle is metaphorically like driving or flying a 
Page x 
plane.  There are few “control knobs” available: what types of reactors are built, what types of fuel
used, and the capacity of separation and fabrication plants.  All of the controls are very sluggish – with 
response times me
s are
asured in decades.  To compound the problem, there is no single driver; control is 
hared by utilities, other industry, government, and regulators.  Worse, it is dark and raining (uncertain)
ce into the future. Perturbations must be anticipated. 
dy.
obs
able 3. Potential Control Knobs of Varying Effectiveness.
s
and our headlights only illuminate a short distan
Table 3 lists potential control knobs that arose during this study.  Future work is required to quantify
each.  Each potential control knob has costs; economic assessments are beyond the scope of this stu
We can state based on hundreds of 2000-to-2100 fuel cycle simulations that at least some control kn
are required, but we do not see any evidence that all of these potential control knobs are needed.
T
Least flexible Most flexible (most effective version of each control knob) 
Miss the 2030-2050 window Deployable before 2030 
Single type of TR FR+TR symbiosis
(TR recycle serves as buffer for mismatch of FR building vs. UOX
separation capacity.)
Fixed conversion ratio Variable conversion ratio 
UREX+1, PUREX, pyro UREX+4
Homogenous core Heterogeneous cores, e.g., IMF-UOX blends, targets, blankets 
Don’t recycle “legacy” used fuel Use drawdown of “legacy” fuel as buffer 
It would be beneficial to have a recycle strategy that could be implemented before the current reactor fleet
retires in the 2030-2050 approximate time period so that replacement reactors fit into the strategy.  The 
reactors built in that time period can determine much of the fuel cycle for the rest of this century,
especially at low growth rates. As nuclear growth rates increase, the importance of the 2030-2050 time
indow decreases.
Multi-pass blended core IMF is a very effective downward Pu control knob.  It can, for example, stabilize 
the Pu inventory even at 1.8% growth. And, for equivalent SNF throughputs, it can be implemented
faster than MOX (if the technology is available) because of the low TRU throughputs; that is, for the 
same TRU separation capacity, IMF provides more ability to control inventories.  IMF options can be 
tuned from conversion ratios near zero to at least 0.6.  The capital investment of reactors would appear to 
exceed that of separation and fabrication facilities. If the IMF infrastructure is built and later not needed, 
thermal reactors can still be operated profitably.  Blended core IMF appears a more effective and flexible 
control knob than MOX. 
Establish fast reactors with flexible conversion ratio as a control knob.  This “control knob” takes longer 
to become available because fast reactors must be tens of percent of the fleet before effects can be seen.
The conversion ratio should be variable from ~0.25 to at least 1.3. Unlike the IMF control knob, this one 
can substantially reduce uranium ore needs if the conversion ratio is over one.  IMF and MOX used in 
conjunction with CFR reduces the number of CFRs needed, and delays when they are needed. 
Systems offering separation among TRU, e.g., UREX+4, offer more flexibility as the ratio among NpPu, 
Am, and Cm in fuels can be controlled. UREX+1 and pyroprocessing lead to group separation of 
NpPuAmCm, removing one potential control knob, but possibly having proliferation risk management
benefits.
e should expand exploration of heterogeneous assemblies/cores and targets, which appear to have 
advantages and agility.  The need for blended cores in fast reactors is well known (core + blanket).
w
W
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Analyses suggest advantages for blended assemblies and targets in thermal reactors.  In particular, the 
blended core multi-pass IMF approach in this study offers significant advantages as well as agility
relative to full core MOX.  Even better might be separating IMF-NpPu versus Am targets, so that little of
e fuel would require remote fabrication.  Preliminary analysis [Goldmann2005] indicates similar
nother Objective – Robustness and Agility
the
position of recycled
aterial changes significantly cycle-by-cycle for MOX, but not for IMF.  Separation and fabrication
en the throw-away fuel cycle [1] may be 
referred. If nuclear growth is very high and/or the cost of uranium ore increases substantially, the
s
osts
additional
eologic repositories is a high priority.
th
transmutation performance, but segregating the Am into targets minimizes the amount of fuel requiring
remote handling. 
A
No single fixed strategy guarantees optimal performance at all times in all possible futures. Instead,
objective in the next few decades should be to cost-effectively develop the technologies to handle 
potential future circumstances.  Thus, two criteria among options should be robustness and agility.
Robustness measures how much preferences stay constant if postulated assumptions and future
circumstances change.  Agility measures the ease of adapting an option if new circumstances warrant.
As an example, we find that the multi-pass blended-core IMF approach would be more robust than the 
multi-pass full-core MOX approach in several ways. One is that the chemical com
m
plants with fixed capabilities would thus be able to handle a wider range of IMF situations than MOX. 
Figure 4 shows some of the key preferences described above.  If the growth of nuclear power is low so 
that neither repository space nor uranium ore are constraints, th
p
breeder fast reactor [2d] tends to be preferred.  If nuclear growth is intermediate, so that the constraints 
and costs of additional geologic repositories are serious issues, but the cost of uranium is less so, then 
recycle in consumer-mode reactors [2a, 2b, or 2c] should be preferred.  The 2005 Report to Congres
from the AFCI program [DOE2005a] indicates that this is the expected condition, i.e., that uranium c
are not expected to a serious problem for the foreseeable future but avoiding the cost of
g
Figure 4. Hypothetical preferred fuel cycle strategies under different conditions
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If fast reactors have similar costs as therma e fast reactor fleet can be built relatively
quickly (compared to repository space con CFRs tends to be preferred over recycle
mu
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l reactors and a sizabl
cerns) then recycle in
in thermal reactors because recycling in the fast reactors is more sustainable than in thermal reactors.
Figure 4 also shows that demonstration of burner fast reactors is an important step to show the viability of 
ch of the option space, especially since we already know we can operate fast reactors in a breeder 
nfiguration.
The most adaptable or flexible option would appear to be strategy 2b - sustainable recycle in a mix of 
thermal and fast reactors.  It sits in the middle of option space in figure 4.  If fast reactors prove too 
expensive, they could be deferred in favor of recycling in thermal reactors.  If fast reactors prove very
ractive, thermal reactors could be phased out.  Such adaptability would come at a price – having to 
monstrate both CFRs and either IMF or MOX in thermal reactors.  For a given amount of desired 
tonium or TRU consumption, calculations show that IMF is more effective than MOX and has lower 
ss throughput. Thus, unless IMF is infeasible or has abnormally high costs, it is preferred versus 
OX. (Since the MOX throughput is 2-3 times higher than IMF throughout, the “per mass” unit costs of 
IMF could be 2-3 times higher than MOX and could be a “wash” economically.)
rategy 2b, however, appears to have relatively high R&D costs because all technologies required for 
ategy 2c are also needed for strategy 2b, plus additional ones.  Thus, a possibly better strategy is 2c – 
stainable recycle in consumer fast reactors - which retains most of the flexibility of strategy 2b, but with 
er R&D costs.  This is indeed what GNEP proposes to do. 
Figure 5 illustrates how strategy 2c, sustainable recycle in consumer fast reactors, is adaptable.  If the cost 
of geologic repositories (either economic or political costs) are low, deployment of consumer fast reactors 
n be slowed relative to plan.  If the cost of uranium ore increases substantially, the deployed fast
ors can be shifted from consumer to breeder mode.  If the cost of fast reactors is too high, then 
ling in thermal reactors should be considered to reduce the need for fast reactors. 
Figure 5. Adaptability of GNEP-like strategy (consumer fast reactors) if conditions change 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND FRAMING
I)
nagement/economics/safety - 
using a combination of “static” c DYMOND.[Moisseytsev2001,
Yacout2005a] (In late FY2006, ION model.)  Thus, instead of 
the
that fuels
n equire remote handling.  In many cases, we examine 
ally to determine the robustness of the observations, e.g., IMF 
u, and Am (mass/yr in separation and fuel fabrication plants) 
ll analyses are for the U.S. reactor fleet.  The results
ch as the FY2006 Comparison Report to 
ongress.[DOE2006]
vel audience.  A wide range of options are studied to 
s and potential improvements.
he specific options presented here are the most optimum or 
rity and readiness to deploy were outside the scope of this report. 
ad ing to make,
-lived technetium and iodine.  Any attempt to make
mptions explicit and indeed to show how a preference could change 
her
nd
e frame, (b) 
eactors are needed to address the timing of AFCI waste mgt benefits (not just enough to 
1.1. Purpose 
This report clarifies many technical issues being analyzed by the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFC
program, including Inert Matrix Fuel (IMF) versus Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel, single-pass versus multi-
pass recycling, thermal versus fast reactors, the need to recycle Np-Pu-Am to meet established AFCI 
objectives, the borderline case of Cm, the potential need for transmutation of technetium and iodine, and 
the value of separating cesium and strontium.  This report represents the first attempt to calculate a full 
range of metrics, spanning all four AFCI program objectives [DOE2005a, DOE2005, DOE2006] - waste 
management, proliferation resistance, energy recovery, and systematic ma
alculations and a system dynamic model,
DYMOND is being replaced with the VIS
only static results, such as reactor-1 can achieve 10% higher uranium ore utilization than reactor-2,
analyses compare various scenarios through the end of the 21st century in a dynamic fashion. These
dynamic analyses are supplemented with static analyses where relevant, such as the observation
co taining americium (thermal or fast reactor) will r
the same issue both dynamically and static
scenarios have lower throughputs of Np, P
than either MOX or fast reactor scenarios. A
presented here were used in various FY2006 reports, su
C
The report’s analyses were produced by INL, ANL, and SNL personnel under their Simulation,
Evaluation, and Trade Study (SETS) work packages during FY2005 with followup work in FY2006.
This is a technical report, not intended for a policy-le
provide the technical basis for identifying the most attractive option
Indeed, we do not believe that any of t
economically feasible.  Technical matu
r e-offs can not be resolved without a “decision context,” i.e., what decision are we tryT
when, under what conditions. 
or example, consider the issue of disposition of longF
a simple decision (transmute versus don’t transmute) invariably is based on various assumptions (often 
implicit) as to what decisions would have been made prior to that decision and on how various
uncertainties will be resolved. Different assumptions can lead to different conclusions; in this report we 
ttempt to make the various assua
depending on assumptions, uncertainties, etc.  Where possible, we then identify what is the most robust
position at present.  In the case of Tc and I, it would be to separate them, without commitment to whet
they would be made into specialized waste forms (relatively likely) or transmutation targets (relatively
unlikely) or taken to a different geologic disposal site.  However, a decision to open the 1st repository (a
therefore finalize its licensing basis) will have occurred before we need to make a final Tc-I decision. 
For another example, consider the urgency of fast reactor deployment, which depends on (at minimum),
) whether uranium resources are believed to be a constraint on a reactor-operation tim(a
whether fast r
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keep stuff out of repository but also must burn it up), (c) whether fast reactors success in the market place
even in the absence of U resource and TRU-transmutation needs. 
Throughout the report we use Light Water Reactors (LWR) as the reference thermal reactor (TR) and the 
s net breeder – breeding ratio and 
eactor (BFR).  More analyses have 
aiwo2005] suggests
ncepts, are
ecycling in thermal reactors, and recycling in 
r eport.
 separation plant (for UOX). 
Build 1st recycle-fuel fabrication plant. 
) of major choices available for each decision. In particular, we consider 
how robust decisions appear to be with regard to six key factors, which are introduced in section 1.5. 
x Growth of nuclear ener
x Cost and acceptance of additional repositories? 
x ation?
Cha
und
Cha . Of particular note 
rad
d in this report.  Of particular note is that the approach to 
l
plu reased each recycle.  The approach to multi-pass IMF involves a blended core 
/4 of pins are UOX, 1/4 are IMF); the TRU in each generation of IMF pins comes from the residual
creased
ich
Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR) as the reference fast reactor (FR).  We do differentiate between a fast reactor
used as a net consumer of TRU – breeding ratio and conversion ratio less than one (typically 0.25) – 
called the Consumer Fast Reactor (CFR) and a fast reactor used a
conversion ratio about 1.07 at equilibrium – called the Breeder Fast R
been done with the LWR and SFR than other systems.  Furthermore, available data [T
that the differences among thermal reactor concepts, and the differences among fast reactor co
minor compared to the differences among once-through, r
the mal reactors, which are the primary options considered in this r
1.2. What is in this report? 
We recommend Chapters 1 and 2 and 9 to everyone. Chapter 1 explains our approach and sets the 
context.  Chapter 2 contains results from the standpoint of five key decisions that we identify:
x Open 1st geologic repository
x Determine credibility of recycling
x Build 1st
x
x Build future separation and fuel fabrication plants. 
For each decision, there are comparisons (qualitative, quantitative from DYMOND analyses, and 
quantitative from static analyses
gy?
x Which reactors succeed in the market place?
x How much uranium is available?
x What proliferation policies exist? 
How much penalty is “hot” fuel separation and fabric
pter 9 contains the highest-level conclusions from the analyses. The other chapters contain the details
erpinning chapters 2 and 9. 
pter 3 describes AFCI objectives and the metrics used in this report to judge each
are the waste management metrics – long-term heat (LTH), long-term dose (LTD), and long-term
iotoxicity (LTR). 
Chapter 4 explains the AFCI options analyze
mu ti-pass MOX involves using burned uranium (BU) for each recycle; to keep the fuel working, the 
tonium content is inc
(3
TRU of the previous generation, both UOX and IMF. To keep the fuel working, the burnup is de
slightly each cycle.  Transmutation colleagues have taken multi-pass MOX and IMF to 5 cycles, wh
would be adequate through the end of this century.
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Chapter 5 contains “static” analyses such as the support ratio of MOX-NpPuAm to UOX (ratio of 13.5) 
and metrics associated with each of the four AFCI objectives. The support ratios and the flux of r
in the system (throughput)
ecycling
are quite important.
e
sele ong once-through, thermal recycling options, and fast reactor recycling options.  In this
x east 2040 
Start thermal recycling with Inert Matrix Fuel (IMF), specifically IMF-NpPuAm
xide Fuel (MOX), specifically MOX-NpPu 
X-NpPuAm
x
The one
bran ecycling in 2025, then phases out recycling in 2040 – providing an answer 
ou start?”  The dates 2025 and 2040 are 
s the target date for beginning
recy
al
lti-
stances:
x r own
uild
x Uncertainties are large; the “right” thing to do is viewed as depending on resolving the uncertainties.
See Section 1.6 for six key uncertain decision factors addressed in our analyses.
x Solutions are viewed as irreversible and inflexible, i.e., might regret the decision later.  Decision
makers at all levels tend to avoid decisions with the potential for “high regret.” This is also posed as 
“what if you are wrong.” 
x The status quo is viewed as acceptable. 
x There is much inertia to the status quo, e.g., large infrastructure and industry capacity associated with 
business-as-usual.
To illustrate – One line of argument [MIT2003, Wald2004] is that we do not know exactly what
repository we need, how a repository would perform over millennia, nor if recycling makes sense,
therefore the U.S. should neither open a repository nor commit to recycling.  We should only study the 
problem; it is not stated when there would be enough “study” to justify action. 
Chapter 6 contains scoping analyses for a broad range of development trees. Development trees denot
ction am
analysis, we assess six development trees, each starting in 2025. 
Continue Once-Through– delaying recycling until at l
x
x Start thermal reactor recycling with Mixed O
x Start thermal reactor recycling with MO
x Start Consumer fast reactors (CFR) 
Start Breeder fast reactors (BFR)
re are decision points causing branching of each tree in 2040, 2060, and 2080.  For example,
ch starts IMF-NpPuAm r
to the question, “what if you want to stop recycling once y
consistent with the 2005 Report to Congress [DOE2005a], which set 2025 a
thermal recycling and 2040 as the target date for deployment of first fast reactors (hence fast reactor 
cling).
Chapters 7 and 8 are DYMOND calculations.  In Chapter 7, the comparisons are structured by 
“development tree.”  For example Development Tree 2 has IMF-NpPuAm starting in 2025, with sever
branches in 2040.  In Chapter 8, the comparisons are by issue, e.g., single-pass vs. multi-pass, and mu
pass IMF vs. multi-pass MOX.
1.3. Making and framing decisions 
Changing the status quo is especially difficult in the following circum
x Multiple objectives are to be met.
A wide range of options exist, each with their own advantages and disadvantages and with thei
advocates and opponents.
x Consequences of decisions are high, e.g., high cost and long time scales.  Fuel cycle facilities 
probably have price tags of 10’s of billions of dollars, at least 0.5 decades between decision-to-b
and facility-in-operation, and facility lifetimes of 3 to 6 decades. 
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However, the U.S. fuel cycle status quo is not sustainable because there is no identified and implemented
path for nuclear waste from current and future nuclear power plants.  The U.S. status quo has the
following characteristics.
x Unimplemented policy to open a first geologic repository.
x Policy to grow nuclear power (e.g. new energy bill), but unproven market implementation of this 
policy.
x No path identified beyond first geologic repository so that there is no identified way to handle nuclear
growth, neither additional repositories nor recycling.
Changing the status quo requires the following:
x Clarify objectives as much as possible. 
x Identifying solutions that are relatively robust in spite of uncertainties.  A common example in the
AFCI program is the robust conclusion that at least one geologic repository is required in all 
scenarios.  An implicit component of this conclusion is that we know enough about the characteristics
of the first repository to warrant proceeding whether once-through or recycling will be used
throughout this century.
x Addressing the “what if you are wrong” question. 
x Addressing ag
Addressing urgency is addressed by 
aking a decision, the classic 
es such as questions as “how do you stop recycling” or “how can you exit  recycling once you
ha e started
. Take de
wrong” in hand before selecting an alternative. 
ility, i.e., how one can adapt to changing circumstances.
, i.e. what happens if decision is delayed.  In this report, urgencyx
consideration of delay in recycling from 2025 to 2040.
igure 1-1 illustrates some of these concepts.  Faced with opposition to mF
thing to do is to push hard (“brute force”) to overcome resistance.  Indeed, sometimes this works, but 
sometimes it does not as the opposition can push just as hard in response.  Instead, we can attempt to 
change the picture by (a) lowering the barrier by reducing the consequences of being wrong and (b) split a 
single decision into a network of staged decisions.[Piet2003]  The “what if you’re wrong” concept 
m tivato
v ?”. The answer should be
cisions one step at a time, while foreseeing future paths. 1
2. Take decisions when the wisdom of the action is relatively robust, i.e., will be seen to be appropriate
under most foreseen futures.  That is keep doors “open” until there is a good reason and good
justification for closing them.
3. Always have a baseline that can be pushed forward if the need for a then-current decision arises.
4. Consider adaptability as one of the criteria for selecting among alternatives, i.e., have potential
answers to “what if you are
Page 4 
ping a decision
de starting with a “blank slate” in 
Figure and kee
A related complication is a
which all options would b ar, consistent basis. 
k slate,” ison
hin the c ns. F
not, select Light Water Reactors (LWRs erprise
1-1. Overcoming resistance to making
that any future fuel cycle decisions are not m
e compared on a cle
If we had a “blan
technologies wit
then we would have a systematic compar
ontext of a comparison of all energy optio
) if the nuclear energy ent
of all possible nuclear energy
or example, we might, or might
were starting from scratch
today.
Page 5 
Figure 1-2. Hypothetical decision tree if we had a “blank slate” on energy choices 
We do not have a blank slate. For example recent French rep pech2
suggests the decisions (and their order) under considerati nce. late” on alre
decid ar an REX ri e or s
not “ s considere amely should ecy ma
while waiting for fast reactors.
, our interpretation of a 
in all scena
ort [Del
is built
s is posed a
004]
ady
“when”,
on in Fra
os. The issu
Their “s
of fast reacting to
if.” The issue of Am i
continue nucle d PU
d in this context, n Am be r cled in ther l reactors
Figure 1-3. Interpretation of nuclear fuel cycle decisions in France 
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T etween the U.S. and France to 
i t
T l
he U.S. situation is different. Indeed, Table 1-1 summarizes differences b
llus rate that the context and status for decisions have significant differences. 
ab e 1-1. Comparison of Fuel Cycle Constraints and Status between U.S. and France 
U.S. France
Policy and market
commitment to nuclear 
power
Energy Policy Act establishes the policy;
we will now see how the market responds. 
produced in France is generated
by nuclear power, France is a n
exporter of electrical power, 
strong government/private
industry collaboration
Currently starting to rebound; the 2005 High, 80% of electricity
et
Policy and licensing
commitment to 1st
repository The U.S. tends to use long-term heat and France tends to use radiotoxicity
ial
It
Policy – yes
Licensing – in progress 
Neither
dose from a prototypical repository to judge
geologic repository benefits (Long term
heat addresses the physical design 
limitations of the repository and dose 
addresses the potential transport of isotopes 
assuming a specific engineered system and
geologic location.)
to judge geologic repository
benefits.  (Radiotoxicity
addresses the maximum potent
risk of the isotopes with no 
mitigation from engineered waste
forms, containers, or geology.
is therefore independent of 
location and configuration.)
1st recycle plant No- historically because of proliferation
concerns in 1977, low price of uranium 
PUREX plant in operation. 
Modified process may be useful 
with fast reactor oxide fuel. 
Ability to dispose
separated uranium in 
near-surface burial 
Yes (if U separated at high purity to qualify
under 10CFR61)
Ability to dispose
separated Cs and Sr in 
near-surface burial 
Yes after 1-3 centuries cooling (if Cs-Sr 
separated at high purity to qualify under 
10CFR61)
regulations for near-surface 
burial appear more stringent in 
this respect. 
Probably not, because French
Proliferation policy No separate Pu is allowed PUREX plant separates pure Pu 
The difference in repository status is instructive. The U.S. is proceeding with the YMP, hence the U.S. 
AFCI program considers repository-specific long-term dose and long-term heat metrics, as opposed to 
only radiotoxicity.  A radiotoxicity approach puts relatively more emphasis on the TRU, especially Pu.  A 
dose approach puts relatively more emphasis on easily transportable elements such as uranium, Tc, I 
versus relatively slow transporting elements such as plutonium.  The heat issue puts emphasis on
plutonium and americium.
On the other hand, the French have a separation and recycle-fuel fabrication plant in operation, with all 
the experience (and inertia) associated with them.  Consistent with this, they tend to emphasize fast 
reactor fuels, e.g., oxide in SFR, that could be handled by that plant or a modest modification thereof. 
But, perhaps the key observation for the U.S. is that the continuation (let alone growth) of nuclear power 
is not assured nor mandated.  Thus, some AFCI program critics argue against implementing recycling in 
part because of the lack of certainty that recycling will be needed ever because of the potential that 
nuclear power will be phased out or grow very slowly.  Indeed, Figure 1-4 illustrates our understanding of 
key decisions facing the U.S., starting with opening the first geologic repository at Yucca Mountain 
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Project (YMP) observing/predicting nuclear growth, and then deciding either a multi-repository path or a 
recycling path.
Figure 1-4. High-Level U.S. Nuclear Fuel Decision Tree 
The decisions in Figure 1-4 form the columns (nuclear growth) and the rows (multi-repository vs.
recycling without fast reactor vs. recycling with fast reactors) in the energy future table.[Dixon2004, 
Piet2004]
The version in Table 1-2 emphasizes the interplay among nuclear growth, repository capacity, fuel cycle
approach, and required number of repositories.  The “limited thermal recycle” rows correspond to a few 
recycles in thermal reactors.  It is difficult to get beyond a repository capacity improvement factor of ~1.5 
with multi-pass MOX but perhaps a repository capacity improvement factor of ~3 could be possible with 
multi-pass IMF using blended UOX/IMF assemblies, the basis for these number is presented in Chapter 5
The “repeated” recycl ed, the improvement
ctor is then controlled by the loss rates each recycle.  Shaded (yellow) cells require more than one 
,000
pletion”
meaning that (a) the repository capacity must be increased to at least 120,000 tonne (plus allowance for 
defense wastes), (b) a second repository must be built, or (c) recycle of at least some SNF must be done.
By 2100, without recycling of some type, there could be 22 repositories worth of SNF generated from the 
decay heat perspective at a growth rate of 3.2%/yr or 50 at a growth rate of 4.5%/year.[DOE2006]
.
e rows require fast reactors so that TRU never has to be discard
fa
repository; green cells require only one repository.  By definition, if the repository capacity is 70
tonne (63,000 of which is for commercial SNF), in only the “Legislative Limit” future is one repository
adequate in the absence of recycling.  The nation is already implementing “Existing License Com
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Table 1-2. Illustration of how a Factor (Nuclear Growth in this case) influences Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Decisions
Nuclear Futures 
Legislative
Limit
Existing
License
Completion
Extended
License
Completion
Continuing
Level
Energy
Generation
Continuing
Market
Share
Generation
Growing
Market
Share
Generation
Corresponding Growth
Rate Nuclear phase out 0%/year 1.8%/year 3.2%/year
Cumulative discharged
fuel in 2100 (tonne-iHM) 63,000 100,000 120,000 250,000 600,000 1,500,000
F elu
Management
Repository
Approach
Capacity
(tonne) Needed to Accommodate Fuel Discharged by 2100
Number of Geologic Repositories
70,000 1.0 1.6 1.9 3.7 8.7 21.6
No recycle
119,000 0.6 0.9 1.1 (a) 2.2 5.2 12.7
70,000 0.7 1.0 1.2 (b) 2.3 5.2 12.8
Single-pass
thermal
recycle
(capacity
multiplication
1.7x)
119,000 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.3 (c) 3.1 7.5
70,000 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6
Thermal/fast
symbiotic
recycle
(capacity
multiplication
of 50x)
119,000 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4
Repository capacity dominated by temperature limits, hence decay heat density.
a. Borderline case, can be reduced to 1 repository with further repository capacity increase from 119,000 to 
127,000 tonne or a 10% increase in fuel burnup.
b. Borderline case, can be reduced to 1 repository with 20% increase in fuel burnup.
c. Borderline case, can be reduced to 1 repository with further repository capacity increase from 1
154,000 tonne or a 30% increase in fuel burnup.
19,000 to 
s noted above, neither multi-repository nor recyA cling have been determined to be credible in the U.S.
 heat in a repository.
to
ening the
Recycling might be a net increase in cost, but not a prohibitively expensive increase.  In the “recycle”
decision branch, two main options denote whether one believes that fast reactors are relatively near-term,
in which case it may be best to introduce the recycle materials directly into fast reactors or recycle only
NpPu in thermal reactors (storing hard-to-handle elements like Am and Cm), or relatively long-term, in 
which case it maybe best to recycle NpPuAm (possibly Cm) in thermal reactors thereby reducing the 
nventory of Am241, which is so important to long-termi
However, Figure 1-4 is too simple because it ignores feedback loops and other factors (beyond AFCI 
control) that would influence the decisions denoted in Figure 1-4.  For example, there are good reasons
uppose that the more sustainable nuclear power appears, the more nuclear growth.  Thus, ops
first repository and establishing the credibility of either multi-recycle or multi-repository would seem to 
increase the potential for higher growth in nuclear energy.  As an example, consider California state law, 
which prohibits construction of new nuclear power plants until a geologic repository opens.  Thus, it is 
not as simple as waiting until we see if there is nuclear growth, and then plan to make nuclear power 
sustainable.  Instead, there is a feedback between steps increasing confidence in nuclear sustainability and
evidence that nuclear will indeed grow. 
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Therefore, we expand Figure 1-4 to include additional decisions, to explicitly mention six key decision 
infactors (such as nuclear growth), and to show relationships among them.  The six factors are described
Section 1.5; the five decisions are described and analyzed in Chapter 2. 
Figure 1-5. Suggested framework of decisions and key factors 
ote that Figure 1-5 differentiates between “can recycle” (D2) and “should recycle” (D3).  It is N
increasingly likely that we can get agreement on D2. A favorable D3 depends on D2 and several other 
factors, most notably nuclear growth (F1) and the cost and acceptance of other repositories (F2). 
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In 2004, the AFCI progr ms of phases. decisions in Fig
:
x D2=noÎ contin d start finding location for additional repositories.
D4=noÎ separation for waste management only
highÎ r fast reactors rec
ctors
x D5=yes, F4=low Î high urgency for fast tain eacto
s explained in Chapter 2, we define and order the de and hence 
; in
be fo sit 2 is
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onsensus of the need to determine the credibility of recy
likely in ch n influ
ost ions (
tions and key assumptions 
major limitation of this study is that thermal reactors (TR) are always represented by Light 
 Fast Reactors (SFR).
lants usin
logy. Processing of fast reactor fuel is always a t power plants
techno , we n this
 for other thermal or fast reactor options, based on ANL transmutation
any
jor limit is no a . Inste
sed. Fo gh w
we do examine metric a hr lat
fuels that require remote e includ m), g thos
or current hands-on fabric m-only)
cular,
s
work, the scenario evaluations will be 
,
am spoke in ter The outcome of the ure 1-4 map
into those phases
ue once-through an
x
x D5=noÎ limited recycle (only single-pass) 
x D5=yes, F4=
or no fast rea
 low urgency fo Î continuous or “transitional”
ed recycle with fast r
ycle using little 
rsreactorsÎ sus
cisions in decreasing order of robustness A
decreasing order of readiness to make each decision. Essentially all pro-nuclear supporters support D1
cause D1 makes se ss of how much s and whether stpart be nse regardle growth one envision the 1 repository
is considered to
because in the ab
llowed by more repo
of establishment o
ories or by recycling. The support for D
e credibility of multiple repositories, th
cling.
increasing,
a growing
c
A key feature of Figure 1-5 is the attempt to show feedback loops. For example, establishing the 
ility of multi-repositories (F2) and/or recycling (D2), hence showing a path for wastecredib from future
nuclear plants,
the other factors and m
fl uuences how m
of the decis
1.4. Limita
uclear growth occurs (F1). F1, in turn,
directly or indirectly).
ences many of 
The first 
Water Reactors (LWR) and fast reactors (FR) are always represented by Sodium
Processing of thermal reactor fuel is always assumed to be done at centralized p g UREX+
usingtechno ssumed to be done a
do not believe that the conclusions ipyroprocessing logy.  To first order report would
differ substantially
analyses.[Taiwo2005]  However, we emphasize that we have not looked at ultra-high burnup in 
thermal reactors (LWR or VHTR) in this report. 
The second ma
indicators are u
ation is that there ttempt
e do not attempt to provide relative or absolute cost values, 
nd fuel fabrication t
ing Am or C
.
to include economics per se
oughputs, and the re
lovebox operation (
ad
ive amount of 
e including Pu),
, economic
r example, althou
s such as separation
handling (thos
ation (uraniu
The third major limitation is that we assume that all options studied are technically feasible, in parti
that multi-pass Inert Matrix Fuel (IMF) is feasible.  Similarly, all options are assumed available at the 
time indicated in various deployment scenarios, i.e., the necessary R&D&D has been done. 
The fourth major limitation is that detailed fuel cycle data is only available for a finite subset of specific
recycle approaches.  Great care has been taken to assure that the fuel cycle performance for each case ha
been analyzed in a consistent manner. However, not all promising options have been considered.  For 
example, detailed analyses of IMF recycle in a blended core have been included in this study; whereas,
e current MOX recycle cases are for full-core loading. In future th
utilized to define additional cases for detailed analyses; and new fuel cycle data on specific options (e.g.
BWR recycle, extended cooling options) will be incorporated into the dynamic model, as available. 
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The fifth is that isotopic decay is not accounted for at any of the long-term storage facilities.  Isotopic
hange is accounted for in the reactor but as the fuel moves from the reactor to repository or reprocessing
do not
with
ranium oxide (UOX) fuel.  The addition of Pu requires glovebox fabrication.  The further addition of Np 
ther
actors.  This requires more analysis.
ly
d near the center of the 
ssembly would not cause power plant operators to require remote handling of the assembly; it is certain 
that concentrating Am toward the assembly center would have lower doses than distributing Am
throughout the assembly (whether the assembly is for use in thermal or fast reactors).  Heterogeneous 
assemblies (indeed blended cores) may therefore offer a way to obtain waste management and 
proliferation advantages of recycling Am with limited economic penalties.
As with other AFCI analyses, we assume that the first geologic repository has the characteristics of the 
Yucca Mountain Project (YMP), specifically the anticipated long-term heat and long-term dose 
limitations.  Thus, we incorporate long-term heat (LTH) analyses by R. A. Wigeland [Wigeland2004a,
Wigeland2004b, Wigeland2006] by calculating the heat released by each isotope emplaced in the 
repository in units of watts-years/gram of the isotope at time of emplacement, where the heat-interval is 
calculated from when repository ventilation stops to about 1500 years.  We incorporate long-term dose 
(LTD) by scaling DOE-RW results provided by W. Halsey.[Halsey2005]  Our calculated units are 
mrem/year at a particular future time from all isotopes that arise from a gram of each isotope at time of 
emplacement in the repository.  A gram of Am241 at emplacement, for example, provides dose several 
thousand years later because of its decay eventually into Np237, itself having radioactive daughters.
These LTD metrics therefore incorporate the various assumptions in the DOE-RW YMP analyses,
especially its oxidizing conditions and the fact that Np solubility is limited.
We do not explicitly consider the potential of repositories with other heat or geochemical characteristics.
The opposite heat case from YMP would be a “wet” repository, in which heat management would be a far 
easier problem and thus LTH metrics less important.  (A wet repository would have, of course, other 
problems.)  The opposite dose case from YMP would be reducing geochemistry.  Although we do not
analyze LTD metrics under reducing conditions, we do estimate long-term radiotoxicity (LTR) which is 
geochemistry-neutral.  LTR incorporates decay and dose potential (once ingested) characteristics of the 
various isotopes; it does not incorporate transport from repository to potential receptors via the 
unsaturated (vadose zone) or saturated (aquifer) surrounding a repository as does the LTD metric. 
Because of U.S. policy, we did not examine any cases where Pu and Np are separated from each other. 
1.5. Key factors 
Table 1-3 lists what we believe to be the six most important technical factors that will influence the five 
fuel cycle decisions; these were shown graphically in Figure 1-5. 
c
there is no isotopic change due to decay accounted for in the current model.  In late FY2006, we are 
shifting to the VISION system dynamic model, which does account for isotope decay.  So far, we
observe changes that would change the conclusions in this report. 
Only fuels containing only uranium can be fabricated hands-on, as is current industrial practice
u
does not appear to change this.  Based on scoping analyses (Chapter 5), generally the addition of ei
Am or Cm requires remote fabrication of fuel pellets and pins, whether the fuel is to be used in thermal or 
fast re
We emphasize that this does not necessarily mean that fuel assembly fabrication and fuel assemb
handling at power plants must also be remote. The shielding by and within the assembly can be 
significant.  For example, it may be that fuel assemblies with Am targets locate
a
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Table 1-3a. Characteristics of Factor 1. Growth of Nuclear Energy
Case Lower bound Intermediate cases Upper bound
Characterist ew
clear p
% gro th rowic No n
(nu
reactors
hase out)
0 wth 1.8% grow 3.2% g th
Table 1-3b. Characteristics of Factor 2. Cost a tance of Additional Repositoriesnd Accep
Case Most restrictive Intermediate cases Best case
Characteristic Additional
repositories
A
rep
acceptable, but
Only a 2nd repository
is allowed for 
hical b
Low
acceptance
precluded
dditional
ositories
costly
geograp alance
cost & high
Table 1-3c. Characteristi r 3. Which mal R d ketcs of Facto Ther eactors Succee in the Mar Place?
Case Status quo Intermediate cases Larg hangeest c
Characterist ly LWR succeeds LWR tes electricity market; V
dominates H2 market
HTic On domina HTR V R displaces
LWR
Table 1-3d. Characteristics of Factor 4. How much Uranium is Available? This has to be
both globally and domestically, i.e., how much of the world’s uranium can be available to the
assessed
US?
Case Most restrictive Intermediate cases Best case
Characteristic C
pe
mill
[H
Steyn2003]
Con res istic
milli U [ eyn
Unco
urc of
nn
onventional
resources –
ssimistic - 3.1
ion tonnes U,
erring2004,
ventional
on tonnes
ources – optim
Herring2004, St
- 16
2003] reso
to
[He
nventional
es (billions
es of U) – 
rring2004]
Table 1-3e. Characteristics of Factor 5. What Proliferatio s Exist?n Policie
Case Status quo Interm sediate case Largest change
Characteristic ep Ad nal intrin u us
/
Ke ing Np with Pu 
is adequate
ditio sic protection req ired M
rem
t meet 100
hr criterion
Table 1-3f. Characteristics of Factor 6. How m alty is “Hot” Fuel S d
Fabrication
uch Pen eparation an
Case Most restrictive Intermediate cases Best case
Characteristic P
glov
u
(r
precluded)
Penalty from
glovebox operation
ok, shielded
operation
unacceptable
Penalty from
shielded operation
acceptable, but cost 
an issue
Nil c
from a
and n
enalty from
ebox operation
nacceptable
ecycling thus
ost penalty
high gamm
eutron dose
It is possible to have a null-solution situation. For example, consider a combination of “additional 
repositories prohibited politically” (F2) with “recycle fuels must meet 100 rem/hr spent-fuel standard” 
(F5).  None of the options currently receiving substantial attention in the AFCI program would be 
satisfactory; rather spiking of the recycle fuel with fission products would be required.  Some
combinations are technically incompatible under any circumstances, e.g., “recycle fuels must meet 100 
rem/hr spent fuel standard” (F5) and “penalty from glovebox operation unacceptable” (F6).  Thus, it 
behooves the government to try to increase option space by taking whatever actions are possible that push 
each factor in a way that increases options. 
The primary way we developed these six factors was to analyze why various experts inside and outside 
the AFCI program had different opinions as to the “right thing” to do.  Most have “the answer”, but those 
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answers differ in large part because of differing opinions regarding one or more of these six decision 
factors.
od
be reduced by AFCI actions (e.g. F6); some by
OE programs outside AFCI (e.g. DOE-NP2010 addresses F1, DOE-RW could address F2, and DOE-
of the technical case for each decision at the present 
me.
d ert able es th ent uce
ncertainties to ract 1-4 the six decision factors with regard to what 
FCI, DOE in general, or other i ontrib de .
For example, some believe that there will be little or no nuclear growth; others believe that there is a go
chance for very high nuclear growth; this is factor F1.  At present, each of these factors remains
significantly uncertain.  Some of those uncertainties can
D
GenIV is addressing F3), but substantial components of all factors are outside DOE’s control. 
It is impractical to say – let’s wait until we have perfect information before making any fuel cycle
decisions.  Instead, Chapter 2 assesses the robustness
ti
In any case, re uction of unc
the extent p
ainties is desir
ical. So, Table
nfluences c
. It behoov
examines
ute to each
e governm
cision factor
to try to red
u
A
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Table 1-4. Characteristics of Key Decision Factors 
F1.
Growth of 
nuclear
energy?
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in the 
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2. ANALYSIS OF FIVE KEY FUEL CYCLE DECISIONS 
Thi
Tha
how
e have defined and ordered the decisions in a way that we believe represents decreasing readiness to 
s chapter both sets the context for the analyses in Chapters 5 through 8, but also uses their results.
t is, the definition and order of decisions itself depends on what we know, what we don’t know, and 
uncertainties influence various potential decisions. 
W
make each decision, and therefore a logical chronological order.  In particular, Table 2-1 shows which 
decision factors would have primary/secondary impact on each postulated decision, as well as which
decisions would themselves inform decision factors. 
able 2-1. Influences between Decision Factors and Decisions T
Factors
Decisions
F1. Growth 
of nuclear 
energy?
F2. Cost and 
acceptance of 
additional
repositories?
F3. Which 
reactors
succeed in 
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place?
F4. How 
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F5. What F6. How
much
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“hot” fuel 
proliferation
policies
exist?
separation
and
fabrication?
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r
d
By
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decisi
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By
cision
D2.
Determine
credibility
of recy
Informed
By
decision
Informed
By
decision
cling
D3. Build 1st
separation
plant for 
U
I
bo
(the ore
attractive
re
the m re
growth; and 
vice versa) OX
mpacts
th ways
m
cycling,
o
D4. Build 1st
recycle-fuel
fabrication
p
Pri
im
couples
w
Impacts both 
ways (the more
attractive
repositories
less need fo
recycling, and 
vice versa
Impacts
both ways
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at cannot
cycle (if
recycle is 
d and
tor
n’t
y
reactor
ul
p
rimary
pact,
couples
it
Primar pact, coul
determine which elements
are separated and hence 
fuel composition
lant
mary
pact,
ith F4.
, the
r
th
re
) goo
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a
ca
rec cle, that
P
im
wo
sup
d lose
ort)
w h F1
y im d
D5. Build 
future
separation
and fuel
fabrication
plants
Primary
im
 Primary
pa
Primary
p
Primary
m
Primary
ipact im ct im act i pact mpact
The rest of this Chapter examines these five postulated decisions to determine uncertainties, which 
options appear the most robust, key unknowns, etc. 
2.1. Open 1st geologic repository
All scenarios (even nuclear phase out) require at least one geologic repository.  Therefore, the U.S. needs 
a geologic repository with these minimum characteristics.
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x Minimum of 70,000 tonne of spent UOX.  This is the current legal limit.  In the absence of recycling,
it would be inadequate.  With multi-pass recycling, the current 10% allocation for DOE/DOE waste
could be increased while a mm nuc gro centu
x Minim m t ra .
This is ut the deci mplemented.  Once it is i d, i
strengthen the foundation for AFCI waste ent s n tab
op repositor .
Table 2-2. D Geologic Re
lso acco
onitored re
odating
rievable ope
lear energy
tion per U.S
wth this
law.
ry.
um of 50 years
settled US policy, b sion has not been i mplemente t will
managem  assessments.  Table 2-2 i a decisio le for
ening the first geologic y
ecision Table for “Open 1st pository”
Decision table Repository now, i.e., at 
YMP site 
Repository later,
site may not be YMP 
No repository
P lution to 
waste problem if
thru
Yes Yes, but delayed NOermanent so
once-
P lution to 
waste proble if
Yes, we see nothing in 
YMP design
precludes recycle option 
Yes, but delayed NOermanent so
m recycle that
A m
p
Y
Only if the pr
be fixed 
NOppropriate if
roblem found with 
ajor
MP
oblem can Yes
Avoid need for o
f eet AF I
objectives, e.g., reduce 
a nt
Yes liz
storage
would be required
ther
acilities to m
t-reactor inve
C
ories
NO, centra ed
retrievable
NO
Assess robustness against F1.  Growth of Nuclear Power 
Appropriate for Nuclear Yes, but capacity would Yes, but delayed NO
phase out have to increase
Appropriate for 0%
growth
NO
Appropriate for 1.8%
growth
NO
Yes, but additional
repositories required if 
most SNF is not
Yes, but the repositories 
would have to be large 
Appropriate for 3.2%
growth
recycled see Table 1-2 
to avoid recycling, see 
Table 1-2 
NO
non that the YMP site 
in the
YM
use
her
Implementing recycling could have four potential major impacts if we wish to avoid a second repository
this century:
x If unrecycled used fu filling must stop in 
.
cle-
Table 2-2 illustrates that “no repository” is never preferred.  “Repository later” is only preferred if a major
-fixable problem is found with the YMP site.  The table supports the proposition
should go forward as expeditiously as possible. 
From the AFCI perspective, the most important statement in the table is perhaps “We see nothing
P design that precludes recycle option.”  Were this not true, then the possibility of recycling could be 
d to as an argument to delay proceeding with YMP.  Hence, this statement requires more discussion 
e.
el fills up the repository then either it must be retrieved or
time to reserve space from the HLW that would result from recycling.  This is discussed below
x The draft tunnel design (radius, spacing) may not provide optimum heat-management for recy
HLW.  This should be analyzed, but the mountain would be flexible for many years after licensing 
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and start of operations (assumed no earlier than 2012).  There is no reason to believe that this is 
infeasible.
x The waste package and titanium drip shields may be over-designed if recycle-HLW waste forms are 
adequately superior to unrecycled UOX as a waste form.  Since presumably the waste package, Ti 
drip shields (and drift tunnels) would be “build as you go,” they could be redesigned if/when recycle-
HLW waste forms became known.  There is no reason to believe that this is infeasible. 
x Long-term dose and radiotoxicity, see section 5.3. 
Table 2-3 explores the retrievability issue.  How much of the SNF must be recycled to “fit” the waste into 
the repository?  How much of the repository must be used to store processed versus unprocessed fuel?
able 2-4 then looks at when filling of the repository must stop if waste is not to be retrieved.  The 
ogic repository must hold processed waste, how much fuel must be 
rocessed?
T
repository section of Appendix B contains the assumed YMP fill rate, starting in 2012.
Table 2-3. How much of a geol
p
Nuclear Futures 
Legislative
Limit
Existing
License
Extended
License
Completion Completion
Continuing
Level
Energy
Generation
Continuing
Market
Share
Generation
Growing
Market Share
Generation
Nuclear growth rate Nuclear phase out 0%/year 1.8%/year 3.2%/year
Cumulative discharged
fuel in 2100 (tonne iHM) 63,000 100,000 120,000 250,000 600,000 1,500,000
Fuel
Management What % of repository must hold processed waste?YMP
Approach Capacity What % of fuel generated by 2100 must be processed?
70,000
No recycling
119,000 Capacitysufficient
70,000 84% of YMP90% by 2100 
Single-pass
thermal
re ycle (heatc
capacity
improvement
of 1.7 
119,000 Processingnot needed 16% by 2100 
10% of YMP
70,000 1% of YMP38% by 2100 
2% of YMP
48% by 2100 
6% of YMP
76% by 2100 
17% of YMP
91% by 2100 
47% of YMP
98% by 2100 
Thermal/fast
symbiotic
recycle (heat
capacity
factor
improvement
of 50x)
119,000
Capacity
sufficient
Processing
not needed 
<1% of YMP
7% by 2100 
3% of YMP
56% by 2100 
9% of YMP
83% by 2100 
25% of 
94% by 2
YMP
100
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Table 2-4. When stop filling YMP if non-retrievable, i.e., if we don’t want to have to retrieve waste. 
Nuclear Futures 
Legislative
Limit
Existing
License
Completion
Extended
License
Completion
Continuing
Level
Energy
Generation
Continuing
Market
Share
Generation
Growing
Market Share
Generation
Nuclear growth rate Nuclear phase out 0%/year 1.8%/year 3.2%/year
Cumulative discharged
fuel in 2100 (tonne iHM) 63,000 100,000 120,000 250,000 600,000 1,500,000
Fuel
Management
Approach
YMP
Capacity
When would filling of the repository have to stop if re l is to be avoided,
assuming start in 2012?
trieva
70,000
No recycling
119,000 Capacitysufficient
70,000 Stop in 2019 
Single-pass
thermal
recycle (heat
capacity
improvement
of 1.7x) 
Processing
not needed 119,000 Stop in 2048 
70,000 Stop in 2035 Stop in 2034 Stop in 2035 Stop in 2032 Stop in 2027 
Thermal/fast
symbiotic
recycle (heat
capacity
factor
improvement
of 50x)
119,000
Capacity
sufficient
Processing
not needed 
Stop in 2052, 
i.e., just 
before
repository
filled
Stop in 2051 Stop in 2049 Stop in 2044 
By definition, if discharged SNF is limited to 63,000 tonne, then a repository capacity of 70,000 (or
st be 
e 2-4) is also true if the repository capacity is 
19,000 and the accumulated fuel is 100,000. 
These tables lead to several conclusions: 
x The higher the heat capacity improvement factor, the less of YMP that needs to be reserved for HLW 
from recycling, therefore we can either fill longer or retrieve less. 
x With an improvement factor of 1.7x (illustrative for single-pass recycling), additional repositories are 
likely to be required for any scenario involving continuation of nuclear power. 
x With an improvement factor of 50, at least half of YMP could be filled with unprocessed waste – 
either commercial spent fuel or DOE/DOD waste.
x With high improvement factors, more of YMP could be allocated to DOE/DOD waste.  That 
allocation is currently 10%, which is thought to be inadequate for the magnitude of cleanup wastes.  If 
that allocation could be raised to 20 or 30%, the cleanup wastes could be dispositioned; this would
also shift more of the cost of YMP from commercial utilities to DOE – a cost savings from recycling.
x The sooner we know the recycle target we will aim for, the clearer the way to use the YMP resource. 
2.2. Determine credibility of recycling
US needs to establish the credibility of one or both ways to handle several times the waste legally 
allowable in the first repository, as was made clear in Table 1-2.  There are two options: multi-
repositories and multi-pass recycling.
119,000) is adequate.  In this case, 100% of YMP can hold unprocessed waste and 0% of the fuel mu
recycled.  This situation (shaded green in Table 2-3 and Tabl
1
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Establishing the credibility of multi-repositories requires legal permission to look for additional sites, the 
olitical willingness e rational for
positories wo ensive ndustr re is a le
subsequent pro re less expensive.  However, in non-nuclear waste m
landfills, this has not proven true.  The lead author has worked with landfill experts on a previous project 
rep gative learnin ti
. The positive finding is t able
ing up! – literally vertical) and to reduce the flux of waste to the landfill by encouraging
recycling. These trends – difficult t es, reduce waste flux by recycling, and expanding
the repository we have – are likely t ries, but of course this is unproven.
ility of multi-pass recycli sis fo sidual HLW (i.e. not
eavy metal”) and one or mo ns a f technology readiness.
So, which options make sense?
The short answer is that multi-pass sue tions (that cannot
transition to multi-pass) should no pters le-pass option is IMF-
NpPu implemented with minimum d tween reactor discharge and the single-pass recycle:
H improvement of 2.0x, vers
x LTD improvement of 2.1x, vers 0x
x LTR improvement of 2.5x, vers
x Uranium utilization improveme nea  goal of 15% improvement.
i-pass opti to meet
x LTH improvement of ~100x, versus goals of 10-50x – pro
separately
provement of ~100x, versus goals of 10-50x – pro at Tc and I are managed separately,
in special w special repositories, or transmuted
x LTR impro 100x, versus goal of 100x – limited by TRU loss rates 
um u e al o
x A combina FR tory  for pr
resistance purposes. 
For current purposes, we assume that establishing the credibili ld require a dedicated
laboratory where separation and fabrication of multi-pass mate ed and
demonstrated.  Table 2-5 provides the decision tree for determ of recycling.  The first 
rec , pr ow
specifically, MOX with Pu, using th a  analyzed multi-pass 
MOX-Pu, but t men e poor based on past and current (Chapter 5) 
analyses becau d be D, and LTR are all dominated by Np and Am, 
it is impossible multi-pass MOX-Pu.  Therefore, even if MOX-Pu were 
started “now”, ill be required on advanced recycling methods that would later be 
implemented to  objectives. 
p to look for additional sites, and som believing that additional
re uld be less exp
ducts and facilities a
than the first. In most i ies, indeed, the arning curve –
anagement, e.g., 
and they all
expensive
(by build
ort a ne g curve with regard to si
hat they are generally
o site new repositori
rue for HLW reposito
ng new landfills – tougher and more
to put more waste into existing landfills 
The credib
“initial h
ng requires a legal ba
re technological optio
options should be pur
t. As shown in Cha
elay be
r YMP capacity of re
t advanced stages o
d, single-pass op
5 and 8, the best sing
x LT us goals of 10-50x.
us goals of 10-5
us goal of 100x 
nt of 1.15, meeting the r-term
Mult ons do exist the objectives
vided that Cs and Sr are managed 
vided thx LTD im
aste forms, in
vement of at least
x Urani tilization improvem
tion of IMF and C
nt of ~100x, versus go
can manage the inven
f 50x.
 and quality of Pu
ty of recycling wou
rials would be develop
ining the credibility
oliferation
option is to ycle immediately
he waste manage
se only Pu woul
to meet AFCI objec
work would st
meet AFCI
esumably with the narr
e PUREX process. We h
t results would b
burned. Since LTH, LT
tives with
range of options that exist today,
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Table 2-5. Decision Table for “D2. Determine Credibility of Recycling”
Decision table Recycle now, i.e., 
commit to relatively
narrow range of 
technical options (i.e. 
merge D2 and D3) 
AFCL, decide on No AFCL, no recycle
recycling later (i.e., 
keep D2 and D3
separate)
option
Assess robustness against F1.  Growth of Nuclear Power 
Avo
y
Yesid second repository Yes, but cost of AFCL Yes
under nuclear phase out would have been
wasted, recycling
wouldn’t have been
necessar
Avo s
und n
id econd repository
er o growth
Avoid s
under lo
econd repository
w growth rates 
Yes, ideal NO
Avoid s
under hi
econd repository
gh growth rates 
No, unless MOX-Pu is 
later changed to better 
recycle options 
Yes, but SNF inventory
continues to grow in the 
meantime
NO
Assess robustness against F2. Cost and acceptance of additional repositories
We hav um
kno d
improve
in case 
m
NO Yes, ideal NOe maxim
wle ge on how to
recycle options
multi-
repositories are
co petitive
he hypothetical dedicated facility, what sepIn t aration targets would be warranted?  Table 2-6 shows
current program objectives and suggestions from this work. 
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Table 2-6. Suggested Separation Targets 
Rec each recovery fraction ( ycle) P ach rroduct purity (e ecycle)
Current goal
[Vandergrift2004]
Differences identified Current goal 
[Vandergrift2004]
Diff
in this study
erences
identified in this
study
Uranium – >90% 90% recovery
potential
disposal
adequate to reduce 
LTD by 10x, would
U, requiring decontam
Pu of > 10
is barely
have to b
reduce L
Meet 10CFR61, e.g., <100 nCi-TRU/gram-
ination factor from
e 98% to 
TD by 50x.
5
Uranium – 
potential
recycle
Not specified Not adequate for IMF 
options.  Even 99%
recovery would only
make the U and Pu 
comparab .17 and 
0.22 tonnes/yr per 
GWe)
“If uranium is
destined for recycle
in reactor fuel, its 
purity requirements 
er and would 
be governed by
ASTM C 877-98.”
Not analyzed
from UOX-51 are great
le (0
NpPu >99% Possibly not adequate
for MOX/CFR
symbiosis, goal of 
99.5% in
appears a
“The purity of this product stream is 
required to meet mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel 
specifications as described in ASTM C833-
.”DOE2005a
dequate.
01
Am >9
pr
9.5% to
ovide 100x
decrease in LTH 
Cm
pro
>99.5% to
vide 100x
decrease in LTH 
Appears “Based on fast reactor recycle of all TRU, 
the lanthanide content of the Am/Cm
product must be <20 mg/g uranium plus 
TRU.”
adequate
Tc and I >95% to provide Recommend 98%
20x decrease in
LTD
allow LTD reduction 
of 50x, comparable to 
 to 
red
“If transmutation of 
Tc is the chosen 
odu
less t
fissile
of Tc
Not analyzed in
this report, but we 
sLTH uction.
option, the Tc
pr ct must contain 
han 16 μg of
actinides per g 
.” 4 μg for I. 
do not see the 
ba is for this
Cs and Sr “97% recovery 
required for Cs
Sr to make
eir recovery
equal to that of all 
other fission 
Recommend 99% to 
accommo
recycling while 
maintaining high LTH 
benefits
Meet 10CFR61, e.g., <100 nCi-TRU/gram
of Cs
and
th
products.”
date repeated -Sr product
2.3. Build 1st separation plant for UOX 
a) AFCL results and (b) nuclear growth, the US will need a 1st separation plant with these 
haracteristics.
Subject to (
c
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x If early nuclear phase out, would not commit to this facility because it would not be needed to st
with
ay
in 1 repository. If evidence that multiple repositories are acceptable/cost effective, might not 
his facility e
x Purpose/role – process spent UOX.  This is robust EVEN if LWRs appear to be displaced by VHTR
e rations plant would be useful for the large LWR spent fuel stockpile; and it 
-end process to allow introduction of alternate spent fuel forms. 
ant to be able to recycle a small amount of MOX and/or IMF, e.g. SFTF 
% MOX in the input stream
o conomics of scale, not 3 or 60-yr facility 
ount of UOX exp onservative estimates
st plant could be as large as 5000 e risk of over-building relative to 
the amount of UOX expected.
ue ll scenarios except BF OX. Even at no-gro
d used UOX will be 96,000 tonnes. If no-growth continu
of a 30-year first separation plant), 160,000 tonnes will have accum with
30-yr lifetime would have to process 5300 tonnes/yr to eliminate this am
ve to process 3700 tonnes/yr to eliminate the 220,000 
s accumulated by 2085.  These numbers increase with growth.  If used, BFR would 
time for BFR introduction
ro growth. (If there is no  growth, it is diffic
calculations in Chapter 7 all use 3,000 tonnes/yr for the 1st p y
t of 3,000 tonnes/year in 2040. Only at 2040 does the rate of s
 rate of used fuel at the nominal growth rate of 1.8%/year.
ation – do not preclude future consumption of U, do not preclude 10CFR61-disposal. 
active scenarios that would require 
ation appro h. See Table 2-7. 
nd LTR program objectives; may be required for 
eration.
am objectives. Therefore, whether to include 
ith Cm requires a tradeoff on (a) cost of Am vs. Cm separation vs. (b) cost of including Cm
handling)
u with Am targets have similar transmutation
Goldmann2005]  IMF-NpPuAm may have proliferation advantages, IMF-NpPu 
withAm targets would appear to have economic advantages (less remote handling).  More work is 
therefore required to select. 
x Recover Tc and I as separate products, which could be transmuted, put into special waste forms, or 
sent to a separate specialized repository later. At the present time, all three options should be
retained.  Analyses in Chapter 5 indicate that Tc and I removal may not be required to meet the 10x 
LTD reduction objective, but would be required to make LTD reduction match LTH reduction so that 
there would be no net increase in dose from the repository as a result of recycling.  See Table 2-8. 
x Recover Cs and Sr as a new class of Greater than Class C (GTCC) waste, could be stored at-grade or 
below-grade or in YMP. Waste form needs to accommodate any of these options.  See Table 2-9. 
commit to t ither.
or fast reactors. Th
may be possibly to develop a head
One would also w
requir
sepa
ement was to be able to handle 2
x Capacity considerati
could process relative to the am
suggest that the 1
.
committing to more than
ected. However, even c
tonnes/yr with littl
ns: e 0-yr
o Over ¾ of the f
of accumulate
end
l in a R is U wth, by 2025 the amount
es to 2055 (hypothetical
ulated.  The 1st plant
ount.  If the 1st plant 
ultimately has 60-yr lifetime, it would ha
tonne
probably not decrease the UOX accumulation rate because of the finite
against a backd
BFR.)
o DYMOND
a 2
p of nuclear ult to imagine introducing
lant in 2025, followed b
eparation exceed thend plan
accumulation
x Aqueous processing
x U separ
x NpPu/Am/Cm should not be precluded at this time, as there are attr
this separ ac
o Am recycle is required to meet LTD, LTH, a
prolif
o Cm recycle is not required to meet any of the progr
Am w
in the recycled fuel (more complex chemistry, hotter
lations sho that IMF-NpPuAm and IMF-NpPo Calcu
performance.[
w
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Table 2-7. Decision Table for Transuranics for “Build 1st Separation Plant for UOX” 
Decision table NpPu/Am/Cm NpPu/AmCm NpPuAm/Cm NpPuAmCm
Provides additional
way to adjust k-eff
of fuel
o
Yes, can vary Pu to
Am rati
Yes, can vary Pu to
Am ratio
NO NO
Assess robustness against F1.  Nuclear Growth? 
Not relevant
Assess robustness ag F2. Cost and accepainst tance of additional repositories?
Separation option
would support
sending Am to a 
hypothetical
repository tailored to
heat-generating
isotopes
Yes ical
repository could also
e Cm
NO NO Only if hypothet
handl
Assess robustness against F3. Which TR success in the market place? 
Supports po
that non-LWR fuel
ssibility Yes Yes NO NO
can include NpPu 
causebut not Am (be
of difficulties of
incorporating high-
vapor-pressure Am)
Supports possibility
that non-LWR fuel
igh-
Yes  would
not be able to be
ion
NO
could incorporate
NpPuAm, but not
burned without
additional, later 
Cm (because of
difficulties of 
eparat
incorporating h
heat Cm
Yes, but Am
s
Yes, ideal
Assess robustness ag F4. How much uraainst nium?
Not relevant
Assess robustness against F5. What proliferation policies?
Supports
roliferation
Yes, but Cm would Yes, ideal because no 
need to include Cm
led fuel
and because Am
transmutation of Am also be in the
with Pu (possible recycled fuel in the recyc
p
advantage) would always be
with the Pu
Supports
have been cheaper also highest 
intrinsic
transmutation of Cm
with Pu (possible
proliferation
advantage)
Cm would have been
unnecessary
benefit)
OK, but possibly a
NpPuAmCm might
Yes Yes, but the Am vs. 
Yes, but Cm
would also be in
the recycled fuel 
(highest cost but
proliferation
wasteful separation;
NpPuAm/Cm or
Assess robustness against F6. “Hot” fuel sep/fabrication penalty?
Supports Yes, ideal Yes, but Cm would NO NO 
transmutation of Am
in separate targets 
(possible economic
advantage)
be in the target
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Table 2-8. Decision Table for Long-Lived Fission Products for “Build 1st Separation Plant for 
UOX”
Decision table Put Tc and I in HLW Put Tc and I in separate 
storage
Make Tc and I into 
targets
Supports possibility that
transmutation of Tc and I
NO Yes Yes
needed to reduce YMP 
peak dose 
Supports possibility that
transmutation of Tc and I
not needed
Yes OK, but the effort to
separate Tc and I and put
into their own
waste/storage forms
would have been wasted
NO
Supports possibility that
Tc or I have some non-
waste value 
NO Yes OK, but the effort to have
made the Tc/I into targets
would be wasted and
would have to be undone
Assess robustness against F1.  Nuclear Growth? 
Not relevant 
Assess robustness against F2. Cost and acceptance of additional repositories?
Supports possibility of a 
separate repository for
Tc and/or I to take
dvantage of their
NO Yes OK, but the effort to have
made the Tc/I into targets
would be wast
would havea
geochemistry (if
additional specialized
if the targ
suitable as
repositories
acceptable)
ed and
to be undone
et form was not
a waste form
were
Assess robustness against F3. Which TR success in the market place? 
Not relevant 
Assess robustness against F4. How much uranium?
N levot re ant
A s ro ss a . What proliferation policies?sses bustne gainst F5
Not relevant 
Assess robustness against F6.”Hot” sep/fabrication penalty? 
Not relevant
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Table 2-9. Decision T ion Plant for
UOX”
able for Short-Lived Fission Products for “Build 1st Separat
Decision Table Put Cs and Sr into 
HLW
Put Cs and Sr into 
non-10CFR61
waste form
Put Cs and Sr into 
10CFR61-type
waste form
Put Cs and Sr
into stable 
storage, pick 
waste form
later
Sup ts
that C a
have o
por possibility
s nd Sr could
NO Yes, but probably wasted the effort to make
the waste form
Yes
ec nomic value
Sup ts
to p
ecial area of YMP
Yespor possibility NO Yes Yes
ut Cs and Sr into
sp
Supports possibility
to put Cs and Sr into
at-grade storage that
converts to
0CFR61 facility 
NO NO Yes Yes
1
Assess robustness against F1. Nuclear Growth? 
Not relevant
Assess robustness against ptan ositoriF2. Cost and acce ce of additional rep es?
Supports possibility
of a repository
N
tailored for Cs and
Sr
M
waste f
M
w
O ight be w
orm
rong ight be wrong
aste form
YES
Assess robustness again . Which TR succe e?st F3 ss in the market plac
Not relevant 
Assess robustness against F4. How much uranium?
Not relevant 
Assess robustness against F5. What proliferation policies?
Supports possibility
of having to spike
NO Y the waste form would
h
Yes
recycle fuel with Cs 
and Sr 
es, but effort to make
ave been wasted
Assess robustness again cast F6.”Hot” sep/fabri tion penalty?
Not relevant because the e is to separate Cs-Sr from the recycled TRU. baselin
f rated CNote that at the time o
10CFR61.
separation, sepa s and Sr would
ste (HLW) is constru
s. If so, the onl
nd Sr would be pla
nnia-long perform
w, they become Grea
r now, said that the
not qu rface d sal per
efin el Wa to Cs and ould
be HLW, regard stic y legal would be a geologic 
repository.  To preserve s, the Cs a ced rift tunnels designed 
for that purpose, but wit le ance.
If Cs and Sr are not construed to be HLW by la ter than Class C (GTCC) waste.  The 
Nuclear Regulatory Com , fo only disposal option is geologic
tunity to make the 
and Sr
o th ed by th
ality for near-su ispo
If the current legal d
indeed
ition of High Lev
less of its characteri
LTH benefit
hout the need for mil
mission (NRC) has
ed to apply
disposal option
in separate d
Sr, it w
repository, but that other options could be considered.  This provides the oppor
grade sargument that at-
cooled sufficiently t
torage of Cs and Sr is an option; after 100-300 years, the Cs
en quality under 10CFR61 (if the regulations haven’t chang
will have
en).
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There is one additional uncertainty regarding the status of Cs and Sr, namely long-lived Cs-135 (3e6 yr).
n 10 1 so no definitive ment is possible. sh
First, the 10CFR61 methodology was applied to Cs-135 [Fetter1990] even pure Cs-
135 would not be a problem.
NR
mit on Cs-137, 460 PCi/cc.  In the final 10CFR61 [NRC1982], there was a
7 to account for the waste being in activated waste form, raising the Cs-137 limit to 4600 
e study for the Spent Fuel Treatment Facility (SFTF) concluded that therefore the equivalent 
s 84 PCi/cc. With the waste forms they were
ma he concentration f FTF Cs waste to be 156 PCi/cc, which is lower than 
of 800 by a margin of 5.  Although they were studying Cs from used UOX, the Cs 
fuels d for other fuels. 
FT he Cs-137 concentration in be 5.26e6 PCi/cc, or a 
years of decay of Cs-137. 
consi the 1 , t er  be other 
y recoverable.  There are at least 95 isotopes currently in use in various 
industries.[Waltar2004a -10 lists six of those isotopes that are relevant to AFCI. 
Rele ren 04a)
It is not addressed i
this.
CFR6 state Two prior studies
with the result that
ed light on
Second, the original
contrast to the li
credit for Cs-13
PCi/cc. Th
C technical report [NRC1981] did calculate a limit for Cs-135, 84 PCi/cc, in 
factor of 10
NRC limit for Cs-135 would be 800 PCi/cc, 10 time
considering, they esti
the hypothetical limit
flux from all of the
ted t rom S
is similar, so the result should hol
F study estimated tNote that the same S waste to
factor of 1140 above the 10CFR61 limit.  This requires 300
There is one other
isotopes economicall
deration in planning
] Table 2
st separation plant he possibility that th e may
Table 2-10. AFCI- vant Isotopes Cur tly in Use (of 95 listed by Waltar20
Isotope
Half
life Applications per Waltar
Potential t anto be a signific
product?
Am-
241
433
years
measurements, and coal ash measurements; used with targets 
(e.g. copper or silver) to generate pure fluorescent x-ray
sources.
other Am isotopes, precluding
many/most of current
applications
Smo tors; combines w
for material inspections (aircr
and others), oil well borehole analysis, soil density Would be contaminated with
ke detec ith beryllium to produce neutrons
aft, [airport luggage screening]
Cf-252
2.65
years
Brain cancer therapy.  Spontaneous fission neutrons for
conducting materials radiography in aircraft and other crucial
structures; soil density measurements.
Is there sufficient yield to 
matter?  Would be 
contaminated with Cf251
(900 years).
Cs-137
30.1
years
Blood irradiation to make organ transplants successful.
Determine ash content of coal entering a power plant (with 
Am-241); determine soil density; radiation monitoring
calibrations.  Determine soil erosion or sedimentation patterns
in reservoirs or estuaries.
Would be contaminated with
Cs-135, would probably not
preclude current applications.
Kr-85
10.8
years Thickness gauges; airport runway lights; methane gas tracer
Issue is cost effectiveness of
capture of this noble gas,
versus other noble gas
isotopes.
Sr-90
28.8
years
With aluminum, produces x-rays to trace water or methane
around petroleum fuels; thickness gauges; small power
sources. Other Sr isotopes decay away
Y-90
2.67
days
Cancer therapy and as labeled monoclonal antibodies for
treating Hodgkins disease, non-Hodgkins lymphoma, breast,
liver, and colon cancer; as microspheres for treating primary
liver cancer, treating benign diseases (rheumatoid arthritis);
treating restenosis of clogged arteries in heart disease.
Start with Sr90 and separate
its daughter Y90
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2.4. Build 1st recycle fuel fabrication plant 
We noted above that none opt meetin ectives, e
t hypothetical 1st recy tion pl t to those options that could move
tives.
x IMF in a form that is recyclable, enabl eventually
transitioning to fast reactors.
x MOX in a form that is recyclable, enab ycles in thermal reactors, possibly
eventually transitioning to fast reactor. 
s
l, i.e., s
of this options.  Here, we summarize the comparison a
a .  First, Table 2-11 pr bl Second, Table 2-12
might make us wish late had not been selected.
suggest a decision tree. 
sion T ss Fu r “Buil 1st Recycle Fuel Fabrication 
of the single-pass ions come close to g AFCI obj we therefor
limit the discussion on
toward the objec
he cle-fuel fabrica
ing one or more recycles in TR, possibly
ling one or more rec
an
x CFR fuel, i.e.,
x BFR fue
kip recycling in thermal reactors, go directly to CFR. 
kip recycling in thermal reactors, go directly to BFR. 
report compares thoseMuch of the rest
conclusions in three w
analysis”, what things
nd our 
is a “regret 
Third, we 
ys ovides a decision ta
r that a given option
e.
Table 2-11. Deci
Plant”
able for Multi-Pa el Options fo d
Decision table Recyclable IMF Recyclable MOX CFR fuel BFR fuel 
Minimize technical risk - d Depends on the type
of fast reactor and its
fuel
Depends on the
type of fast 
reactor and its 
fuel
Loses because multi
pass IMF is very
exploratory
Favore
Disposal of U becomes
more of an issue (e.g.
YMP U doses)
Slightly favored, but
only if we use
burned U in the
MOX instead of
Slightly favored, 70-
80% of the uranium
is still discarded.
YES – favored
because all 
uranium is 
usable
NO
fresh U. Even then,
~90% of the burned
uranium is still
discarded.
Relatively high cost of
separating and
fabricating recycled
material
throughput of options
studied
discouraged
rial
Yes, lowest NO, option NO, option
discouraged
Yes, high
throughput but
relatively
“clean” mate
Assess robustness against F1.  Nuclear Growth? 
Appropriate for nuclear 
se out and relative
w growth
Appropriate for
nuclear phase out,
relatively low growth
o IMF 
pha
lo
Similar t NO
Appropriate for high
growth
Adaptable to high
growth by throttling
back on IMF
percentage. Full-core
substantial, sustained
nuclear growth
because little short-
Can adjust
conversion ratio
accordingly.
YES
IMF to BFR allows
about half the rate of
BFR introduction as 
Appropriate for
relatively high
assurance of 
term benefit (LT 
heat, LT dose,
proliferation metrics)
– consistent with
UOX to BFR. French assumptions
Assess robustness against F2. Cost and acceptance of additional repositories?
If re
re
positories are 
adily accepted and
ost effective
incentive for IMF, MOX, or CFR recycling would substantially
decrease.
YES, still 
important
because of 
uranium usage
c
Were cost and acceptance of many repositories not an issue, the 
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Assess robustness against F3. Which TR success in the market place? 
Supports possibility
that LWR continues to
beat all competition
Yes Yes CFR component of
fleet would be 19%
if matched with
IMF, higher if
matched with UOX
or MOX.
Not unless/until
uranium forces
BFR adoption
Supports possibility
that VHTR enters the
market either for 
hydrogen or for
electricity.
Depends on finding analogs of these fuels for VHTR. Not unless/until
uranium forces
BFR adoption
Assess robustness against F4. How much uranium?
Supports possibility
that U not a constraint
for several centuries
Yes Yes Yes NO
Supports possibility
that U is a near-term
constraint
Relatively poor, IMF
is too successful in
burning Pu
Yes Yes, natural lead
into BFR 
Yes
Assess robustness against F5. What proliferation policies?
Supports possibility
that WU inventory
must be reduced soon
Yes, Pu inventory can
be “frozen” once 
multi-pass IMF
adopted.
NO Not quite as good as
multi-pass IMF.
NO
Assess robustness against F6.”Hot” sep/fabrication penalty? 
Supports possibility
that remote fabrication
uneconomic, i.e., only
Pu or NpPu recycled
Possibly, using the
blended core concept
with separate Am
targets
No repository benefits, little help with
proliferation metrics, hence the only reason
to adopt these options would be the modest
savings in uranium ore required (17% for
multi-pass MOX, 30-50% for CFR)
No repository
benefits, but
would address
uranium ore 
limits
Some people prefer to look at these types of decisions from the standpoint of “regret” – why might I wish 
I had not made such a choice?  Table 2-12 provides a “regret analysis” comparing the four options.
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Table 2-12. Regret Analysis on Possible Recycle Fuel Options – What Could Go Wrong and Wha
Could We Do About it? 
t
Decision table Recyclable IMF Recyclable MOX CFR fuel BFR fuel
Regrets related to waste 
management (1) 
 MOX accrues
benefits slowly 
compared to all other
options. If this
happens, the only fix
would be to change
to another fuel type.
Regrets related to waste 
management (2) 
Uranium disposal could become more of an issue, in which case all of 
these options suffer because most of the uranium is discarded.  The
None
only fix would be to shift to BFR, the only option that uses all types of
“waste” uranium.
Regrets related to MOX does little to
reduce Pu.  The fix 
would be to shift to
IMF.
 Excess Pu
accumulated,
fix would be to
shift to CFR or
proliferation resistance
IMF.
Regrets related to
ranium energy 
IMF is intended to 
destroy Pu at the
MOX is not a 
breeder; the fix
 None
u
recovery maximum rate by
excluding uranium
and eliminating in-
would be to shift to
BFR.
core Pu production.
Therefore if taken too
far it becomes more
difficult to shift to
BFR than had MOX
been used.
Regrets related to
economics and safety 
IMF could be found to
have flaws.  Fixes
could be to stop
recycling, shift to
MOX, or shift to FR. 
MOX could be found
to have flaws. Fixes
could be to stop
recycling, shift to
IMF, or shift to FR. 
FR not proven,
could be viewed as a
mistake.  CFR 
option would require
27% CFR fraction in
fleet (17% if IMF-
CFR), meaning that 
significant fraction
of the fleet could be
at risk.
FR not proven,
could be viewed
as a mistake
(indeed
Superphenix
has not led to a 
series of FR).
BFR option
requires
most/all of the
fleet to be BFR.
Figure 2-1 illustrates the concept of a decision tree.  The example is used to assess the risk of a heart 
attack at hospitals.  Easy to use.  Simple in concept.  Built on a huge number of extensive studies.  Figure 
2-2 is our first attempt at a decision tree for selecting among recycle fuels.  Relatively simple.  Built on 
many analyses – both in and out of this report. 
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Figure 2-1. Sample decision tree for classifying incoming heat attack patients as high or low risk, easy to
apply, but built on a large number of extensive studies.[Gigerenzer1999]
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Figure 2-2. Decision tree for selecting among recycle-fuel strategies 
The concept of this type of decision tree is to make a series of binary (yes/no) decisions that led to making
a selection among options.  As noted in Chapter 1, the first issue in this sense is whether or not nuclear is 
going to continue, if not, recycling does not make sense.  If so, perhaps the most important question that 
would make the other questions moot is whether uranium resources are going to be limiting in perhaps a 
half century. If so, that dominates and BFR should be the preferred path.  If not, there are a series of 
questions that lead to CFR, n-pass IMF, n-pass MOX, or keeping once-through.
Note that with either multi-pass IMF or multi-pass MOX, it is prudent to keep a FR component.  As 
explained in later Chapters, by themselves, TR cannot meet AFCI objectives.  It appears that the 
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strategies of multi-pass IMF and multi-pass MOX can indeed be continued indefinitely (until uranium
r em). But ld be accomplished by eventually t
es.
d until the next century, but it will happen eventually.  Adding CFR to IMF 
cum ave to
ation brication plants
be faced only after building the fir abrication plants.  The AFCI 
timeline calls for the first separation plant in 2025, wi rication shortly thereafter. The decision
ld e so t not) ava in 2040.
The basic options for subse ould be as f
drop
3. Keep recycling, but change approach. 
mifications of such c n 7.  The main things that o wrong, and what
one could do about them, w n the regret analysis in Table 2-11. 
he cost of changing reactor typ
ost .g. UO M
esources become a probl , this wou hrowing away unburned
TRU that had accumulated.  When that happens, the repository benefit will not meet AFCI objectiv
This probably can be deferre
or MOX means that ac ulated TRU never h
future separ
be thrown away.
and fuel fa
st separation and fuel f
th fuel fab
2.5. Build
This decision must
on subsequent plants wou presumably be mad
quent plants w
hat FR are (or are
ollows:
ilable
1. Drop nuclear 
2. Keep nuclear, but recycling
The ra hoices are in Chapter 6 a
ere already addressed i
d could g
The major point to make
exceeds the inertia and c
re is that the inertia and
of changing fuels, e
es, e.g. TR to/from FR 
OX.X to/from IMF to/from
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3. AFCI CTIVES A TRI
e ob s the e metric
and targe ul alyzed are listed in Table 3-3.  The 
otivates and explains indivi
period through 2025, when m recomm m
Int to 5 until
n I s, p
several of the een
Table 3-1. AFCI Objectiv ongress [DOE2005a]
OBJE ND ME CS
The AFCI program objectives are now documented in a recent report to Congress.[DOE2005a]  This 
thosChapter starts with
rics
jectives (Table 3-1) a
ts are in Table 3-2; the f
dual
the AFCI progra
motivation for th
l set of metrics an
metrics. In Table 1, “sho
ends the need for a com
2
s in this study.  The most
rt-term” refers to the 
ercially-deployed spent 
important met
rest of this Chapter m
fuel treatment facility. “
availability of Generatio
the time after 
ermediate-term” refers
V fast spectrum reactor
se fast reactors have b
es from Report to C
the period from 20
rojected to be about 2040
built.
the commercial 
. “Long-term” refers to 
Objective 1. Reduce the lo l burden of nuclear energy throng-term environmenta ugh more efficient 
disposal of waste materials.
In the short-term, develop
99.5 percent of transuran
reactors.
a cle ies
ics or g itia xisting
nd demonstrate fuel cy
from waste destined f
technologies and facilit
eologic disposal and in
that remove more than 
te their recycle in e
In the short-term, improve ary heat-producing fission p
(cesium and strontium) to reduce geologic repository impacts.
management of the prim roducts in spent fuel 
In the intermediate- and long-terms, enable repeated recycling to reduce dispose actor
of more than 100, delaying the need for additional geologic repositories for a ce th
growing energy production.
d transuranics by a f
ntury or more, even wi
In the intermediate- and
radiotoxicity by a factor of
lon -l urce nd
ig yst
g-terms, reduce the long
100, simplifying the des
ived radiation dose so
n of a waste isolation s
s by a factor of 10 a
em.
Objective 2. Enhance over oli via impall nuclear fuel cycle pr feration resistance roved technologies for
spent fuel management.
In the short-term, develop f chnologies tha ins ration barriers.uel cycle te t enhance the use of intr ic prolife
In the short-term, demo
usable m
nstr in percent of transuranic weapons-
aterials from wast or dire materials through
ate the capability to elim
e streams destined f
ate more than 99.5
ct disposal by destroying these 
recycling.
In the long-term, stabilize
sustained
the inventory of weapons-usable material in storage by consuming it for 
energy production.
Objective 3.  Enhance energy security by extracting energy recoverable in spent fuel and recycled
material, ensuring that uranium resources do not become a limiting resource for nuclear power. 
In the short-term, develop t to li up to 15 percent by 
recycling the fissile material in spent nuclear fuel. 
he technologies needed extend nuclear fuel supp es by
In the long-term, extend nu more t cling uranium in spent fuel and 
depleted uranium, thereby converting current wastes i
clear fuel resources han 50-fold by recy
nto energy assets.
Objective 4.  Improve fuel cycle management, while e fuel cycle economics and continuing competitiv
excellent safety performance of the entire nuclear fue em.l cycle syst
At all times, ensu
competitiveness of
re that adv lo nt d mic
nuclear
anced fuel cycle techno
electricity.
gies cause no significa ecrease in the econo
At all times, maintain exce ance of ilitillent safety perform nuclear fuel cycle fac es and operations.
For the long-term, improve nt to rage at n nts.spent fuel manageme reduce on-site sto uclear power pla
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Table 3-2. Most important metrics in this study 
Metric Targets (see Chapter 3)
Long-term heat (LTH) improvement 10x to 200x to achieve actual repository-heat
improvements of 10-50x. As explained below, the 
metric can overpredict the actual heat-based 
pository improvements calculated by Wigeland.
LT
re
H
Long-term dose (LTD) improvement 10-50x
Long-term radiotoxicity (LTR) improvement 100x
Uranium ore use improvem .1
50
ent 1 5 short term
x long term
Pu239 equivalent tonnes/yr per GWe for fresh 
fuel
As low as possible
Pu239/Pu-total in fresh fuel As low as possible (the value for discharged UOX-
51 is 53%)
Avoid fully remote fuel fab For as much fuel as possible rication
Minimize throughput of TRU (tonnes/yr per 
GWe)
As low as possible to minimi
issues
ze safety and economic
Percent fuel that are new As low as possible to reduce ic
uncertainty
safety and econom
Percent of reactors that are new As low as possible to reduce safety and economic
uncertainty
Is option sustainable per re Yepository limits? s
Is option sustainable per ur sanium limits? Ye
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Table 3-3. Full Set of Metrics Used in this Study (Relative to Once-Through where Relevant)
AFCI Objective/Metric Purpose Weakness Suggested Future Work
Obj iect ve 1. Reduce the long-term environmental burden of nuclear energy through more efficient 
disp aos l of waste materials
Total mass in system
Total mass in reactors 
Total mass in repository
Total m
& fuel f
s.
ass in separation 
abrication
helping to understand
how each case is 
functioning
directly tied to AFCI 
objectives and 
therefore should not be 
used to select among
option
Basic parameters None of these are N/A
Heavy metal (HM) mass
in system
Common metric to
understand waste 
management
HM mass is not 
directly an AFCI
objective
N/A
TRU mass in repository
TRU mass in system remove
from w
ly
N/AShort-term objective to LTH, LTD, and LTR 
99.5% of TRU 
aste to
are more technical
valid indicators of
repository repository benefits
None Short-term objective to 
improve management
TBD
of Cs-Sr 
Long-term heat (LTH) Indicator for
interval (watt-yr) from
50 to 1500 years after
emplacement in a
geologic repository
capacity, hence the 
long-term objective to 
avoid need for 2
repository See Section 3.1.1. Improve metric to be a 
t-
nd
repository for at least a 
century
LTH predicts 
repository heat-load
capacity increases for 
cases constrained by
mid-drift temperature, 
but not for cases 
constrained by drift 
wall temperature.
better predictor of hea
load capacity of a 
repository.
Long-term dose (LTD) 
(mrem/yr) at 1e4 to 1e6
years after emplacement
in a repository.  Key 
time is typically 5e5 
ears.
Long-term objective to 
reduce long-lived dose 
sources by 10x
See Section 3.1.2.  We 
interpret this objective 
as requiring reduction
of peak doses by 10x,
not all doses at all 
times after
Update on the basis of 
new numbers from the 
Yucca Mountain 
Project (YMP) when 
available.
y
emplacement.
Lo
(LT
arious times after decay radiotoxicity sou suggest
ng-term radiotoxicity
R) (mrem/gram) at 
Long-term objective to 
reduce long-lived
rces by
See Section 3.1.3.  No 
direct regulatory value, 
but doesv
starts.  Key time is 
typically 1e3 years.
100x hazard relative to 
benchmarks such as 
uranium ore. 
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AFCI Objective/Metric Purpose Weakness Suggested Future Work
Objective 2. Enhance overall nuclear fuel cycle proliferation resistance via improved technologies for 
spent fuel management
Pu 239 in system-
Pu in system metrics for quantity of 
material
weapon-usable
isotopes the same.
replace with Pu-239
tric. (see
text)
Common simplified Ignores all other Should be discouraged,
weapons usable isotopes, weights all Pu equivalent me
Pu-239 fraction of total
Pu in system
Indicator of quality of 
weapons-usable
material, relevant to 
short-term goal of 
enhancing intrinsic
proliferation barriers 
Poor indicator of 
“quality”, but simple to 
calculate.
Unshielded dose rate 
(duplicate of objective 4 
metric)
Indicator of handling
resistance, relevant to 
short-term goal of 
enhancing intrinsic
proliferation barriers 
Scaled from past
calculation, not a new 
calculation.  See 
section 3.3. 
Better “quality” metric
needed.  Dose 
calculations for 
representative fuels and 
geometries needed.
Additional work
needed for “key
technologies” that 
facilitate export control 
(i.e. are not multi-use), 
technologies that
become inoperable 
without international
support.
Pu-239-equivalents in 
repository
TRU mass in repository
(duplicate of objective 1 
metric)
Short-term objective to 
eliminate 99.5% of 
TRU weapons-usable 
material from
repository
Pu-239-equivalents in 
system
RU mass in system
uplicate of objective 1 
Long-term objective to 
usable inventory
Pu-239 equivalent is 
the more technically
valid measure of 
“weapons-usable”
inventory, see section 
3.3.  “TRU mass” 
isotopes the same.
The metric “TRU 
mass” should be 
discouraged, replace 
with Pu-239 equivalent
metric.
stabilize weapons- weights all TRU 
T
(d
metric)
Objective 3. Enhance energy security by extracting energy recoverable in spent fuel and recycled
material, ensuring that uranium resources do not become a limiting resource for nuclear power.
Uranium ore needed Compare versus 1.15x 
(short term) and 50x
The metric is clear; the 
targets (1.15x, 50x) 
regarding the size and 
the uranium
N/A
(long-term) goals depend on beliefs
cost of
resource.
Bur
acc u
ned U (BU)
um lated/used
Dep e
ccumulated/used accumulation of BU from waste mgt 
It therefore makes
sense to account for the 
mulation and use 
of BU and DU. 
Helps understand how Complete economic
let d U (DU) being used. Also, convert BU and DU accu
a
uranium resources are accounting would 
and DU has economic
and waste management
implications.
liabilities to energy
source assets once FR
become available.
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AFCI Objective/Metric Purpose Weakness Suggested Future Work
Objective 4. Improve fuel cycle management, while continuing competitive fuel cycle economics and 
excellent safety performance of the entire nuclear fuel cycle system
UOX operating reactors 
IMF/MOX operating 
reactors
FR operating
Basic indicators of how 
each scenario functions 
N/A
Unshielded dose rate Indicator for economic
and safety penalties
from recycling TRU 
Crude approximation
of unshielded dose 
rate, which is itself a 
crude approximation of 
the underlying issue 
Dose rates for 
representative fuels and 
geometrics.
Throughput = mass of 
discharge fuel per year
by type (UOX, MOX, 
IMF, FR) 
Throughput = mass 
discharge fuel per year
by element (U, Np, Pu, 
Am, Cm), by fuel type
Indicator of economic
(e.g. required facility
capacity) and safety
(e.g. transportation)
 Examine how
separation and fuel 
plants would change as 
the relative mix of U, 
Np, Pu, Am, Cm
changes
SNF sent to/retrieved 
from repository/year
Indicator of economic
(emplacement/retrieval)
and safety
(transportation)
 N/A 
None at present Economic value of 
other materials
recovered from used 
fuel
 TBD 
Percent of fuel that is 
MOX or IMF in Fleet 
Compare versus M. 
Todosow results. 
Existing limits
calculated for 1st pass 
Need analogous limits
for n>1 passes 
Percent of reactors that 
re new types in Fleet possible to reduce 
uncertainties
Desire as low as 
a
Percent of fuel that is 
new in Fleet 
Desire as low
possible to reduce 
 as 
uncertainties
Percent of fuel that is Pu 
in Fleet 
Compare versus French 
criterio
Existing limits Need analogous limits
n of 10% calculated for LWR for IMF and for n>1 
with 1st pass MOX passes
SN wetF at reactor in
storage (< 5 yr) 
SN
torage (> 5 yr)
The 5-year threshold is 
is ok for UOX but may
not be for recycle fuels 
A mini-model that
to-dry can occur, and 
when aging pad at 
Yucca Mtn can be 
avoided.
F at reactor in dry
an approximation that determines when wet-
s
Mass of Np, Am, and Need more
Cm in wine cellar 
age (mass of Pu in 
the “wine cellar” and 
how it can be managed. stor
wine cellar is zero)
-term objective to 
analysis of
Long
reduce at-reactor 
inventories
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We also note that the AFCI has two key strategic or schedule goals: [DOE2005a]
 2025 a 
rcial-scale spent fuel treatment facility capable of separating transuranics in a 
y in response to market needs.” 
gram wishes to avoid the technical need for a second geologic repository this century.
igure 3-1 shows the number of repositories that would be required for the waste generated this century if 
ould
utilization of the first repository by 10x.  At 
growth rate of 3.2%, the highest considered in this year’s report to Congress [DOE2005a], we would 
need an improvement of 22x.  The 3.2% growth rate results in 370 GWe of installed capacity in 2050, 
s
directors published a report [Grunder200  a growth rate of 4.5%/yr at least until 
050.  Dixon and Piet estimated the growth rate by ctive of “50 percent of U.S. electricity
0x
x “Develop and make available for industry the separations technology needed to deploy by
comme
proliferation-resistant manner for their recycle and destruction through transmutation.”
x “Develop and make available the fuel cycle technology needed for commercial deployment by 
2040 of fast spectrum reactors operating either exclusively as transuranics transmuters or as 
combined fuel breeders and transmuters.  Actual decisions to deploy fast reactors will, of course,
be made by industr
he dates of 2025 and 2040 therefore help structure the development trees in Chapters 6 and 7.T
Specifically, baseline analyses use 2025 as the start date for recycling, generally in thermal reactors.
Similarly, baseline analyses use 2040 as the start date for FR and FR recycling.
3.1. Waste Management 
The three primary metrics are long-term heat (LTH), long-term dose (LTD), and long-term radiotoxicity
(LTR).  Calculations of associated coefficients in this study are described in Appendix D. 
3.1.1 Long-Term Heat (LTH)
The AFCI pro
F
the once-through strategy is kept.  Consistent with Table 1-3, at a nominal growth rate of 1.8%, we w
need 10 YMP-sized repositories, or therefore to improve the
a
imilar to the MIT high-growth scenario of 477 GWe.[Dixon2004, MIT2003]  The DOE laboratory
3] with targets that imply
noting the obje2
and 25% of U.S. transportation fuels produced by nuclear energy by 2050,” this results in 700 GWe
installed capacity by 2050.[Dixon2004] If continued to 2100, this would require an improvement of 5
to stay within one repository.  Therefore, we believe that avoidance of a second repository this century
means we need to improve the utilization of the first repository by 10x to 50x. 
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Figure 3-1. Number of YMP-sized repositories needed in the once-through strategy as a function of 
growth to 2100.
ne
Wigeland, [Wigeland2004a, Wigeland2004, Wigeland2005] a major factor determining the amount of 
waste that can om when
entilation of the repositor is closed 
ealed). Current policy and regulations constrain the closure time from a minimum of 50 years to a 
maximum of 300 years.  The end-period of the heating interval (~1500 years) is approximate; indeed, a 
single value is an approximation of a time-dependent heat transfer calculation.  For present purposes, we 
use an LTH metric defined as the energy (watts-year) released per mass of isotopes emplaced in the 
repository.  This requires us to account for the heat released during the time interval ventilation-stop to 
1500 years from the isotopes and its decay products. Appendix D contains a list of these coefficients for 
three ventilation-stop cases, 50, 100, and 300 years after emplacement.
Wigeland’s analyses show cases vary as to which temperature constraint dominates, as follows: 
x Temperature below 96 qC between drifts, so that water can drain between drifts 
x Drift wall temperature below 200 qC, at time that waste is emplaced
x Drift wall temperature below 200 qC, at time that waste is no longer ventilated, i.e., repository closure
Figure 3-2a shows the actual heat-load-limited improvement factors calculated by Wigeland. 
O of the key repository capacity factors is long-term heat (LTH).  As analyzed and explained by
be emplaced in a YMP-like repository is the heat generated from the waste fr
y stops to ~1500 years. The ventilation stops when the repositoryv
(s
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Mid-Drift Temp.
>1600 yrs
Limited by 200 ºC Drift
Wall Temp. at Closure
Assumptions
Burnup: 50 GWd/MTIHM
Separation: 25 years
Emplacement: 25 years
Closure: 100 years
Figure 3-2a. Heat-limited repository capacity improvement factors [Wigeland2006]
he LTH used acityT
im
in this study is a merely a metric that allows us to approximate repository cap
provement.  Figure 3-2b shows the actual heat-limited repository capacity improvement
[Wigeland2005, Wigeland2006] as a function of the LTH metric calculated by us.
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Figure 3-2b. Repository capacity improvement factors versus calculated LTH metric
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The future contains several types of data points, as follows:
x Black line = repository capacity improvement if dictated solely by LTH improvement.
x Yellow squares = limited by limited by 96 qC mid-drift temperatures
x Red triangles = limited by 200 qC drift wall temperature at closure 
x Blue circles = limited by 200 qC drift wall temperature at emplacement
We see that the LTH metric is an excellent predictor for cases dominated by mid-drift temperatures.  It 
overpredicts for cases dominated by drift wall temperatures.  Therefore, judging from Figure 3-2b, if our
goal is to reduce by 10-200x.
able
2,
e
heat constraints on the repository by 10-50x, we should reduce LTH
Figure 3-3 plots the LTH values (W-yr/g-isotope) calculated for this study.  Appendix D contains a t
of the values.  Note that the LTH values vary by 4 orders of magnitude.  The highest isotopes are U23
Pu238, Pu240, Pu241, Am241, Am242m, Am243, Cm242, Cm243, Cm244, Sr-90, and Cs-137.  The
LTH values for Cs90 and Sr137 decrease significantly when the integration period changes from 50-1500
to 100-1500 to 300-1500 as their ~30 year halflives allow significant decay during the ventilation period.
Shorter-lived TRU isotopes, e.g., Cm244 (18 yrs) do not show as rapid a decrease in LTH values becaus
they are merely decaying into other radioactive isotopes, which themselves generate heat in the time
period of interest.
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Figure 3-3. LTH values (watt-year/gram) for key isotopes
.1.2 Long-Term Dose (LTD)
A
d
public living near th
3
nother potential limitation on the amount and nature of waste emplaced in the repository is long-term
ose. As of this writing, there are two dose standards for the maximally exposed individual (MEI) of the 
e repository:
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x 15 mrem/year at time periods less than 10,000 years; the peak dose in this time period is typically at 
e period
. Reduce the long-term dose sources so that the peak long-term dose is reduced by 10x.
3. Reduce the long-term dose sources so that the peak long-term dose is reduced by as much as the heat 
constraints are lowered (10-50x), i.e., so that as more reactor-years’ worth of waste is emplaced, the 
net dose to the maximum exposed individual of the public does not increase relative to the throw-
away fuel cycle.
4. Reduce the long-term dose sources so that emplaced waste meets the 15 and 350 mrem/year
standards.
A literal reading of the current AFCI objectives [DOE2005a, DOE2005b, DOE2006] would lead to target 
version 1, but we reject this as outside the spirit of the AFCI objectives.  It would automatically mean that 
all long-term isotopes would have to be reduced by 10x, regardless of the totals, regardless of how peak 
doses were impacted.
Target-2 is a minimum objective to show compliance with AFCI objectives. 
Target-3 is more stringent than target-2 because the peak dose would have to be reduced by as much as 
50x depending on the heat-reduction factor. 
For once-through fuel, the current peak dose (at 500,000 years) per the most recent target-4 is 31 
mrem/year,[Halsey2005] providing a margin of a factor of 11 versus the draft standard of 350 mrem/year.
If we reduced the peak dose by 10x (target-2) and emplaced 50x more waste (achieve heat reduction of 
50x), we would obtain 155 mrem/year. Thus, hypothetical target-4 is not controlling relative to target-3. 
summary, we need to reduce the peak doses by at least 10x (target 2) and possibly as much as 50x
(target 3).  Of course, these targets need to be 
significantly.
10,000 years
x 350 mrem/year at time periods between 10,000 and 1,000,000 years; the peak dose in this tim
is typically ~500,000 years.
There are four possible AFCI targets: 
1. Reduce all long-term dose sources (i.e. all long-term isotopes) by 10x. 
2
In
reexamined if YMP-calculated hypothetical doses change 
W. Halsey has provided (from DOE-RW), current estimates of maximum repository dose, shown in 
Figure 3-4.  The peak dose is 31 mrem/yr at 500,000 years.
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Hypothetical repository doses
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Figure 3-4. Hypothetical repository dose per DOE-RW via W. Halsey,[Halsey2005] dose from isotopes 
grouped by decay chain
For our assessments, we have estimated the dose at time T from all isotopes that result from a gram of 
-5 shows the results for 10,000
each isotope emplaced into the repository, by scaling from the DOE-RW calculations.  The units are 
therefore mrem/yr at time T/g-isotope emplaced in the repository. We calculate these coefficients at 
10,000, 20,000, 50,000, 100,000, 200,000, 500,000, 800,000, and 1,000,000 years after emplacement as 
hose are the time periods in the data set provided by DOE-RW. Figure 3t
and 500,000 years.  To improve readability, Figures 3-6 and 3-7 show only key isotopes at 10,000 and 
500,000 respectively.
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Figure 3-5. LTD values for several isotopes at 10,000 years and 500,000 years after emplacement
At 10,000 years
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Figure 3-6. LTD values for key isotopes at 10,000 years after emplacement
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to human receptors.  The advantages of LTR as a metric are that it is 
s.
ants discussion here.  Used UOX-51 tends to have LTR higher than uranium ore 
for ~400,000 years, coincidentally about the time period of peak LTD.
Figure 3-8 shows a classic decay of radiotoxicity relative to uranium ore.[DOE2005a]  We note that a 
reduction of LTR by ~100x would mean that recycle waste would have lower radiotoxicity than uranium
Figure 3-7. LTD values for key isoto
In the above Figures, note that several groups of isotopes have the same value.  For example, the values 
for Np237, Pu241, and Am241 are the same because on this time scale, any amount of Am241 or Pu241 
will have decayed into Np237. And, Pu238 and U234 are the same; on the time scale of interest, Pu238 
(88 years) decays into U234 (2.4e5 years).
Also note that Tc99 and I-129 dominate at 10,000 years, but that U and TRU isotopes dominate at 
500,000 years.
Finally, note that the uranium values are high, especially for the relatively shorter-lived U233 and U234. 
We show in Chapter 5 that uranium doses can be significant.  And, recycle approaches that generate
U234/Pu238 are harmed in this metric. 
3.1.3 Long-Term Radiotoxicity (LTR) 
Long-term radiotoxicity differs from LTD because it ignores how much of isotopes emplaced in the 
epository can actually transportr
independent of repository location and design, independent of repository calculational uncertainties, and 
one can compare LTR directly to uranium ore.  The first two advantages are why international 
assessments of waste management advantages tend to use LTR rather than either LTD or LTH as metric
The last advantage warr
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ore within 1,000 years af
within engineering experience, whereas provin
ter emplacement.  This brings the time scale for repository design hypothetically
g performance at 400,000 is problematical.  This is the 
es greater than 1000 years, e.g. a reduction 
d 3x at 100,000 years would appear sufficient. 
logic underlying the AFCI program objective of a factor of 100x reduction.  So, the AFCI has a goal to 
reduce LTR by a factor of 100, at 1000 years after placement.  To meet the underlying “no worse than 
uranium ore” objective, the LTR reduction can be less for tim
of 30x at 10,000 years, 10x at 50,000 years, an
Figure 3-8. Radiotoxicity relative to natural uranium ore [DOE2005a]
 ingested (or drunk).
Appendix D 
e results calculated for this study are in Figure 3-9.  Note that the coefficients include 
 the original isotope as they accumulate.  So, for example, the coefficients for uranium
h equilibrium and then decay slowly 
7.7e4 yr) is approaching 
4e8 yr) reaches equilibrium at 
ibrium early because it major
u 4e10 yr) is longer lived.  U238 (4.5e9 yr) reaches equilibrium at about 1e6 yr because 
To assess this objective, we calculated LTR coefficients, mrem/year per gram
contains a list of these coefficients.  The calculation of LTR per isotope is conceptually
straightforward; th
all daughters from
isotopes in Figure 3-10 grow until all their respective daughters reac
alflives. U234 (2.4e5 yr) peaks at about 1e5 yr because Th230 (at their long h
equilibrium only at the time that U234 is significantly decaying. U235 (7.0
a231 (3e4 yr) has grown in.  U236 (2.3e7 yr) is at equilabout 1e5 because P
a ghter, Th232 (1.d
of U234 and Th230.
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Fi s calculated for this study, select
e uivalent to this much fuel is 1.3e4 mrem/g-fue
g ed isotopes only.  The radiotoxicity of uranium ore 
q l, or about 7.9 times higher than U238 in this figure to 
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Figure 3-10. LTR values calculated for this study, uranium isotopes only.  The radiotoxicity of uranium
ore equivalent to this much fuel is 1.3e4 mrem/g-fuel, or about 7.9 times higher than U238 in this figure 
to account for the conversion between ore and enriched uranium.
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With renormalization of our LTR results to uranium ore, it is possible to compare the current values with 
an entirely separate, independent calc d Accelerator Application
program.[AAA2001] as well as the 20 05a].  Figure 3-11 shows reasonable 
s in
nificantly below the current study or the 2001 study from the AAA program.
ulation from the earlier Advance
05 Report to Congress [DOE20
agreement, with the exception that the calculation in [DOE2005a] did not include the radiotoxicity of
uranium because it was focused on relatively short time periods.  Thus, at long times, the value
[DOE2005a] drop sig
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3.2. Proliferation Resistance 
only
e IAEA 
ses the second test to exclude Pu mixtures with more than 80% Pu238.  This works out to an 
e
is once
gain considered weapons usable. Therefore, “weapons usable” includes [Piet2004]
x Am
F gure 3-11. LTR values calculated for
For present purposes, we consider proliferation resistance in three ways - quantity of weapons-usable 
material, quality of weapons-usable material, and ease of handling. 
The IAEA defines “weapons-usable” to include any isotope with finite critical masses, excluding
those that generate so much heat that it is impossible/impractical to keep the material solid long enough to
assemble and detonate a weapon.  The first test allows U233, U235, and all TRU isotopes. Th
u
approximate threshold of 450 watts/gram.  We tested this threshold against other isotopes and found on
with sufficient heat to matter, Cm-244. A Cm mixture with more than 16% Cm-244 would appear
therefore to not be weapons-usable.  So, if Cm is separated from other TRU, it would not be weapons
usable.  However, Cm mixed with Am or other TRU falls below the threshold and would therefore be 
weapons usable.  Furthermore, when the Cm cools for several decades it decays to Pu-240 which
a
x Uranium with >12% U233 or >20% U235 
x Pu
x Np
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x Cm only if mixed with other TRU, co
ntory.”  A literal interpretation of this phrase 
t is inappropriate because
ake
ghted by its
are sphere critical mass; see Appendix D for values used in this study (Figure 3-12).  In particular, this 
oled for a long period
3.2.1 Quantity
The AFCI objectives refer to “TRU weapons-usable inve
would mean we measure quantity by simply the TRU mass.  We believe that tha
assigns the same value to all TRU isotopes, yet clearly they contribute differently to the ability to mit
a nuclear weapon.  Instead, we primarily use “Pu-239 equivalent” masses. Each isotope is wei
b
weights Am isotopes much lower than Pu-239 and Pu-238.
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tric, the ratio of Pu239/Pu-total. 
Figure 3-12. Bare Sphere Critical Mass, data from
3.2.2 Quality
The AFCI objectives do not directly refer to the quality of weapons-usable material, but the potential
importance of “quality” can be inferred by the reference to intrinsic proliferation resistance.  In this study,
we use the simplest “quality” me
3.2.3 Dose rates and the Spent Fuel Standard
There are wide differences of opinion as to the importance of dose rates for weapons-usable material in
the fuel cycle, this is part of uncertainty F6.  (There are also wide differences of opinion on the economic
implications of dose rates, this is part of uncertainty F5; see section 3.4.) 
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The narrow interpretation of the “spent fuel st  100 rem/hr contact dose rates.  Stillman 
[Stillman2004d] has shown that this is not ach irst recycle of UOX unless the material is 
r
ixtures, because most of the gamma production is low energy, which can be readily shielded.  A truly
ates resulting from the TRU alone,[Hannum1995], but 
as demonstrated by thin steel is 
needed to shield some of the ac hich is why the dose rates are relatively low (even for 
mpared to previous bare mater ons. se
of thumb” for discharged fuels with fission prod
Am241
239
44
    0.010 rem/hr
apons gra
alyses indicate that, consistent with S ls
/hr standard.  (See Chapter 5.)  So, th e
n of the “spent fu ndard” is to spike the fuel with Cs or some other penetrating 
mitter.  Feasible, perhaps, but this is undesirable for several reasons.
/hr) is a b
000] used a broader definition of “spe
of excess weap ade Pu. In th
hysical size, ch orm, etc. – ot
s a requirement.
der 100 rem as a require her reasons to recycle
dose (e.g. Am aste manag e should be considered.  Even 
ways to obtain nefits of re
handling. If t y reason to s-
ossibility should only be retained as a l in case proliferation policies 
ption.
ergy
As describe in more detail elsewhere, [Piet2004] we id ee major possibilities for uranium
sources
– 16 million tonnes-U [Herring2004, Steyn2003]
ing unconventional resources, e.g., 4,200 million tonnes-U from sea water and
2004]
andard” is simply
ieved with the f
spiked with Cs.  For metric purposes, we have generated a crude approximation of dose rates by 
examining Stillman’s results.  His calculations were for 4.3-kg of spent UOX in a prototypical caniste
geometry.  It is important to recognize that self-shielding effects will be important for transuranic (TRU) 
m
unshielded configuration can allow high dose r
these g shielded by even a thin wall container ammas are Stillman.  Only
tinide gammas, w
Am) co ial evaluati By analyzing Stillman’s results, we obtain the
“rules ucts removed.
Gamma 0.100 rem/hr
Pu-reactor grade (i.e. contains Pu238)
Pu-weapons grade (i.e. Pu
0.050 rem/hr
0.005 rem/hr
0.500 rem/hrNeutron Cm2
Pu238
Pu-we de 0.001 rem/hr
tillman’s results for UOX, none of the recycle fue
e basic conclusion is that the only way to meet th
These scaling an
meet the 100 rem
narrow interpretatio
gamma or neutron e
el sta
But, perhaps this narrow definition (100 rem it of a “red herring.”  A NAS panel led by John 
nt fuel standard” to decide on the best course of
it, they considered other make-it-hard-to-mess
Holdren [NAS2
action for disposition
parameters such as p
insist on 100 rem/hr a
ons-gr
emical f
-wi
quite similar to other methodologies.  They did n
ment. WheTherefore, we do not consi
material that increases
/hr
and w
re there are ot
ement benefits), thes
better is to search for the be cycling Am without incurring the cost of fully
remote fabrication and he onl recycle a material is to increase dose rates (e.g. C
spiking), that p ow priority alternative
(F5) force ado
3.3. En  Recovery
entify thr
re
x Pessimistic, known recoverable resources – 3.1 million tonnes-U [Herring2004, Steyn2003]
x Realistic, estimated conventional resources
x Optimistic, includ
phosphate.[Herring
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3.4. System Management 
These sets of issues are typically underappreciated. The entire fuel cycle system must fit together, 
including:
x Balancing the types of facilities (different reactors, fuel enrichment, fuel fabrication, separation) – 
this becomes more complicated the more elements there are to the system.
x Readiness Levels – Is a proposed change to the status quo ready to proceed?
x Robustness as described in Chapter 1 – the property of a system that it is more likely to be found
“correct” as future circumstances change.
x Agility (adaptability) as described in Chapter 1 – the property of a system that it is easier to adapt to 
new circumstances as they arise. [The combination of robustness and agility produce solutions that 
minimize the chance of “regret” later and are therefore are easier to sell now.]
x Economics – capital versus operating costs, balancing the short and long term costs and benefits, 
matching, working to ascribe costs to those receiving the benefit, short and long term energy security
x Safety – worker and community, short and long term risks and benefits, life cycle analysis compared
to other energy resources 
3.4.1 How does the system work together?
Once-through is simple and linear.  We know how to make the pieces work – except that no country has
put the final piece into the system, namely geologic disposal.  Nonetheless, over time, we know how to 
make mining, fuel enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactors all balance.  Currently, there may be a 
perturbation occurring (uranium price spike) in anticipation of higher uranium need.  This will 
presumably lead to increasing uranium mining to re-balance the system.  If the anticipated growth of 
reactors does not occur, an increase in mining could instead throw the system out of balance. 
Pu recycle (TR and MOX-Pu) is relatively simple.  There are several additional elements in the sy  – 
separation plant, MOX f and additiona ypes
f waste. This requires b acteristic time frames.
d VHTR 
r FR (garbage disposal units).  Each of these reactors
of the existing infrastructure as practical
Industrial Readiness – ability, willingness of industry to participate in a new fuel cycle
x Regulatory Readiness – ability to proceed from the regulatory standpoint 
x Socio-Political Readiness – ability to proceed from the “public” perspective.  Over long time periods, 
socio-political readiness will provide regulatory readiness. 
3.4.3 Robustness and agility 
These concepts are critical, but difficult to define. 
stem
l tabrication plant (in addition to the UOX fabrication plant),
alancing more elements in the system, each with their charo
Several countries are making this work – except no country has geologic disposal and there is typically a 
stockpile of Pu accumulating.
The opposite extreme is a hypothetical mix of LWR (cheapest electricity production?) an
cheapest hydrogen production?) and consume(
would have their own constraints and own fuel.  Yet, the system would be expected to work together.
3.4.2 Readiness levels 
We have not considered readiness levels in this report..  We do note that there are at least five types of 
“readiness” that should be considered in future work.
x Technical Readiness  – dependability of R&D products. 
x Infrastructure Readiness – ability, barriers to use as much
x
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We consider robustness of a decision t e unch
postulating diffe ll come to the same erence.
hat with two exceptions, the preference of multi- multi-pass MOX is
iders differin mong metrics depend ne thinks the future 
xception is tha anium resources are a major constraint, one would select neither 
to t th cal feasibility and relative
en
ly is the property of a hat reduces the need to 
were found to
of
unconventional resources was established.  Most of the systems would be robust in that this new 
rmation would not induce our successors to change how they were operating, indeed, one would not
uddenly wish to change pted and later found 
at uranium was not a co BFR or reduce their
ity
hropshire.  The present report does include some factors that inform with regard to economics:
), or remote (containing Am or Cm).
Transportation mass flu
torage re
would in
x Quantification of o
x R&D cost 
x Possible alternative (rare earths, Cm/Bk/Cf, Tc as steel-strengthening 
agent)
r ana the follow ssed in f
x The feed compos a enar .x);
how much variati cost
x The fuel composi to a reactor can change w pe enrichment of any
element other than u knob composition are (a) how 
used fuel from diffe d at th t and/or fuel fabrication plant, (b) 
uranium enrichment Pu ratio by fuel type or fuel composition, (d) changing the 
Am to Pu ratio. Usi resumably has cost implications. 
x Homogeneity vs. he ll be seen in Chapter 4, there are at least three ways to 
implement the IMF concept.  What are the cost implications, e.g., economies of scale? 
o be high when preferences ar anged as postulated “futures”
change, i.e., people rent “futures” wi  decision, the same pref
We find, for example, t pass IMF over
unchanged as one cons g importance a ing on what o
looks like.  The first e t if ur
and go straight to breeder fast reac
cost of multi-pass IMF has not be
rs. The second, of course, is tha
established.
e techni
Another aspect of robustness, ana zed in Chapter 6, system t
change the system as circumstances change.  Consider a scenario where uranium resources
e less of a constraint than previously thought, e.g., if new resources were found or the practicalityb
in
s
fo
the system selected.  The exception could be BFR; if ado
nstraint, one might either lower the breeding ratio of theth
contribution to the reactor fleet. 
Agility is a related but separate concept.  Agility is the property of an option that allows us to change the
option if new circumstances warrant.  Fast reactors, for example, that can be altered from consumer to 
reeder are very agile. b
3.4.4 Economics 
A major late-FY2006 activity is merging the system dynamic model with the Economic Database activ
ed by D. Sl
x Waste management metrics (covered in section 3.1) 
x Uranium needed (covered in section 3.3)
Percent of new reactors vs existing reactor typesx
x Percent of fuel that is hands-on (UOX), glovebox (PuNp
x x
x Interim s quirements
Future work clude
the economic impact of the ab ve indicators
uses for separated products
In particular, ou lyses have shown that ing need to be addre uture economic
ios (see section 5
analysis.
ition into a separation plant ch
on is acceptable with what
tion in
nges with time in most sc
impacts?
ith time. We ignore isoto
s” that can control net fuel
e separation plan
ranium.  So, the major “
rent reactors are blende
, (c) changing the U to
ng any of these knobs p
terogeneity. As wi
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o “Full core” IMF – all fuel in a reactor is IMF (assuming this is feasible) 
o Blended core IMF – some pellets (and pins) are IMF, some are UOX.  All assemblies are
same.
the
o Blended core IMF with Am targets – some pellets/pins are IMF, some are UOX, and some are
able 3-4. Thermal Reactor Safety Constraints on MOX/IMF [adapted from Todosow2004] 
Am targets. All assemblies are the same
x Cost of lost resources for economic expansion due to consuming “excess” Pu. 
x Cost of “mining” spent fuel from repository if once-through continues.
3.4.5 Safety
For present purposes, we divide safety issues into three categories. 
x Reactors
x Fuel cycle facilities, primarily separation and fuel fabrication facilities 
x Transportation
With regard to reactor safety, Table 3-4 lists safety constraints based on void coefficient and other 
considerations.  It is important to note that these limits are based on the first recycle pass (MOX or IMF);
little work has been done on subsequent passes.  We therefore consider “% Pu” as a key metric to 
calculate.
T
single-pass MOX single-pass IMF
% of
reactors that 
can use 
% of core % of all fuel 
in fleet 
(reactors x 
core)
% of
reactors that 
can use 
% of core % of all fuel 
in fleet 
(reactors x 
core)
Current
PWRs and 
BWRs
50% 33% 16% 25% 25% 6%
Future
PWRs and 
BWRs
100% 100% 100% 50% 100% 50%
There is also a French criterion: 10% Pu in core, based on MOX-Pu fuel [Salvatores2003]
Although we do not have corresponding limits on all the cases in this study, we do have these 
expectations.
x Systems with enriched U-235 reduces the problem with including TRU in the core [Salvatores 2003]
x As the Pu vector in MOX-cores degrades with subsequent recycles, the problems get worse 
[Salvatores2003]
x Including Np or Am or Cm – impact unclear. 
T
ranspo
Per AFCI objectives, there 
alculation portable
he other safety concerns will generally scale with how much mass is being processed, fabricated, and 
rted. We therefore pay special attention to throughput, see section 5.1 t
3.4.6 At-reactor inventories 
is a simple metric we use – the at-reactor inventories of used fuel.  In our 
s, we differentiate between TR fuel younger than 5 years, which is assumed not transc
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to centralized separation plants, and fuel older than 5 years, which is transportable.  The short-hand terms
are wet and dry storage. 
An item for future work, however, is to assess when the wet/dry (non-transportable/transportable)
-
t-
at from MOX at 51 GWth-day/tonne-HM to be similar to UOX at the same burnup, as an 
example.
threshold is crossed for recycle fuels.  As fuels become “hotter,” we would expect the waiting period to 
increase.  However, much of the short-term heat driving this issue are relatively short-lived fission
products that (a) we do not track in DYMOND because they are not relevant to fuel and waste 
management and (b) do not substantially change with recycle fuels.  Per fission energy released, the short
lived fission products are similar.  So, at relatively short times, one would expect the fission-produc
dominated he
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4. AFCI OPTIONS
This chapter describes options for reactors, separation, and fuels.  Appendix B contains various input 
parameters for the specific cases in this study.  Appendix C contains the input and output fuel 
composition recipes. 
The highlights of this chapter pertain to the fuels (section 4.3) and how they would be used in recycle
systems.  The multi-pass MOX approach in this study uses once-burned uranium in the feed and varies 
the Pu/U ratio each cycle to sustain recycling.  This leads to high recirculating TRU flows, discussed 
further in Chapter 5.  The multi-pass IMF approach in this study uses UOX for about 3/4 of the pins in 
blended cores; the other 1/4 of the pins are IMF.  The recirculating flows are much lower.  There are three 
consumer fast reactor (CFR) cases analyzed – symbiotic with used UOX, with used MOX (which itself 
comes from UOX), and with used IMF (which itself comes from UOX).  The equilibrium cycles for these 
CFR cases differ as the continuing makeup from the ermal reactors varies.  There are two breeder fast 
r
e
4.1. Reactors 
We limit our analyses to three reactor types: 
x TR - Light Water Reactors (LWR) as representative of all TR.  These advanced LWR are assumed
able to burn UOX, IMF, or MOX.  Appendix A lists acronyms.
x CFR - Consumer Fast Reactors, assumed to have characteristics as a Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR) with 
conversion ratio of 0.25.  These are therefore not the typical FR, but rather ones modified to 
deliberately burn more Pu-239 (and other fissiles) than they create.  As such, CFR would tend to 
serve the functions of thermal reactor with IMF. 
x BFR – Breeder Fast Reactors, assumed to have characteristics as a Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR) with 
conversion ratio approximately 1.1.
So, how robust are our conclusions for other reactor types?
There are two other thermal reactors considered in the GenIV program: Supercritical Water Reactor
(SCWR) and Very High Temperature Reactor (VHTR).  As shown in [Taiwo2005] the current GenIV 
reference design for the SCWR has little difference in fuel performance compared to conventional LWRs.
However, the VHTR is designed for significantly higher burnup (100 GW-day/tonne) and higher thermal
efficiency (48%). It was shown in [Taiwo 2005] that for the GenIV base VHTR design the TRU 
production rate is 45% lower than conventional LWRs. However, the resource utilization may be slightly
worse than LWRs because of the high enrichment required to meet the VHTR design goals.
There are two other fast reactors considered in the GenIV program: Lead Fast Reactor (LFR) and Gas 
Fast Reactor (GFR).  The base fuel cycle for all three GenIV fast reactor concepts is a closed fuel cycle
using recycle transuranics and depleted uranium fuels. The GenIV reference designs for each concept are 
BFR, not CFR configurations. Although some variability is observed between the fuel performances in 
the three concepts [Taiwo 2005]; the basic transmutation performance is expected to be similar.
There is one final system, the Molten Salt Reactor (MSR), where the salt is also the fuel.  This is a 
fundamentally different system in many respects.  And, it can be configured as either thermal or fast, with 
varying degrees of difficulty.  The MSR remains to be analyzed.
th
eactor (BFR) cases analyzed – UOX transitioning to BFR and UOX-IMF transitioning to BFR.  The 
quilibrium BFR cycle is the same between these two cases, but the path toward equilibrium varies. 
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4.2. Separation 
We limit our analysis to two separation technologies: 
x UREX+ as representative of wet (aqueous) separation. 
x Pyroprocessing as representative of dry separation. 
These are the only two technologies with active research in the AFCI program.
W match UREX+ with recycling of TR fuels and pyroprocessing with recycling of FR fuels. e
r considerations in selecting among UREX+ and 
r
alized plant?
at
Wh
x
x TR
e
x
x
ess
FR
sep
pyr
tech
opt s
rate ple, it appears that for BFR fuels at equilibrium, the required loss rate is about 1/3 of that 
for UOX. 
From the standpoint of our analyses, there are four majo
py oprocessing.
x hat type of fuel can be sent to each plant?
x What TRU are separated from each other?
What is the loss rate per recycle?
W
x
x Is it envisioned to be at-reactor or centr
The UREX+ technology is, of course, designed for processing oxide fuels and therefore is the logical
ch to UOX or MOX.  We assume it is also the match for recycling IMF.  Therefore, we make the m
simplifying assumption that the same technology works with any of the TR fuels in our analysis.
en VHTR fuels are considered in future analysis, this must be re-visited. 
There are four UREX+ variations considered in the AFCI program 
UREX+1 provides group separation of all TRU elements (Np, Pu, Am, Cm), e.g., appropriate for
remote fabrication of GenIV fast reactor fuel. 
UREX+2 provides NpPu and AmCm as two products, primarily intended for recycling NpPu in
and keep AmCm for later FR.
x UREX+3 provides Np, Pu, Am, and Cm as four products.
x UREX+4 provides NpPu, Am, and Cm as three products, primarily intended for recycling NpPu and 
Am in TR, and then sending the small Cm stream to disposal or keeping it for FR.
therefore consider that W
x UREX+1 provides the product IMF-NpPuAmCm and for the first cycle of FR fuel when TRU are 
shifted from TR to FR, 
UREX+2 provides the product for IMF-NpPu and MOX-NpPu, and 
UREX+4 provides the product for all other cases.
The cost differences among these three cases requires analysis.
The pyroprocessing technology is designed for metal fuel. We therefore consider it to be used to proc
fuel, for recycle back to FR. 
A critical parameter in our analysis is the loss rate per recycle.  We assume 0.2%/recycle (half during 
aration and half during fabrication).  We use the same value for all of the UREX+ variants and for 
oprocessing.  Further experimental work is required to be able to differentiate among separation 
nologies on the basis of loss rates.  In Chapter 5, we show that the required loss rate varies among
ions; the higher the content of heat-generating isotopes in recycling fuel, the lower the allowable los
s. For exam
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4.3. Fuels 
le 4-1 lists the fuels we wished to include inTab this study.  We were unable to obtain input/output fuel
m
entr
co positions for a few cases that we desired, so that the comparison analyses sometimes miss some 
ies.
Table 4-1. Fuels Considered for this Study
Fuel type Burnup (GWth-
day/tonne-HM)
Notes
UOX 33 Performed static but not DYMOND analyses
UOX 51 Baseline once-through
UOX 100 Performed static but not DYMOND analyses
MOX-NpPu 51 Single-pass only
MOX-NpPuAm 51 This is the only multi-pass MOX case.  It
increases the Pu/U ratio each cycle to keep the 
fuel burning.
MOX-NpPuAmCm Not available
MOX (blended core) Not available 
IMF
(ful
-NpPu
l core)
633
IM
(full core) 
Not available F-NpPuAm
IMF
probably be distributed among several reactors. 
Single-pass only.  Calculated as if the core was 
100% IMF; in reality, these IMF pins would 
-NpPuAmCm 554
(full core) 
IMF
(ble
-NpPuAm
nded core)
65-58 These are blended assemblies with 60 IMF pins 
and 204 UOX pins per assembly.  The burnup
decreases each cycle in the current approach. 
IMF
sepa
(ble
-NpPu with
rate Am targets
nded core)
66-58 These are blended assemblies with 4 Am targets,
60 IMF pins, and 200 UOX pins per assembly.
The burnup decreases each cycle in the current 
approach.
UOX/CFR symbiosis 177 No recycling in TR. 
IM NpPu, CFRF/CFR symbiosis 176 Three fuels required – UOX, IMF-
MOX/CFR symbiosis 128 Three fuels required – UOX, MOX-NpPu, CFR 
UOX-to-BFR 66 No recycling in TR. 
IMF-to-BFR 66 Three fuels required – UOX, IMF-NpPu, BFR 
M Not availableOX-to-BFR
U ore to BFR Not available A BFR can be started with enriched U235 rather 
than depend on the availability of Pu from thermal 
reactors.
Our
.
. Ratio of Pu to U 
3. U235 enrichment
There are two types of blending implicit in our fuel scenarios. 
First is the blending of TRU (and sometimes uranium) to make new fuel.  For example, the 1st-pass
MOX-NpPuAm fuel composition requires the NpPuAm from 13.5 used UOX fuel assemblies. (Chapter 5 
analysis has made it clear that in defining any fuel scenario, there are three important parameters.
Blending within fuel assemblies or cores. 1
2
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has more on such support ratios.) The multi-pass MOX recipes also require burned uranium (BU), but 
is why the UOX separation approach must in all cases separate U from TRU; otherwise there 
is no way to ge TR h co or ppr to m ss MO
shown in Figure
there is an order of magnitude more used burned uranium from separation of UOX than is used in making
MOX. That
t the right U/
4-1.
U mixtures. T e basic ncept f this a oach ulti-pa X is
Figure 4-1. Multi-pass MOX approach used in this study
Figure 4-1 shows that once-burned uranium is an off-stream from separation of UOX; a few percent of 
this uranium is used as feed to the MOX cycles. Twice-burned uranium is an off-stream from separation 
of MOX; it is discarded.  The support ratios each cycle vary; more details can be found 
elsewhere.[Wigeland2004a, Wigeland2004b]
The second is blending of different fuels in the blended core-IMF cases – fuel assemblies include both
IMF pins and UOX pins.  (In all other cases, the cores are considered homogeneous.)  Table 4-2 provides 
the blending we used.[Goldmann2005]  The intent was to take the remaining TRU from one generation to 
make the IMF for the next generation. That is, IMF in cycle N+1 is made from the TRU remaining in 
IMF cycle N plus the TRU in the preceding cycle’s UOX.  Figure 4-2 illustrates the concept. As the TRU 
from 264 UOX pins are used to make the IMF in 60 first cycle pins, we refer to the initial support ratio as 
4.4 from the perspective of TRU mass.  The support ratio is 1-1 from the perspective of reactor-to-reactor, 
i.e., 1 UOX reactor supports 1 reactor using the IMF-1 blend. 
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Table 4-2. IMF Blended Cores 
IMF-NpPuAm/UOX blends IMF-NpPu/UOX/Am blends
Where is the Am? In the IMF fuel In separate Am targets
# UOX pins/assemb 204 ( 20ly 77.3%) 0 (75.8%)
# IMF pins/assembly 6 60 (22.7%) 0 (22.7%)
# Am pins/assembly N/A 4 ( 1.5%)
U mass fraction in assembly (i.e. 
l in
~98% (exact value depends on 
which IMF cycle)
~98%
the heavy meta UOX)
TRU mass fractio ~2% <2%n in IMF pins 
Am mass fraction ets N/A ~0.2%in Am targ
Both cases also have 24 guide tubes and 1 ins tube for a 89 pins (17trument total of 2 x 17)
Figure 4-2. Multi-pass IMF approach used in this study
I ewhat of promise between (a) IMF concepts that attempt to burn 
a single pass (the single-pass cases in this study are good ex eaving t o
ain high LTH, LTD, and LTR im ents) but too little fissile content to continue to 
and (b) the current MOX concept that has lower LTH, LTD, and LTR improvements.
lended c etr n UOX and IMF is because uranium in UOX (or 
MOX) serves two ctive” f nt and f th he matrix in 
IMF is some other “inactive” ingredient, such as MgAl2O4.  That IMF matrix eflected in
core, the fissile content m ent (throughout fuel life) to keep k-eff>1.  There are as
many as 3 “knobs” as listed in Table iven tar
This approach to
everything in
dispose (to obt
burn
MF is som a com
amples), l oo much t
provem
In these b ores, the asymm
functions – an “a
y in mass betwee
uel ingredie the matrix or e ceramic, but t
mass is not r
Table 4-2. 
For any TR ust be suffici
4-3 for a g get burnup.
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Table 4-3. “Knob able to Keep the Fuel Burnings” Avail
U235 enrichment Ratio of Pu to U Ratio of Am to Pu 
UOX cores Enrichment incre
desired burnup incre
uased as 
ases.
Unavailable (no P
fresh fuel) 
in Unavailable (no Pu) 
MOX cores Increase U
compensa
235 enrich
te for degrading Pu
Pu to
the MOX fuel
ment to Adjust ra of
mixture.
In current analysis, the U 
in MOX is always burned 
composition.
uranium (0.8% U235) 
tio U in
IMF-full cores Unavailable (no U) Unavailable (no U) 
IMF blended cores Increase U235 enrichment in 
UOX pins to compensate for
deg
pins.
nce-through
(with 51 burnup)
Adjust ratio of IMF pins to 
UOX pins.  This allows 
, c
be used for ca
in such cases the
intent is to include
as much Am as 
would be available.
In principle ould
ses
where Am is
recycled.  In 
practice, this has not 
been done because
rading mixture in IMF the composition of each 
fuel (UOX, IMF) to stay 
In current analysis, the 
UOX is always 4.3% 
enriched, the same as 
UOX in o
constant, only the number
of pins changes. 
In UOX cores, of course, the U235 enrichment is set so that as the fuel burns there is always sufficient 
U235 (plus Pu239 bred in-situ) to keep the core going.  One cannot independently adjust the Pu
composition in UOX cores.
In MOX, there is an additional “knob”, adjusting the ratio of Pu to U in the MOX.  In this study,
uccessive MOX cycles are kept fissile by adjusting Pu to U; the uranium in MOX is always burned 
s not use the U235 “knob”.
blended cores, in principle there are also U235 an y
ferently than in MOX.  E. Hoffman at ANL is exploring this option
n2005b]  In this report, only the Pu/U “knob” is used; the uranium enrichm always
as the UOX fuels in this study.
In IMF full cores, the only “knob” is how much fuel is put There is no uranium, hence no 
U235 nor Pu/U to adjust. 
Figures 4-3 and 4-4 show how the composition of fuel chang e for MOX and IMF.  The MOX 
omposition changes radically.  Even the first cycle is 16% Pu, req 3 tonnes-Pu/yr per GWe.  Since 
s
uranium (0.8% U235).  Thus, the n-pass MOX in this study doe
In IMF d Pu/U ratio knobs, the are simply
implemented dif
space.[Hoffma ent is
4.3%, set the same
into the core.
es by cycl
uiringc
spent UOX has 0.22 tonnes-Pu/yr per GWe, the output of 13.5 UOX reactors is required for the first 
MOX recycle.
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-3. Elemental composition of full core MOX fuel by recycle generation. Generations 6
In contrast, Figure 4-4 shows that the composition of the blended IMF cores stays fairly constant.
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Figure 4-4. Elemental composition of blended core IMF fuel by recycle generation 
Page 62 
The “knobs” in FR are different.  It is still required to get each core started with fissiles. But, unlike TR, 
all U and TRU isotopes can contribute to having a favorable neutron balance.  It is, for example, 
impossible to start a pure U238 or Pu238 core, even though both isotopes fission in a fast reactor. 
We studied three types of consumer fast reactor systems, illustrated in Figures 4-5, 4-6, and 4-7.  The fast 
reactor conversion ratios are approximately 0.25, thus considerable TRU must be supplied from thermal
reactors each cycle.  Unlike a pure-thermal system, however, the equilibrium composition in the FR will 
continue to burn.  And, when recycling, the composition approaches equilibrium faster than in a thermal
reactor.  However, the equilibrium is not reached in just one or two cycles (see Chapter 5 for some
discussion).
Figure 4-5. UOX- Consumer (Burner) Fast Reactor (CFR) symbiosis
Figure 4-6. UOX-IMF- Consumer (Burner) Fast Reactor (CFR)  symbiosis
Figure 4-7. UOX-MOX-Consumer (Burner) Fast Reactor (CFR) symbiosis
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All CFR cases, by definition, accumulate some burned uranium while using a minority of the BU from
thermal reactors. In contrast, breeder fast reactors (BFR) use previously discarded uranium, eith
uranium or depleted uranium (DU).  Figures 4-8 and 4-9 illustrate the two BFR cases in this study. T
are two other BFR cases we were unable to study.  One is the MOX analog to the IMF case, namely
er burned
here
OX-MOX-BFR.  The other is starting BFR directly with enriched U235, bypassing the need for anyU
thermal reactors.  This would be the fallback position, for example, if thermal reactor recycling were too 
successful in drawing down Pu inventories so that a rapid BFR buildup was constrained by inadequate Pu
stocks.  This is explored in Chapter 8. 
is only used for BFR startup, thereafter burned (shown) or depleted
uran ot show th
Figure 4-8. UOX-BFR case, UOX
ium (n n) provides e input
y used for BFigure 4-9. UOX-IMF-BFR case, UOX/IMF is onl F ereafter burned (shown) orR startup, th
depleted uranium (not shown) provides the input 
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5. “STATIC” ANALYSES
This Chapter contains “static” analyses using various TR and FR fuel compositions, which are described 
in Appendix C.  These analyses have several purposes: 
x Calculate parameters directly associated with individual fixed fuel compositions, e.g., the Pu239/Pu 
ratio for various fuels. 
x Calculate idealized fuel throughputs and equilibrium mixes of reactor types, without constraints 
imposed by the need for building actual facilities (reactors, separation, fuel fabrication).
x Understand leverage points by comparing options.
x Inform the analysis of the dynamic DYMOND results.
The analyses are divided into five categories.  The first pertain to mass throughputs and support ratios, 
which were introduced at the end of Chapter 4.  The other four pertain to the four AFCI objectives. 
Here are the highlights from this Chapter.
x Using Pu/U in MOX leads to varying compositions each cycle, with large recirculating Pu flows.
This means that the separation plant used to process MOX will have to evolve as the cycles proceed. 
x Fuel composition in IMF blends stays fairly constant.  The recirculating Pu flows in multi-pass IMF 
are typically 1/2 to 1/3 of multi-pass MOX.  The separation plant for IMF as the cycles proceed can 
stay constant, the elemental composition of the feed changes little. A similar approach for MOX 
blending may be able to improve the composition trends noted above.
x More than 80% of the fuel in the s ) in multi-pass
IMF or multi-p mal recycling
primarily handle UOX, even with multi-pass MOX or IMF scenarios.  When thermal recycling starts, 
the system is made
into IMF or and fuel
processing is adequate to draw down the legacy UOX. 
x More than 70% of the fuel in the system (at equilibrium) in thermal/fast-consumer symbiosis cases is 
UOX.
x To reduce uranium throughput, the only effective leverage is burnup.  Recycling, per se, does not 
reduce uranium throughput.
x Can’t reduce fission product throughput on a per GWe basis. 
x To reduce plutonium throughput, use IMF.  Avoid BFR.  If one overburned Pu in 1-pass IMF, 
recycling cannot be sustained, the residual unburned TRU would eventually be discarded and waste 
management objectives not met.  Backing off to blended multi-pass IMF avoids this problem for 
several decades, but not permanently.
x To reduce Am and Cm throughput, use BFR or IMF.  From whatever the starting point following TR 
recycle, the higher actinide composition will slightly increase in the CFR. 
x To reduce the required fraction of CFR in a thermal-CFR symbiotic system, use IMF.  IMF-CFR 
requires 19% CFR.  MOX-CFR requires 20% CFR.  UOX-CFR requires 27% CFR.  Starting 
recycling with IMF, therefore, reduces the need for CFR later. 
x To reduce Pu inventory in the entire system, avoid once-through. UOX-51 makes Pu at 0.22 tonnes-
Pu/yr per GWe.  The next highest Pu production rate is the equilibrium BFR, 0.10 tonnes-Pu/yr per
GWe.  Thus, there is less Pu in a BFR system (with the design of a breeding ratio of 1.12) than in a 
once-through system!  Of course, the Pu in the UOX-51 system is “self protecting” because it is
unprocessed used fuel, whereas the Pu in the BFR system is recirculating with lower levels of self-
protection.
ystem at any given point in time (even at equilibrium
ass MOX is still UOX.  This means that the separation plants for ther
100% UOX; this drops slowly to 80% as used UOX is processed and the TRU 
MOX.  The 80% UOX value can only be temporarily reduced if separation
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x To reduce weapons-usable material, use single-pass full-core IMF.  Avoid BFR and UOX-51. BFR
cases have a slight increase in weapons-usable material; all pure-thermal-recycle and CFR cases
a net decrease in weapons-usable material.
x To reduce the amount of recirculating weapons-usable material, use IMF, avoid BFR.  The flux of 
Pu239-equivalent/yr per GWe of fresh fuel is 0.26 for 5
have
r
To reduce Pu “quality” use IMF.  Avoid BFR.
x If only looking at the Pu239 equivalent fraction in fresh fuel, avoid full-core IMF.  The Pu239-
equivalent fraction , if one takes credit
for the Pu “quality”, the picture changes.  The Pu239/Pu-total fraction for all the first pass fuels is the 
Based on crude scaling analyses, we believe that MOX-NpPu and IMF-NpPu would require 
X
x None of the single-pass-only systems come close to achieving program goals, see Table 5-1. They
could be dropped from the program.  (We did not study the VHTR.) 
x Among multi-pass pure thermal systems, IMF appears superior to MOX, see Table 5-2.  However, 
either only obtains ~17% improvement in uranium utilization and are therefore not sustainable from
the uranium perspective in the long term.  Although thermal recycling can be continued indefinitely,
eventually sufficient TRU accumulates so that the TRU would be discarded with corresponding waste 
management penalties.  However, this appears deferrable until the next century because 5 recycles 
appear practical.  Building the infrastructure for multi-pass thermal recycling establishes some of the 
infrastructure for later fast reactors.  And, using IMF would decrease the percent of CFR needed from
27% to 19%.
x CFR systems can be continued indefinitely; there is no need to discard TRU.  Systems with 19% 
CFR, 11% IMF, and 71% UOX would be sustainable until uranium resources limit.
x BFR systems can be continued indefinitely and are the most sustainable.  However, to preserve waste
management and proliferation resistance benefits, one would not want to stop recycling without first 
transitioning back to CFR for several cycles.  Even better would be rampdown with a combination of 
CFR and IMF. 
x To increase the potential build rate of BFR, maximize its breeding ratio (esp. for early cycles), do not 
burn Pu239 in therm e BFR startup cycle.
The ratio of output- tup cycle), 1.65 
(UOX-to-IMF-to-BFR startup cycle), and 1.07 (BFR equilibrium cycle).  The high ratio for the IMF-
BFR startup cycle m  cycle is the 
same for UOX-to
th pass IMF, 0.50 for 5th pass MOX, 0.36 fo
IMF-CFR, and 1.07 for BFR. 
x
is 65-70%.  Indeed, the fraction of Pu is over 90%. However
same as the UOX-51 output, 53%.  For multi-pass IMF, multi-pass MOX, and CFR, the Pu239/Pu-
total fraction steadily decreases.  It increases for BFR cases, evolving toward an equilibrium value of 
72%.
x
glovebox-fabrication, all other recycle fuels (which all contain Am) would require remote fabrication.
The exception is part or all of the IMF blended cores.  In multi-pass IMF-NpPuAm, the 204 UO
pins (of 264 total) would be hands-on; the 60 IMF-NpPuAm pins would be remote.  The final
assembly is probably remote, but more work is needed.  In multi-pass IMF-NpPu with separate Am
pins, the 200 UOX pins are again hands-on, the 60 IMF-NpPu pins would be glovebox (?), the 4 Am
target pins would be remote, and more work would be required to know if the final assembly would
be remote or glovebox.
al reactors, and reprocess quickly to use fissile Pu241 in th
fissile/input-fissile in this study are 1.06 (UOX-to-BFR star
itigates the burning of Pu239 in thermal reactors.  (BFR equilibrium
-BFR and UOX-to-IMF-to-BFR.)
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Table 5-1. Key Results for Single-Pass Cases 
(pink means option does not meet target, yellow means it partially meets target, green would have met it 
met target.) 
Targets (see
Chapter 3) 
UOX-
33
UOX-
100
MOX-
NpPu
MOX-
NpPuAm
IMF-
NpPu
IMF-
NpPu
AmCm
IMF-
NpPuAm
(blended
core)
IMF-
NpPu/Am
(blended
core)
Long-term
heat (LTH)
improvement
10x to 200x
(to achieve
actual
repository
improvements
of 10-50x)
0.95 1.17 1.07 1.12 1.98 1.82 1.61 1.67
Long-term
dose (LTD)
improvement
10-50x 0.90 1.12 1.35 1.41 2.09 1.96 1.57 1.63
Long-term
radiotoxicity
(LTR)
improvement
100x 0.89 1.38 1.12 1.18 2.46 2.39 1.79 1.85
Uranium ore 
use
improvement
1.15 short
term
50x long term
0.88 0.97 1.09 1.07 1.15 1.14 1.13 1.14
Is option sustainable per
repository limits
NO
Is option sustainable per
uranium limits
NO
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Table 5 e improvement factor this 
century ing never stops 
-2. Key Results for Multi-Pass Cases.  First number in each cell is th
 (~5 cycles) if recycling stops. The second number is the improvement if recycl
(only feasible with fast reactors in the system).
Improvement
Targets (see
Chapter 3) 
Thermal
recycling with
MOX
Thermal
recycling with
IMF
Consumer fast
reactor (CFR)
with IMF 
thermal
recycling
Breeder fast
reactor (BFR)
Long-term heat 
(LTH)
improvement
10x to 200x (to
achieve actual 
repository
improvements of 
10-50x)
1.5x
Plateaus
near this 
value
2.9x
Plateaus
near this 
value
~4x
~50x at
99.5%
removal of 
TRU+Cs+Sr
~5x
~70x at
99.5%
removal of 
TRU+Cs+Sr
Long-term dose
(LTD)
improvement
10-50x reduction
in peak dose,
which is at 
500,000 years
after
emplacement
1.9x
Plateaus
near this 
value
3.0x
Plateaus
near this 
value
~4x
~60x at
99.5%
removal of 
TRU+U+Tc+I
~7x
~190x at
99.5%
removal of 
TRU+U+Tc+I
Long-term
radiotoxicity
(LTR)
improvement
100 reduction of
radiotoxicity at
1000 years after
discharge so that
waste is less toxic
than original
uranium ore 
1.9x
Plateaus
near this 
value
3.2x
Plateaus
near this 
value
~4x
~100x at 
99.5%
removal of 
TRU+U+Tc+I
~7x
~100x at 
99.5%
removal of 
TRU+U+Tc+I
Uranium ore use
improvement
1.15 short term
50x long term
1.17x
~1.2x
1.17x
~1.2x
1.32x 2.0x
1.42x ~100x
Pu239 equivalent
tonnes/yr per
GWe for fresh
fuel
As low as
possible
0.50
Slow
increase
0.26
Slow
increase
Not
estimated
0.36
Not
estimated
1.07
Pu239/Pu-total in
fresh fuel 
As low as
possible (value
for discharged
UOX-51 is 53%)
32% for 5th
cycle fuel 
Cannot
drop much
further
33% for 5th
cycle fuel 
Cannot
drop much
further
14% in CFR 72%
53% in IMF
14% in CFR 
53% in IMF 72%
Avoid fully For as much fuel
remote fuel 
fabrication
as possible 
True for the
80% of the fuel
that is UOX, 
untrue for
MOX-NpPuAm
itself
True for the ¾ 
UOX pins in
blended
assemblies, true 
for IMP-NpPu
(with separate
Am targets) 
No No
Minimize
throughput of
TRU (tonnes/yr
per GWe)
As low as
possible to
minimize safety
and economic
issus
0.94
Slowly
increase
0.34
Slowly
increases
Not Not
estimated estimated
0.85 1.45
Percent fuel that 
is new
As low as
possible
17% 17% 29% 100%
Percent of As low as Zero Zero 19% 100%
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reactors that are
new
possible
Is option sustainable per repository
limits
NO, because unburned TRU must
eventually be discarded, but 
probably after this century
Yes, unburned TRU does not ever
have to be discarded, performance
depends on loss rates
Is option sustainable per uranium
limits
NO Yes
The LTH improvement factors for 5-cycles CFR and BFR come from Wigeland2004a as they use cycle-by-cycle 
compositions for those cases, which we did not use in this study.  The 5-cycle value for MOX (1.5x) is the same
in Wigeland2004a and here.
The 5-cycle uranium improvement factors for BFR are probably understated, they depend on the breeding ratio
(output-fissile/input-fissile) for the first few cycles, which was not optimized.
5.1. Throughputs and Support Ratios 
The results in later Chapters are difficult to understand without first examining throughputs and support 
ratios.  Throughputs refer to the mass flux in and out of reactors, separation, or fuel fabrication plants.
The support ratios refer to how many reactors (or pins) of one type of fuel are required to make the TRU 
requir
X fuel
onnes-Pu/year versus 
ed for the next generation.
We start with the support ratios of how much UOX is required (at equilibrium) to make IMF or MO
with the compositions in this study. For example, Table 5-3 shows that 13.5 units of UOX are needed to 
ake 1 unit of MOX-NpPuAm; this is caused by the UOX discharge rate of 0.22 tm
the MOX-NpPuAm input requirement of 2.98 tonnes-Pu/year.  (13.5=2.98/0.22)  The support ratio for 
MOX-NpPuAm (13.5) is higher than for MOX-NpPu (10.7) because more Pu is needed in the former
case to compensate for the Am in the fuel. 
Table 5-3. Support Ratios for 1st pass in Thermal Reactors
Recipe used in this 
study
UOX to recycle fuel 
with NpPu 
UOX to recycle fuel 
with NpPuAm 
UOX to recycle fuel 
with NpPuAmCm
MOX-full core 10.7 13.5 Not calculated 
IMF-full core 6.6 Not calculated 7.1
IMF-blended core Not calculated 1.0 on basis of 1 reactor Not calculated 
feeds 1 reactor.
4.4 from the 
perspective that 264 
UOX pins make 60 
IMF pins 
For IMF-full core cases, the support ratios are lower than for analogous MOX-full core cases; there is no 
U238 in these core IMF-
pPuAmCm (7.1) is highe e to 
mpensate for the Am and Cm in the fuel.  For the IMF-blended core, the situation is fundamentally
different.  By design, the TRU from one UOX core is made into the IMF for the next core; hence the 
support ratio is 1.0.  Indeed, the 1st pass of the IMF-blended core in this study still produces slightly more
Pu239 than it consumes.
Table 5-4 shows more support ratios, this time for multi-pass cases. By design, the support ratio for the 
IMF-blended core case stays at 1.0.  The support ratios for multi-pass MOX drop quickly from the
UOX/MOX-1 support ratio (13.5) as MOX is itself recycled.
s; less Pu is needed. Again we see the trend that the support ratio for
r than for IMF-NpPu (6.6) because more Pu is needed in the former casN
co
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Table 5-4. Support Ratios for multi-pass in Thermal Reactors, support ratios for MOX 6-8 are 
extrapolated
UOX to 
recycle 1 
Recycle
1 to 2 
Recycle
2 to 3 
Recycle
3 to 4 
Recycle
4 to 5 
Recycle-
5 to 6 
Recycle
6 to 7 
Recycle
7 to 8 
IMF
(blended
core)
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Not calculated
MOX
(full
core)
13.5 1.98 1.52 1.35 1.26 1.20 1.09 1.07
Figure 5-1 shows the equilibrium mix among fuels in a multi-pass MOX system.  For a system of multi-
passes, it is assumed that the Nth cycle is thrown away.  For example, at equilibrium, in a MOX-1 system,
93.1% of the fuel is UOX and 6.9% is MOX-1.  (7% = 1/(1+13.5)) The MOX-1 can either be thrown 
away, or made into MOX-2, in which case the equilibrium shifts to 90.0% UOX, 6.7% MOX-1, 3.4% 
MOX-2.  The fraction of the preceding generations decreases slightly to “make room” for the newest
generation, e.g., the MOX-1 fraction drops from 6.9% to 6.7%.  Thus, the system is temporally stable as it 
proceeds to additional generations.  Note at MOX-8, over 80% of the fuel in the system is still UOX. 
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Figure 5-1. Equilibrium mix of fuels as a function of number of MOX recycle passes 
Figure 5-2 is the same as Figure 5-1, except for IMF instead of MOX.  Because the support ratios from
each generation to the next is 1, the fleet is balanced (at equilibrium) among the blends available.  For 
example, an equilibrium IMF-5 case would have 1/6 of the fleet each burning UOX, IMF-blend-1, etc.
The numbers deviate slightly from the ideal because the burnup of successive IMF generations is reduced 
to keep the system going. 
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Figure 5-2. Equil recycle passes
rally stable.  If there is sufficient separation and fuel fabrication 
a mix of fuels at all times.  Nonetheless, we still refer to Figure 5-2 as representing 
ld
f
ibrium mix of fuel assemblies for different number of IMF
There are two critical points to make about Figure 5-2.
First, the IMF system may not be tempo
capacity, the entire fleet will progress through the cycles.  Thus, at any given point in time, the entire fleet 
could be at cycle-4 if all reactors started recycling at the same time.  In contrast, the MOX blending 
approach requires
equilibria because over time, reactors would be at different generations.  For example, in a 4-pass
approach, overtime a “real” system would evolve so that roughly 1/5 of the reactors would be at the start 
(MOX), 1/5 each at IMF-blend-1 through 4.  IMF-blend-4 would be discarded and those reactors wou
start over. 
Second, Figure 5-2 would seem to imply that multi-pass IMF is dominated by IMF fuel, not UOX.
However, this is not the case because each of the blends is itself dominated by UOX (204 pins out of
264). Figure 5-3 breaks down fuel usage accordingly.  As in multi-pass MOX, we find that over 80% o
the fuel in the system is UOX.
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l
ystems, we have results generation by generation.  For the fast reactor 
ystems, we have only two results – “startup” and “equilibrium.” The startup cycle takes only thermal
reactor fuel as feed.  The “equilibrium” cycle primarily uses recycled fast reactor fuel as feed,
su
composition jumps immediatel startup cycle.  This indeed is 
good approximation for key isotopes such as Pu239.  However, our analyses indicate that the 
pproximation is poor for some isotopes that buildup slowly in fast reactors, such as Am242m.  We 
actor cases with caution.
Tab cases, as well as the resulting 
sup t
through r
that the
vector recovered from the IMF is significantly denatured, requiring a higher fast reactor loading to 
chieve criticality.
Figure 5-3. Equilibrium mix of fuel types for different number of IMF recycle passes
We now turn to fast reactor systems.  The available transmutation analyses differ from those for therma
reactors.  For thermal reactor s
s
pplemented by thermal reactor discharged fuel only for CFR cases.  The approximation is that the 
y to the “equilibrium” composition after one
a
a
therefore have to look at the generation-by-generation results for the fast re
le 5-5 shows (on a per GWe basis) the Pu fluxes for the CFR and BFR
por ratios.  On a per-energy basis, to start up one CFR requires 8.9 UOX, 11.50 UOX (if first cycled
MOX-NpPu), and 42.5 UOX (if first cycled through IMF-NpPu).  This is attributed to the facto
IMF burns more Pu than MOX requiring additional spent fuel assemblies; in addition, the Pu 
a
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Table 5-5. Support Ratios for Fast Reactor Cases 
UOX/CFR
symbiosis
MOX/CFR
symbiosis
IMF/CFR
symbiosis
UOX to
BFR
IMF to
BFR
Required TRU for start-up cycle
onnes-TRU/yr per GWe)
2.19 3.34 4.03 1.52 3.06
(t
TRU feed from source for the start-
p cycle (tonnes-TRU/yr per GWe) 
0.246 2.23 0.63 0.246 0.63
u
Support ratio for start-up cycle 8.9x 1.5x from
MOX,
16.1x from
the UOX 
that went 
into the 
MOX
6.4x from
IMF,
41.8x from
the UOX 
that went 
into the 
IMF
6.17x 4.8x from
the IMF, 
31.8x
from the 
UOX that 
went into 
the IMF 
Required TRU for equilibrium
cle (tonnes-TRU/yr per GWe)
2.77 3.52 3.68 1.34 1.34
cy
TRU feed from source for the 
uilibrium cycle (tonnes-TRU/yr
er GWe)
2.11 from
CFR
0.66 from
UOX
2.77 from
CFR
0.74 from
MOX
3.32 from
CFR
0.36 from
IMF
1.34 +
0.11
excess
1.34 + 
0.11
excess
eq
p
Support ratio for equilibrium cycle 2.66x UOX 0.33 MOX 
3.57 UOX
0.57 IMF 
3.77 UOX 
N/A N/A
Figures 5-4, 5-5, 5-6 show the hypothetical evolution of a fleet for the CFR cases.  The concept is the 
same as for the multi-pass IMF and MOX cases above, except here we make the approximation that the 
composition for the first CFR is the “startup” composition and for all later cycles is the “equilibrium”
composition.  We divide the total “equilibrium” portion of the fleet into the “last” cycle and the
intermediate cycles.  If a policy of N-cycles and then throw away were adopted, the “last” cycle would be
the one thrown away.  In each case, the systems are evolving toward an equilibrium including UOX, IM
or MOX, and CFR.  For the major transuranic isotopes (e.g., Pu-239, Pu-240), the transition from fast 
reactor startup to equilibrium will be rapid; however, slow build-up has been observed for lower 
oncentration isotopes that have equilibrium concentra
F
tions significantly higher than the initial LWR feed 
., Am-242m).
c
materials (e.g
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Figure 5-4. Hypothetical evolution of fleet for UOX-CFR symbiosis
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Figure 5-5. Hypothetical evolution of fleet for UOX-MOX-CFR symbiosis
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Figure 5-6. Hypothetical evolution of fleet for UOX-IMF-CFR symbiosis
Figure 5-7 compares the three equilibria.  For both UOX-CFR and UOX-MOX-CFR, the equilibrium
CFR portion of the fleet is 27%.  Including MOX in the system basically only displaces some of the 
UOX.  For UOX-IMF-CFR, however, the equilibrium CFR portion is only 17%.  IMF displaces CFR, 
which is unsurprising as both are designed to primarily burn Pu.  This option is therefore preferred if one 
is concerned with the possible high cost of CFR relative to thermal reactors.  Again, the pure-thermal
systems can continue indefinitely, but after some number of cycles, unburned TRU are discarded. 
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Figure 5-7. Equilibrium fleet mixes for CFR symbiotic cases 
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Of course, none of the pure-thermal cases nor thermal/CFR symbiotic cases avoid the need for contin
U235 consumption.  Therefore, none are sustainable if uranium resources become a constraint. If so
only options are BFRs.
uing
, the
igures 5-8 and 5-9 show the evolution of BFR systems for UOX-BFR and UOX-IMF-BFR respectively.
We again caution that these are suspect because of the “startup/equilibrium” approximation in the 
transmutation calculations.  Both systems are evolving toward 100% BFR, but it will take awhile if these 
calculations are accurate.  Of particular note is that the UOX-IMF-BFR case proceeds towards 100% BFR 
at about half the rate as UOX-BFR; of course, by design, the IMF is burning Pu. The UOX-IMF-BFR
case is not a logical one for the long term, but it provides us some glimpse as to what happens if UOX-
IMF runs for a few decades, reducing Pu stocks, and then BFR are introduced. 
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100%
0%
10%
20%
30%
Cycle-0 Cycle-1
(IMF)
Cycle-2
(startup)
Cycle-3 Cycle-4 Cycle-5 Cycle-6 Cycle-7 Cycle-8
Pe
r 40%
90%
50%
60%
70%
80%
ce
nt
 o
f f
le
et BFR-eq (thrown away)
BFR-eq
BFR-start
IMF
UOX
Figure 5-9. Hypothetical evolution of fleet for UOX-IMF-BFR 
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We recognize that conversion ratio can vary anywhere between 0.25 (CFR in this study) and 1.1 (BFR in 
is study.  We therefore estimated how some key parameters would vary as a function of CR.
leet must be FR at 
onversion ratio of 0.25. Figure 5-10 shows that the required fraction of fast reactors increases sharply at 
th
The equilibrium fraction of the reactor fleet that must be fast reactors is a strong function of the FR
conversion ratio.  With UOX feeding consumer fast reactors, about 27% of the f
c
the FR conversion ratio approaches 1. 
80%
100%
UOX/CFR
UOX/IMF/CFR60%
40%
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0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
FR conversion ratio
Figure 5-10. Required percent of fast reactors at equilibrium (FR/(FR+TR)) as a function of fast
reactor (FR) conversion ratio.  Red line shows UOX with consumer fast reactors.  The black line
shows UOX with 1 recycle of IMF in thermal reactors followed by consumer fast reactors (CF
If 1 pass recycle in thermal reactors with IMF is added to CFR, the required fraction of fast reactors is 
decreased, as shown in the curve above, because the IMF dest
R).
roys some of the TRU that would otherwise 
ave to be destroyed by the fast burner reactors. Additional recycles in thermal reactors would further 
to
sable
east 5 cycles in 
ermal reactors.  However, only about 2 cycles in thermal reactors if recycle Np-Pu-Am-Cm.
Figure 5-11 sh .  As 
onversion ratio increases toward 1, the uranium utilization improvement (relative to once through) 
increases to about 160x, relative to once-through fuel cycle at 51 MW-day/kg-HM burnup. 
h
lower the required fraction of fast reactors.  However, the benefit of each additional recycle in a thermal
reactor drops, e.g., the value of a second recycle is less than the first.  And, although it is possible to 
indefinitely recycle in a fast reactor (the equilibrium concentration still works as fuel), it is not possible
indefinitely recycle in thermal reactors.  In thermal reactors, eventually, the TRU mix becomes unu
and must be discarded.  The unusable equilibrium is more unusable and is approached faster the more
TRU isotopes are recycled.  Thus, as a backup to the CFR case (only recycle in fast reactors), if we 
recycle Np-Pu-Am in thermal reactors, FY2005 analyses show that it is possible to get at l
th
ows the uranium utilization improvement as a function of FR conversion ratio
c
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Figure 5-11. Uranium utilization improvement versus fast reactor conversion ratio
e
235. Consistent with figure 5-11, that number changes little until the FR conversion
(unused)
from the LWR portion of the fleet 
    0.9 M r m
    0.05 er e – ium m p o e
Thus, little of the original uranium ore is used in the FR portion of the fleet.  The uranium utilization 
out ce s a r of  lower (better) than 149 MW-uran ore/year needed 
ough LWRs. 
Figure 5-12 shows uranium flows as a function of FR conversion ratio.  Here, we assume that discharged 
uranium is used as the source of uranium for the FR. A LWR at 51 MW-day/kg-HM burnup uses 19 MT-
enriched uranium/year per GWe at 4.3% enrichment.  This is 149 MT-uranium-ore/year per GWe, if th
tailings are 0.2% U
ratio approaches 1.0.  At FR with CR=0.25, we find approximately …
109 MT/yr per GWe – Uranium ore needed 
  95 MT/yr per GWe - Enrichment tailings
  13 MT/yr per GWe - Unused “burned” uranium discharged
(73% of fleet)
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Figure 5-12. Uranium supply needed as function of FR conversion ratio.  BU = burned uranium, the 
igure 5-13 shows the uranium flows in the range of conversion ratio from 0.95 to 1.00 to show more
is
e required is only 7.2 MT/year per GWe, a factor of 20 
provement versus the once-through fuel cycle.  Only above CR=0.986 are any of the uranium
uranium discharged from thermal reactors (TR). 
F
detail as the conversion ratio approaches 1.  At CR=0.986, all of the burned uranium discharged from
LWRs is required to make fuel for the FR portion of the fleet.  At this conversion ratio, 5% of the fleet
LWR, 95% is fast reactors.  The total uranium or
im
enrichment tailings needed. 
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Figure 5-13. Uranium supply needed as function of FR conversion ratio.  BU = burned uranium, the 
uranium discharged from thermal reactors (TR). 
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At CR=0.9985, only 0.5% of the fleet is LWR, 99.5% is fast reactors.  At this conversion ratio, the
uranium enrichment tailings (for the current LWRs) are no longer adequate to supply uranium for the fast 
reactors.  Previously stockpiled uranium tailings (burned or depleted) would be required for part of the 
fast reactors.  The uranium improvement factor at CR=0.9985 is about 90.
Having established the support ratios and the percent of the fleet burning each type of fuel, we turn to 
mass throughput.
Figure 5-14 shows the throughput (tonnes/year) of discharge fuel to separation plants for the various cases 
studied.  The mass is dominated in all cases by uranium, consistent with the observations above that UOX 
remains the dominant fuel in the system, except in the BFR cases.  The uranium in the BFR cases, of 
course, provides fertile U238.
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thermal efficiency for the fast reactor.  Indeed, the fission product yield for U235 and Pu239 differ 
Figure 5-14. Equilibrium Mass Throughputs (num
Recall that each case includes all the types of fuels
includes the UOX, the IMF, and the CFR output, normalized to 1 GWe.
The throughputs are in the range of 15 to 19 tonnes/year with only three exceptions: low UOX burnup 
), ultra high UOX burnup (100) and BFR.  The various IMF cases show somewhat lower throughputs 
the analogous MOX cases.  With MOX, there is uranium coming
used MOX; uranium continues to cycle around the system. With IMF, t
used UOX; uranium does not contin
throughput is ultra-high burnup.
next several graphs divide the values in Figure 5-14 by element to better understand trends.  Figure 5-
emoves uranium.1
Figure 5-15 shows just the fission product throughputs.  These are constant among the pure thermal cases.
There is a slight reduction for the CFR and, even more, for BFR.  This is presumably due to the increase 
in
Page 80 
(Figure 5-16).  Recall that all discharge masses in this study reflect 5 years of decay after reactor
discharge.
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Figure 5-15. Equilibrium Mass Throughputs, Fission Products Only
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Figure 5-16. Fission yields for U235 and Pu239, data from [Walker1989]
UOX and IMF. The highest is for BFR. The ases have significant recycling TRU flows 
Figure 5-17 shows just the TRU throughputs for the same cases.  The lowest TRU throughputs are for 
MOX and CFR c
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because none of them are as efficient in consuming TRU as does IMF.  By continuing to recycle the TRU 
ulti-pass MOX, CFR symbiotic cases), the Am accumulates together with the Pu. (m
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Figure 5-17. Equilibrium Mass Throughputs, TRU elements only 
Finally Figure 5-18 focuses onsider multi-pass MOX 
ersus IMF. Multi-pass MOX accumulates more Am each pass.  The Am is not burning very efficiently.
A must be burning somewhat better in the IMF calculations, but there is a significant accumulation of 
termediate is
on the “hottest to handle” elements, Am and Cm. C
v
m
Cm.  Note that the CFR cases have the highest Am and Cm throughputs, because of the Am and Cm
coming from the feed. The equilibrium BFR cases contain significantly less Am and Cm because the
otopes fission in the fast flux. in
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Figure 5-18. Equilibrium Mass Throughputs, Am and Cm only
Page 82 
The cost implications of these differing mass throughputs requires analysis.
5.2. Waste Management Calculations
ventilation, the minimum
quired by law.
This section examines long-term heat (LTH), long-term dose (LTD), and long-term radiotoxicity (LTR). 
5.2.1 Long-Term Heat (LTH)
Unless otherwise stated, all analyses in this section are for the case of 50-year
re
Table 5-6 shows the LTH improvement for the various single-pass cases.  The best is IMF-NpPu, which 
is slightly better than IMF-NpPuAmCm.  This was somewhat surprising.  We believe it is caused by
needing more Pu to make the NpPuAmCm case work; indeed, the IMF-NpPu case has 14% higher
burnup.  A single-pass strategy does not meet program objectives.  Note that the IMF blended core case
does not perform as well (for this first cycle) as the IMF full core cases, which go to higher burnups and 
leave little fissile material left.  This of course makes it very difficult to continue to recycle those IMF 
cases.  The IMF blended core does better than the 1st pass MOX cases.  By design, the multi-pass IMF 
approach sacrifices some benefit the first pass in an attempt to keep going. 
Table 5-6. LTH Results for Single-pass Cases, Normalized to UOX-51 as baseline 
Targets (see
Chapter 3) 
UOX-
33
UOX-
100
MOX-
NpPu
MOX-
NpPuAm
IMF- IMF- IMF-
NpPu NpPu
AmCm
NpPuAm
(blended
core)
IMF-
NpPu/Am
(blended
core)
Bu nup (GWth-day/tonne) 33 100 51 51 633.2 553.8 64.8 66.1r
Lon 0.95 1.17 1.07 1.12 1.98 1.82 1.61 1.67g-term 10x to 200x
(to achieveheat (LTH)
im rovementp actual
repository
improvements
of 10-50x)
LTH of heat released from when ventilation stops (50 
ears) to 1500 years, whereas Wigeland’s analyses determine the maximum loading to stay within the set 
of temperature limits.  Nonetheless, we find good agreement.
Table 5-7. Current results compared to those of R. Wigeland
Table 5-7 compares current results with those of Wigeland for multi-pass MOX.  Recall in this study the
improvement is calculated solely by the metric 
y
Cycle 1 Cycle 2 Cycle 3 Cycle 4 Cycle 5
50-yr ventilation (this study) 1.12 1.19 1.26 1.34 1.43
75-yr ventilation (Wigeland) 1.09 1.18 1.27 1.39 1.49
100-yr ventilation (this study) 1.09 1.19 1.28 1.38 1.48
300-yr ventilation (this study) 1.05 1.13 1.27 1.41 1.54
Figure 5-19 compares multi-pass cases, either calculated here or in an earlier report [Stillman2004c].
Note that the two MOX-NpPuAm cases agree; the earlier report used actual thermal transient 
calculations, as discussed in Chapter 3, in this report we used the simpler LTH metric.  CORAIL is a 
MOX-type approach with a different blending strategy than the MOX case used here and in 
Page 83 
Stillman2004c.  The cycle-by-cycle isotope inventories in the CFR and BFR cases in [Stillman2004c]
were estimated in that study. 
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Figure 5-19. Comparison of multi-pass cases with 75-year ventilation in the repository.  Cases marked 
“ANL” were calculated in [Stillman2004c].
NpPuAm is the highest after the first recycle, but at the cost of creating a 
residual that is very difficult to continue to use in an LWR.  The blended core IMF case in this 
l
in
t
Three observations of Figure 5-19 are as follows: 
x Even after 5 recycles, none of the cases achieves the AFCI program objectives of 10-50. 
x MOX does substantially worse than either IMF or the FR cases.
x 1-pass, full core IMF-
study more modestly burns TRU in the first recycle, but the approach can continue for additiona
recycles.
Figure 5-20 compares multi-pass MOX with multi-pass IMF.  The IMF cases do better than MOX;
however, none of these cases achieve the minimum 10x objective.  As shown in Chapter 7, little mass
the system would get past 5 cycles this century.  So, multi-pass IMF or MOX looks like a strategy tha
would work this century. The load on the repository would be controlled by losses.  If recycling stopped 
after 5 cycles, there would be still be real benefit, ~3x for IMF. 
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We now consider how “hot” each fuel bec ll o cy of conc ing
the heat-dominant isotopes lati les T v o th th he
system has bee d, i.e., the uranium.  Figures 5-21a and 21b show the LTH in units of 
gram of fuel for the various cases.  These values are for fuels only, not how they would be com in a
m. -21 s e r e fue sig ntl tter.” re 5-21 s
e potential is dominated by NpPu at 5-yr after discharge.  Note that the relative 
ducts (Cs and Sr) declines relative to once-through fuels: fission products do not 
TRU elements do. 
cycle3
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Figure 5-20. Comparison of multi-pass full-core MOX versus multi-pass blended core IMF (50-yr
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Figure 5-21a. LTH per gram of each fuel 
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Figure 5-21b. LTH per gram of each fuel, normalized to 100% to show elemental contribution to total. 
A more appropriate comparison is to normalize the above results on a per energy basis.  Therefore, 
Figures 5-22a and 5-22b show LTH values, this time on a per GWe basis.  As with Figure 5-16, these are 
not “fleet” calculations, they are simply the values for each type of fuel.  The MOX cases are seen has 
attaining high LTH values, the dominant isotope becomes Pu238. 
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Figure 5-22a. LTH per GWe of each fuel 
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alized to 100% to show elemental contribution to total. 
UOX-MOX-CFR
UOX-IMF-CFR
UOX-BFR
UOX-IMF-CFR
ix of fuels at equilibrium is shown in Figure 5-23. 
Figure 5-22b. LTH per GWe of each fuel, norm
We now turn to “equilibrium” calculations for the entire fleet: 
5-pass MOX, then discard 
5-pass IMF, then discard 
UOX-CFR
The m
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For the pure-thermal cases, loss rates do not 
atter much because the 5  cycle is discarded.  For the CFR and BFR cases, if Cs and Sr fission products
are not separated, but 100% of TRU are recycled, it appears that an LTH improvement of 10x can be 
achieved, barely.  Recall, however, that LTH improvement overpredicts actual repository heat
improvement; see Chapter 3.  Wigeland found [Wigeland2005] a maximum benefit of 6x (actual 
repository heat calculation, not simple metrics) without separation of fission products, but this was 
looking only at the composition of used UOX-51.  Current results are not a basis for concluding that 
fission products can be kept with recycled FR fuel. 
Figure 5-23. Equilibrium mix of fuels in seven systems
Figure 5-24 shows the resulting LTH improvement factors.
thm
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objective is very of TRU.[DOE2005a] nd
preparation of that report had been 99% recovery. In t e LTH improvement factors 
OX/CFR), 49 (IMF/CFR), 55 (UOX/CFR), and 70 (BFR), see Figure 5-25.  Because the LTH 
nt factors can overpredict actual repository performa esults may not be adequate to 
d repository for high growth scenarios.  It is envisioned that Cm is ycled in fast 
onetheless, the figure also shows a curious result with regard to separation of C
umulates in the BFR systems, it is less important to recycle it. Even if fissio
rown away each cycle, the BFR system keeps an LTH im t of just over 
s unlikely to actually achieve a repository improvement of 10x, howev
Figure 5-24. LTH improvement factors for seven sy
The program
Sr during
99.5% reco A t
his case, th
entative program objective for Cs a
are 27 (M
improveme nce, these r
avoid a secon always rec
reactor systems, n m.
Because less Cm acc n
products and Cm are th provemen
10x.  We caution that this i er.
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s
, Pu241/Am241 for LTH. There are five major differences, which we 
t multiple times after emplacement.  The patterns, for example, at 10,000 
placement are fundamentally different, as discussed in Chapter 3.  In contrast, the 
patterns for LTH at different ventilation 
000 years. A emoved, the
eak dose can shift to other time periods. Our interpretation is the program goal is to reduce peak 
products are Cs
a
on
el
special repository
tailored to their eeping Tc 
and I with HL ate their
contribution to repository dose by some unspecified method. 
portance of chemical form.  The chemical form is irrelevant to 
LTH
improv
Figure 5-25. LTH improvement factors for FR systems
5.2.2 Long-Term Dose (LTD)
In many ways, the patterns for LTD and LTH are similar.  The single most important set of TRU isotope
re Pu241/Am241/Np237 for LTDa
emphasize because the AFCI program has tended to be focused on LTH, but must also now examine
LTD.
irst, LTD must be assessed aF
versus 500,000 after em
periods are basically the same.  For UOX, peak doses occur at 
s shown below, however, if some, but not all, components of waste are r500,
p
doses, whenever they occur.
The second set of differences involve fission products.  For LTH, the dominant fission
and Sr. They cannot be transmuted effectively.[Salvatores1998]  The only options (Chapter 2) are to keep 
them with HLW or separate and dispose of them elsewhere, e.g., at-grade storage or in a special part of
repository.  For LTD, the dominant fission products are Tc and I.  Their relative importance depends
the time after emplacement.  They can be transmuted, although slowly.[Yang2004, Salvatores1998] If
separated from HLW, options include transmutation, putting in a more durable waste form than spent fu
(hence reducing their effective contribution to repository dose), or putting into a
chemistry. In the following analysis, we simplify these options to either k
W, or separating them and doing something that would effectively elimin
The third set of differences involve the im
, but highly relevant to LTD. In the following analysis, we have no way to apply credit for 
ed waste forms; all material is assumed to behave as if spent UOX.
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The fou
there is
delay al ore difficult to transmute, but less likely to lead to 
som es for
the 4 de
Chain 4N+1: Np237 (2.1e6) and U233 (1.6e5)
basis
earance of Cm244 from LTH calculations once it decays); it is an advantage
enefit or disadvantage only if the transmutation rate of its daughters are higher or lower than the original 
d on
o heat in the 1500-year
time period.  For LTD, however, decay into uranium isotopes (and Np237) accomplishes nothing because
these are the long-lived isotopes that can transport out of the repository.  And, the underlying chemistry is 
that uranium is more soluble and transports faster than TRU. 
Figures 5-26a and 5-26b show the hypothetical dose at 500,000 years.  Note first that the uranium dose 
increases from MOX cycle 1 to 5, even though the fraction of uranium in the fuel is decreasing!  Tracing 
back through the calculations reveals that the cause is slow accumulation of U234, a decay product of 
Pu238.  Indeed, the small amount of uranium made in IMF-NpPu and IMF-NpPuAmCm is U234. 
Similarly, the uranium doses for the BFR-equilibrium fuels are low relative to the amount of uranium in 
the fuel because there is little U234 (less accumulation of Pu238) and relatively little U235.  As shown in 
Chapter 3, the dose per gram from U234 is higher than U235, which is higher than U238. 
rth set of differences involve the benefit, or lack thereof, of delay.  It is well known that for LTH
a benefit of waiting for Cm244 (18.1 years) to decay.  There are LTH tradeoffs for Pu241/Am241;
lows Pu241 to decay to Am241, which is m
e of the higher actinides.  For LTD, delay is generally less important.  The key long-lived isotop
cay chains are as follows:
Chain 4N: U236 (2.3e7) and Th232 (1.4e10)
Chain 4N+2: U238 (4.5e9) and U234 (2.4e5)
Chain 4N+3: U235 (7.0e8) and Pa231 (3.0e4)
Delay only allows TRU to decay down to U236, Np237, U238, and U235.  Indeed, on a “per gram”
the LTD for many TRU isotopes are the same as one of those four isotopes.  Delay does not eliminate a 
problem (as does the disapp
b
isotope.
The final set of differences involve uranium.  For LTH, uranium is unimportant; whether uranium is 
separated, burned, put into near-surface disposal is irrelevant. For the LTD values in this study, base
recent unpublished YMP values (Chapter 3, Appendix D), uranium is important. Indeed, there is at least
one long-lived isotope in each of the four decay chains.  For LTH, decay into uranium isotopes (and 
Np237) is good because they are long-lived and therefore do not contribute much t
Page 91 
1.E+00
1.E-04
U
O
X
 (3
3)
U
O
X
 (5
1)
U
O
X
 (1
00
)
M
O
X
-N
P
-1
 (5
1)
M
O
X
-N
P
A
-1
 (5
1)
M
O
X
-N
P
A
-2
 (5
1)
M
O
X
-N
P
A
-3
 (5
1)
M
O
X
-N
P
A
-4
 (5
1)
M
O
X
-N
P
A
-5
 (5
1)
IM
F-
N
P
-1
 (6
33
)
IM
F-
N
P
A
C
-1
 (5
54
)
IM
F-
N
P
A
-1
 (6
5)
IM
F-
N
P
A
-2
 (6
5)
IM
F-
N
P
A
-3
 (6
5)
IM
F-
N
P
A
-4
 (6
5)
IM
F-
N
P
A
-5
 (6
5)
U
O
X
/C
FR
-s
t (
17
7)
U
O
X
/C
FR
-e
q 
(1
77
)
M
O
X
/C
FR
-s
t (
17
6)
M
O
X
/C
FR
-e
q 
(1
76
)
IM
F/
C
FR
-s
t (
11
8)
IM
F/
C
FR
-e
q 
(1
28
)
U
O
X
-to
-B
FR
-s
t (
66
)
U
O
X
-to
-B
FR
-e
q 
(6
6)
IM
F-
to
-B
FR
-s
t (
66
)
IM
F-
to
-B
FR
-e
q 
(6
6)
H
(m
re
m
/y
r n
or
m
1.E-03
1.E-02
1.E-01
po
th
et
ic
al
 d
os
e
al
iz
ed
 p
er
 G
w
e 
of
 e
ac
h 
f
y
ue
l)
FP
Cm
Am
NpPu
U
Figure 5-26a. Hypothetical dose per GWe at 500,000 years per GWe of fuel 
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Figure 5-26b. tion among
elements
Pu241.
never over 1.4%.
the
 Hypothetical dose at 500,000 years per GWe of fuel, showing the contribu
As expected, in all cases the dose at 500,000 years is dominated by NpPu, especially Np237 and
The Am dose is dominated by Am241. At 500,000 years, the FP products are relatively unimportant,
Table 5-8 shows the LTD reduction for single-pass cases.  The pattern is the same as for LTH. None of
systems come close to adequate performance. 
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Table 5-8. Key Results for Single-Pass Cases relative to UOX-51
Targets UOX- UOX- MOX- MOX- IMF- IMF- IMF- IMF-
(see
Chapter
3)
33 100 NpPu NpPuAm NpPu NpPu
ACm
NpPuAm
(blended
core)
NpPu/Am
(blended
core)
Long-term
dose (LTD)
10-50x 7 1.630.90 1.12 1.35 1.41 2.09 1.96 1.5
improvement
Figure 5-27 compares multi-pass MOX with multi-pass IMF.  As with LTH, the IMF cases do better; 
however, none achieve the minimum 10x objective. Removing Tc and I helps, but not much.
3.5
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3.0
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MOX-NpPuAm (include Tc+I)
IMF-NpPuAm (exclude Tc+I)
IMF-NpPuAm (include Tc+I)
IMF-NpPu /Am (exclude Tc+I)
IMF-NpPu /Am (include Tc+I)
Figure 5-27. LTD improvement factor for multi-pass MOX and multi-pass IMF 
So far, the improvement factors are so small, it does not matter that dose varies at different time perio
but as we look for higher LTD improvements, we have to consider that impact.  Figure 5-28 shows the
hypothetical dose for 70,000 tonnes of once-through UOX-51 with varying fractions of elements
removed.  Baseline (nothing removed) peaks at 31 mrem/yr at 500,000 years per the original numbers
from DOE-RW.  Removing 99% of NpPu, NpPuAm, or even NpPuAmCm does not meet the program
objective of 10x improvement.  Rather 90% removal of U is required in addition to removing 99% of 
NpPuAm; Cm is not an issue at this point.  So, 99% NpPuAm and 90% U removal meets the minimum
10x objective, it actually achieves about 20x.  Perfect removal of everything except FP achieves 26x. 
ds,
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Figure 5-28. Hypothetical dose for 70,000 tonnes of UOX-51 with various elements removed;
removal of 99% NpPuAm and 90% U achieves LTD reduction of 10x
We argued in Chapter 3 that it could be valuable to achieve better LTD performance, at least sufficient s
that recycling is a net “wash” on dose – this would require the LTD improvement to be as high as the 
repository heat improvement, for example 50x. 
Figure 5-29 shows that going to 99.9% removal of U, Np, Pu, Am, and Cm would not be sufficient to 
reduce peak dose by 50x. Once most of the U, Np, Am, and Am are removed, the problem becomes
fission products Tc99 and I-129 at 100,000 years after emplacement.  Figure 5-29 shows that 90%
removal of technetium and iodine, in addition to 99% removal of NpPuAm and 90% removal of uranium,
would indeed reduce peak doses by 50x. 
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Figure TD improvement factors for the same “equilibrium” cases.  The first bar, 
“U+T 00%” denotes total recovery of heavy metals but all Tc and I going to the repository.
This l rovemen   If we want to achieve LTD improvement as high as our 
target t capacit ments, something has to be done with the Tc and I. 
Figure 5-29. Hypothetical dose for 70,
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Figure 5-30. LTD improvement factors for sustainable cases
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Therefore, the program should not exclude the possibility of recycling Tc and I.  Fortunately, the UREX+ 
e effective
ose relative to spent UOX) or potential geologic disposal; all options would be left open. 
more exact analyses.
either LTD or LTH. Like LTH, the chemical form of waste is irrelevant.  Like 
LTD, the value depends on the time after emplacement.
ring
self must be reduced by almost a factor of 
100x.  (99.5% implies 200x reduction, but for only the first pass.)
peakin red for the LTR objective.
Recycling of C
Accounting for cluding the daughters from uranium.  For example,
Pu238 decays i ium isotopes is dominated by their
radioactive dau
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process (as embodied in the Spent Fuel Treatment Facility (SFTF) design study) extracts Tc and I so that
they are separated for potential future transmutation, for dedicated waste forms (to reduce th
d
The above results are merely exploratory and future work is required to make
5.2.3 Long-Term Radiotoxicity (LTR) 
LTR is yet different than
The conclusions regarding LTR are the following: 
x Recycling of fission products such as Cs, Sr, Tc, and I are not needed to meet the LTR objective of 
100x reduction at 1,000 years.
x Recycling of Pu and Am are required to meet the LTR objective.  Recovery of 99.5% of the Pu du
multi-pass recycling is probably not adequate because Pu it
x Strictly s g, Np recycle is not requi
x m is borderline. 
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Figure 5-31. Radiotoxicity relative to natural uranium ore, by isotope (same case as Figure 3-8).
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Figure 5-32. Radiotoxicity relative to natural uranium ore, by dominant isotope (same case as Figure 3-8). 
Figures 5-31 and 5-32 show by inspection that neither fission products (FP) nor Np are important relative 
to the LTR reduction objective.  These figures also imply that recycle of Cm is not required; however, as 
shown below, this is an erroneous conclusion because the daughters of Cm244 are important.  Recycle of 
Pu and Am are required. 
In this study, we calculated LTR metrics such that each isotope includes all of its associated daughters;
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Figure 5-35. Radiotoxicity of UOX-51, grouped by element at time of discharge.  The radiotoxicity of the
uranium ore equivalent to fuel (dotted line in the figure) is 1.3e4 mrem/g-fuel.
In principle, either calculational approach – show each daughter explicitly in Figures 5-31/32 or
incorporate daughters with their isotope of origin in Figures 5-33/34/35 will produce the same total 
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radioatoxicity. The latter approach has the advantage of more clearly identifying which elements have to 
be recycled. Isotopes have to be recycled if they – or their daughters – adversely im tal .
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x U238 (4.5e9 yrs) – Its key daughter is U235 (2.4e5 yrs) so that it takes until 1e6 yrs for the LTR to 
plateau.  Thereafter, it is constant.
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Figure 5-36. Radiotoxicity of UOX-51, uranium isotopes only.
Because natural uranium is 99.3% U238 and its radiotoxicity (once daughters build in) exceeds U235 and 
is close to U234, U238 defines the radiotoxicity of natural uranium ore (if one ignores natural thorium).
Figure 5-36 shows that the radiotoxicity of uranium is 1.6e3 mrem/g-uranium.  Indeed, by 1e7 years, the 
radiotoxicity of UOX-51 is also controlled by U238. On that time scale, spent fuel has returned to its 
starting point – uranium and its daughters.  At times over 1e5 years, uranium isotopes must be considered
in radiotoxicity calculations. 
Figure 5-37 shows the radiotoxicity of used fuel for the three different UOX burnups considered in this 
study.  Figure 5-38 shows the same thing, except normalized to uranium ore.  Note that the normalization
to uranium ore is itself a function of burnup because the uranium enrichment varies.  At 33 MW-day/kg-
HM, the conversion (0.2% tails) is 5.8 g-ore/g-fuel.  At 51 MW-day/kg-HM, it is 7.9.  At 100 MW-
day/kg-HM, it is 15.9 g-ore/g-fuel.  Figure 5-38 shows that the impact of burnup is very small, as we 
would expect – the accumulation of long-lived TRU isotopes (relative to the uranium ore required to 
make the UOX fuel) depends mostly on the amount of power generated (number of fissions), not whether 
the fissions are taking place in 3 batches of 33 MW-day/kg-HM fuel or 1 batch of 100 MW-day/kg-HM.
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Figure 5-37. Radiotoxicity of UOX, showing the impact of burnup from 33 to 100 MW-day/kg-HM
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Figure 5-38. Radioxicity of used UOX, normalized to uranium ore, showing the impact of burnup from 33 
to 100 MW-day/kg-HM.
Table 5-9 shows the radiotoxicity relative to UOX-51 for the single-pass cases in this study.  Like LTH 
and LTD, the values are fairly close to 1, nowhere near the 100x target. 
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Table 5-9. Radiotoxicity results for single-pass cases, normalized to UOX-51
Targets
(see
Chapter
3)
UOX-
33
UOX-
100
MOX-
NpPu
MOX-
NpPuAm
IMF-
NpPu
IMF-
NpPu
ACm
IMF-
NpPuAm
(blended
core)
IMF-
NpPu/Am
(blended
core)
Long-term
radiotoxicity
(LTR)
improvement
100x at 
1000 yr 
after
discharge
0.89 1.38 1.12 1.18 2.46 2.39 1.79 1.85
Figure 5-39 shows the radiotoxicity improvement factor for mult-pass IMF and MOX; the trends are very
similar to the analogous LTD and LTH improvement factors.  This is unsurprising because the dominant
elements – Pu, Np, and Am - are the same.
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Figure 5-39. LTR improvement factors for multi-pass MOX and multi-pass IMF 
Table 5-10 shows the results for multi-pass recycle cases in this study.  Again, the results are quite similar
to LTD. 
Table 5-10. Multi-pass LTR results at 0.1% loss 
MOX
NpPuAm
IMF-
NpPuAm
UOX/CFR
symbiosis
MOX/CFR
symbiosis
IMF/CFR
symbiosis
UOX to
BFR
IMF to
BFR
Targets
(see
Chapter
3)
Throw away after 5 
cycles Equilibrium
LTR
improve-
ment
100x at 
1000 yr
1.86 3.19 >100 >100 >100 >100 >100
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5.3 Proliferation Resistance 
5.3.1 Quantity metrics 
Figure 5-40 shows the Pu239 equivalent fraction of each fuel, which weights each isotope by their bare 
sphere critical mass relative to Pu239. There are five particular items to note, moving from left to right in 
the Figure.  First, the Pu-239 equivalent fraction of the multi-pass MOX fuels steadily increases, this is 
because of Pu-238.  Unfortunately, however, the Pu238 fraction is never high enough that Pu in the fuel 
ceases to be considered weapons-usable by IAEA [IAEA2001] definitions.  Second, the Pu-239 
equivalent fraction for single-pass IMF-NpPu and IMF-NpPuAm is high, by design!  Third, the Pu239 
equivalent fractions for multi-pass IMF are similar to once-through because they are mostly UOX.  Less 
than 2% (by mass) of the multi-pass IMF blends is TRU.  Fourth, the Pu239 equivalent fractions for the 
CFR cases are high.  Five, the only cases where the Pu239 equivalent fraction is higher for the output fuel
than the input fuel are the BFR cases, UOX-33, and UOX-51.  In all others, it is literally true that 
recycling has the net effect of destroying weapons-usable material. 
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Figure 5-40. Pu239 equivalent fraction for fuels in this study
Figure 5-41 looks at the throughput of weapons-usable material in fresh fuel, again using Pu239-
equivalent as the metric.  As expected, the BFR system is the highest. 
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Figure 5-42 shows the Pu fraction of each fuel.  The trends are quite similar to Pu239 equivalent with the 
exception that the input value for once-through is zero here, but non-zero (because of U235) in Figure 5-
30.
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Figure 5-42. Pu fraction of fuels in this study
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5.3.2 Quality metrics 
Figure 5-43 shows the fraction of Pu239/Pu-total for the fuels in this study.  The ratio is undefined for 
fresh once-through because there is no Pu.  The input values for all fuels that directly use Pu from
discharged UOX-51 is, of course, the same as the output value for UOX-51, 53%.  The lowest Pu239/Pu
fuel is IMF-CFR, but of course the IMF-CFR system requires full-core IMF in symbiosis with the CFR 
and the Pu239/Pu for fresh IMF is 53%. 
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Figure 5-43. Pu239/Pu-total fractions for fuels in this study
5.3.3 Fuel Handling 
Stillman [Stillman2004d] provided gamma and neutron results for 4.3-kg of spent UOX in a prototypical
geometry.  By analyzing his results, we obtain these “rules of thumb” for discharged fuels with fission 
products removed.  Recall that a truly unshielded configuration, can allow high dose rates resulting from
the TRU alone,[Hannum1995], but these gammas are shielded by even a thin wall container as 
demonstrated by Stillman.  Only thin steel is needed to shield some of the actinide gammas, which is why
the dose rates are relatively low (even for Am) compared to previous bare material evaluations. 
Gamma Am241 0.100 rem/hr
 Pu-RG 0.050 rem/hr
 Pu-WG 0.005 rem/hr
Neutron Cm244 0.500 rem/hr
 Pu238 0.010 rem/hr
 Pu-WG 0.001 rem/hr
Figure 5-44 illustrates the expected gamma and neutron dose from different fuels (fresh or 5-year after 
discharge).  There are several points to be made, remembering that this approach is only a crude estimate
that neglects any changes in the important self-shielding effects (see Section 3.2.3). 
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In all cases, the true dose rate of discharged fuels is dominated by fission products.  None of the TRU-
based dose rates exceed 100 rem/hr; discharged fuels are much hotter.  Indeed, it takes ~100 years before 
used once-through fuel decays to ~100 rem/hr.  Since all fuels have roughly the same fission products, it 
will take all of them roughly the same time to drop to ~100 rem/hr.  The discharge values in Figure 5-30 
for the higher cases are dominated by Cm244 (18.1 year), so that the TRU component of dose rates will 
not stay near 100 rem/hr either.  Therefore, the duration of “self-protection” (versus the 100 rem/hr value) 
does not appear likely to change significantly among fuels. 
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Figure 5-44. Crude approximation of unshielded dose rates for fuels in this study with fission products
removed.  We stress that these are crude, intended primarily to help compare options in a relative sense. 
We now turn to fresh fuels.  Within a factor of 3 up and down 1 rem/hr represents transition from hands-
on/glovebox to fully remote fabrication.  See also Appendix F. There are three types of fuels that may
avoid fully remote fabrication. 
1. First cycle fuels without Am, MOX-NpPu and IMF-NpPu.  This is likely to be a valid conclusion as 
it matches international practice.  Lacking recipes for multi-pass fuels without Am, we cannot 
validate whether this favorable result holds for subsequent recycles.
2. BFR fuels at equilibrium.  The BFR spent fuel has an isotopic vector much more concentrated in Pu-
239 than LWR spent fuel. Thus, Figure 5-34 shows that the dose rates for even the entire transuranic 
mix are quite low. However, the typical practice for fast reactor recycle is to process the fuel with 
very short cooling times (e.g., 2 years for pyroprocess in this study); this is done to reduce the total 
inventory contained in the fast reactor fuel cycle. These short cooling times would require remote 
fabrication, despite the favorable TRU dose characteristics.
3. Multi-cycle IMF-blended assemblies, with IMF-NpPuAm.  The validity of this finding is unclear,
but would seem unlikely. The crude estimates here indicate lower dose than for MOX-NpPu.  The ¾ 
of each assembly that are UOX pins, of course, avoid fully remote fabrication. The IMF pins on the 
outer edge of each assembly contain all of the TRU. The mass of TRU in each assembly is small, less 
than 2%, in contrast to 100% for full-core IMF.  That is what produces the result in Figure 5-30.
These outer IMF pins will have relatively little shielding, so it would likely that the IMF pins and the 
final assembly will require remote fabrication.
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4. Multi-cycle IMF-blended assemblies, with IMF-NpPu and separate Am targets.  The difference from
the preceding case is that the Am is not in the IMF-NpPu pins (which therefore are similar to the full-
core IMP-NpPu pins), the Am is in 4 target pins (of 264 in the assembly), deeper within the assembly.
It is quite possible that final assembly would not require fully remote fabrication.  The UOX pins 
would be hands-on, the IMF-NpPu pins are possibly glovebox, and the Am targets would be remote
fabrication.
The anticipated fabrication approach for the fuels in this study is therefore given in Table 5-11.
Table 5-11. Anticipated fabrication approach for the fuels in this study 
Fuel type Anticipated fabrication approach 
UOX-31 Hands on
UOX-51 Hands on
UOX-100 Hands on
MOX-NpPu Glovebox 
MOX-NpPuAm Remote
MOX-NpPuAmCm Remote
IMF-NpPu (full core) Glovebox
IMF-NpPuAm (full core) Remote
IMF-NpPuAmCm (full core) Remote
IMF-NpPuAm (blended core) UOX pins – hands-on 
IMF pins – remote
Final assembly –remote
IMF-NpPu with separate Am targets (blended core) UOX pins – hands-on 
IMF pins – glovebox
Am targets - remote
Final assembly – remote
UOX/CFR symbiosis Remote
IMF/CFR symbiosis Remote
MOX/CFR symbiosis Remote
UOX-to-BFR Remote for short cooling time
IMF-to-BFR Remote for short cooling time
MOX-to-BFR Remote for short cooling time
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5.4 Energy Recovery
Table 5-12 shows the uranium utilization improvement factor for single-pass cases; these are for the 
entire system, e.g., they account for the UOX needed to make MOX and IMF, neither of which use 
enriched uranium.  Only IMF-NpPu meets the short-term objective of 1.15.
Table 5-12. Uranium Utilization Improvement factors  (compared to UOX-51) for Single-Pass 
Cases
Targets
(see
Chapter
3)
UOX-
33
UOX-
100
MOX-
NpPu
MOX-
NpPuAm
IMF-
NpPu
IMF-
NpPuAmCm
IMF-
NpPuAm
(blended
core)
IMF-
NpPu/Am
(blended
core)
Uranium ore 
use
improvement
1.15
short
term
50x
long
term
0.88 0.97 1.09 1.07 1.15 1.14 1.13 1.14
Note that the uranium ore utilization for UOX-33 and UOX-100 are both lower than UOX-51.  This 
agrees with past work.  Hesketh and Robbins (BNFL, no date or conference ID available) concluded “A 
clear minimum in fuel cycle costs are seen at or below 55 GWd/MT” and that this conclusion is “robust 
against perturbations in the underlying assumptions” such as the price of uranium.  Gregg and Worrall 
similarly concluded (Effect of Highly Enriched/Highly Burnt UO2 Fuels on Nuclear Design Parameters
and Economics" ANFM 2003 Conference) that “there is no fuel cycle cost benefit in discharge burnups
greater than 70 to 75 GWd/MT.” 
Figure 5-45 shows the uranium improvement factor for 5-pass MOX and IMF.  The IMF-NpPuAm case
has plateaued and peaked very slightly at cycle 4. The IMF-NpPu with Am target case does slightly better 
than the IMF-NpPuAm case.
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Figure 5-45. Uranium utilization factors for multi-pass IMF and MOX.
The equilibrium value for the CFR cases is determined simply by the fraction of UOX in the equilibrium
fleets, with the results of 1.37 (UOX/CFR), 1.49 (MOX/CFR), and 1.38 (IMF/CFR). 
The equilibrium value for the BFR cases is determined by the use of U238, not U235.  At equilibrium,
BFR has 10.57 tonnes-U/yr input (per GWe), 9.64 tonnes-U/yr output, requiring a makeup of 0.93 
tonnes/yr.  UOX-51 requires 18.96 tonnes-enriched U/yr (per GWe).  At 4.3% enrichment and 0.2%
tailings, 7.88 tonnes-U-ore needed to make 1 tonne of enriched U, so that UOX-51 requires 149 tonnes-
U-ore/yr.  Thus, the uranium utilization improvement factor is 149/0.93 = 160. 
5.5 System Management (economics, safety, etc.) 
From a system management perspective, the key is that the throughput of recirculating TRU varies so 
much among concepts, see section 5.1.
x The TRU throughput for the multi-pass full-core MOX cases in this study is always higher than 
for multi-pass IMF.  At the 5th cycle, the values are 0.94 and 0.34 tonnes-TRU/yr per GWe. 
x The TRU throughput for CFR cases is 0.75 (UOX-CFR), 1.04 (MOX-CFR), and 0.79 (IMF-
CFR).  These numbers, of course, include the UOX, MOX, and IMF required to keep the CFR 
going.  However, for integrated FR-separation-fabrication plants, most of these mass flows would
not have the leave the site.
x The TRU throughput for BFR is the highest, 1.45 tonnes-TRU/yr per GWe at equilibrium.
However, for integrated FR-separation-fabrication facilities, as in the Integral Fast Reactor 
concept, only 7% of this would have to leave the site. 
Worker dose and public risk throughput the fuel cycle will, to some degree, scale with the throughput of 
the “nastier” isotopes.  In this regard, the rank order is roughly short-lived fission products, Cm, Am, Pu, 
Np, U.  The flux of fission products is basically constant (per GWe).  The flux of uranium does not 
change much either, except for ultra-high-burnup.  The flux of the TRU elements changes significantly; 
see section 5.1 for details. 
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Finally, we note that the percent of new fuels and new reactors vary significantly.  These can be seen 
directly from the blending Figures in section 5.1.  Of course, the worst case are the BFR cases, with 100% 
new fuels and 100% new reactors.  The pure thermal cases would use existing reactors, possibly with 
minor variations.  The more than 80% of UOX fuel in these systems is of course unchanged, but the 
approximately 20% of IMF or MOX would be new.  The UOX-CFR system at equilibrium is 27% new 
CFR fuel, 73% UOX.  The MOX-CFR system is 20% new CFR fuel, 7% new MOX fuel, and 73% UOX.
The IMF-CFR system is 19% new CFR fuel, 11% new IMF fuel, and 70% UOX.
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6. SCREENING ANALYSES OF DEVELOPMENT TREES 
Previous chapters contained key fuel cycle decisions (Chapter 2), AFCI objectives and metrics (Chapter 
3), the alternatives (Chapter 4), and “static” analyses of the various fuel and reactor options and how they
can be combined (Chapter 5).  This Chapter is the first of three that address timing and dynamics.  This 
Chapter approaches development “trees” using complex spreadsheets, carrying simulations to 2100.  It 
concentrates on basic metrics such as mass to repository and, equally important, on semi-qualitative
considerations such as what new technologies are needed or abandoned in each scenario.  Chapters 7 and 
8 analyze development trees using the DYMOND system dynamic model.
This Chapter has two parts.  First is a broad screening analysis of ~160 scenarios.  Six trees start in 2025: 
(1) continue once-through, (2) start IMF-NpPuAm, (3) start MOX-NpPu, (4) start MOX-NpPuAm, (5) 
deploy a few consumer fast reactors, and (6) deploy a few breeder fast reactors.  Each tree has as many as 
6 branches in 2040 denoting exiting technologies, shifting technologies, or adding technologies.  There 
are additional branches in 2060 and 2080.  Some branches are not studied, e.g., if a technology is exited in 
2040, re-start in 2060 or 2080 is not analyzed.  In all cases nuclear generation was level – that is, new 
types of reactors could be introduced only as existing LWRs were retired.  Top-level conclusions are as 
follows:
1. The system has high inertia, it takes decades to affect major change.  This may be overcome in a 
growth situation in which new reactors are needed to meet demand.  A growth rate as low as 1%
would introduce one new reactor each year. 
2. In postulating development paths, consider the potential number of new technologies to be 
implemented at any given time, the fewer the better. 
3. Even spacing decisions points 20 years apart, it is difficult to observe the impact of the nth decision 
before it would be necessary to make the n+1th decision so that its implementation could begin 20 
years after the implementation of the nth decision.  There is high potential to “out drive our 
headlights.”
4. The two options with the most leverage (ie. the ability to change the amount of Pu in the system are 
IMF and fast reactors.  MOX has less leverage.
5. There are more options to meet repository heat objectives than there are to meet uranium resources
objectives.
a. A screening analysis of 155 branches showed 5% had less than 10% of total energy
produced from recycled fuel, 60% between 10 and 20% from recycled fuel, 31% between 
20% and 50%, and 4% (six) over 50%.  The six with over 50% start thermal or fast 
recycling in 2025 with fast recycling in 2040.  The ones with less than 10% abandoned 
recycling.
b. A similar screening analysis showed that (for 0% growth), 33% of the branches fill the 
repository less than 10%, 27% fill between 10 and 100% of the repository, and 40% 
exceed a 129,000 tonne repository.  The first group uses fast reactors, particularly in the 
later years of the century. The last group rejects recycling sooner or later. 
The second part is a more detailed screening of 36 scenarios, 6 branches for each of the 6 trees.  These are 
the same 36 trees analyzed with DYMOND in Chapter 7.  Top-level conclusions are as follows:
1. Don’t use breeder FRs when the nuclear capacity is declining.  SNF inventories increase with harmful
results.
2. Be cautious in using IMF in high growth if you want some TRU to start up breeder FRs. 
3. Starting up fast reactors commits their operation for a long time; loading fuel (IMF/MOX) lets you 
out in a very few years.  This suggests that it will be difficult to make a decision to start a major 
rampup to fast reactors.  Instead, a cautious introduction of fast reactors may be the only way to start. 
The only way to get full use of the TRU is to have fast reactors in the system.  The only way to 
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minimize the number of repositories in the long term (if there is any growth) is to include fast reactors 
in the system.
4. So long as thermal reactors and burner FRs are used, uranium resources will eventually be limiting.
Only by using breeder FRs can recycle fuel enable long-term sustainable growth.
6.1 Screening analysis of 160 scenarios 
This section presents the results of developing a decision tree for which key decisions are made in 2025, 
2040, 2060 and 2080 regarding the deployment of certain AFCI and Gen IV technologies. The data are 
provided at the end of section 6.1. The analysis, for the most part, assumes a “Level Generation” nuclear 
future – one in which the generation of nuclear energy remains constant throughout the 75-year period. 
The Level Generation future is one which significantly inhibits further development of nuclear power, as 
growth in generation generally enhances flexibility, agility and robustness. 
There are nearly 160 different trajectories through the decision space, out of a potential 600 if all
combinations were considered.  At the end of section 6.1, Table 6-1 provides summary results.  The first 
four columns describe the trajectory, identifying the decisions made in 2025, 2040, 2060 and 2080.  The 
fifth column provides a “point score” for “Robustness,” for which one point is awarded if 
reprocessing/recycling is enabled, another if fast reactors are enabled, and another if the Monitored 
Geologic Repository (MGR) is not full, and finally another if the repository is nearly empty. The sixth 
column provides an evaluation for “Agility” by indicating technologies available quickly, of which fast 
and thermal technologies are indicated separately. The seventh column shows the percent of energy
generated from recycle fuel over the 75-year span of the decision tree.  The eighth column shows the 
amount of SNF reprocessed in “system years,” where a system year is the amount of SNF generated by
the current 100 reactors in a year (approximately 2100 tonnes).  The ninth column has the equivalent 
amount of SNF in the MGR (or other repository). The SNF-equivalent has been calculated using the 
Wigeland & Bauer [Wigeland2004a] loadings for recycle fuel and a 5% residue for fast reactor HLW. 
Fast reactors are presumed to consume 9 thermal reactor fuel loads of SNF.  A numeric result gives the 
number of 129,000 tonnes-MGRs (in other words, a 1.3 means 1.3 x 129,000 or 167,700 tonnes) needed 
to handle the SNF.  “OK” means the MGR is not full, and “E’er” means that it is less than 10% full.  Note 
that the crude algorithms used to estimate the equivalent loading of the MGR are not applicable to 
situations in which there is an early introduction and then abandonment of the fast reactor technology.
Generally, the YMP is not filled only if fast reactors are used (one successful trajectory is all IMF).
Generally, the more robust trajectories are those that involve fast reactors after 2060.  The most agile 
trajectories include thermal technologies after 2060. This particular result requires some further comment
regarding the value of agility.  While a technology is being introduced, agility provides the ability to react 
quickly to “bad news.”  Thus, during the introduction of the fast reactor, it would be good to be able to 
switch back to thermal reactors.  But as the fast reactors from the first generation are being retired, such 
agility is of very little value.  Consequently, a low agility score in 2100 may be less important than such a 
score during the first four decades immediately after deciding to deploy fast reactors.  The greatest energy
production from recycle fuel occurs when the greatest use of fast reactors occurs.  The most flexible 
trajectory, balancing these somewhat disparate results, would seem to argue for an early (2025) decision
to introduce both a hermal recycle technology (either IMF or MOX, or both) and fast reactor technology
fueled with recycled TRU.  (The higher flexibility of this “dual-path” approach would likely come at the 
expense of higher R&D and deployment costs.)  After a few decades with this “dual-path” approach, if 
nuclear growth is high, only fast reactors would be deployed.  This approach capitalizes on the existing 
knowledge base for thermal reactors and maintains agility while FR technology is introduced and 
“proved,” and finally comes to rely on a technology that promises to minimize the requirement for MGR 
space.
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These results can be interpreted in term of “opening doors” and “closing doors,” where an open door 
implies an opportunity and a closed door implies an opportunity lost.  Within this metaphor, R&D is the 
“key” to opening doors.  This key is time-sensitive, and after a decade or more without use, it loses its 
value because other technologies advance and the “old” R&D becomes increasingly anachronistic. The 
first door to be opened is recycling. Recycle implies reprocessing and a decision to maximize the
capability of the MGR.  This door is opened by the Secretarial Decision on a second repository in 2007-
10 and the successful development of appropriate reprocessing, waste form and recycle fuel fabrication 
technologies. If that door is closed by a decision to continue to use the once-thru cycle and to initiate a 
second repository, there will be no justification for continued R&D and no development of “the key,” so 
the door will remain closed, probably forever. If the door is opened, thermal recycle will increase the 
capacity of the MGR by 50-100%, based on results from Wigeland & Bauer.  Perhaps more importantly,
the demand for “permanent” space in the MGR will be dramatically reduced for a few decades until the 
final recycle batches must be emplaced, allowing time to work off the current SNF backlog.  If IMF is the 
recycle fuel of choice, the final recycle batches will require emplacement around 2050 to 2070, whereas 
with MOX fuel that will not occur until after about 2090. 
The second door to be opened is that representing the fast reactor.  The “key” for that door is being jointly
developed by the Gen IV and AFCI programs – Gen IV considering the reactor and ancillary systems and 
AFCI the fuel cycle.  Within the door metaphor, this is a door that must be opened slowly because a new 
reactor technology is introduced and time will be required to gain operating experience and to implement
“lessons learned” from the early years of operation.  The promise of the fast reactor is that it can consume
all the TRU materials present in SNF, so that the HLW consists primarily of relatively short-lived fission 
products.  This has the potential to increase the capacity of the MGR by a factor of 20 to 40, or perhaps 
even more, especially when considering that the time required to fill the MGR will be comparable to or 
greater than the decay time of the HLW. The 21st century offers a potentially unique opportunity for 
opening this door: 1) R&D on fast reactors will be “fresh” so that it can be readily implemented in an 
operational setting; and 2) economic fuel resources for thermal reactors will still be plentiful, so that a 
ready supply of TRU materials for fast reactor fuels development and demonstration of reactor operation 
using these fuels will be facilitated. These factors would seem to argue for introduction of “Burner” fast 
reactors - fast reactors that “feed” on the TRU produced by recycling in thermal reactors.  Keeping a mix
of thermal and fast reactors operating for several decades also allows for agility in the event of a problem
in the full deployment of fast reactors. If the fast reactor door is not opened, the main problem confronting
nuclear power today – the lack of a suitable approach for disposal of spent fuel – will recur in a few 
decades.  Assuming the MGR is expanded to about 129,000 tonnes-iHM, continued operation in the once-
thru mode until around 2035 can be accommodated, operation in a recycle mode can be accommodated
until somewhere between 2065 and 2090 (at which time the commitment represented by irradiation of the 
final recycle will overwhelm the MGR capacity), and operation with fast reactors is possible for the 
foreseeable future.  Thus, closing the door on fast reactors simply delays the inevitable decline of nuclear 
power and provides only a stop-gap remedy to our dependence on foreign countries for energy resources. 
6.1.1 Decision Guidelines
Selection of “No Recycle” precludes recycle options thereafter (implies failure of recycle concept). In 
2025 this may occur because the 2007-2010 Secretarial decision was to build a second repository or 
because AFCI was unable to show economic recycling in compliance with US requirements. Even if 
recycling is beneficial, a decision to forego it will halt research and a 15 year hiatus will effectively close 
the door on that option.
Selection of a FR (fast reactor) option (“Breeder FR” or “Burner FR”) followed by selection of TR 
(thermal reactor) option (IMF or MOX) precludes subsequent FR options (implies failure of FR option).
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A decision to move to IMF after MOX implies a serious desire to destroy TRU. It involves “wasting” 
some of the “recycle energy” inherent in the MOX recycle (unless the MOX TRU can be re-fabricated
into IMF). Therefore, only “No Recycle” and “IMF” are acceptable decisions after such a transition. In 
very general terms, IMF and MOX fuels are similar in that they consume TRU and can presumably be 
placed in existing reactors.  They are also similar in that their use is limited by the amount of discharge
TRU available to 15-20% of the fuel (or reactors, if special reactors were designed) and they do not 
completely destroy the TRU, as a fast reactor would. The IMF fuel produces the bulk of the “extra” 
energy and consumes the bulk of the TRU in a single cycle, and requires only two cycles to reach its end-
point. The MOX fuel produces slightly more “extra” energy (17% compared to 15%), but requires five 
cycles to complete. 
6.1.2 Reactor Introduction Constraints
There is a continuing demand for nuclear power – level generation or some growth. 
Reactor life is 40-60 years; 60 for LWRs, 40 for first generation fast reactors.  Only LWRs and FRs are 
considered.
All existing NPPs obtain 20-year extensions to their licenses and none shut down early. On that basis, 
existing plant retirements occur as follows. 
Time Period Capacity
Before 2035 6 GWe 
2036 – 2040 31 GWe 
2041 – 2045 14 GWe 
2046 – 2050 36 GWe 
2051 – 2055 10 GWe 
2056 - 2060 2 GWe 
New NPPs are added without premature shutdown of older plants. That means no new plants are
introduced before about 2033 in the “Level Generation” nuclear future, and only about 37 GWe can be 
introduced in the 2025-2040 time period. After 2059, no plants are introduced until 2073, and probably
not until 2093. 
6.1.3 Other Analysis Assumptions
SNF accumulated by 2015 is 80,000 tonnes. The energy content/burnup is equivalent to 60,000 tonne at 
50 GW-day/tonne. SNF is accumulated thereafter at the rate of 21 tonne/NPP per year with an assumed
burnup of 50 GW-day/tonne. All fuel assemblies produce the same energy; therefore all fuels produce the 
same amount of “standard” SNF. 
The compositions for MOX and IMF are based on analyses through May 2005.  Therefore, the IMF cases
are all “full core.”  The multi-pass IMF blended core case calculated later [Goldmann2005] was not 
analyzed.
Recycle options using IMF and MOX are as described by Wigeland & Bauer.  Burner fast reactors 
(reactors fueled by the TRU in LWR SNF) require 10 assemblies of SNF to produce one new FR 
assembly.  One tonne of FR SNF (equivalent to 50 GW-day) yields 0.05 tonne HLW (equivalent SNF). 
LWRs are capable of substituting IMF/MOX assemblies up to about 20% of their core loading. 
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Note that IMF-NpPuAm produces about 115% the energy of the original uranium fuel, and does so in two 
cycles (23 years). MOX-NpPuAm produces about 117%, but it takes 60 years to capture it. 
Although there is a significant cost difference between MOX-NpPu and MOX-NpPuAm, in this analysis,
there seems to be little difference, so no sequence begins with MOX-NpPu. 
The reprocessing plant is assumed to have a capacity of 5000 tonne/yr.
6.1.4 Definitions
Robustness: Allows for growth of nuclear power and provides for options to be exercised at a later date. 
Also accommodates some “upsets. Enabling reprocessing and recycle is critical. However, unless fast 
reactors are also enabled, the MGR will eventually fill. Fast reactors are also somewhat less sensitive to 
variations in fuel composition, so they can accommodate a greater variety of fuels.  Timing is also
important, and if the MGR is full (so a second is required), or filling, then additional pressure will be 
applied to find acceptable trajectories through “option space.”
0 to 4 points as follows: 
1 point if recycling enabled
1 point if fast reactors enabled
1 point if MGR is not full (at 129,000 tonnes)
Robustness
1 point if MGR is less than 10% full 
If uranium resources are severe:
0 to 2 points as follows: 
0 point if no FR
1 point if Burner FR 
Uranium
2 point if Breeder FR 
If proliferation precludes recycling:
0 to 2 points as follows: 
0 point = shutdown reactors 
1 point = modify reactors 
Proliferation
2 point = no change required 
Agile: Is capable of being implemented quickly, without major disruption to on-going operations. This 
requires that technologies be available. Fuel changes are easier to accommodate than reactor changes. 
However, fast reactors can probably handle fuel changes better than thermal reactors. Technologies that 
have failed or have not been used for 40 years are considered unavailable. Thus, in a sequence like Fast 
Reactor followed by IMF-NpPuAm, the fast reactor technology is considered unavailable. Similarly, a 
sequence such as IMF-NpPuAm followed by IMF NpPuAm makes the MOX-NpPuAm technology
unavailable because of the 40 year hiatus in its use. 
Technologies quickly available
Th = thermal (IMF or MOX) 
Agile
F = fast (any fuel)
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Recycle-Fuel Energy: % of energy from recycled fuel 
SNF Reproprocessed: Reactor-years of SNF reprocessed/100 
Equivalent SNF:
1 point if recycling enabled
1 point if fast reactors enabled
1 point if MGR is not full (at 129,000 tonnes)
Equiv SNF 
1 point if MGR is less than 10% full 
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6.1.5 Results
Table 6-1. Results of Screening Analysis of 160 Scenarios
2070 2070 2070 Agile
Recyc
Energy
SNF
Repro'ed
Equiv
SNF
2025 2040 2060 2080 Robust
If U 
severe
If prol
precludes
recycling Percent Years
129,000
tonne-
YMPs
Once-
thru
No
Recycle No Recycle No Recycle 0 None 0.00% 0 2.00
IMF-
NPA
No
Recycle No Recycle No Recycle 0 0 1.5 None 4.94% 36 1.68
| IMF-NPA No Recycle No Recycle 0 0 1.5 None 12.96% 83 1.28
| | IMF-NPA No Recycle 0 0 1.5 None 16.26% 103 1.09
| | IMF-NPA IMF-NPA 2 0 1.5 1 Th 19.60% 123 OK
| | IMF-NPA MOX-NPA 1 0 1.5 2 Th 17.93% 123 1.13
| | IMF-NPA Burner FR 3 0 1.5 Th + F 20.17% 123 OK
| | IMF-NPA Breeder FR 3 0 1.5 Th + F 20.70% 123 OK
| | MOX-NPA No Recycle 0 0 2 None 14.38% 103 1.34
| | MOX-NPA IMF-NPA 2 0 2 2 Th 19.96% 123 OK
| | MOX-NPA MOX-NPA 1 0 2 1 Th 17.71% 123 1.27
| | MOX-NPA Burner FR 2 0 2 Th + F 18.27% 123 1.18
| | MOX-NPA Breeder FR 2 0 2 Th + F 18.79% 123 1.10
| | Burner FR No Recycle 0 1 1 None 16.26% 103 1.09
| | Burner FR IMF-NPA 2 1 1 1 Th 19.60% 123 OK
| | Burner FR MOX-NPA 1 1 1 1 Th 17.93% 123 1.13
| | Burner FR Burner FR 3 1 1 Th + F 20.17% 123 OK
| | Burner FR Breeder FR 3 1 1 Th + F 20.70% 123 OK
| | Breeder FR No Recycle 0 2 0 None 16.26% 103 1.09
| | Breeder FR IMF-NPA 2 2 0 1 Th 19.60% 123 OK
| | Breeder FR MOX-NPA 1 2 0 1 Th 17.93% 123 1.13
| | Breeder FR Burner FR 3 2 0 Th + F 20.17% 123 OK
| V Breeder FR Breeder FR 3 2 0 F 20.70% 123 OK
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2070 2070 2070 Agile
Recyc
Energy
SNF
Repro'ed
Equiv
SNF
2025 2040 2060 2080 Robust
If U 
severe
If prol
precludes
recycling Percent Years
129,000
tonne-
YMPs
|
MOX-
NPA No Recycle No Recycle 0 None 10.62% 83 1.58
| | IMF-NPA No Recycle 0 None 14.75% 103 1.39
| | IMF-NPA IMF-NPA 2 1 Th 14.83% 123 OK
| | MOX-NPA No Recycle 0 None 14.11% 103 1.49
| | MOX-NPA IMF-NPA 1 2 Th 18.04% 123 1.32
| | MOX-NPA MOX-NPA 1 1 Th 18.18% 123 1.37
| | MOX-NPA Burner FR 3 Th + F 13.26% 123 OK
| | MOX-NPA Breeder FR 3 Th + F 13.92% 123 OK
| | Burner FR No Recycle 0 None 14.11% 103 1.49
| | Burner FR IMF-NPA 1 1 Th 18.04% 123 1.32
| | Burner FR MOX-NPA 1 1 Th 16.02% 123 1.49
| | Burner FR Burner FR 2 Th + F 18.74% 123 1.28
| | Burner FR Breeder FR 2 Th + F 19.25% 123 1.20
| | Breeder FR No Recycle 0 None 14.11% 103 1.49
| | Breeder FR IMF-NPA 1 1 Th 18.04% 123 1.32
| | Breeder FR MOX-NPA 1 1 Th 16.02% 123 1.49
| V Breeder FR Breeder FR 2 F 19.25% 123 1.20
| Burner FR No Recycle No Recycle 1 None 15.67% 83 OK
| | IMF-NPA No Recycle 1 None 19.72% 103 OK
| | IMF-NPA IMF-NPA 2 1 Th 23.09% 123 OK
| | MOX-NPA No Recycle 1 None 17.28% 103 OK
| | MOX-NPA IMF-NPA 2 2 Th 21.42% 123 OK
| | MOX-NPA MOX-NPA 2 1 Th 20.69% 123 OK
| | Burner FR No Recycle 1 None 22.29% 103 OK
| | Burner FR IMF-NPA 3 1 Th 26.32% 123 E'er
| | Burner FR MOX-NPA 2 1 Th 24.14% 123 OK
| | Burner FR Burner FR 4 Th + F 28.39% 123 E'er
| | Burner FR Breeder FR 4 Th + F 33.88% 123 E'er
| | Breeder FR No Recycle 1 None 22.29% 103 OK
| | Breeder FR IMF-NPA 3 1 Th 26.32% 123 E'er
| | Breeder FR MOX-NPA 2 1 Th 24.14% 123 OK
| V Breeder FR Breeder FR 4 F 33.88% 123 E'er
|
Breeder
FR No Recycle No Recycle 2 None 21.41% 83 E'er
| | IMF-NPA No Recycle 2 None 25.30% 103 E'er
| | IMF-NPA IMF-NPA 3 1 Th 29.42% 123 E'er
| | MOX-NPA No Recycle 2 None 23.42% 103 E'er
| | MOX-NPA IMF-NPA 3 2 Th 27.75% 123 E'er
| | MOX-NPA MOX-NPA 3 1 Th 27.02% 123 E'er
| | Breeder FR No Recycle 2 None 39.51% 103 E'er
| | Breeder FR IMF-NPA 3 1 Th 44.06% 123 E'er
| | Breeder FR MOX-NPA 3 1 Th 41.89% 123 E'er
V V Breeder FR Breeder FR 4 F 59.30% 123 E'er
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2070 2070 2070 Agile
Recyc
Energy
SNF
Repro'ed
Equiv
SNF
2025 2040 2060 2080 Robust
If U 
severe
If prol
precludes
recycling Percent Years
129,000
tonne-
YMPs
MOX-
NPA No Recycle No Recycle No Recycle 0 None 2.85% 36 1.83
| IMF-NPA No Recycle No Recycle 0 None 10.97% 83 1.52
| | IMF-NPA No Recycle 0 None 14.65% 103 1.29
| | IMF-NPA IMF-NPA 1 1 Th 18.17% 123 1.09
| | IMF-NPA Burner FR 2 Th + F 18.74% 123 1.00
| | IMF-NPA Breeder FR 3 Th + F 19.27% 123 OK
| | Burner FR No Recycle 0 None 14.65% 103 1.29
| | Burner FR IMF-NPA 1 1 Th 18.17% 123 1.09
| | Burner FR Burner FR 2 Th + F 18.74% 123 1.00
| | Burner FR Breeder FR 3 Th + F 19.27% 123 OK
| | Breeder FR No Recycle 0 None 14.65% 103 1.29
| | Breeder FR IMF-NPA 1 1 Th 18.17% 123 1.09
| V Breeder FR Breeder FR 3 F 19.27% 123 OK
| MOX-NPA No Recycle No Recycle 0 None 9.76% 83 1.67
| | IMF-NPA No Recycle 0 None 14.06% 103 1.46
| | IMF-NPA IMF-NPA 1 1 Th 17.65% 123 1.24
| | MOX-NPA No Recycle 0 None 14.11% 103 1.52
| | MOX-NPA IMF-NPA 1 2 Th 18.04% 123 1.34
| | MOX-NPA MOX-NPA 1 1 Th 18.31% 123 1.39
| | MOX-NPA Burner FR 2 Th + F 18.87% 123 1.30
| | MOX-NPA Breeder FR 2 Th + F 19.38% 123 1.22
| | Burner FR No Recycle 0 None 14.11% 103 1.52
| | Burner FR IMF-NPA 1 1 Th 18.04% 123 1.34
| | Burner FR MOX-NPA 1 1 Th 18.31% 123 1.39
| | Burner FR Burner FR 2 Th + F 18.87% 123 1.30
| | Burner FR Breeder FR 2 Th + F 19.38% 123 1.22
| | Breeder FR No Recycle 0 None 14.11% 103 1.52
| | Breeder FR IMF-NPA 1 1 Th 18.04% 123 1.34
| | Breeder FR MOX-NPA 1 1 Th 16.02% 123 1.52
| V Breeder FR Breeder FR 2 F 19.38% 123 1.22
| Burner FR No Recycle No Recycle 0 None 12.50% 83 1.19
| | IMF-NPA No Recycle 1 None 16.98% 103 OK
| | IMF-NPA IMF-NPA 2 1 Th 20.66% 123 OK
| | MOX-NPA No Recycle 0 None 15.18% 103 1.17
| | MOX-NPA IMF-NPA 2 2 Th 19.40% 123 OK
| | MOX-NPA MOX-NPA 1 1 Th 19.31% 123 1.05
| | Burner FR No Recycle 1 None 19.94% 103 OK
| | Burner FR IMF-NPA 2 1 Th 24.07% 123 OK
| | Burner FR MOX-NPA 2 1 Th 22.45% 123 OK
| | Burner FR Burner FR 4 Th + F 26.84% 123 E'er
| | Burner FR Breeder FR 4 Th + F 32.18% 123 E'er
| | Breeder FR No Recycle 1 None 19.94% 103 OK
| | Breeder FR IMF-NPA 2 1 Th 24.07% 123 OK
| | Breeder FR MOX-NPA 2 1 Th 22.45% 123 OK
| V Breeder FR Breeder FR 4 F 32.18% 123 E'er
| Breeder FR No Recycle No Recycle 2 None 25.71% 83 E'er
| | IMF-NPA No Recycle 2 None 31.00% 103 E'er
| | IMF-NPA IMF-NPA 3 1 Th 35.06% 123 E'er
| | MOX-NPA No Recycle 2 None 28.74% 103 E'er
| | MOX-NPA IMF-NPA 3 2 Th 33.39% 123 E'er
| | MOX-NPA MOX-NPA 3 1 Th 27.91% 123 E'er
| | Breeder FR No Recycle 2 None 51.29% 103 E'er
| | Breeder FR IMF-NPA 3 1 Th 56.36% 123 E'er
| | Breeder FR MOX-NPA 3 1 Th 54.48% 123 E'er
V V Breeder FR Breeder FR 4 F 77.32% 123 E'er
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2070 2070 2070 Agile
Recyc
Energy
SNF
Repro'ed
Equiv
SNF
2025 2040 2060 2080 Robust
If U 
severe
If prol
precludes
recycling Percent Years
129,000
tonne-
YMPs
Limited
FR No Recycle No Recycle No Recycle 0 None 1.09% 36 1.30
| IMF-NPA No Recycle No Recycle 1 None 6.57% 83 OK
| | IMF-NPA No Recycle 1 None 13.03% 103 OK
| V IMF-NPA IMF-NPA 2 1 Th 16.85% 123 OK
| MOX-NPA No Recycle No Recycle 0 None 5.90% 83 1.16
| | IMF-NPA No Recycle 0 None 11.14% 103 1.02
| | IMF-NPA IMF-NPA 2 1 Th 15.18% 123 OK
| | MOX-NPA No Recycle 0 None 10.49% 103 1.13
| | MOX-NPA IMF-NPA 2 2 Th 14.94% 123 OK
| V MOX-NPA MOX-NPA 1 1 Th 15.09% 123 1.03
| Burner FR No Recycle No Recycle 2 None 6.43% 83 E'er
| | IMF-NPA No Recycle 2 None 12.58% 103 E'er
| | IMF-NPA IMF-NPA 3 1 Th 17.05% 123 E'er
| | MOX-NPA No Recycle 1 None 10.32% 103 OK
| | MOX-NPA IMF-NPA 3 2 Th 15.37% 123 E'er
| | MOX-NPA MOX-NPA 2 1 Th 14.79% 123 OK
| | Burner FR No Recycle 2 None 11.43% 103 E'er
| | Burner FR IMF-NPA 3 1 Th 16.91% 123 E'er
| | Burner FR MOX-NPA 3 1 Th 14.89% 123 E'er
| | Burner FR Burner FR 4 Th + F 14.44% 123 E'er
| | Burner FR Breeder FR 4 Th + F 19.91% 123 E'er
| | Breeder FR No Recycle 2 None 11.43% 103 E'er
| | Breeder FR IMF-NPA 3 1 Th 16.91% 123 E'er
| | Breeder FR MOX-NPA 3 1 Th 14.89% 123 E'er
| V Breeder FR Breeder FR 4 F 19.91% 123 E'er
| Breeder FR No Recycle No Recycle 2 None 15.00% 83 E'er
| | IMF-NPA No Recycle 2 None 21.16% 103 E'er
| | IMF-NPA IMF-NPA 3 1 Th 25.62% 123 E'er
| | MOX-NPA No Recycle 2 None 18.89% 103 E'er
| | MOX-NPA IMF-NPA 3 2 Th 23.94% 123 E'er
| | MOX-NPA MOX-NPA 3 1 Th 23.37% 123 E'er
| | Breeder FR No Recycle 2 None 38.23% 103 E'er
| | Breeder FR IMF-NPA 3 1 Th 43.71% 123 E'er
| | Breeder FR MOX-NPA 3 1 Th 41.69% 123 E'er
V V Breeder FR Breeder FR 4 F 64.63% 123 E'er
6.2 Analysis of 6 development trees, 6 branches each 
This section provides summary results from investigation of a “decision tree” containing 36 combinations
of possible scenarios covering the time frame from 2015 to 2100, inclusive.  Table 6-2, in section 6.2.3, 
contains the results.  The first four columns set forth the case number, the reactor/fuel option selected for 
the period 2025 to 2039, the reactor/fuel option selected for the period 2040 to 2100, and the availability
of reprocessing (none, start in 2025, or delayed to 2040).  The remaining columns are described below. 
Unless otherwise indicated (by “No Nuclear” in the third column), the analysis assumes level generation 
(i.e. 0% growth) throughout the time period.  This means that new nuclear power plants (NPP) are added 
only when existing ones shut down. The analysis assumes that all existing NPP obtain 20-year extensions
to their operating licenses.  That means a modest amount of replacement capacity will come on-line 
between 2030 and 2040. Then the remaining existing NPP will shut down between 2040 and 2060. This
will be followed by a period with no shutdowns and then, finally, the replacement capacity will shut down 
between 2070 and 2080.  In the “No Nuclear” future, there are no replacements for the NPP shut down in
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2040 and beyond. In the level generation future, they are replaced by new NPP.  In the cases involving
fast reactors, the CFRs and BFRs become the replacements for the shutdown NPPs  Growth of the fast 
reactor NPP population is also limited by the amount of plutonium (or TRU) available for fuel. 
LWRs are presumed to use either normal (no recycle) fuel, IMF or MOX fuel. CFRs are presumed to be 
used primarily to destroy TRU, and have a very low conversion ratio. This may be achieved through 
reactor design (a “skinny” reactor, for example), fuel type (an IMF-like fuel, for example) or both.  BFRs 
are assumed to be oxide-fueled SFRs because that may simplify the transition from LWRs to BFRs, but 
they could be any kind of breeder reactor. 
The analysis generally assumes that destruction (or use) of TRU is a priority and that all available SNF 
will be reprocessed to obtain the TRU.  This is accomplished by making the initial reprocessing capacity
larger than required for a sustainable fuel recycle. More details on this can be found in the assumptions. In 
this analysis, “delayed recycle” is interpreted as “delayed reprocessing.”  This minimizes the amount of in
situ modification of the fuel material through radioactive decay.
When fuel technologies change (as in a change from MOX to IMF, for example) the fuel in the NPP is 
discharged at the next opportunity (not the next refueling), so freshly charged fuel would remain in the 
NPP for five years.
Note that the methodology is strained in the “Nuclear Phase-Out” (No Nuclear) cases. The core fraction 
devoted to recycle fuel grows as plants are shut down because the feed material remains relatively
constant, since it reflects reactor loadings from a decade or more earlier when the nuclear capacity was 
larger.
6.2.1 Explanation of Columns in Table 6-2 
Tech. Need. New technologies required for this case. The individual technologies considered are listed in 
the assumptions. For example, in case 2.2 one new technology is required for the duration of the scenario, 
and that is the Monitored Geologic Repository.
Tech. < >: New technologies that are required and then abandoned. For example, again in case 2.2, three 
technologies and needed, but then abandoned. They are IMF fuel fabrication, IMF reprocessing, and 
LWRs with mixed cores (UOX and IMF, in this case). 
Tech. Gone:  Technologies that are abandoned. For example, again in case 2.2, no technologies are 
abandoned. That means that the four in current use (LWRs, uranium acquisition, enrichment, and UOX 
fabrication) continue to be needed.
UOX SNF @ YMP:  Thousands of tonnes iHM of uranium oxide SNF in storage at YMP by 2100. In
general, this number will not exceed 83.8, the presumed capacity of YMP. The SNF is brought to YMP 
from the utilities on the schedule set forth by OCRWMP. 
UOX SNF @ Util:  Thousands of tonnes-iHM of uranium oxide SNF in storage at utilities by 2100. This 
is the excess over the 83,800 tonnes-iHM presumed capacity of YMP. In fact some or all could be stored 
at YMP, if that facility were to be expanded, or at another repository. This quantity will always include 
SNF discharged between 2096 and 2100, as that SNF will not have cooled sufficiently for reprocessing or 
storage.
Rcy SNF @ YMP:  Thousands of tonnes-iHM of recycle SNF at YMP by 2100. Recycle SNF is sent to 
YMP if it is IMF-2 or MOX. Again, the last five years of discharges will be found at the utilities.
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HLW @ YMP (Eq. MT=tonne):  HLW sent to YMP, expressed as equivalent tonnes-iHM of UOX 
SNF. The analysis considers HLW to require 5% of the space needed for the SNF from which it was 
extracted. For example, case 2.3 (IMF/NPA for 75 years) indicates 11,800 tonneeq of HLW. This is the 
HLW from 236,000 tonnes-iHM (11,800/0.05) of SNF and it will occupy the same space as 11,800
tonnes-iHM of UOX SNF.
Eq. SNF @ YMP:  The aggregate of HLW and SNF at YMP expressed as equivalent thousands of 
tonnes-iHM of UOX SNF. This is an indication of the extent to which space at YMP is required. For 
example, case 2.3 shows 93,300 equivalent tonnes-iHM. This would exceed the 83,800 tonnes-iHM
capacity, but would be well within an expanded capacity of 129,000 tonnes-iHM.
Rcy Gen:  The percent of nuclear electricity generation over the period 2015 thru 2100 that was
generated from recycle fuel and fast reactors.
Nuc. Gen:  Total nuclear electricity generation over the period 2015 thru 2100.
Max. Recy:  The peak fraction of generation from recycle fuel in thermal reactors. The reprocessing plant 
is sized to process all legacy SNF and other SNF available for reprocessing during its presumed 30-year
life.  Thus, during those 30 years production of TRU for recycle fuel will exceed that which is sustainable 
under a level generation future. Consequently, the core fraction devoted to recycle fuel will increase 
rapidly to a figure determined by the reprocessing capacity, and will then drop, after about 30 years, to a 
level that is sustainable. Note that this does not include any contribution from fast reactors; it is a measure
of the reactor core configuration devoted to fuel containing TRU. 
HLW:  Thousands of tonnes-iHM of SNF that were processed into HLW. 
Eq. SNF:  The grand total equivalent SNF generated by 2100. This includes SNF at YMP and at the 
utilities, HLW at YMP, and the SNF equivalent of the in-reactor inventory at the end of 2100. 
6.2.2 Explanation of Table Columns
Technologies:
x Monitored Geologic Repository
x Reactor Systems – LWR 
x Reactor Systems – LWR with mixed load (e.g., UOX & IMF) 
x Reactor Systems – CFR (assumes low conversion ratio attributable to design) 
x Reactor Systems - BFR 
x Uranium Mining, Milling, Conversion
x Enrichment
x Fuel Fabrication – UOX Fuels 
x Fuel Fabrication – MOX, MOX/NP (Glovebox Operations)
x Fuel Fabrication – MOX-NPA (Hot Cell or Remote Operations) 
x Fuel Fabrication – CFR Fuels (different design, criticality issues) 
x Fuel Fabrication – BFR Fuels (different design, criticality issues) 
x Reprocessing – Oxide SNF 
x Reprocessing – IMF SNF 
x Reprocessing – CFR SNF (presumably like IMF reprocessing, but different stream sizes)
x Reprocessing – BFR SNF (presumably like oxide reprocessing, but different stream sizes)
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Normalizing the Starting SNF Inventory:  As of 1/1/2000, approximately 2427 reactor years of 
operation were available to existing commercial nuclear power plants prior to expiration of their operating 
licenses. Since about 21 tonnes of SNF is discharged for each year of operation, this corresponds to about 
48,900 tonnes of SNF to be discharged during all but the last year of operation. In the aggregate, core 
discharges after the final year of operation will amount to approximately 9,500 tonnes. Given that DOE 
has planned for about 83,800 tonnes of SNF1, that means that about 25,500 tonnes had been generated at 
that time. Similarly, by 1/1/2015, an additional 31,500 tonnes will have been generated for a total, at that 
time, of 57,000 tonnes. It should be noted that these numbers are not entirely self-consistent. On this 
basis, during the 1573 reactor years operated, only 16.4 tonnes/yr of SNF was discharged.
YMP Capacity:  The capacity of YMP is reported to be 63,000 tonnes-iHM. Yet, OCRWMP states that 
it can accept 83,800 tonnes-iHM of SNF. Some of this is accomplished by mixing “cool” SNF with 
“hotter” material. The current capacity is assumed to be 83,800 tonnes-iHM.
Reprocessing Capacity: The reprocessing capacity is based on reprocessing all legacy SNF plus all the 
5 yr. old SNF generated during the life of the reprocessing facility. Because this is a “first of a kind”
facility, a 30 year lifetime seems reasonable. Even though significant pre-operation R&D&D will occur 
and a significant “pilot plant” demonstration will be made, it seems reasonable to believe that 
technological and regulatory advancements during 30 years will render the plant obsolete, or nearly so. 
Total SNF to be processed during that time will be about 138,000 tonnes so the plant size should be 4,600 
tonnes annually. It does not matter whether this is one 4600 tonnes/yr plant or ten 460 tonnes/yr plants. It 
is assumed that all fuel types envisioned can be handled by the plant capacity. This is probably true for 
oxide SNF, but would, as a minimum, require a different front end for IMF SNF. 
IMF Fuel: IMF fuel data are taken from Wigeland & Bauer.[Wigeland2004a]  The data are as given in 
the Table. The table indicates that 7.1 tonne of UOX SNF are required to make 1 tonne of IMF-1 fuel. 
Similarly, 19.9 tonne of IMF-1 SNF equivalent to 141 tonne of UOX SNF, is required to make 1 tonne of 
IMF-2 fuel. In the Wigeland & Bauer approach, the IMF-2 SNF and the HLW from 141 tonne of UOX 
and the 19.9 tonne of IMF-1 HLW would be emplaced together and would require 1/2.1 as much space as 
the equivalent SNF. This is interpreted to mean that the HLW and IMF-2 SNF together are equivalent to
77.1 tonne of UOX SNF. The last two rows in the table are an attempt to partition this between HLW and 
actual IMF SNF. This is done by assuming that all HLW is equivalent to 1/20 of the SNF from which it 
was produced and assigning the remainder of the equivalent SNF to the IMF SNF.
IMF-1 IMF-2
UOX Required 7.1 141
IMF-1 Required (1) 19.9
IMF-2 (1)
Total Fuel 8.1 161.9
Storage Factor 1.8 2.1
Equivalent SNF 4.5 77.1
HLW @ 0.05 0.36 8.05
SNF alone 4.15 69.05
MOX Fuel:  MOX-NpPuAm fuel data are also taken from Wigeland & Bauer.[Wigeland2004a] The 
MOX-NpPuAm fuel are identified as MOX-1 through MOX-5 in the accompanying table. It is similar to 
the one above for IMF fuel. For example, it takes 1.98 tonnes of MOX-1 SNF (equivalent to 26.74 tonne
1 “Analysis of the Total System Life Cycle Cost of the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program”,
DOE/RW 0533, May, 2001, USDOE/OCRWM 
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of UOX SNF) to produce 1 tonne of MOX-2 fuel. The partitioning of equivalent SNF is the same as the 
approach for IMF SNF. MOX-0 fuel is MOX/NP. The 4 tonnes-UOX per tonne-MOX-0 is assumed. 
MOX-0 SNF is assumed to be similar to MOX-1 SNF, both in its “SNF Value” and in its use to make 
MOX-2 fuel. 
UOX
MOX-0
MOX-1
MOX-2
MOX-3 Req’d 
MOX-4
MOX-5
Total
Storage
Equiv.
HLW @ 0.05
MOX
Fast Reactors:
ratios between 0.2
reactors (CF
UOX R
CFR-1 Required 
CFR-2 Required 
BFR Required 
Total
Storage Factor 
Equivalent S
HLW @ 0.05
SNF alone 
MOX-0 MOX-1 MOX-2 MOX-3 MOX-4 MOX-5
Required 4 13.5 26.74 40.66 54.75 68.97 
Req’d (1)  1.98    
Req’d  (1) 1.98 3.01 4.06 5.11 
Req’d   (1) 1.52 2.05 2.58 
 (1) 1.35 1.70 
Req’d     (1) 1.26 
     (1) 
Fuel  14.5 29.72 46.19 63.21 80.62 
Factor  1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 
SNF  13.2 24.8 35.5 45.2 53.7 
  0.68 1.44 2.26 3.11 3.98 
SNF 12.51 12.51 23.33 33.27 42.04 49.77 
 Reactors consume about 1 tonne of fissile material each year. LWRs have conversion 
5 and 0.5, so production of fissile material is about 0.25 to 0.5 tonnes/yr. Consumer fast 
Rs) have conversion ratios around 0.25. Thus, since they produce only about 0.25 tonne fuel 
per year, they need about 0.75 tonne as makeup. This means that at least three LWRs are required to 
provide makeup for a single CFR. When other factors, such as neutron absorbing non-fissile diluent 
nuclides are taken into account, a ratio of 6 to 8 is reasonable. This study uses 8. Breeding fast reactors 
(BFRs) not only support themselves, they allow for growth because they produce more fissile material 
than is needed for their own refueling. Early generation BFRs will probably have conversion ratios 
between 1.1 and 1.2. They will therefore produce 0.1 to 0.2 tonnes of fissile materials that are excess to 
their needs. A BFR requires 2-2.5 tonnes of fissile material to get started, so a new one can start up for 
roughly every 15-20 BFR-years of operation. The fissile content of LWR SNF is about 1%, so a new BFR 
(or CFR, for that matter) will require 200-250 tonnes of LWR SNF or about 10-12 LWR years. Allowing 
for dilutions, as above, would increase that to around 24 (or about 500 tonnes of UOX SNF. Looking at it 
in a slightly different way, the fissile loading of a FR is about 3 three times the size of a reload. Thus, 
starting a new CFR or BFR will require about 24 reloads from LWR fuel. The “SNF values” were 
assumed on the basis that CFR-1 and -2 SNF would be similar to IMF-1 and -2 fuel, respectively in terms 
of their storage factor. The value for BFR fuel is approximately 5 times the CFR-1 value on the basis that 
it will have perhaps five times the TRU content. 
CFR-1 CFR-1 CFR-2 CFR-2 BFR
equired 8  80  8 
(1)  10  1 
 (1) 10 
1  7/8 
Fuel 9  91   
1.8  2.1 
NF 5  43.33 43.33  
0.4  4.5 
4.6 4.6 38.83 38.83 25 
Thermal Reactor Transitions: In a transition from IMF to MOX fuel, it is assumed that 20 tonnes of 
IMF-1 SNF can be used to create 1 tonnes of MOX-2 fuel. In transitioning from MOX to IMF, it is 
assumed that 2 tonnes of MOX-1 SNF or 3 tonnes of MOX-2 SNF can be used to make 1 tonnes of IMF-
1 fuel. Similarly, it is assumed that 1.35 tonnes of MOX-3 SNF or 1.7 tonnes of MOX-4 SNF can be used 
to make 1 tonnes of IMF-2 fuel.
Thermal-Fast Transitions: In using thermal reactor recycle fuel to make fast reactor fuels, ratios similar
to those assumed for MOX-IMF transitions were used. The table to the right indicates the ratios used. The 
“SNF Values” are the same, regardless of the TRU origin, so they are not repeated here. It is assumed that 
IMF-2 and MOX-5 are still sent to YMP for emplacement, and are not used for generating fast reactor 
fuels.
CFR-1 CFR-2 BFR
IMF-1 Req’d 20 20
MOX-1 Req’d 2 2
MOX-2 Req’d 3 3
MOX-3 Req’d 1.35 4
MOX-4 Req’d 1.75 5
Fast-Thermal Transitions: The assumptions for producing thermal reactor fuels from fast reactor SNF 
are given in the accompanying table. Again “SNF values” are independent of TRU origin and are not 
repeated here.
IMF-1 IMF-2 MOX-1 MOX-2
CFR-1 Req’d 8 8
CFR-2 Req’d 10 10
BFR Req’d 7/8 7/8
6.2.3 Results 
Page 126 
 
Pa
ge
 
T
ab
le
 6
-2
. S
um
m
ar
y 
R
12
7
es
ul
ts
 fr
om
 D
ec
is
io
n 
T
re
e 
A
na
ly
si
s
C
as
e
20
25
-2
03
9
20
40
-2
10
0
R
ep
ro
ce
ss
Te
ch
N
ee
d
Te
ch
< 
> 
Te
ch
G
on
e
U
O
X
 S
N
F
@
 Y
M
P
K
to
nn
es
-
iH
M
U
O
X
 S
N
F
@
 U
til
K
to
nn
es
-
iH
M
R
cy
 S
N
F
@
 Y
M
P
Eq
.
K
to
nn
e
H
LW
@
 Y
M
P
Eq
.
K
to
nn
e
Eq
. S
N
F 
@
 Y
M
P
Eq
.
K
to
nn
e
R
cy
 G
en
 
%
N
uc
 G
en
 
G
W
-y
r
M
ax
 R
ec
y
%
H
LW
K
to
nn
e
SN
F
Eq
. S
N
F
K
to
nn
e
1.
1
O
nc
e-
Th
ru
N
o
N
uc
le
ar
N
on
e
1
0
4
83
.8
56
.8
83
.8
41
12
14
0.
6
1.
2
O
nc
e-
Th
ru
O
nc
e-
Th
ru
N
on
e
1
0
0
83
.8
14
7.
8
83
.8
85
21
24
1.
1
1.
3
O
nc
e-
Th
ru
IM
F-
N
PA
D
el
ay
 to
 2
04
0 
5
0
0
0.
0
7.
8
1.
1
11
.1
84
.2
17
.1
%
85
21
34
.4
%
22
1.
2
11
7.
2
1.
4
O
nc
e-
Th
ru
M
O
X
-N
PA
D
el
ay
 to
 2
04
0 
4
0
0
0.
0
6.
8
0.
0
11
.1
12
.9
16
.3
%
85
21
31
.6
%
22
2.
4
16
0.
7
1.
5
O
nc
e-
Th
ru
C
FR
D
el
ay
 to
 2
04
0 
5
0
0
0.
0
8.
0
0.
0
11
.3
11
.3
14
.8
%
85
21
22
5.
6
58
.0
1.
6
O
nc
e-
Th
ru
B
FR
 o
nl
y
D
el
ay
 to
 2
04
0 
4
1
4
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
11
.3
11
.3
41
.7
%
81
24
22
5.
9
38
9.
3
2.
1
IM
F-
N
PA
N
o
N
uc
le
ar
St
ar
t2
02
5
1
3
4
0.
0 
6.
8 
1.
4 
7.
3
69
.4
23
.8
%
41
12
93
.8
%
14
5.
6
76
.0
2.
2
IM
F-
N
PA
O
nc
e-
Th
ru
20
25
-2
03
9
1 
3 
0 
31
.5
12
6.
3
7.
1
3.
7
64
.7
5.
0%
85
21
34
.4
%
73
.8
20
0.
5
2.
3
IM
F-
N
PA
IM
F-
N
PA
St
ar
t2
02
5
5 
0 
0 
0.
0
7.
8
1.
1
11
.1
85
.0
17
.1
%
85
21
34
.4
%
22
1.
2
11
0.
7
2.
4
IM
F-
N
PA
M
O
X
-N
PA
St
ar
t2
02
5
4 
2 
0 
0.
0
7.
5
0.
6
10
.7
39
.5
16
.2
%
85
21
34
.4
%
21
4.
9
14
1.
3
2.
5
IM
F-
N
PA
C
FR
St
ar
t2
02
5
6 
2 
0 
0.
0
10
.5
0.
0
9.
6
10
.8
16
.8
%
85
21
34
.4
%
19
2.
9
50
.7
2.
6
IM
F-
N
PA
B
FR
on
ly
St
ar
t2
02
5
5
3
4
0.
0 
4.
0 
0.
0 
9.
4
10
.5
44
.2
%
85
21
34
.4
%
18
7.
9
35
2.
6
3.
1
M
O
X
-N
P
N
o
N
uc
le
ar
St
ar
t2
02
5
1
2
4
21
.6
 
3.
7 
6.
9 
5.
9
14
1.
8
46
.1
%
41
12
89
.5
%
11
7.
8
14
5.
5
3.
2
M
O
X
-N
P
O
nc
e-
Th
ru
20
25
-2
03
9
1 
2 
0 
32
.6
11
9.
6
0.
0
3.
3
35
.9
8.
9%
85
21
62
.1
%
66
.7
16
4.
9
3.
3
M
O
X
-N
P
IM
F-
N
PA
St
ar
t2
02
5
5 
1 
0 
0.
0
7.
8
0.
9
11
.1
76
.5
24
.3
%
85
21
62
.1
%
22
1.
5
10
4.
0
3.
4 
M
O
X
-N
P
M
O
X
-N
PA
 
St
ar
t2
02
5
5
0
0
0.
0
7.
5
3.
3
10
.3
17
5.
1
31
.7
%
85
21
62
.1
%
20
5.
5
28
5.
5
3.
5
M
O
X
-N
P
C
FR
St
ar
t2
02
5
6 
1 
0 
0.
0
8.
4
0.
0
11
.9
11
.9
24
.3
%
85
21
62
.1
%
23
7.
3
41
.1
3.
6
M
O
X
-N
P
B
FR
 o
nl
y
St
ar
t 2
02
5 
4
3
4
11
.9
1.
1
0.
0
11
.9
20
2.
6
24
.3
%
85
21
62
.1
%
23
7.
3
20
2.
0
4.
1
M
O
X
-N
PA
N
o
N
uc
le
ar
St
ar
t2
02
5
1
2
4
0.
0 
4.
5 
2.
8 
7.
8
10
8.
6
24
.1
%
41
12
91
.4
%
14
9.
1
11
3.
1
4.
2
M
O
X
-N
PA
O
nc
e-
Th
ru
20
25
-2
03
9
1 
2 
0 
33
.7
12
7.
7
3.
5
3.
8
82
.0
2.
7%
85
21
18
.7
%
76
.6
21
9.
2
4.
3
M
O
X
-N
PA
IM
F-
N
PA
St
ar
t2
02
5
5 
1 
0 
0.
0
7.
8
0.
8
11
.1
66
.0
16
.1
%
85
21
40
.9
%
22
1.
7
93
.5
4.
4
M
O
X
-N
PA
M
O
X
-N
PA
St
ar
t2
02
5
4 
0 
0 
0.
0
7.
5
1.
1
10
.8
65
.0
17
.3
%
85
21
28
.1
%
21
6.
9
17
6.
3
4.
5
M
O
X
-N
PA
C
FR
St
ar
t2
02
5
6 
1 
0 
0.
0
9.
2
0.
0
11
.9
11
.9
12
.4
%
85
21
18
.7
%
23
7.
3
37
.6
4.
6
M
O
X
-N
PA
B
FR
 o
nl
y
St
ar
t 2
02
5 
4
3
4
0.
0
1.
1
0.
0
11
.9
11
.9
 4
8.
1%
85
21
18
.7
%
23
7.
3
20
2.
0
5.
1
C
FR
N
o
N
uc
le
ar
St
ar
t2
02
5
1
4
4
0.
0 
2.
2 
2.
2 
2.
1
39
.2
21
.4
%
41
12
14
3.
5
41
.4
5.
2
C
FR
O
nc
e-
Th
ru
20
25
-2
07
1
1 
4 
0 
0.
0
69
.4
6.
1
8.
6
92
.6
12
.4
%
85
21
17
1.
8
17
1.
5
5.
3
C
FR
IM
F-
N
PA
St
ar
t2
02
5
5
3
0
0.
0 
9.
0 
0.
5 
4.
2
43
.2
17
.9
%
85
21
19
.4
%
20
5.
0
83
.7
5.
4
C
FR
M
O
X
-N
PA
St
ar
t2
02
5
4
3
0
0.
0 
9.
6 
0.
0 
3.
2
11
.3
13
.7
%
85
21
13
.3
%
20
6.
1
63
.8
5.
5
C
FR
C
FR
St
ar
t2
02
5
5
0
0
0.
0 
8.
4 
0.
0 
2.
7
11
.3
15
.1
%
85
21
20
.1
%
22
5.
4 
54
.2
5.
6
C
FR
B
FR
 o
nl
y
St
ar
t 2
02
5 
4
4
4
0.
0
1.
7
0.
0
21
.0
11
.2
48
.1
%
85
21
8.
9%
16
2.
0
42
0.
8
6.
1
B
FR
N
o 
N
uc
le
ar
St
ar
t 2
02
5 
1
4
4
0.
0
0.
8
16
.3
20
.8
41
4.
7
30
.0
%
41
12
13
3.
0
41
5.
5
6.
2
B
FR
O
nc
e-
Th
ru
20
25
-2
05
6
1
4
0
0.
0 
93
.6
 
16
.9
 
26
.6
42
9.
6
14
.5
%
85
21
17
.0
53
2.
5
6.
3
B
FR
IM
F-
N
PA
St
ar
t2
02
5
5
3
0
0.
0 
9.
2 
0.
5 
4.
6
46
.2
21
.0
%
85
21
43
.0
%
20
4.
7
93
.0
6.
4
B
FR
M
O
X
-N
PA
St
ar
t2
02
5
4
3
0
0.
0 
9.
7 
0.
0 
3.
0
10
.8
13
.6
%
85
21
11
.8
%
20
5.
7
60
.3
6.
5
B
FR
C
FR
St
ar
t2
02
5
5
3
0
0.
0 
8.
2 
0.
0 
9.
9
11
.2
15
.1
%
85
21
19
7.
6
58
.6
6.
6
B
FR
B
FR
 o
nl
y
St
ar
t 2
02
5 
4
1
4
0.
0
0.
0
0.
0
11
.1
11
.1
60
.4
%
85
21
22
2.
5
38
9.
1
6.2.4 Observations
1. Agility: Agility is here defined as the ability to change quickly. In general, fuel options have the
ability to be changed much more rapidly than do reactor options. Consequently, fuel options are more
agile. In most respects, IMF and MOX appear to have about the same effect on the LWR population.
They both equilibrate somewhere around 15% of the core loading, for example. The one difference is 
that the equivalent SNF “value” of the in-reactor inventory of MOX fuel is much greater than that of 
IMF fuel, and on that basis the IMF fuel might be judged slightly more agile – at least less of a
“downside” of a whole core discharge is required or if there is a sudden loss of reprocessing. In terms 
of agility, CFRs and BFRs seem roughly equivalent. This is due, in part, to the presumption that the 
CFR has a low conversion ratio because of its geometry, not because of its fuel. Thus, agility is
limited by the ability to change out a reactor. Thus, arranged in order of agility, the options seem to 
be IMF, MOX, fast reactors. 
2. Robustness: Robustness is here defined as the ability to perform under different conditions. There
seem to be no major differences between LWRs with MOX or IMF fuels and CFRs. However, BFRs 
pose a different problem. The best solution in a “declining nuclear market” is to consume all (or as 
much as possible) of the TRU. However, the BFRs produce more TRU. Consequently, in a declining
market, they worsen the SNF situation because they increase the amount of TRU that must be dealt 
with. The other three options destroy TRU and have less of a “downside” in a declining market. CFRs 
are “single purpose” in that they destroy TRU. In a framework that wishes to make the most use of 
TRU, they are less well suited. Arranged in order of declining robustness, the options are IMF/MOX, 
CFRs, BFRs.
3. On the other hand, BFRs appear to be able to sustain a growth rate of 2-3% per year, and are the only
option that can do so. The other three options can equilibrate so that recycle is effectively destroying
the TRU produced, but growth must be accommodated by starting new reactors on UOX fuel and 
allowing a cycle (12 years) to produce TRU. 
4. Effect of Assumptions: The assumption of a 4600 tonnes/yr reprocessing plant causes the legacy
SNF to be consumed by 2060 (2080 if reprocessing is delayed to 2040). Consequently, the production
of TRU during those years is about 220% of “normal.” As a result, the recycle content of LWR cores 
starts high and then declines to a more nearly equilibrium level. CFR start-ups must be constrained so 
that they do not run out of fuel during their later years. On the other hand, this gives BFRs a “boost” 
and allows them to more quickly enter the market. The results are “driven” by the assumptions on 
SNF “value” and on the utility of one fuel in making another. More studies like the Wigeland and 
Bauer study could do much to provide a stronger basis for studies such as this. 
5. The equivalent SNF value of IMF-2 is much greater than that for any of the higher MOX SNF. IMF 
cases tend to produce more recycle SNF during this time period than the MOX cases – largely
because there are 2 cycles to IMF SNF, but 5 cycles to MOX-SNF. Thus, the equivalent SNF at YMP 
is larger for the IMF-IMF (2.3) case than for the MOX-MOX (4.4) case. However, that means that the 
MOX fuel has a higher “holdup” in terms of reactor inventory at the utilities. The holdup for IMF fuel 
is around 30 tonneeq whereas for MOX it is around 100 tonneeq. The MOX holdup is strongly
influenced by the long cycle time (~60 years for 5 cycles) – that means that the effects of the early
high fuel production rate persist for a long while. For comparison, look at cases 5.4 and 6.4 to see 
where MOX fuel seems to equilibrate when its initial production is constrained.
6. The MOX/NP cases involve more recycle fuel than the other cases because of the high assumed 
conversion from UOX to MOX (1/4 to make MOX-NpPu and 1/13.5 to make MOX-NpPuAm). In 
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fact, in case 3.1 (MOX/NP-Nuclear Phaseout) the amount of recycle SNF overwhelmed the reduced
demand for fuel and some of the lower (MOX-1 to -4) SNF had to be sent to YMP rather than 
converted to fuel. In terms of energy generated using recycle fuel, this increased amount of recycle
fuel is good. However, in terms of SNF generation, this is not good. One would expect the equivalent 
SNF developed in Case 1.2 to be an index against which other cases could be compared, and that all 
other cases would have lower values. That seems not to be the situation for case 3.4 (MOX-NpPu-
MOX-NpPuAm). The calculations have been checked and seem to be correct, but the result remains
suspect. It is likely that the assumptions are internally inconsistent.
6.2.5 Case-by-Case Comments
Table 6-3. Comments on Individual Trees 
Case Comment
Case 1.1 30.8 GW of replacement LWRs added between 2033 and 2039. Remaining 68.4 GW of 
existing reactors retired at the end of their 60-yr extended licenses by 2059. Last replacement 
reactor shut down after 40 years in 2079. 
Case 1.2 No Comment
Case 1.3 Because of the large initial output of Pu/TRU, the recycle content of LWR cores reaches about 
34%. However, after equilibration, IMF fuel accounts for about 15% of the reactor loading. 
Case 1.4 Because of the large initial output of Pu/TRU, the recycle content of LWR cores reaches about 
31%. However, by 2100 MOX/NPA fuel accounts for about 23% of the reactor loading. 
Case 1.5 23 GW of CFR capacity added by 2049 and maintained thereafter. Fuel inventory grows until 
2081 (when legacy SNF is gone), then declines and is exhausted by 2100.
Case 1.6 BFR capacity grows to 45 GW by 2058 and holds until 2072 (no LWR retirements), then 
grows to 99 GW (100%) by 2086. BFR fuel inventory grows until 2076, drops to a low 
(essentially zero) in 2085 (when legacy SNF is gone and BFR capacity is growing), grows
thereafter at a rate that should support about a 3% capacity growth rate. 
Case 2.1 Recycle fuel production is stopped in 2073 and the last LWR shuts down in 2079. Recycle
fraction builds quickly to 34% and then grows further to 94% as LWRs are shut down (94% at 
35 GW) and then drops to zero as the in-reactor fuel is discharged. 
Case 2.2 Recycle fraction grows to 34% by 2032. Recycle fuel production stopped in 2040 and fraction 
drops to zero by 2044.
Case 2.3 Recycle fraction grows to 34% by 2032, then drops slightly to 31% around 2052 and sort of 
equilibrates around 14% after legacy SNF is gone. 
Case 2.4 Recycle fraction grows to 34% by 2032, holds, and drops to 16-17% as MOX replaces IMF. 
Only 1 year of IMF-2 fuel produced, 24 years of MOX-5. 
Case 2.5 Recycle fraction as in prior IMF cases. 18 GW of CFRs replace retiring LWRs after 2040. 
CFR fuel inventory grows until 2056 (when legacy SNF is exhausted), then drops to 
essentially zero by 2100.
Case 2.6 Recycle fraction as in prior IMF cases. 41 GW BFR capacity added by 2050, starts growing 
again in 2057, reaching 87 GW in 2072 and then 89 GW by 2100. Fuel inventory peaks in 
2075 (no capacity growth, so breeding increases fuel) then drops to essentially zero in 2086 as
capacity grows; grows thereafter at a rate that could sustain a 1%-2% capacity growth. 
Case 3.1 Recycle fraction grows to ~60% by 2032, holds until 2037; reaches 87% in 2042 as LWRs 
retire, then wobbles thru 2060 and ends at ~50%. Reprocessing plant shutdown in 2074. 
Case 3.2 Recycle fraction grows to ~60% by 2032, holds until 2037; declines thereafter. 
Case 3.3 Recycle fraction grows to ~60% by 2032, holds until 2037; reaches 50% around 2052, then 
drops to about 10% and equilibrates around 14%
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Case 3.4 Recycle fraction grows to ~60% by 2032, holds until 2037; reaches 50% around 2052, then 
drops to about 44% and then further to 16% by 2100.
Case 3.5 21 GW of CFR added shortly after 2040. Fuel peaks at 2055 (when legacy SNF is gone) and is 
gone by 2100.
Case 3.6 61 GW of BFR added by 2057, then increases to 99 GW capacity between 2073 and 2079. 
Fuel inventory peaks in 2048, has a low in 2057, peaks again in 2075, another low in 2086,
then grows enough to sustain 3% capacity growth. 
Case 4.1 Recycle fraction grows rapidly, is 25-30% in years before 2040, then grows to 90 in 2054 as 
LWRs retire. Reprocessing plant shuts down in 2073, last LWR in 2083 with no recycle fuel. 
Case 4.2 Recycle fraction grows to 18% by 2033 and then declines after 2040. 
Case 4.3 Recycle fraction grows to 18% by 2033, then to 41% by 2044, equilibrates around 14% about 
2070.
Case 4.4 Recycle fraction grows to 18% by 2033, then up to 28% after 2040, finally down to 17% 
around 2090.
Case 4.5 MOX fuel production starts in 2025. Replacement LWRs are brought on-line between 2033 
and 2041. CFR fuel production starts in 2040 and the first CFR starts up in 2041, building
quickly to 19.8 GW. CFR fuel inventory builds until about 2056, when the legacy SNF is 
exhausted. After that the inventory drops slowly and is exhausted by 2100. A mix of about 12-
13% CFRs would be self-sustaining. 
Case 4.6 MOX fuel production starts in 2025. Replacement LWRs are brought on-line between 2033 
and 2041. BFR fuel production starts in 2040. BFR fuel inventory builds until 2047, when the 
FR capacity begins to climb steeply to about 58 GW. The inventory is essentially depleted 
from 2054 to 2059 (actually 3 replacement LWRs should have started up at this time, but the 
analysis assumed that they got 20-year license extensions). From 2060 to 2073, there are no 
retirements, so the fuel inventory builds. BFRs are added between 2073 and 2080 to fill out
100% of the generating capacity. The BFR fuel inventory grows until 2073 and then drops as 
the inventory is used to fuel the BFRs starting up from then on. In 2086 the fuel inventory is 
again depleted and after that it grows until the sequence ends in 2100. This growth in fuel 
inventory would likely sustain a growth in BFR population of somewhere near 3 percent per 
year after about 2089.
Case 5.1 CFR fuel production starts in 2025 when reprocessing begins. A significant inventory is 
produced before CFRs are added starting in 2033. 22 GW of CFRs are added as replacements 
for retiring LWRs between 2033 and 2038, and CFR operation continues thru 2079. The 
reprocessing plant is shut down at the end of 2074, so CFR fuel must be drawn from inventory 
starting in 2077. LWR retirements after 2040 reduce the LWR capacity to 8.8 GW in 2059,
and the last LWR is shutdown in 2080.
Case 5.2 CFR fuel production starts in 2025 when reprocessing begins. A significant inventory is 
produced before CFRs are added starting in 2033. 26.4 GW of CFRs are added as
replacements for retiring LWRs starting in 2033. Starting in 2040, no further CFRs are added 
but CFR operation continues until 2077. The reprocessing plant is shut down at the end of 
2071, so CFR fuel must be drawn from inventory starting in 2074.
Case 5.3 CFR fuel production starts in 2025 when reprocessing begins. A significant inventory is 
produced before CFRs are added starting in 2033. 17.6 GW of CFRs are added as
replacements for retiring LWRs starting in 2033. Based on the allocation of TRU from UOX
SNF, this will exhaust the preproduced CFR fuel when the CFRs are themselves retired after 
40 years of operation. Beginning in 2040 sufficient IMF-1 fuel is produced to achieve a 17%
recycle fuel mix in LWRs. CFR fuel production is stopped in 2065. The amount of TRU from
UOX SNF for recycle and CFR fuel drops significantly around 2055, when all of the legacy
fuel has been reprocessed.
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Case 5.4 CFR fuel production starts in 2025 when reprocessing begins. A significant inventory is 
produced before 13.2 GW of CFRs is added as replacement for retiring LWRs starting in 
2033. Based on the allocation of TRU from UOX SNF, this will exhaust the preproduced CFR 
fuel when the CFRs are themselves retired after 40 years of operation. Beginning in 2040
sufficient MOX-1 fuel is produced to achieve an 11% recycle fuel mix in LWRs. CFR fuel 
production is stopped in 2065; however, in about 2057 (when the legacy SNF is gone) the 
consumption of UOX SNF for LWR MOX fuel requires the entire amount available, and only
CFR-2 is produced during the last 8 years.
Case 5.5 19.8 GW of CFR capacity is added as LWRs are retired and by 2040 all CFRs are on-line. 
This number of CFRs is not sustainable; it exhausts the CFR fuel by 2100. The sustainable 
mix appears to be about 12% (12 GW out of 99)
Case 5.6 Only 9 GW of CFRs are added between 2033 and 2036. Beginning in 2040 BFRs are added as 
LWRs retire. By 2051 about 63 GW of BFR capacity is online. FR fuel production starts in 
2027 and the inventory grows until about 2044 when the fuel needs of the growing BFR 
population overcome the production from legacy fuel and the inventory begins to decline. It 
reaches a low in 2058 after the legacy SNF is gone. No BFRs are added between 2051 and 
2077. By then the FR fuel inventory has grown to support further additions of BFRs  as well 
as replacing the retiring CFRs with BFRs. There is insufficient UOX SNF to completely
replace all the retiring LWRs, however and by 2100, about 13% of the capacity is still LWRs. 
By the end of the century, the fuel inventory is growing fast enough to accommodate a 1-2% 
growth in capacity.
Case 6.1 About 31 GW of BFRs replace LWRs by 2039. The last LWR shuts down by 2060, last BFR 
in 2079. BFR fuel inventory peaks in 2058, when production of BFR fuel stops (reprocessing 
down in 2056). BFR fuel inventory essentially zero at time of last BFR shutdown. All BFR 
SNF produced after 2058 is “stranded.” 
Case 6.2 About 31 GW of BFRs replace LWRs by 2039. Last BFR shuts down in 2079. BFR fuel 
inventory peaks in 2058, when production of BFR fuel stops (reprocessing down in 2056). 
BFR fuel inventory essentially zero at time of last BFR shutdown. Alternatively, could stop 
reprocessing in 2040. BFRs would run out of recycle fuel in 2062 and require UOX fuel 
(perhaps 10-15% enriched) thereafter. This would increase the equivalent SNF from 532,500 
tonnes to 599,400 tonnes and generate 9,300 tonnes of uranium fast reactor SNF.
Case 6.3 BFR capacity limited to 22 GW. On this basis BFR fuel inventory peaks in 2056 and declines 
thereafter to reach zero with shutdown of last BFR about 2076. IMF production is limited to 
8% of LWR capacity to provide TRU for BFRs. Recycle fraction climbs to 42% as BFR SNF 
is “worked off” and then declines to about 17%. BFR fuel production stops in 2067.
Case 6.4 BFR capacity limited to 17 GW. On this basis BFR fuel inventory peaks in 2056 and declines 
thereafter to reach zero with shutdown of last BFR about 2076. MOX production is limited to 
8% of LWR capacity to provide TRU for BFRs. Recycle fraction climbs to 11% as BFR SNF 
is “worked off” and stays around there until the end. BFR fuel production stops in 2065. 
Case 6.5 About 31 GW of BFRs replace LWRs by 2039. Last BFR shuts down in 2079. CFR additions 
amount to 22 GW. FR fuel peaks in 2053, declines to essentially zero in 2076 as CFRs 
consume the TRU, peaks again in 2089 and BFR cores are reprocessed and then declines
through 2100, when a reasonable amount remains (enough for 3-4 reactor lifetimes).
Case 6.6 System is 100% BFR by 2079. BFR fuel peaks in 2075, drops slightly to a low in 2082 and 
then grows at a rate to sustain 3-4% capacity growth. 
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7. DYMOND ANALYSES OF SIX DEVELOPMENT TREES 
The results presented herein for the scenarios were calculated using the nuclear energy systems dynamic
analysis code DYMOND.[Moisseytsev2001, Yacout2005a]  The code simulates the energy-demand
driven nuclear energy system scenarios over time and allows the simulation of changing nuclear reactor 
parks and fuel cycle options.  It includes different types of delays and feedbacks associated with the 
construction of nuclear facilities and the decisions to build such facilities.  The mass flows of the different 
fuel cycle spent fuel streams are followed and the associated decay heat generations are calculated.  More 
details about the models that are related to the global nuclear energy simulation are presented by
Moisseytsev2001 and GIF2002.  Other DYMOND modeling of the U.S. nuclear park within the AFCI 
context are provided by Yacout2004a and b, and Yacout2005a, b. 
Table 7-1 summarizes the six development trees analyzed in this Chapter.  Each is assumed to start in 
2025.  Each tree has six branches in 2040, the three that we considered the most interesting in addition to
nuclear phase out, recycling phase out, and continuing what was started in 2025. We limited the analysis
to 6 branches for tractability.  One could, in principle, postulate an almost unlimited combination of 
scenarios.  Unlike Chapter 6, we did not further complicate the analysis by postulating branches at 2060 
or 2080.  We calculated the various metrics in Table 3-2 for each of the 36 branches (6 trees x 6 
branches/tree) using DYMOND, except 2 of the 36 could not be calculated because we lack fuel 
composition recipes for MOX-to-BFR. 
For branches where nuclear is phased out (1.1, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1, 6.1) the model is not currently capable of 
moving the remaining material to the repository.  In these cases the final mass in the repository will be the 
total system mass for those elements that are to be placed in the repository (Note:  reprocessing would 
eliminate the need to put uranium and fission products to the repository).  For the discussion in this
section, the system includes the repository, reactors, reprocessing , and all intermediate storage or 
processing steps. 
For all cases, the initial reactor fleet was assumed to contain only thermal reactors.  Some of the initial 
thermal reactors (35) were only capable of utilizing UOX fuel and their burn-up was set at 33.  The 
remaining initial thermal reactors (68) were capable of utilizing UOX, MOX, or IMF fuel, and their burn-
up for UOX was set at 51.  This allowed the average burn-up of the existing reactor fleet to be met (45), 
while allowing some of the existing legacy reactors to utilize MOX or IMF in the future.  In the model,
the thermal reactors which only utilize UOX are retired before the thermal reactors with multiple fuel 
capability.
Note, when the Pu or TRU availability is inadequate for LWR reactors capable of running MOX or IMF, 
the model automatically substitutes UOX. 
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Table 7-1. Summary of Development Trees
Development
Tree
Motivation for Analysis Notes Deployment
constraints
1. Continue once-
through until
2040, i.e., delay
recycling
Explores continuation of
once-through for an 
additional 15 years.
Branch 1.2 continues “once-through”
until the end of the century.
N/A
2. Start IMF-
NpPuAm in 2025
(using blended
IMF/UOX cores)
Attempts fastest possible
reduction in LTH, LTD, and
LTR using thermal reactors 
and UREX+ separation
technology, but an unproven
fuel.
Assumes n-pass IMF fuels and their
separation are practical. This IMF 
approach uses blended fuel assemblies,
with ¾ UOX and ¼ IMF, with the TRU 
in used fuel UOX and IMF in one
generation making the IMF in the next
generation.  Other n-pass IMF
approaches require analysis, including
increasing the IMF/UOX ratio to 
further accelerate benefits or require
fewer reactors to use the blend.
3. Start MOX-
NpPu in 2025
Closest to current
international practice and
current technology, while
avoiding separation of Pu
Restricted to 1-recycling pass in current
analyses.
4. Start MOX-
NpPuAm in 2025
Attempts modest repository
benefits using thermal
reactors, UREX+
technology, and fuels
relatively similar to current
UOX and MOX-Pu.
Assumes BU is the uranium component
in MOX; the Pu/U ratio increases each 
cycle to keep the cores critical.  Other
n-pass MOX approaches require
analysis, including keeping the core
critical by increasing the uranium
enrichment instead of the Pu/U ratio. 
3 kt/yr separation
plant starts in 2025.
All fuel that can be
made from that
separation plant is
assumed to be used
in the growing TR 
fleet.
5. Start consumer
FR in 2025
Moves into FR, skipping
recycling in TR.  The early
FR experience would set the
stage for BFR when
uranium resources warrant.
Balancing all the components of this
type of system is not straightforward.
6. Start breeder
FR in 2025
Moves into FR, skipping
recycling in TR.  Aims to 
accommodate a hypothetical 
combination of limited
uranium resources and high
nuclear growth.
Unique among the options in that BFR
uses depleted uranium.
FR deployment is
limited by the
amount of Pu
available for FR 
fuel,  existing FR’s
have 1st priority on
fuel over new FR’s, 
if insufficient fuel is 
available for FR’s to 
start, the missing
capacity is  met by
starting thermal
reactors
The model is capable of running limited combinations of reactor types.  The relative proportion of each 
type of reactor present in the system depends on the request, meaning the percent of power generation 
capacity coming online to be provided by specific reactor types.
The single-pass and multi-pass MOX recipes used in this chapter are full core recipes.  The single-pass 
IMF recipe (IMF-NpPu) is also a full core recipe.  The multi-pass IMF recipe (IMF-NpPuAm) is a 
blended core recipe.  For multi-pass fuels, each pass is tracked in the model. Multi-pass MOX has 8 
passes (pass 1-8 in the model), while multi-pass IMF has 5 passes (pass 1-5 in the model).  All UOX fuel 
supplied to make up for missing MOX or IMF fuel is accounted for in a separate pass (pass 0 in the 
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model). When fast reactors are being requested for the reactor fleet all spent UOX (pass 0 in the model),
spent pass 1 fuel (MOX or IMF depending on the case), spent pass 8 MOX fuel, spent pass 5 IMF fuel, 
and spent fast reactor fuel goes to the fast reactors.  This means when fast reactors are being added to the 
system, no new MOX or IMF fuel is being added to the thermal reactors.  In general this is a reasonable 
approximation of how the reactor fleet would be run given the current set of the reactor/fuel options in the 
model (currently VHTR reactors are not part of the model). Since IMF, MOX, and consumer fast reactors
all perform somewhat similar functions of reducing transuranics, so directing fuel towards one type of 
fuel reactor system is reasonable.  Breeder fast reactors utilize transuranics (especially plutonium) to 
increase the energy recovery from uranium, and work to some degree in opposition to thermal recycle and 
consumer fast reactors, directing fuel towards one type of fuel reactor system is again reasonable. In the 
future, the model will be modified to allow more flexibility in how spent fuel is allocated to existing 
reactors.
The support ratio (number of reactors in pass n required to provide fuel for reactors in pass n+1) varies 
among fuel types.  For the multi-pass IMF (blended core) fuel used in this model, the support ratio is 
pproximately one, this means the of IMF available for successive cycles of IMF remains fairly constant.
This allows IMF fuel to move into a large proportion of the reactor system quickly.  The multi-pass MOX 
(full core) and one-pass MOX (full core) fuels used in this model have a support ratio of 7-11, depending 
on the cycle of the fuel.  This means that successive cycles of MOX move very slowly into the reactor
system.
In the current version of the model, the amount of recycled fuel available for reactors is based on the 
elemental plutonium content of the spent fuel isotopes.  Fuel control based on elemental plutonium is a 
reasonable approximation, especially when only type of recycled fuel is used.  The isotopic composition
of plutonium, other transuranics, and uranium in fuel are key to a reactors performance and the isotopic 
composition depends on the fuel and how it is burned.  This means that the results from some of the 
fuel/reactor combinations presented in here may be refined in the future, especially once isotopic flow 
control is developed in VISION.
Note that DYMOND currently has a simple model for retirement of current reactors.  As shown in Figure 
7-1, the current estimates for reactor retirement have been pushed a bit further into the future.  This is 
good from the standpoint of maximizing return on current investment and on the time available before 
selecting reactor types for the replacement reactors.  The current model overpredicts how soon new
reactor types would replace these retiring reactors but underpredicts the fraction of retirements that occur 
after 2040. 
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Figure 7-1. Estimated retirement of the current 103 reactors
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7.1. Continue Once-Through until 2040 – delayed recycling
This development tree (Figure 7.1-1) explores continuation of the status quo (once-through) until at least 
2040.  In 2040, there are six branches. Branch T1.1 is phase out of nuclear power; no new reactors are 
built, existing reactors continue until the end of their lifetimes.  Note that the current 103 reactors are 
projected to retire in the period 2027 until 2044 in the current DYMOND model.  Thus, if nuclear phase 
out starts in 2040, most of the current reactors will have already been replaced.  The last reactor would 
not stop until 2104 (60 years after 2044).  Branch T1.2 is indefinite continuation of once-through.  The 
other branches simply start recycling (trees T2, T4, T5, and T6) 15 years later than if they had started in 
2025.
Figure 7.1-1. Development tree for continuing once-through until 2040.
The LWRu reactors in Figure 7.1-2 can only utilize UOX fuel; these reactors will be retired by 2032.  In 
trees 1.5 and 1.6, the power provided by fast reactors is relatively small, even when the request (i.e. the 
percent of power generation capacity coming online to be provided by specific reactor types) for fast 
breeder reactors is set to 100% (tree 1.6).  This is because the system is Pu limited for fast reactors given 
the current fast reactor recipes and breeding ratios.
Figure 7.1-3 shows the amount of mass in the repository as a function of time.  The repository is assumed
to open in 2012 with a maximum receiving capacity of 3 ktonne per year.  Continuing with once through 
(T1.2) or phasing out nuclear, starting in 2040, results in greater than 250 ktonne of spent fuel in the 
repository by 2100.  Compared to once through, switching to multi-pass IMF (T1.3) or breeder fast 
reactors (T1.6) in 2040 reduces the mass of isotopes in the repository by approximately 80% by 2100, 
while switching to consumer fast reactors in 2040 reduces the mass of isotopes in the repository by
approximately 70%. Switching to multi-pass MOX (T1.4) in 2040 reduces the mass of isotopes in the 
repository by approximately 60% by 2100.
In order to achieve a 99.5% reduction in TRU content in the repository by 2100 multi-pass recycling of
thermal or fast reactor fuels must start prior to 2040. Of the options explored, multi-pass IMF (T1.3) or 
breeder fast reactors provide the quickest reduction of TRU in the repository.
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Figure 7.1-2. Power capacity of operating reactors by reactor type for each case in tree 1 (remain with 
once-through at 2025).  LWRu is a thermal reactor that can only handle UOX.  LWRm is a thermal
reactor that can handle multiple fuels (e.g. UOX, MOX, IMF). FR is a fast reactor that may function as a 
consumer (CFR) or a breeder (BFR). 
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Figure 7.1-3. Total mass in repository for each case of tree 1 (remain with once-through at 2025).  T1.1 
and T1.2 overlay each other.
Figures 7.1-4 and 7.1-5 show the total and uranium mass (respectively) in the system for each case.
Uranium accounts for the majority of the mass in the system and the relative order of mass for uranium
and total system are the same for all six cases.  As expected, phasing out nuclear (T1.1) results in the 
lowest mass in the system where continuing and once through (T1.2) result in highest mass in the system.
Switching to multi-pass MOX or multi-pass IMF at 2040 reduces the total mass in the system a small 
amount, with IMF reducing the mass more than MOX. This is probably due to the relatively flat support 
ratio of multi-pass IMF (a blended core recipe) that allows it to move more quickly than multi-pass MOX 
(a full core recipe into the reactor fleet (see Figure 7.1-6). The consumer fast reactor (T1.5) sits between
MOX and IMF; this is expected since the function of consumer fast reactor in the reactor system is similar
to that of multi-pass MOX or IMF.  Switching to breeder fast reactors decreases system mass more than 
consumer fast reactors, MOX or IMF by 2100.
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Figure 7.1-4. Total mass in system for each case of tree 1 (remain with once-through at 2025).
Figure 7.1-6 shows a clear difference between multi-pass IMF (T1.3) and multi-pass MOX (T1.4).  The 
multi-pass IMF has a low support ratio and is blended core fuel. The multi-pass MOX has a higher
support ratio and is a full core fuel. This means that the IMF moves much more quickly into the reactor 
fleet than the MOX.  However, as discussed in Chapter 5.  The amount of UOX in both systems is about 
the same since blended core IMF includes a significant amount of UOX in its recipe. 
Plutonium (Figure 7.1-7) represents a small percent of the total mass in the system.  Starting multi-pass
IMF (T1.3) in 2040 significantly reduces the amount of plutonium in the system compared to all of the 
other cases, even compared to phasing out nuclear.  This suggests that running multi-pass IMF may be 
desired even if nuclear power is phased out to reduce the amount of plutonium in the repository.
Once through UOX represents the worst case for uranium usage (see Figure 7.1-8).  From a uranium
conservation perspective, the faster recycling is started for thermal reactors or fast reactors the better. Of 
the continuing thermal reactor options, multi-pass IMF (T1.3) consumes the least uranium ore by 2100.
This is probably because the support ratio (number of reactors in pass n required to provide fuel for 
reactors in pass n+1) is approximately one, so the system is not as limited with respect to Pu as for fast 
reactors and the amount of multi-pass IMF available for successive cycles of multi-pass IMF remains
fairly constant.  This allows multi-pass IMF fuel to move into a large proportion of the reactor system
quickly (see Figure 7.1-6).  The multi-pass MOX (T1.4) used in the model uses fresh uranium when
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Figure 7.1-5. Mass of uranium in system for each case of tree 1 (remain with once-through at 2025).
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Figure7.1-6. Mass percent of multi-pass MOX or multi-pass IMF fuel in reactors for each case of tree 1 
(remain with once-through at 2025).  The multi-pass IMF for case T1.3 is a blended core rather than a full 
core; in T1.3 the entire fleet would use the 3/4-UOX/1/4-IMF blend.  Case 1.4 is full MOX core; in T1.4 
about 10% of the fleet would use full-core MOX.  T1.1, T1.2, T1.5, and T1.6 do not contain MOX or 
IMF and overlay each other.
sufficient Pu is not available to make MOX and the support ratio for multi-pass MOX is much steeper 
than that for multi-pass IMF.  This means that successive cycles of multi-pass MOX move very slowly
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into the reactor system (see Figure 7.1-6), so a large portion of the fuel in the reactor fleet remains UOX
(see Figure 7.1-6).  The uranium usage for the consumer and breeder fast reactor cases (T1.5 and T1.6, 
respectively) is not surprising.  As was shown in Figure 7.1-2, fast reactors represent only a small
proportion of the reactor fleet by 2100, while the remaining fleet is operating with once through UOX
(see the curve for T1.2), which uses the most uranium of all the cases. 
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Figure 7.1-7. Mass of plutonium in system for each case of tree 1 (remain with once-through at 2025). 
Figure 7.1-8. Uranium ore consumed for each case in tree 1 (remain with once-through at 2025). 
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7.2. Start IMF-NpPuAm in 2025 
Development tree 2 is illustrated in Figure 7.2-1. This tree attempts the fastest possible reduction in LTH, 
LTD, and LTR using thermal reactors and UREX+ separation technology, but an unproven fuel: Chapter 
8 shows that this was achieved.  Basic physical principles assure us that IMF-NpPuAm is the fastest way
to transmute these three elements, but the particular implementation of this approach is not necessarily
optimum, see section 5.1. 
Figure 7.2-1. Development tree for starting IMF-NpPuAm in 2025.
Branches T2.1 and T2.2 reflect phase out, of nuclear power or thermal recycling.  In branch 2.1, no new 
nuclear power plants are ordered after 2040; those in existence are allowed to continue to their 60-year
lifetimes, as are the separation and fuel fabrication plants.  In branch T2.2, nuclear power is continued,
but thermal recycling is phased out quickly after 2040 in favor of the once-through fuel cycle.  Branch 
T2.3 continues IMF-NpPuAm in 2040 thru the end of the century. Branch T2.4 is motivated by a 
hypothetical combination of potential problems encountered with IMF (i.e. retreat from IMF) and desire 
to continue recycling in thermal reactors (hence shift to MOX).  Branch T2.5 reflects adoption of 
consumer FR’s in 2040, leading to a symbiosis of TR (using UOX and IMF) and CFR.  In this case, we
assume that it makes more sense to transmute Am (and Cm) in the CFR than in the TR, thus, the IMF 
shifts from IMF-NpPuAm back to UOX once through since most available spent fuel is sent to FR 
reprocessing.  Branch T2.6 reflects adoption of breeder FR in 2040, with eventual phase out of TR. 
As shown in Figure 7.2-2, thermal reactors dominate the system through 2100. Neither consumer  (T2.5) 
nor breeder (T2.6) fast reactors provide much power by 2100.  The slow entry of fast reactors into the 
fleet occurs for two main reasons:
- the number of fast reactors requested is limited in the case of T2.5.  Consumer fast reactors are
requested (i.e. the percent of power generation capacity coming online to be provided by a specific
reactor types) as 30% of the total reactors called but by 2040 most of the first wave of reactor 
replaced has already occurred and the growth rate is only 1.8% for non-replacement reactors. 
- the number of fast reactors started is limited by the amount of plutonium present, MOX and IMF 
thermal reactors and consumer fast reactors are generally net consumers of plutonium, the recipe for 
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the breeder fast reactor used in the model has a low breeding ratio and therefore does not generate
significant excess plutonium to start additional fast reactors. 
These mechanisms restrict the number of consumer and breeder fast reactors present by 2100.
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Figure 7.2-2. Power capacity of operating reactors by reactor type for each case in tree 2 (start IMF-
multipass in 2025). LWRu is a thermal reactor that can only handle UOX.  LWRm is a thermal reactor 
that can handle multiple fuels (e.g. UOX, MOX, IMF). FR is a fast reactor that may function as a 
consumer (CFR) or a breeder (BFR).  T2.2, T2.3, and T2.4 overlay each other. 
All of the cases which continue with recycling, IMF, MOX, consumer fast reactor, breeder fast reactor 
(T2.3 – T2.6) will achieve a 99.5% reduction in TRU content in the repository by 2100.  Looking at the 
graph (Figure 7.2-3) it is clear that IMF could be started later than 2025 and still meet the repository
reduction goal, although based on the results of tree 1 (Figure 7.1-3) IMF must start before 2040.  Of the 
options explored, multi-pass IMF provides the quickest reduction of TRU in the repository.  The plot for
phase out of nuclear (T2.1) is misleading since the recycling of the fuel by IMF keeps fuel out of the 
repository until sufficient reactors are retired to result in excess IMF fuel; the mass in the repository 
would eventually equal the mass in the system for the phase out nuclear case (T2.1 in Figure 7.2-4).
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Figure 7.2-3. Total mass in repository for each case in tree 2 (start IMF-multipass in 2025).  T2.5 and 
T2.6 are overlaid. 
Figure 7.2-4 shows the total mass in the system as a function of time for each case. As with tree 1, the 
mass of uranium (Figure 7.2-5) and the total mass track together; this is expected since uranium accounts
for the majority of the system mass. Phasing out nuclear power after 2040 (T2.1) results in the smallest
total mass.  The breeder FR case (T2.6) has the next least amount of mass in the system.  This is because 
the breeder FR requires less uranium (T2.6, Figure 7.2-5) than the other reactor/fuel types and breeder 
FRs account for approximately 40% of the deployed reactor capacity by 2100 (T2.6 plots, Figure 7.2-2).
Little differentiation is seen among the remaining cases; this is due to a combination of uranium usage 
and percent of deployed reactor capacity for the various fuel/reactor cases.  Phase out of recycling moves
the system back to UOX fuel which maintains a high uranium usage.  Continuing with multi-pass IMF 
results in a high percentage of IMF in the system by 2100 (T2.3, Figure 7.2-6), but only reduces uranium
usage slightly since this is a blended core fuel.  Switching to multi-pass MOX reduces the uranium
demand by the fuel, but percent of MOX fuel in the system by 2100 is very small (T2.4, Figure 7.2-6).
Adding some consumer FRs to the system does not decrease the system or uranium mass significantly;
this is because consumer FRs provide no more than 30% of the deployed reactor capacity by 2100 while 
the remaining LWRs use uranium and the consumer FR in this case has a conversion ratio of 0.25 which 
means that it has only slightly better uranium usage than thermal reactors (see Chapter 5). 
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Figure 7.2-4. Total mass in the system for each case in tree 2 (start IMF-multipass in 2025).  T2.3 is 
overlaid by T2.4 and T2.5.
Uranium in System
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Year
kt
on
ne
T2.1-PhasOutNuc
T2.2-PhasOutRecy
T2.3-Continue
T2.4-MOX-NPA
T2.5-IMF-NP/CFR
T2.6-BFR
Figure 7.2-5. Mass of uranium in system for each case in tree 2 (start IMF-multipass in 2025). 
Starting multi-pass IMF in 2025 results in a substantial movement of IMF into the reactor fleet by 2040.
This is due to large number of legacy reactors retiring during this time and the reservoir of legacy spent 
fuel available for making IMF.  When multi-pass IMF continues through the century, the system becomes
IMF limited around 2085 (T2.3).  This is likely due to two factors. First, in the current model, multi-pass
IMF has a finite recycle life, after 5 cycles (each for 12 yrs) the fuel is sent to the repository or fast
reactors (if available), IMF fuel started in 2025 is being retired in 2085.  Second, there is no legacy fuel 
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remaining to provide extra IMF fuel for new reactors coming on-line, earlier in the century legacy spent 
fuel provided start-up fuel for new reactors, that otherwise would have been started with UOX.
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Figure 7.2-6. Percent of MOX or IMF fuel in reactors for each case in tree 2 (start IMF-multipass in 
2025). T2.5 and T2.6 are overlaid.
Other than for phasing out nuclear, continuing with IMF results in the greatest reduction of plutonium
(see Figure 7.2-7).  Switching to MOX at 2040 (T2.4) would retain more plutonium in the system, while 
still keeping waste out of the repository.  This option could be helpful if implementation of fast reactors is 
delayed.
 Page 145
Plutonium in System
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Year
kt
on
ne
T2.1-PhasOutNuc
T2.2-PhasOutRecy
T2.3-Continue
T2.4-MOX-NPA
T2.5-IMF-NP/CFR
T2.6-BFR
Figure 7.2-7. Mass of plutonium in system for each case in tree 2 (start IMF-multipass in 2025). 
Figure 7.2-8 shows the uranium ore consumed for each case.  Phasing out nuclear (T2.1) uses the least 
uranium, followed by breeder fast reactors (T2.6).  The highest (by a small amount) uranium ore usage 
through 2100 is shown by switching to multi-pass MOX (T2.4) or adding consumer fast reactors (T2.5). 
This is not surprising since multi-pass IMF was started in 2025 and approximately 60% of the reactor 
fleet is using IMF by 2040.  The support ratio for multi-pass MOX is higher than that for IMF so less 
reactors can initially be supported by MOX fuel than IMF fuel; therefore additional UOX is needed
compared to remaining with IMF.  Switching to consumer fast reactors essentially means converting most
of the reactor system to UOX fuel, since the number of consumer fast reactors increases slowly (see 
Figure 7.2-2) and no new IMF is being made (recall the discussion in chapter 7 introduction about fuel
reprocessing when fast reactors are being requested). 
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Figure7.2-8. Mass of uranium ore consumed for each case in tree 2 (start IMF-multipass in 2025). 
7.3. Start MOX-NpPu in 2025 
Development tree 3 is illustrated in Figure 7.3-1.  This tree is primarily motivated as the closest to current 
international practice and closest to current technology, while avoiding separation of Pu.  Instead, Np and 
Pu are always kept together.  MOX-NpPu fuel would, like MOX-Pu, be fabricated with glovebox
technology. For DYMOND calculations, we assume that the oldest fuel is separated and recycled first.
However, this assumption makes little difference because (a) we are already assuming that glovebox 
fabrication is adequate and (b) without inclusion of Am in the recycle fuel, we get little reductions in LTH 
whether or not Pu241 has had time to decay.
Figure 7.3-1.  Development tree for starting MOX-NpPu in 2025.  (Lacking fuel composition recipes,
there are no DYMOND calculations for branch T3.6.) 
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In DYMOND calculations, we treat this case as being limited to 1-recycle pass of the MOX-NpPu.  This 
is primarily because we lack fuel composition recipes for n-pass recycling.
As with tree 2, the first two branches at 2040 reflect phase-out of nuclear reactors and recycling and the 
third branch is simply continuing what was started in 2025.  Branch T3.4 reflects a hypothetical shift to a 
long-term thermal recycling strategy; the penalty of going from glovebox to remote fuel fabrication would 
be accepted and reductions in LTH, LTD, LTR would accelerate because Am would be recycled.  In 
contrast, Branch T3.5 assumes that consumer FR’s (CFR) are introduced in 2040 and that they serve the 
function of reducing Am (rather than TR in Branch T3.4).  Branch 3.6 shows introduction of breeder FR 
(BFR) and the phasing out of TR. 
There are, of course, intermediate cases one could devise, such as a symbiosis of BFR and TR.  Such a 
case would be appropriate if we needed high-temperature TR reactors (VHTR) for hydrogen production
but wanted the uranium utilization and waste management benefits of BFR. 
The distribution of thermal and fast deployed reactor capacity is shown in Figure 7.3-2.
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Figure 7.3-2. Power capacity of operating reactors by reactor type for each case in Tree 3 (start MOX-
onepass in 2025). LWRu is a thermal reactor that can only handle UOX.  LWRm is a thermal reactor that 
can handle multiple fuels (e.g. UOX, MOX, IMF). FR is a fast reactor that may function as a consumer 
(CFR) or a breeder (BFR).  T3.2, T3.3, and T3.4 are overlaid.). 
Only the two multi-pass recycling options, multi-pass MOX (T3.4) and consumer fast reactor (T3.6) can 
achieve a 99.5% reduction in TRU content in the repository by 2100 (see Figure 7.3-2).  Single-pass 
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MOX (T3.3) is better than switching to once through (T3.2) in 2040, but only slows the rate of material 
entering the repository.
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Figure 7.3-3. Total mass in repository for each case in tree 3 (start MOX-onepass in 2025). 
Figure 7.3-4 shows the total mass in the system as a function of time for each case.  Phasing out nuclear 
power (T3.1) after 2040 results in the smallest total mass in the system Of the thermal reactor cases, 
phasing out recycling in 2040 results in slightly more mass in the system than continuing with one pass 
MOX.  Switching to multi-pass MOX or consumer fast reactors in 2040 reduces the total mass in the 
system.  As with tree 1, the mass of uranium (Figure 7.3-5) and the total mass track together; this is 
expected since uranium accounts for the majority of the system mass.
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Figure 7.3-4. Total mass in the system for each case in tree 3 (start MOX-onepass in 2025). 
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Figure 7.3-5. Mass of uranium in system for each case in tree 3 (start MOX-onepass in 2025).
By 2040, only approximately 6% of the reactor fuel is one-pass MOX (Figure 7.3-6); this is much lower 
percentage of the system fuel than was seen for multi-pass IMF in tree 2.  Like multi-pass MOX, one-pass 
MOX has a steeper support ratio than multi-pass IMF; several reactors loads of spent fuel are needed for 
every reactor load of MOX.  The doubling of the reprocessing rate in 2040 allows more legacy spent fuel 
to be reprocessed and temporarily increases the amount of MOX is available (see T3.1 and T3.3).  If 
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nuclear is phased out (T3.1), the percent of MOX in reactors increases through 2060 because the number
of reactors is steady while the amount of reprocessing capacity increases and legacy fuel is available.  The 
second increase after 2090 is because the number of reactors is decreasing, while the reprocessing
capacity remains constant. A switch to multi-pass MOX in 2040, results in a more than a doubling of the 
percent of MOX in reactors.  The decrease in the percent of MOX in reactors after 2070 is due to a lack of 
additional fuel from legacy reactors, a constant reprocessing rate from 2060 – 2080 and the continued 
growth of the reactor fleet.
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Figure 7.3-6. Mass percent of MOX fuel in reactors for each case of tree 3 (start MOX-onepass in 2025). 
Other than for phasing out nuclear, moving to multi-pass MOX at 2040 results in the greatest reduction of 
plutonium (see Figure 7.3-7) in the system.  Curves T3.3, 3.4, 3.5 peak around 2060, presumably because
that is the time of maximum Pu availability as spent fuel has been withdrawn from the respository.
The plot of uranium ore usage (Figure 7.3-8) shows little differentiation among the cases (except for 
phasing out nuclear power), this is probably because MOX and consumer reactors account for only a 
small percentage of the reactor fleet; most of the fleet uses UOX through 2100. 
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Figure 7.3-7. Mass of plutonium in system for each case of tree 3 (start MOX-onepass in 2025). 
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Figure 7.3-8. Uranium ore consumed for each case in tree 3 (start MOX-onepass in 2025). 
7.4. Start MOX-NpPuAm in 2025 
This tree attempts modest repository benefits using thermal reactors, UREX+ technology, and fuels 
relatively similar to current UOX and MOX-Pu.  It can be said to be a U.S. analog to current international 
practice.  The primary differences are inclusion of Np (and Am) to avoid separation of pure Pu and 
inclusion of Am and Np to start reduction in LTD, LTH, and LTR. 
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Figure 7.4-1. Development tree for starting MOX-NpPuAm in 2025.  (Lacking fuel composition recipes, 
there are no DYMOND calculations for branch 4.6.) 
As with trees T2 and T3, branches 1 and 2 reflect phase out scenarios.  Branch T4.3 continues MOX-
NpPuAm n-pass recycling in 2040, to the end of the century.  Branch T4.4 could occur under two related 
conditions.  First, IMF wasn’t ready in 2025 (hence start thermal recycling with MOX) but is ready in 
2040.  Second, the reductions in LTH, LTD, LTR, and weapons-usable inventory obtainable by MOX are 
determined to be insufficient, hence motivating a shift from MOX to IMF. 
Branches T4.5 and T4.6 reflect deployment of FR.  As with tree T2 and T3, if CFR are built, it is assumed
that they are superior for burning Am than TR, thus, the TR fuel shifts from MOX-NpPuAm to MOX-
NpPu.  As with branch T3.6, the lack of MOX-to-BFR fuel recipes prevents DYMOND calculations for 
that case. 
Thermal reactors dominate the energy production through 2100 (see Figure 7.4-2).  Consumer fast 
reactors come online very slowly because of the lack of plutonium and because they, like MOX and IMF, 
are net plutonium consumers.
Fuel for fast reactors comes from four places: 1. UOX fuel in the system, 2. MOX or IMF fuel after its 
first cycle, 3. MOX or IMF fuel after its last cycle, or 4. fuel in existing fast reactors.
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Figure 7.4-2. Power capacity of operating reactors by reactor type for each case in tree 4 (start multipass-
MOX in 2025). LWRu is a thermal reactor that can only handle UOX.  LWRm is a thermal reactor that 
can handle multiple fuels (e.g. UOX, MOX, IMF). FR is a fast reactor that may function as a consumer 
(CFR) or a breeder (BFR).  T4.2, T4.3, and T4.4 are overlaid. 
All of the cases except phase out recycling (T4.1) and phase out nuclear (T4.1) result in a 99.5% 
reduction in TRU content in the repository by 2100.  Of the options explored, multi-pass IMF provides 
the quickest reduction of TRU from the repository.  The plot of mass for phase out of nuclear (T4.1) 
would go back up and match the total system mass by 2100 (see T4.1 in Figure 7.4 -6). 
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Figure 7.4-3 Total mass in repository for each case in tree 4 (start multipass- MOX in 2025).  T4.1, T4.3,
and T4.5 overlap.
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As with the previous three trees, the total mass in the system (Figure 7.4-3) shows the same trends as the 
uranium in the system (Figure 7.4-4).  Reverting to once through (T4.2) results in the highest mass in the 
system, while phasing out nuclear (T4.1) results in the smallest mass.  The difference between staying
with mult-pass MOX (T4.3), switching to multi-pass IMF at 2040 (T4.4) or adding consumer fast reactors
at 2040 is very small, at least by 2100.
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Figure 7.4-4. Total mass in system for each case of tree 4 (start multipass-MOX in 2025). 
The mass of uranium in the system (Figure 7.4-5) for multi-pass MOX (T4.3) and multi-pass IMF (T4.4) 
and consumer reactors (T4.5) are very close.  The amount of fresh uranium does not decrease much with 
MOX (T4.3) because of the steep support ratio between successive cycles of MOX means that only a 
small portion of the reactor fleet contains MOX (see Figure 7.4-6).  In the multi-pass MOX and consumer
reactor case presented here, only 30% of new reactors are consumers, so only a small number of
consumer fast reactors are present in the system by 2100 (see Figure 7.4-2).  This means that in both 
cases, most of the reactor fleet is running on UOX.
The mass of uranium in the system with IMF (T4.4, Figure 7.4-5) is slightly less than that for MOX or 
MOX and consumer fast reactor.  IMF fuel moves into the reactor fleet more quickly than MOX fuel (see 
Figure 7.4-6). This is due to the recipe for multi-pass IMF which has close to a 1:1 support ratio.
However, the IMF recipe used in this case is for a blended core, this means a large percentage of the core 
is UOX so the overall amount of uranium in the system does not decrease significantly.
Starting multi-pass IMF in 2040 results in a substantial movement of IMF into the reactor fleet by 2080 
(T4.4, Figure 7.4-6).  This is due to legacy reactors retiring during this time and the reservoir of legacy
spent fuel available for making IMF.  As multi-pass IMF continues through the century, the system
becomes IMF limited around 2085 (T4.4).  This is due to legacy fuel no longer being available (it was 
consumed prior to 2080) to provide extra IMF fuel for new reactors coming on-line, earlier in the century 
legacy spent fuel provided start-up fuel for new reactors, that otherwise would have been started with 
UOX.  The slight rise in the percent of multi-pass MOX in the system around 2090 is due to reactors
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leaving the system while reprocessing capacity remains constant which keeps the MOX supply constant
or increasing slightly, so a higher percentage of the fuel in each reactor is MOX.
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Figure 7.4-5. Mass of uranium in system for each case of tree 4 (start multipass-MOX in 2025). 
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Figure 7.4-6. Mass percent of MOX or IMF fuel in reactors for each case of tree 4 (start multipass-MOX
in 2025). The multi-pass IMF (T4.4) has a low support ratio and is blended core fuel.  The multi-pass
MOX (T4.3) has a higher support ratio and is a full core fuel. 
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IMF in this case (see T4.4 of Figure 7-4.7) reduces the amount of Pu in the system to a level comparable
to the amount of Pu that would be in the system if we shut down nuclear power starting in 2040.  IMF 
does a very good job of consuming Pu. Multi-pass MOX reduces the amount of Pu in the system more
than the consumer FR case but only because of the limited number of consumer FRs that are on line by 
the end of the century. 
Moving to multi-pass fuel systems (see Figure 7.4-8, MOX (T4.3), IMF (T4.4) or CFR (T4.5)) reduces 
the amount of uranium ore consumed compared to a once through system (T4.2).  Moving to IMF fuel at 
2040 results in the largest reductions in the amount of uranium ore consumed by 2100.  All cases except, 
for terminating nuclear power (T4.1) consume a substantial amount of uranium ore. 
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Figure 7.4-7. Mass of plutonium in system for each case of tree 4 (start multipass-MOX in 2025). 
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Figure 7.4-8. Uranium ore consumed for each case in tree 4 (start multipass-MOX in 2025). 
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7.5. Start Consumer fast reactors in 2025 
This tree starts CFR, skipping recycling in TR. The early FR experience would set the stage for BFR 
when uranium resources warrant.  As with the other trees, the first branch in 2040 is phase out of nuclear.
Branches T5.2, T5.3, and T5.4 show phase out of the FR, e.g. if performance is inadequate.  (One could 
argue that this is what the French did when they terminated SuperPhenix.)  In branch T5.2, the FR is 
replaced with simply once-through.  Thus, branch T5.2 is the same as once-through except for a few FR 
built between 2025 and 2040.  In branches T5.3 and T5.4, the FR is replaced with thermal recycling via 
MOX and IMF respectively.  Branch T5.5 continues the status quo and branch 6.6 accelerates the
transition to FR.
Figure 7.5-1. Development tree for starting consumer FR in 2025.
The rate that consumer fast reactors are built depends on the request rate, the growth rate of the fleet, and 
the amount of plutonium available for starting the fast reactors.  For the cases presented here, the request 
(i.e. the percent of power generation capacity coming online to be provided by specific reactor types) is 
30% of new construction from 2025 to 2040 and then either continuing with that request (case 5.5),
reducing that request to zero (cases 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, and 6.4), or increasing the request  to 100% (case 5.6) 
and switching to breeder fast reactors.  As for all the other cases discussed in chapter 7, the growth rate is 
1.8% per year starting in 2010.  The amount of plutonium available for starting the fast reactors depends 
on the recent history of plutonium generation and usage by the reactor fleet.  When fast reactors are 
turned on, the fast reactors receive all UOX spent fuel, IMF or MOX pass 1 spent fuel, IMF pass 5 or 
MOX pass 8 spent fuel, and all fast reactor spent fuel.  This means that once the fast reactor is turned on, 
the thermal reactor portion of the system will run MOX and IMF for the fuel that remains in the system,
but the majority of the fuel in thermal reactors will be UOX.
Thermal reactors dominate the energy production through 2100 (see Figure 7.5-2).  Consumer (T5.5 FR) 
and breeder fast reactors (T5.6 FR) come online very slowly because of the lack of plutonium.
For the case (T5.5) where consumer fast reactors are requested for 30% of the new reactor starting in 
2025 and continue through 2100, the system becomes plutonium limited a little after 2090.  This is not 
unexpected since the legacy spent fuel available earlier in the century would have provided “extra” 
plutonium compared to the current reactor fleet so that more consumer fast reactors could be built than 
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the fleet would normally support.  Remember also that more plutonium is required to start a fast reactor 
than to continue its operation.  The decrease in reactor capacity seen is from fast reactors built around 
2030 retiring.  A somewhat similar trend is seen when a switch is made to phasing out consumer fast 
reactors and continuing with once through (T5.2 FR), starting multi-pass MOX (T5.3 FR), or starting
multi-pass IMF (T5.4 FR).  In these cases, the plateau is due to discontinuing the building of fast reactors 
and the slope downwards is due to the retiring of fast reactors built around 2030.  If a switch is made to 
100% breeder fast reactors (T5.6 FR) in 2040, substantially more fast reactors enter the system.  Early on, 
the difference between the breeder and convert fast reactor contributions is due mostly to the higher
percent of breeder reactors requested.  At the end of the century, the breeder fast reactor case (T5.6 FR) is 
plutonium limited, but not as badly as for the consumer fast reactor case (T5.5 FR), so a leveling rather 
than a decrease in fast reactors is seen.  The plateau after 2090 is due to the rather weak breeding capacity
of the recipe used for this case.  Using a stronger breeder recipe would likely eliminate the plateau. 
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Figure 7.5-2. Power capacity of operating reactors by reactor type for each case in tree 5 (start once-
through/consumer fast reactor symbiosis in 2025). LWRu is a thermal reactor that can only handle UOX.
LWRm is a thermal reactor that can handle multiple fuels (e.g. UOX, MOX, IMF). FR is a fast reactor 
that may function as a consumer (CFR) or a breeder (BFR). 
All of the cases which continue with recycling, IMF, MOX, consumer fast reactor and breeder fast reactor
(T5.3, T5.4, T5.5 and T5.6) will achieve a 99.5% reduction in TRU content in the repository by 2100.
Looking at the graph (Figure 7.5-3) it is clear that shifting back from fast reactors to multi-pass MOX or 
IMF will still meet the repository reduction goal by 2010.  The mass in the repository for phase out of 
nuclear (T5.1) would eventually equal the mass in the system for the phase out nuclear case (T5.1 in 
Figure 7.5-4).  If consumer fast reactors are phased out at starting in 2040 and a once through thermal
system is adopted at that time, then mass in the repository in 2100 will approach that of the continuous 
once through system shown by T1.2 in Figure 7.1-3.
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Figure 7.5-3. Total mass in repository for each case in tree 5 (start once-through/consumer fast reactor
symbiosis in 2025). 
Figures 7.5-4 and 7.6-5 show the total and uranium mass (respectively) for each case.  Uranium accounts 
for the majority of the mass in the system and the relative order of mass for uranium and total system are
the same for all six cases.  As expected, phasing out nuclear (T5.1) results in the lowest mass in the 
system while discontinuing consumer fast reactors and switching to once-through thermal reactors (T5.2) 
results in highest mass in the system.  Phasing out consumer fast reactors and switching to MOX or IMF 
at 2040 reduces the total mass in the system compared to switching to once-through.  This is probably due
to the decrease in the uranium ore request (see Figure 7.5-8) that results from recycling fuel. Between
MOX and IMF, IMF offers more reduction in total mass than MOX, this is more clearly seen in the plots 
of uranium in the system (see Figure 7.5-5) and plutonium in the system (see Figure 7.5-7).  This is 
probably due to the relatively flat support ratio of IMF which allows it to move more quickly than MOX 
into the reactor fleet (see Figure 7.5-6). While the consumer reactor cases that continue with reprocessing 
(T5.3, T5.4, and T5.5) are close together, switching to a breeder fast reactor in 2040 significantly reduces 
the total mass and uranium in the system.
The mass of uranium in the system (Figure 7.5-5) for multi-pass MOX (T5.3) and multi-pass IMF (T5.4) 
is very close.  The amount of fresh uranium does not decrease as much with MOX (T5.3) as for IMF 
(T5.4) because of the steep support ratio between successive cycles of MOX means that only a small
portion of the reactor fleet contains MOX (see Figure 7.5-6).  Whereas the recipe for multi-pass IMF 
which has close to a 1:1 support ratio which allows IMF to move into the system quickly.
Continuing with consumer fast reactors (T5.5) does not reduce the amount of uranium in the system any
better than moving to MOX. When a switch is made to breeder fast reactors in 2040 (T5.6) the uranium in 
the system is further reduced from that achieved by switching to IMF.
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Figure 7.5-4. Total mass in the system for each case in tree 5 (start once-through/consumer fast reactor
symbiosis in 2025). 
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Figure 7.5-5. Mass of uranium in system for each case in tree 5 (start once-through/consumer fast reactor
symbiosis in 2025). 
Starting multi-pass IMF in 2040 results in a substantial movement of IMF into the reactor fleet by 2080.
This is due to legacy reactors retiring during this time and the reservoir of legacy spent fuel available for 
making IMF.  As multi-pass IMF continues through the century, the system becomes IMF limited around 
2085 (T5.4). This is due to legacy fuel no longer being available (it was consumed prior to 2080) to 
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provide extra IMF fuel for new reactors coming on-line, earlier in the century legacy spent fuel provided 
start-up fuel for new reactors that otherwise would have been started with UOX. 
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Figure 7.5-6. Mass percent of multi-pass MOX or multi-pass IMF fuel in reactors for each case of tree 5 
(start once-through/consumer fast reactor symbiosis in 2025).  The multi-pass IMF (T5.4) has a low 
support ratio and is blended core fuel. The multi-pass MOX (T5.3) has a higher support ratio and is a full 
core fuel. 
IMF in this case (see T5.4 of Figure 7-5.7) reduces the amount of Pu in the system below that which
would be in the system if nuclear power is phased out starting in 2040.  IMF does a very good job of 
consuming Pu.  As expected, shifting to breeder fast reactors (T5.6) increases the amount of plutonium in 
the system. Continuing with consumer fast reactors results in less plutonium in the system than for 
switching to once-through.  This is not surprising since consumer fast reactors, IMF and MOX all reduce 
the amount of plutonium in the system.  MOX is more effective than consumer fast reactors in consuming
plutonium.  The large difference in the amount of plutonium in the system between IMF and MOX is due 
both to IMF’s better ability to consume plutonium and to the higher percentage of IMF in the system
compared to MOX. 
Looking at Figure 7.5-8, continuing with a consumer fast reactor – once through thermal reactor system
(T5.5) uses the same uranium as moving toMOX thermal reactors (T5.3). As in previous trees, the once 
through thermal reactor case (T5.1) use the most uranium.  Other than phasing out nuclear, switching to 
multi-pass IMF (T5.4) or breeder fast reactors in 2040 (T5.6) does the most to reduce uranium
consumption.
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Figure 7.5-7. Mass of plutonium in system for each case in tree 5 (start once-through/consumer fast 
reactor symbiosis in 2025). 
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Figure 7.5-8. Mass of uranium ore consumed for each case in tree 5 (start once-through/consumer fast 
reactor symbiosis in 2025). Plots for T5.3 and T5.5 overlay each other. 
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7.6. Start Breeder fast reactors in 2025 
This tree moves into FR, skipping recycling in TR.  It aims to accommodate a hypothetical combination
of limited uranium resources and high nuclear growth, without expending resources on recycling in TR. 
As with the other trees, the first branch in 2040 is phase out of nuclear.  Branches 6.2-6.4 show phase out 
of the BFR, e.g. if performance is inadequate.  (One could argue that this is what the French did when 
they terminated SuperPhenix.)  In branch T6.2, the BFR is replaced with simply once-through.  Thus, 
branch 6.2 is the same as once-through except for a few BFR built between 2025 and 2040.  In branches 
6.3 and 6.4, the BFR is replaced with thermal recycling via MOX and IMF respectively.  Branch 6.5 
continues the status quo and branch T6.6 accelerates it. 
Figure 7.6-1. Development tree for starting breeder FR in 2025.
The rate that breeder fast reactors are built depends on the request rate (i.e. the percent of power 
generation capacity coming online to be provided by specific reactor types), the growth rate of the fleet, 
and the amount of plutonium available for starting the breeder reactors.  For the cases presented here, the 
request rate is 30% of new construction from 2025 to 2040 and then either continuing with that request 
rate (case 6.5), reducing that request rate to zero (cases 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4), or increasing the request rate to 
100% (case 6.6).  As for all the other cases discussed in chapter 7, the growth rate is 1.8% per year
starting in 2010.  The amount of plutonium available for starting the breeder reactors depends on the 
recent history of plutonium generation and usage by the reactor fleet.  When fast reactors are turned on, 
the fast reactors receive all UOX spent fuel, IMF or MOX pass 1 spent fuel, IMF pass 5 or MOX pass 8 
spent fuel, and all fast reactor spent fuel.  This means that once the fast reactor is turned on, the thermal
reactor portion of the system will run MOX and IMF for the fuel that remains in the system, but the 
majority of the fuel in thermal reactors will be UOX.
Thermal reactors dominate the energy production through 2100 (see Figure 7.5-2).  Consumer (T5.5 FR) 
and breeder fast reactors (T5.6 FR) come online very slowly because of the lack of plutonium. A plateau 
and decrease after 2090 is seen when a switch is made to phasing out nuclear (T6.1 FR), phasing out 
breeder fast reactors and continuing with once through (T6.2), starting multi-pass MOX (T6.3 FR), or 
starting multi-pass IMF (T6.4 FR).  In these cases, the plateau is due to discontinuing the building of fast 
reactors and the slope is due to the retiring of fast reactors built around 2030.  If 30% breeder fast reactors 
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continue to be requested past 2040 (T6.5 FR) or a switch is made to 100% breeder fast reactors (T6.6 FR) 
in 2040, substantially more fast reactors enter the system.  Early on, the difference between the two 
breeder cases is due mostly to the percent of breeder reactors requested.  At the end of the century,
moving towards 100% breeder fast reactors results in  periodic plutonium limited growth fairly quickly
(by 2065), while continuing with 30% breeder reactors avoids plutonium limitations.  This suggests that 
the optimum request rate for moving to breeder fast reactors (for these recipes) is a little above 30%.
Using a stronger breeder recipe would reduce the amount of plutonium limitation.
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Figure 7.6-2. Power capacity of operating reactors by reactor type for each case of tree 6 (start breeder 
fast reactors in 2025).  The lines for fast reactors for cases 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 overlay each other. LWRu 
is a thermal reactor that can only handle UOX.  LWRm is a thermal reactor that can handle multiple fuels 
(e.g. UOX, MOX, IMF). FR is a fast reactor that may function as a consumer (CFR) or a breeder (BFR). 
All of the cases that continue with recycling, IMF, MOX, and breeder fast reactor (T6.3, T6.4, T6.5 and 
T6.6) will achieve a 99.5% reduction in TRU content in the repository by 2100.  Looking at the graph 
(Figure 7.6-3) it is clear that shifting back from fast reactors to multi-pass MOX or IMF will still meet the 
repository reduction goal in 2100.  The mass in the repository would eventually equal the mass in the 
system for the phase out nuclear case (T6.1 in Figure 7.6-4).  If breeder fast reactors are phased out at 
starting in 2040 and a once through thermal system is adopted at that time, then mass in the repository in
2100 will approach that of the continuous once through system shown by T1.2 in Figure 7.1-3.
Figures 7.6-4 and 7.6-5 show the total and uranium mass (respectively) for each case.  Uranium accounts 
for the majority of the mass in the system and the relative order of mass for uranium and total system are
the same for all six cases.  As expected, phasing out nuclear (T6.1) results in the lowest mass in the 
system while discontinuing breeder fast reactors and switching to once-through thermal reactors (T6.2) 
results in highest mass in the system.  Phasing out breeder fast reactors and switching to MOX or IMF at 
2040 reduces the total mass in the system compared to switching to once-through. This is probably due to 
the decrease in the uranium ore request (see Figure 7.6-8) that results from recycling fuel.  Between MOX 
and IMF, IMF offers more reduction in total mass than MOX, this is more clearly seen in the plots of 
uranium in the system (see Figure 7.6-5) and plutonium in the system (see Figure 7.6-7).  This is probably
due to the relatively flat support ratio of IMF that allows it to move more quickly than MOX into the 
reactor fleet (see Figure 7.6-6).  While the cases that continue with reprocessing (T6.3, T6.4, T6.5, T6.6) 
are close together, switching to 100% breeder fast reactor in 2040 significantly reduces the total mass and 
uranium mass in the system.
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Figure 7.6-3. Total mass in repository for each case of tree 6 (start breeder fast reactors in 2025). Lines 
for cases T6.1, T6.2, T6.5, and T6.6 overlay each other. 
Figure 7.6-4. Total mass in system for each case of tree 6 (start breeder fast reactors in 2025). 
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Uranium in System
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Figure 7.6-5. Mass of uranium in system for each case of tree 6 (start breeder fast reactors in 2025).
Figure 7.6-6. Mass percent of MOX or IMF fuel in reactors for each case of tree 6 (start breeder fast 
reactors in 2025). 
IMF in this case (see T6.4 of Figure 7-6.7) reduces the amount of Pu in the system to a level comparable
to the amount of Pu that would be in the system if we shut down nuclear power starting in 2040.  IMF 
does a very good job of consuming Pu.
Switching to 100% breeder reactors (T6.6) for new construction in 2040 results in the highest mass of 
plutonium in the system at 2100.  Phasing out breeder fast reactors and returning to once-through (T6.2) 
results in significantly more plutonium in the system than moving to multi-pass MOX (T6.3) or multi-
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pass IMF (T6.4).  Switching to IMF (T6.4)is the only case that reduces the level of plutonium in the 
system at 2100 to below that of phasing out nuclear (T6.1). 
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Figure 7.6-7. Mass of plutonium in system for each case of tree 6 (start breeder fast reactors in 2025).
Phasing out breeder fast reactors and returning to once-through UOX (T6.2, Figure 7.6-8) results in the 
highest uranium ore consumption by 2100.  Switching to multi-pass MOX (T6.3) consumes only slightly
less uranium than the once-through case; this is probably due to the low percent of MOX fuel 
(approximately 10%) in thermal reactors by 2100.  Switching to multi-pass IMF (T6.4) consumes less 
uranium than the MOX case; this is probably due to the relatively high percent of IMF fuel 
(approximately 80%) in thermal reactors by 2100.  Recycling fuel reduces uranium consumption
compared to once-through.  Switching to 100% of new reactors being breeder fast reactors (T6.6) reduces 
uranium consumption about twice as much as continuing with 30% of new reactors being breeder fast 
reactors (T6.5).
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Figure 7.6-8. Uranium ore consumed for each case in tree 6 (start breeder fast reactors in 2025).
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8. DYMOND ANALYSES OF SPECIFIC ISSUES 
Previous chapters contained key fuel cycle decisions (Chapter 2), AFCI objectives and metrics (Chapter 
3), the alternatives (Chapter 4), and “static” analyses of the various fuel and reactor options and how they
can be combined (Chapter 5).  This Chapter is the third of three that addresses timing and dynamics.
Chapter 6 examined development trees using relatively simple analysis of more possibilities. Chapter 7 
examined the same trees using DYMOND.  This Chapter uses the results from Chapter 7 and other
DYMOND calculations as needed to examine particular issues, including the following: 
1. Comparison of single-pass options (uses trees 2, 3, 4, and variations thereof) 
2. Comparison of multi-pass options (uses tree 2 and 4) 
3. Comparison of single-pass versus multi-pass.
4. Transition to fast recycling (uses trees 5 and 6)
8.1. Comparison of single-pass options 
This subsection shows DYMOND calculations for the following single-pass cases:
IMF-NpPu (full core) 
IMF-NpPuAm (blended) 
IMF-NpPuAmCm (full core)
MOX-NpPu (full core) 
MOX-NpPuAm (full core) 
UOX once through (for comparison)
None of these cases meet the AFCI objectives.
The following assumptions/settings were used for the calculations presented in this section: 
- 1.8% annual growth rate in power demand starting in 2010
- repository opens in 2012
- reprocessing starts in 2025 with an annual reprocessing capacity for spent fuel from thermal
reactors of 3 kton/yr in 2025, 6 kton/yr in 2040, 9 kton/yr in 2060, and 12 kton/yr in 2080 
- all cases start with once through UOX in thermal reactors, all cases except OTC change to a one-
pass MOX or IMF formulation in 2025 
- the amount of MOX or IMF fuel that is available is calculated based on the amount of Pu 
available
Figure 8.1-1 shows the percentage of MOX or IMF fuel in the reactors (calculated as ktonne of MOX or 
IMF fuel / total ktonne of fuel in the reactors *100) as a function of time.  As expected, the plot for OTC 
remains zero (no recycled fuel).  Two of the IMF cases, IMF-NpPu and IMF-NpPuAmCm, and the two 
MOX cases, MOX-NpPu and MOX-NpPuAm, account for less than 15% of the total fuel in the reactors.
The IMF-NpPuAm case shows a stiking different trend and accounts for up to 95% of the fuel in the 
reactors.  This is due to the IMF-NpPuAm being a blended core recipe rather than a full core recipe.  Full 
core recipes imply that all the pins in a given reactor are made of MOX or IMF; in the current model
formation of MOX or IMF is based on the availability of Pu.  If there is not enough Pu to make enough 
MOX or IMF for a full core, enough MOX or IMF is made for the available Pu and the remainder of the 
core is made of UOX.  The total amount of MOX or IMF fuel in the reactors is then some fraction of the 
fuel capacity of the reactors.  Blended core recipes assume that only part of the pins in a given core are 
IMF or MOX and the remaining pins are UOX.  As in the full core cases, the current model formation of 
MOX or IMF is based on the availability of Pu.  If there is not enough Pu to make enough MOX or IMF 
pins for a blended core, enough MOX or IMF is made for the available Pu and the remainder of the core 
is made of UOX.  Since blended IMF or MOX fuel includes both tranuranic and uranium oxide pins, the 
amount of transuranic required to make a complete core of blended fuel is lower than that to make a 
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complete core of full core IMF or MOX.  This means that for a given amount of available transuranics, 
blended core IMF or MOX fuel may account for a higher percentage of the total fuel in reactors than full 
core IMF or MOX fuel. 
For these calculations, one-pass MOX or IMF fuel was used.  For these calculations, one-pass means that 
fresh UOX fuel entering the reactor exits the reactor as spent UOX fuel and then goes to reprocessing to 
form fresh MOX or IMF fuel.  Spent MOX or IMF fuel exiting the reactor goes to the repository; it is not 
reprocessed, hence the name one-pass, the MOX or IMF fuel makes one pass through the reactor. 
A peak in the percent of reactor fuel provided by MOX or IMF fuels is seen for all recipes around 2060.
This results from a combination of increasing reprocessing capacity and the availability of legacy fuel.
Once all the legacy fuel is reprocessed in the 2060-2070 time period, the relative amount of transurantics
decreases so percentage of MOX or IMF fuel decreases.  The steeper increase observed for IMF-NPA 
(blended core) is due to the lower amount of tranuranic required to make a complete core of blended fuel 
and the extra transuranic available from the legacy fuel. 
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Figure 8.1-1. Percent of total fuel in reactors provided by MOX or IMF fuel recipes.  The plots for IMF-
NP and IMF-NPAC overlay each other. 
The percent of the total mass in reactors that is Pu is presented in Figure 8.1-2.  The results presented in 
the figure support the previous discussion.  While the percent of reactor fuel provided by blended versus 
full core MOX or IMF fuel recipes is very different, the percent of Pu in the reactor cores is quite similar
for all of the MOX or IMF recipes.
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Figure 8.1-2. Percent of total mass in reactors that is Pu. 
The total mass of spent fuel in the repository is shown in Figure 8.1-3.  Continuing with once through
results in the greatest amount of mass in the repository by 2100.  Moving at 2025 to a one pass MOX or 
IMF full core fuel reduces the amount of spent fuel in the repository relative to once through. The large 
difference between the IMF-NPA blended fuel and the other MOX and IMF full core fuels reflects both 
the amount of each fuel type in the reactors and the way the fuel is handled in the current model.  The 
IMF-NPA blended fuel accounts for a greater percentage of the fuel in reactors than the full core fuels do.
Since any type of spent IMF or MOX fuel is sent to the repository, it is expected that more IMF-NPA fuel 
ends up in the repository since there is more in the reactors.  However, from figure 8.1-2, it is clear that 
the percentage of transuranics in the reactors for all of the fuel types is fairly close.  The large difference 
between the mass for the IMF-NPA and the other fuel types is how uranium is handled.  In the current
model, the fresh uranium used to make the IMF-NPA is counted as part of the mass of IMF or MOX fuel; 
the core is supposed to be heterogenous with respect to UOX and transuranics.  When the IMF-NPA 
blended core spent fuel exits the reactor, all the fuel, including the spent UOX that is part of the normal 
fuel recipe goes to the repository.  The core is not disassembled with the spent UOX going to
reprocessing and the spent transuranics going to the repository.  In the current model, when there is not 
enough full core MOX or IMF to complete a core, UOX is added.  The added UOX is counted as part of 
the mass of UOX, not MOX or IMF.  When the MOX or IMF full core spent fuel exits the reactor, only it 
goes to the repository.  The UOX added to complete the load goes to reprocessing; this is the equivalent 
of disassembling the core. If the spent UOX for both types of recipes were treated the same way, then all 
five recipes would provide similar results.  This difference in how spent cores and the spent UOX are
treated siginificantly impacts the compositon of the material in the repository and the rate at which mass
is placed in the repository. 
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Figure 8.1-3. Total mass in repository. The plot for IMF-NP is overlain by the plot for IMF-NPAC.  The 
IMF-NPA recipe is a blended core fuel while the other MOX and IMF recipes are for full core fuels. 
Continuing with once-through UOX (Figure 8.1-4) results in the highest mass in the system.  Compared
to once-through, switching to one-pass MOX in 2025 reduces the total mass in the system by 
approximately 10%, while switching to one-pass IMF in 2025 reduces the total mass in the system by
approximately 20%.  No significant differences were observed amoung the different MOX and IMF 
recipes.
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Figure 8.1-4. Total mass in the system.  The plot for IMF-NP is overlain by the plot for IMF-NPAC.  The 
IMF-NPA recipe is a blended core fuel while the other MOX and IMF recipes are for full core fuels. 
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The masses of plutonium (Figure 8.1-5) and uranium (Figure 8.1-6) in the system track with the total 
mass in the system.  Continuing with once-through UOX results in the highest plutonium and uranium
masses in the system.  Compared to once-through, switching to one-pass MOX in 2025 reduces the 
plutonium in the system 19-24%, depending on the recipe.  Compared to once-through, switching to one-
pass IMF in 2025 reduces the plutonium in the system 48 – 62%, depending on the recipe. 
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Figure 8.1-5. Mass of plutonium in system
Uranium is the largest single element in the mass of the system (see Figure 8.1-6) and “controls” the total 
mass in the system.
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Figure 8.1-6. Mass of uranium in system.
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The mass of plutonium-239 in the system (Figure 8.1-7) tracks closely with that of the total plutonium in 
the system (Figure 8.1-).  This is expected since plutonium-239 is the dominant isotope of plutonium in 
the fuels.  The mass fraction of plutonium-239 in fuel decreases between the inlet and outlet recipes for 
all of the MOX and IMF recipes presented; these recipes are net consumers of plutonium-239.  As 
expected the mass fraction of plutonium-239 increases in the outlet recipes for once through UOX,
making it a net producer of plutonium-239.
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Figure 8.1-7. Mass of plutonium-239 in system.
The mass of plutonium-238 (Figure8.1-8) does not track with the mass of total plutonium in the system.
Plutonium-238 accounts for a small fraction of the total plutonium in the fuels.  In contrast to plutonium-
239, the mass fraction of plutonium-238 in fuel increases between the inlet and outlet recipes for all of the 
MOX and IMF recipes presented; these recipes are net producers of plutonium-239.  While for once
through UOX, the trend is the same for plutonium-239, the mass fraction of plutonium-238 increases in 
the outlet recipes for once through UOX, making it a net producer of plutonium-238.  The observed 
difference in order is due to the MOX and IMF fuels being net producers of plutonium-238 in contrast to 
them being net consumers of plutonium-239.
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Figure 8.1-8. Mass of plutonium-238 in system.
The amount of weapons usable material in the system (see Figure 8.1-9) can be correlated to the potential 
for having sufficient material to create a critical mass.  The current model uses the critical mass of 
plutonium-239 as a reference critical mass.  The masses of all remaining isotopes, that are capable of 
forming a critical mass, are ratioed to mass required to form a critical mass of plutonium-239 and an 
equivalent mass of plutonium-239 is calculated.  The equivalent masses are summed to estimate the mass
of weapons usable material in the system.  The relative magnitude of weapons usable material in the 
system is the same as the relative magnitude of plutonium-239 in the system, suggesting that for these 
fuels and operating modes, plutonium-239 is the major component of weapons usable material in the 
system.  Switching to one-pass MOX in 2025 decreases the weapons usable material in the system at 
2100 by 20 – 23%, depending on the recipe.  Switching to one-pass IMF in 2025 decreases the weapons
usable material in the system at 2100 by 45 – 57% depending on the recipe.  For each of the recipes used, 
at any point in time, less than half of the total weapons usable material is in reprocessing, dry interim
storage, or fuel fabrication (Figure 8.1-10).
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Figure 8.1-9. Weapons usable material in system.
Weapons Usable in Reprocessing, Fuel Fabrication, and Dry
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Figure 8.1-10. Weapons usable material in reprocessing, fuel fabrication, and dry interim storage
The long-term heat (50-1500 years) from the material placed in the repository is presented in Figure 8.1-
11.  The blended IMF-NPA fuel results in a significantly higher heat load than the other recipes.  Looking
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at the details of the model, most of the difference is due to the heat load contributions of Cm-245, Am-
243, and other actinides. 
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Figure 8.1-11. Total long-term heat (50-1500 years) in repository.
The dose at 500,000 years from material in the repository (see Figure 8.1-12) tracks with the total mass in 
the repository (see Figure 8.1-3). 
Dose at 500,000 Years in Repository
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Year
m
re
m
/y
r/
kt
on
ne
IMF-NP
IMF-NPA
IMF-NPAC
OTC
MOX-NP
MOX-NPA
Figure 8.1-12. Dose at 500,000 years from material in the repository.
Continuing with once-through fuel consumes the most uranium ore (see Figure 8.1-13). 
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Figure 8.1-13. Uranium ore consumed.
The AFCI program has four major objectives,[DOE2005a] as follows:
1. Reduce the long-term environmental burden of nuclear energy through more efficient disposal of 
waste materials.  Single pass full core IMF or MOX can significantly reduce the amount of material 
placed in the repository through 2100, however, neither MOX or  IMF can fully consume the TRU so 
that MOX and IMF do not lead to a long reduction of required repository capacity.  The long-term
heat and dose in the repository are not significantly reduced compared to once-thru in the long term
since one pass recycle does not significantly reduce the mass placed in the repository in the long-
term.
2. Enhance overall nuclear fuel cycle proliferation resistance via improved technologies for spent fuel 
management.  MOX and IMF reduce the amount of total Pu and Pu-239 in the system compared to 
once-thru.  IMF results in a greater reduction of total Pu and Pu-239 than MOX.  MOX and IMF 
increase the amount of Pu-238 in the system compared to once-thru, but the weapons useable material 
in the system is decreased.
3. Enhance energy security by extracting energy recoverable in spent fuel and depleted uranium,
ensuring that uranium resources do not become a limiting factor for nuclear power.  MOX and IMF 
reduce the consumption of uranium ore with IMF reducing the uranium usage more than the MOX. 
4. Improve fuel cycle management, while continuing competitive fuel cycle economics and excellent 
safety performance of the entire nuclear fuel cycle system.
Overall, while single-pass strategies improve some aspects of the fuel cycle, they do not adequately meet
all four AFCI objectives. 
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8.2. Comparison of multi-pass MOX versus IMF 
In this section, we cross compare among some of the branches in Chapter 7 to examine multi-pass IMF
versus MOX.  Both are NpPuAm. The branches compared are as follows:
x T1.2 Once through
x T1.3 Multi-pass blended-core IMF starting in 2040
x T1.4 Multi-pass full-core MOX starting in 2040 
x T2.3 Multi-pass blended-core IMF starting in 2025
x T4.3 Multi-pass full-core MOX starting in 2025 
The graphs show that in almost all cases, IMF beats MOX.  The primary counter example is the higher 
Cm in IMF after a few cycles; this was predicted from the analyses in Chapter 5.  The cause seems to be 
that the IMF approach transmutes more of the Pu, Np, and Am with the byproduct of higher TRU
isotopes such as Cm244.
The graphs also give a measure of the impact of delaying recycling from 2025 to 2040.  In many cases, 
starting multi-pass IMF in 2040 catches up to benefits from multi-pass MOX started in 2025, an example
of why we describe IMF has being a better “control knob” than MOX. 
As we look deeper into some of the metrics here versus Chapter 7, we see more of the limitations of the 
existing model – most especially the lack of isotope decay while material is storage.  (The first 5 years of 
decay after discharge is captured because we use 5-year-after discharge recipes.)
8.2.1 Basic parameters
We start with the mass in the system.  Figure 8.2-1 shows the mass in the entire system.  The two cases
that start in 2025 diverge from once-through sooner than the 2040 cases, but there are time lags between 
when recycling starts and when the total mass in the system starts to change. 
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Figure 8.2-1. Total mass in the system for the cases being cross compared 
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Figure 8.2-2 is the first of several graphs that divide the total mass into key components, starting with 
uranium.  Because uranium dominates the mass of the system, this figure is extremely similar to Figure 
8.2-1.
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Figure 8.2-2. Total uranium in the system for the cases being cross compared
Figure 8.2-3 shows the total plutonium in the system.  Multi-pass IMF can basically “freeze” the
inventory of Pu even with 1.8%/year growth; MOX cannot.  However, it appears that the later IMF is 
started, the more difficult it is to freeze the Pu inventory.
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Figure 8.2-3. Total Pu in the system, note that there is more Pu in the MOX cases.  Both MOX and IMF 
have lower Pu than once-through.
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Figure 8.2-4 shows only Pu239; the trends are similar to total Pu.  IMF’s known ability to better burn 
Pu239 is quite evident.  Figure 8.2-5 shows only Pu238; there is substantial increase in the Pu238 
inventory in the system for the MOX cases.  We do not fully understand (yet) the difference between 
MOX and IMF, but we do know that MOX has a larger recirculating inventory yet burns less of several 
TRU isotopes. 
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Figure 8.2-4. Pu239 in the system.
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Figure 8.2-5. Pu238 in the system
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Figure 8.2-6 shows total Np in the system, which is basically Np237.  The IMF systems appear
substantially more successful in ridding the system of Np237, which is a major contributor to long-term
dose.  Note that MOX/2025 has a 15 year head-start on IMF/2040; it takes until about 2085 before
IMF/2040 passes MOX/2025.  Starting earlier helps.
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Figure 8.2-6. Total Np in the system, note that there is more Np in the MOX cases.  Both MOX and IMF 
have lower Np than once-through.
Figure 8.2-7 shows total Am.  We suspect that all of the Am curves have a systematic error, which is most
pronounced for once-through.  We speculate that if isotopic decay is included in future models we would 
see that the Am in once-through is higher than for IMF or MOX, but this is not for certain.  Consider 
Figure 8.2-8, which shows Am241.  Both Figure 8.2-7 and 8.2-8 show that MOX deviates up and IMF 
deviates down from once-through; more deviation the sooner recycling starts. 
Recall that DYMOND does not explicitly account for isotopic decay while material is in storage.  Isotopic 
decay is built into the 5-year-after-discharge recipes. Decay of Pu241 into Am241 is one of the major
pathways to Am241.  Thus, the increase of Am241 while SNF is in longer-term storage is not accounted 
for.  Once fuel is discharged, the isotopics in DYMOND are accounted for using the 5-year-after
discharge recipes.  This overstates decay from zero to 5 years; but misses decay thereafter.  So, most of 
the decay of Pu241 into Am241 for the once-through curves is missing.
For the recycle cases, however, most of the decay is accounted for; consider a 12-year loop (if separation
capability is sufficient).  Decay of Pu241 during the 4-5 years that fuel is in a reactor is accounted for; the 
decay of Pu241 during the first 5 years after discharge is accounted for.  Decay during the 2 years of 
separation and fabrication is not accounted for.  So, up to 83% (10/12) of the decay is accounted for, cycle
by cycle.
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Figure 8.2-7. Total Am in the system, note that there is more Am in the MOX cases than in the IMF cases
because some Pu is recycled, producing Am, but less Am is burned.  However, believe that once-through 
actually as more Am than either IMF or MOX. 
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Figure 8.2-8. Total Am241 in the system.  We suspect that the Am241 content in once-through is
understated because it is missing the decay of Pu241 into Am241; the Am241 content in once-through is 
possibly higher than either MOX or IMF. 
Figure 8.2-9 shows total Cm in the system.  Consistent with observations in Chapter 5, there is more Cm
accumulation in the IMF systems than in MOX.  This is the major penalty for IMF’s ability to more
effectively and more quickly transmute the lower TRU.  Figure 8.2-10 shows that indeed the majority of 
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the Cm mass is Cm244.  Because of its 18.1-year halflife, the decay of Cm244 during the simulation is 
significant, but missed for once-through for reasons noted above. Thus, we believe the Cm and Cm244
mass for once-through is probably overstated.
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Figure 8.2-9. Total Cm in the system, note that there is more Cm in the IMF cases than in the MOX cases
because the Am is more effectively transmuted with the side effect of generating Cm.  Cm mass in once-
through is probably overestimated.
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Figure 8.2-10. Cm244 in the system, note that there is more Cm in the IMF cases than in the MOX cases.
Cm244 mass in once-through is probably overestimated.
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8.2.1 Waste management 
We now turn to waste management, starting with Figure 8.2-11, which shows the total mass in the 
repository.  As in Chapter 7, the once-through curve simply increases at 3000 tonnes/year, the assumed
receipt rate at the repository.  For the two 2025-start cases, mass starts being withdrawn at 2040, when the 
second separation plant comes on line, doubling reprocessing capacity.  Per GWe, IMF has slightly lower
mass throughput, so that repository mass is withdrawn slightly faster.  Between 2060-2070, all emplaced
SNF has been withdrawn for either IMF or MOX; the only mass in the repository is HLW left over from
recycling. The slope change in 2060 reflects the third separation plant coming on line.  The 2040 cases 
start withdrawing mass from the repository about 20 years after recycling starts, after the second
separation plant comes on line.  The slope change in 2080 again reflects the third separation plant coming
on line.  But, the 15-year delay in recycling means that there is still emplaced SNF in the repository at the 
end of the simulation.
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Figure 8.2-11. Total mass in the geologic repository
Figure 8.2-12 shows the LTH metric for the mass in the repository.  Recall that LTH is defined in Chapter 
3; it is a measure of time-integrated heat load to the repository.  The metric here is for 50-years ventilation 
time.  The trends mirror those of total mass, Figure 8.2-11. 
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Figure 8.2-12. Long-Term Heat (LTH) integral for 50-year ventilation time for the mass in the repository.
Figure 8.2-13 is a subset of Figure 8.2-12, looking only at the lower part of the graph.  The emplaced 
LTH is falling at 2060 as mass is withdrawn from the repository; with IMF faster than MOX.  The LTH 
does not go back to zero, of course, because of the HLW from processing losses.  More IMF goes through 
more cycles, which means that there is more accumulated HLW, so from 2070 to 2090, there is actually
more IMF LTH in the repository than MOX LTH. 
Total LTH50 In Repository
0.00E+00
5.00E+07
1.00E+08
1.50E+08
2.00E+08
2.50E+08
3.00E+08
3.50E+08
4.00E+08
4.50E+08
5.00E+08
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
year
T2.3 IMF-NPA 2025
T4.3 MOX-NPA 2025
Figure 8.2-13. Long-Term Heat (LTH) integral for 50-year ventilation time for the mass in the repository,
zooming on the lower part of the graph 
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Figure 8.2-14 shows the long-term dose (LTD) metric for mass in the repository.  LTD is defined in 
Chapter 3.  This plot shows LTD at 500,000 years after emplacement.  The basic trends are the same as 
before, dominated by withdrawal of mass from the repository.
Dose at 500,000 Years in Repository
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Year
m
re
m
/y
r
T1.2 Once-thru
T1.3 IMF-NPA 2040
T1.4 MOX-NPA 2040
T2.3 IMF-NPA 2025
T4.3 MOX-NPA 2025
Figure 8.2-14. Hypothetical Long-Term Dose (LTD) 500,000 years into the future from mass emplaced in 
the repository
8.2.3 Proliferation resistance
Figure 8.2-15 shows how recycling degrades Pu, using the simple metric Pu239/Pu-total.  IMF degrades 
the Pu faster and further than MOX.  Remember, however, that here IMF is blended core, multi-pass IMF.
It is therefore not designed to destroy the maximum amount of Pu as does 1-pass IMF; it is designed to 
burn as much Pu as possible while keeping recycling going.  This moderates how far the Pu is degraded; 
more analysis would be required to better understand what, if anything, this degree of degradation 
accomplishes from the proliferation perspective. 
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Figure 8.2-15. Ratio of Pu239/Pu-total throughout the system.  IMF degrades the Pu vector more and 
faster than MOX. 
Figure 8.2-16 shows the weapons-usable (WU) inventory.  Per Chapter 3, “weapons-usable” is measured
in Pu239-equivalent.  For once-through, the slow increase is, of course, simply the mass in interim
storage.  Blended core multi-pass IMF-NpPuAm is superior to Full core multi-pass MOX-NpPuAm with 
regard to lowering the WU inventory.
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Figure 8.2-16. Weapons-usable inventory measured in “Pu239-equivalent” mass
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8.2.4 Energy recovery
Figure 8.2-17 shows the uranium ore consumed.  Consistent with Chapter 5, we observe that IMF needs 
less uranium ore, because it is more effectively burning plutonium.  Of course, the uranium savings are 
higher the sooner recycling starts.  By the end of the simulation, IMF/2025 has achieved almost 19%
savings relative to once-through; this is slightly higher than the “equilibrium” value of 17% calculated in 
Chapter 5 because the system has used the legacy SNF.  IMF/2040 lags slightly behind because it has not 
yet used all of the legacy SNF in the repository; it should eventually catch up to IMF/2025.  At 2100,
IMF/2040 is only at 16% savings.  The MOX cases lag the IMF cases because (a) IMF burns plutonium
better and (b) the lower TRU throughput allows IMF to proceed cycle-by-cycle further and faster than 
MOX.
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Figure 8.2-17. Uranium ore consumption
8.2.5 At-reactor storage inventories
Figure 8.2-18 shows the at-reactor wet storage inventory.  In the current simulations, this is simply all 
SNF within 5 years of discharge.  All the curves ramp up during the first 5 years of the simulation
because we start the simulation with zero wet storage; it build to the correct value 5 years later as fuel is 
discharged from reactors starting in 2000.  The MOX and once-through cases have almost the same SNF 
mass; they have the same burnup, 51 MW-day/tonne-HM.  The IMF cases have slightly higher burnup, 66 
to 58 MW-day/tonne-HM depending on which cycle; so for the same energy produced, there is slightly
less SNF mass being discharged. 
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Figure 8.2-18. At-reactor wet storage inventories.  The once-through and MOX cases overlay each other; 
the IMF cases overlay each other, except for at 15-yr mismatch.
Figure 8.2-19 shows dry storage at reactors.  In the current model, this is all fuel that is more than 5 years
old but has not yet been shipped to the geologic repository or separation plants. All curves are wrong for 
the first several years of the simulation because we start dry storage inventory at zero in 2000; all such 
inventory is instead considered “legacy SNF” and accounted for separately.  The once-through curve is 
simply the difference between total SNF minus the 3,000 tonnes/year sent to the geologic repository.  The 
2025 curves start decreasing shortly after reprocessing starts.  (Note that they do not decrease when the 
repository opens in 2012 because legacy SNF is sent to the repository first.)  Once the separation plant 
opens in 2025, legacy SNF goes to the repository and dry-storage SNF goes to the separation plant.  By
2040, the at-reactor dry storage inventory in the 2025-cases is gone; thereafter, the separation plants use a 
combination of fuel reaching 5-years age plus SNF withdrawn from the geologic repository. The pattern 
for the 2040-cases is the same, only delayed. The difference between the 2025-cases and the 2040-cases 
shows how much additional at-reactor storage is required because of the delay in recycling.
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Figure 8.2-19. At-reactor dry storage inventories 
8.3. Comparison of multi-pass versus single-pass 
This section compares the results of single-pass fuels to multi-pass fuels for MOX and IMF. The current 
model has fuel recipes for five full core single-pass fuels, MOX-NpPu, MOX-NpPuAm, MOX-
NpPuAmCm, IMF-NpPu, and IMF-NpPuAmCm and one full core multi-pass fuel, MOX-NpPuAm.  The 
model also has a recipe for one blended core fuel, IMF-NpPuAm which can be run as a single or multi-
pass fuel. 
In the model, some legacy (reactors existing at time = 0 in the model) reactors are assumed to only be 
able to use UOX fuel, these are designated LWRu in Figure 8.3-1; the remaining legacy reactors are 
assumed to be able to use UOX, MOX and IMF fuels and are designated LWRm in Figure 8.3-1.  All new
(reactors built after time=0 in the model) light water thermal reactors (LWR) built are capable of handling 
UOX, MOX , and IMF fuels and are also designated LWRm in Figure 8.3-1. 
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Figure 8.3-1. Deployed light water reactor (LWR) capacity.  LWRu reactors can accept only UOX fuel.
LWRm reactors can accept UOX, MOX, or IMF fuels.
The mass percent of plutonium in the reactors depends on the fuel recipe and whether the fuel is run in 
single or multi-pass mode.  For IMF (see Figure 8.3-2), the single-pass blended core NpPuAm fuel results 
in the lowest Pu levels in the reactors by 2100; the same fuel run in a multi-pass mode results in more Pu 
in the reactors at 2100 
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Figure 8.3-2. Mass percent of plutonium in reactors containing varying fractions of IMF fuels. 
Combining the IMF fuel mass percent data presented in Figure 8.3-3 with the plutonium mass percent
data presented in Figure 8.3.2 presents a slightly different perspective on the plutonium content in 
reactors as shown in Figure 8.3-4.  The full core IMF recipes (IMF-NP and IMF-NPAC) account for less 
than 2% of the total fuel in the reactors by 2100, this means for these cases, most the fuel in reactors is 
UOX.  The blended core IMF recipe (IMF-NPA) accounts for at least 40% and as much as 80% of the 
total fuel in the reactos at 2100.  Even though there is substantially more IMF fuel in the reactors, the 
blended recipe has a lower effective plutonium content than the full core recipes. Multi-pass blended IMF 
results in a lower plutonium fraction than single-pass blended IMF. 
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Figure 8.3-3. Mass percent of IMF in reactors containing varying fractions of IMF fuels. 
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Figure 8.3-4. Mass percent of plutonium per mass percent of IMF fuel in reactors.  Plutonium content
normalized for IMF content in the reactors. 
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Mass Percent of Plutonium in Reactors with MOX
and UOX  Fuels
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Figure 8.3-5. Mass percent of plutonium in reactors containing varying fractions of MOX and UOX fuels. 
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Figure 8.3-6. Mass percent of MOX in reactors containing varying fractions of MOX and UOX fuels. 
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Figure 8.3-7. Mass percent of plutonium per mass percent of MOX fuel in reactors.  Plutonium content
normalized for MOX content in the reactors.
The current model treats full core and blended core single-pass fuels differently with respect to the 
repository.  Single-pass fuels are not reprocessed before placement in the repository, so all MOX (Figure 
8.3-8a) or IMF (Figure 8.3-8b) fuel goes to the repository.  For fuel core recipes, all of the fuel
categorized as MOX or IMF is burned uranium or non-uranium mixed oxides.  While the blended core 
IMF includes fresh uranium in its recipe.  In all cases, if there is not enough plutonium to make sufficient 
MOX or IMF, UOX is used to provide the remaining fuel required.  In the current model, all UOX fuel is 
treated the same, so for single-pass MOX or IMF operation (all the cases with an “o” in figures 8.3-5 and 
8.3-6) the spent UOX is split from the spent MOX or IMF and reprocessed rather than being sent to the 
repository with the spent MOX and IMF.  The fresh UOX that is contained in the blended single-pass 
IMF (IMF-NPA-o in Figure 8.3-8) stays with the IMF so that spent UOX in the blended IMF stays with 
the spent IMF and goes into the repository.  If blended IMF (IMF-NPA-m in Figure 8.3-8) is used in 
multi-pass mode, all of the spent fuel is recycled so only the HLW goes to the repository.  This is why the
mass in the repository for IMF-NPA-o is so much higher than the IMF-NPA-m and the other IMF recipes. 
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Figure 8.3-8a. Total mass in the repository for reactors containing IMF and UOX fuels. “o” indicates 
single-pass case and “m” indicates multi-pass case. 
Looking at the full core single-pass cases, IMF (Figure 8.3-8) results in less mass in the repository by 
2100 than MOX (Figure 8.3-9).  This is not surprising since among the full core single-pass cases more
MOX fuel than IMF fuel is in the reactors by 2100 (see Figures 8.3-3 and 8.3-5).
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Figure 8.3-8b. Total mass in the repository for reactors containing MOX and UOX fuels.  “o” indicates 
single-pass case and “m” indicates multi-pass case. 
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Moving to multi-pass fuels, either full core MOX or blended core IMF results in the highest amounts of 
high level waste in the repository (see Figures 8.3-9a and 8.3-9b), but these cases also significantly reduce 
the mass in the repository by 2100. 
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Figure 8.3-9a. High level waste mass from reprocessing and fuel fabrication in the repository for reactors 
containing IMF and UOX fuels.  “o” indicates single-pass case and “m” indicates multi-pass case.
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Figure 8.3-9b. High level waste mass from reprocessing and fuel fabrication in the repository for reactors 
containing MOX and UOX fuels.  “o” indicates single-pass case and “m” indicates multi-pass case.  The 
three single-pass cases (“o”) fall on top of each other. 
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Uranium is the single largest element by mass in the system as illustrated by Figures 8.3- 10 and 11 for 
MOX or IMF fuels.  Within a type of fuel, IMF or MOX, the specific recipe of fuel used and the number
of passes for that fuel have little effect on the mass in the system. The IMF recipes result in a lower 
system mass than the MOX recipes by 2100. 
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Figure 8.3-10a. Total mass in system with a combination of IMF and UOX fuels.  The three single-pass 
lines (“o”) fall on top of each other. 
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Figure 8.3-11a. Mass of uranium in system with a combination of IMF and UOX fuels.  The three single-
pass lines (“o”) fall on top of each other. 
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Figure 8.3-10b. Total mass in system with a combination of MOX and UOX fuels.  The four lines 
basically fall on top of each other. 
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Figure 8.3-11b. Mass of uranium in system with a combination of MOX and UOX fuels.  The four lines 
basically fall on top of each other. 
The mass of plutonium in the system is dependent on the fuel recipe used and whether the fuel is single or 
multi-pass.  For IMF (Figure 8.3-12), the blended fuel recipe brackets the full core recipes.  Single-pass
blended IMF results in the largest amount of plutonium in the system, while multi-pass blended IMF 
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results in the smalles amount of plutonium in the system.  All of the MOX recipes are full core fuels.  For 
MOX fuels, single-pass MOX-NPA or MOX-NPAC result in the highest amount of plutonium in the 
system, while multi-pass MOX-NPA results in the lowest plutonium in the system.  Overall, IMF recipes 
resulted in less plutonium in the system than MOX recipes.
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Figure 8.3-12. Mass of plutonium in system containing IMF and UOX fuels. 
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Figure 8.3-13. Mass of plutonium in system containing MOX and UOX fuels. The plot for MOX-NPAC-
o overlays the plot for MOX-NPA-o.
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Plutonium-239 (Figures 8.3-14 and 8.3-15) accounts for most of the plutonium in the system and shows 
the same trends and relative magnitudes as total plutonium.
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Figure 8.3-14. Mass of plutonium-239 in system containing IMF and UOX fuels.
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Figure 8.3-15. Mass of plutonium-239 in system containing MOX and UOX fuels.  The plot for MOX-
NPAC-o overlays the plot for MOX-NPA-o.
Plutonium-238 accounts for a significant but smaller fraction of the total plutonium in the system.  For 
IMF, the single-pass IMF-NPAC fuel results in the largest amount of plutonium-238 by 2100 (Figure 8.3-
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16).  The multi-pass IMF-NPA fuel results in the smallest amount of plutonium-238, about half that 
produced by the single-pass IMF-NPAC recipe.  For MOX, the multi-pass MOX-NPA fuel results in the 
highest amount of plutonium-238 in the system by 2100.  The MOX-NP single-pass fuel results in the 
lowest amount of plutonium-238 in the system by 2100.
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Figure 8.3-16. Mass of plutonium-238 in system containing IMF and UOX fuels 
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Figure 8.3-17. Mass of plutonium-238 in system containing MOX and UOX fuels.  The plot for MOX-
NPAC-o overlays the plot for MOX-NPA-o.
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The plots of weapons usable material for the MOX (Figure 8.3-18) and IMF (Figure 8.3-19) fuels have 
the same shapes and relative positions and similar magnitudes to the plots of total plutonium for the same
recipes.   This suggests that plutonium drives the weapons usable content of material in the system.  IMF 
recipes result in lower weapons usable quantities than MOX recipes and of the IMF recipes, multi-pass
IMF-NPA results in the lowest weapons usable mass in the system.
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Figure 8.3-18. Weapons usable material in system containing MOX and UOX fuels.  The plot for MOX-
NPAC-o overlays the plot for MOX-NPA-o.
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Figure 8.3-19. Weapons usable material in system containing IMF and UOX fuels. 
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Long-term heat in the repository generally tracks with the mass in the repository.  For IMF (Figure 8.3.-
20), the multi-pass IMF-NPA recipe results in the lowest long-term heat at 2100.
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Figure 8.3-20. Total long-term heat (50-1500 years) in repository from a combination of IMF and UOX 
fuels in the system.
For MOX (Figure 8.3-21), the multi-pass MOX-NPA recipe results in the lowest long-term heat at 2100.
For the single-pass MOX recipes, MOX-NP results in a lower long-term heat than MOX-NPA or MOX-
NPAC eventhough the mass of MOX-NP is lower than that of the other two recipes.  This suggests that 
americium and curium make a significant contribution to the long-term heat of the material.  There is no 
significant difference in long-term heat between the multi-pass IMF and the multi-pass MOX. 
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Figure 8.3-21. Total long-term heat (50-1500 years) in repository from a combination of MOX and UOX 
fuels in the system.  The plot for MOX-NPAC-o overlays the plot for MOX-NPA-o.
The dose at 500,000 years from material in the repository generally tracks with the mass in the repository.
For IMF (Figure 8.3-22), the multi-pass IMF-NPA recipe results in the lowest dose. 
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Figure 8.3-22. Dose at 500,000 years from material in repository for combinations of IMF and MOX fuels 
in the system.
For MOX (Figure 8.3-23), the multi-pass MOX-NPA recipe results in the lowest dose.  For the single-
pass MOX recipes, MOX-NP, MOX-NPA and MOX-NPAC result in the same dose, eventhough the 
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masses of MOX-NPAC and MOX-NPA are lower than that of MOX-NP.  This suggests that americium
and curium make a significant contribution to the dose from the material.  There is no significant 
difference in dose between the multi-pass IMF and the multi-pass MOX.
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Figure 8.3-23. Dose at 500,000 years from material in repository for combinations of MOX and MOX 
fuels in the system.  The plot for MOX-NPA-o and MOX-NP-o is overlain by the plot for MOX-NPAC-o.
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8.4. Transitioning to, and management of, fast reactors 
This section presents a set of practical scenarios that serve as examples of the complexity of the real-
world scenarios focusing on transitioning to consumer fast reactor (CFR) systems.  The current scenarios 
focus on improving permanent disposal utilization and/or reducing the temporary spent fuel storage 
inventory.
8.4.1 General assumptions and timelines
The basic assumptions of the scenarios, related to the existing U.S. reactors park and the future reactor 
systems, are the same as assumptions presented in previous sections except as follows.  First, in addition 
to the baseline growth case (1.8% per year), there are also cases at 0% growth and 3.2% growth.  Second, 
analyses assumed that ultra-high burnup fuels (e.g., 100 GW-day/tonne) replace existing fuel.  Third, the 
deployment of reprocessing capacity is roughly half of the other analyses, corresponding to the ultra-high 
burnup.  Fourth, all TRU from UOX SNF is transmuted by a consumer fast reactor (CFR).  Fifth, 
deployment of CFRs is limited to about 1.6 GWe/yr (correspond to 5 CFRs of about 3.2 GWe each), 
beyond 2030.
The timeline for these scenarios is as follows:
- Starting 2010, demand growth at different rates (0, 1.8, 3.2%).
- Starting 2015, use ultra-high burnup, 100 GW-day/tonne fuel in all reactors
- Starting 2025, SNF reprocessing starts using a first commercial plant (800 tonne/yr) starts in 2025
followed by an upgrade to 2,000 tonne/yr in 2035 and 3,000 tonne/yr total capacities in 2055.
- FR deployment starts with a first of a kind plant (FOAK) FR , followed by full deployment of FRs 5 
years later, at a maximum rate of 1.6 GWe/yr (5 FR burners/yr)
- Starting 2028, replace retiring LWRs with FRs to meet new energy demand if possible. If there is not 
enough TRU for FRs, build new ALWRs
8.4.2 Scenario results 
The base scenario is 1.8% growth rate with implementation of high burnup fuel starting in 2015.  Figure 
8.4-1 shows the deployment of both LWR and FR capacities according to this growth rate, where the CFR
contribution to the total energy generation is as high as about 18%.  The limited reprocessing capacity of 
LWR spent fuel, shown in Figure 8.4-2, does not limit the deployment of FR systems. The limitation here 
on the deployment of FRs is instead caused by the constraint of maximum deployment rate of 1.6 GWe/yr
FR capacity per year, which is imposed to limit the number of FR burners to be deployed per year, as 
shown in Figure 8.4-3.  The fast reactor percent of total capacity increases gradually to about 18%, and a 
significant decline starts 2090 because of the retirement of FRs built in 2030, while the TRU inventory is 
not large enough to make up for those reactors and also respond to increase in demand.  However, this 
can be avoided by increasing the reprocessing capacity a few years earlier, or deployment of breeder 
reactors, to avoid the eventual shortages in transuranics. 
 Page 210
1.8% Growth Rate starting 2010
0
100
200
300
400
500
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080
Year
G
W
e
FR
LWR (100 GWd/t Fuel starts 2015)
Figure 8.4-1. Thermal and fast reactor installed capacity for 1.8% growth
Figure 8.4-2. LWR SNF reprocessing capacity for 1.8% growth 
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Figure 8.4-3. LWR and CFR capacity additions for 1.8% growth
The key scenario results are shown in Figures 8.4-4 and 8.4-5.  As shown in Figure 8.4-4, SNF in 
temporary storage requirements are minimized.  With reprocessing and transfer of SNF to repository, 
storage temporary requirement decline, and by about 2030, storage requirements are less than the storage 
requirements in 2000.  Eventually storage requirements starts to increase after a 2043 minimum.  Direct
disposal of large amounts of SNF in repository is realized in this scenario.  By 2028 all 2000 legacy SNF 
is transferred to repository, and by 2043, all SF production goes to reprocessing, and no more transfer of 
SNF to repository takes place until ~ 2088 when SF available exceeds the  reprocessing needs.  SNF in 
repository reach ~ 94,000 tonnes by 2043 (including military & DOE 7000 tonnes).  The LWR spent fuel 
inventory in temporary storage, Figure 8.4-4, is gradually reduced to less than the year 2000 inventory by 
the end of the century.  In addition, reprocessing capacity has been sized (Fig. 8.4-2) such that the 
available unused Pu inventory (from reprocessed spent fuel) as shown in Figure 8.4-5, is capped at less 
than the current worldwide inventory of 150 tonnes. Uranium utilization improves with this scenario 
where uranium consumption has decreased by about 14% by the year 2100.  The CFR fraction of the total
energy park reaches about 18% by the end of the century.
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Figure 8.4-4. Dynamics of waste accumulation in both temporary and permanent storage for 1.8% growth 
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Figure 8.4-5. Pu from reprocessed SNF but not used (1.8% growth )
Figures 8.4-6 through 10 show scenarios results for the 0% growth rate.  This limitation on growth of 
nuclear energy constrains the deployment of CFRs and limit it to the period between 2028 and 2043 to
replace retiring reactors, until the next wave of retirement of LWRs in 2087, which are ALWRs that were
built starting 2027. By 2043, the percent of fast reactors reaches about 22.5%, and remains constant until 
2087, when ALWRs start to retire. 
Figure 8.4-6. Thermal and fast reactor installed capacity for 0% growth
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Figure 8.4-7. LWR SNF Reprocessing Capacity for 0% Growth Rate 
Figure 8.4-8. LWR and CFR capacity additions for 0% growth 
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Figure 8.4-9. Dynamics of waste accumulation in both temporary and permanent storage for 0% growth 
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Figure 8.4-10. Pu from reprocessed SNF but not used (0% growth) 
Those ALWRs retired in 2087 are replaced by CFRs, which increase the CFR% in capacity.  Increase in 
CFRs starting 2087 leads to CFR% in capacity of about 28% by 2090.  In this scenario, the SNF 
temporary storage requirements are also minimal.  With reprocessing and transfer of SNF to repository
storage requirements decline, and by about 2028, storage requirements are less than the storage 
requirements in 2000.  Direct disposal of large amounts of SNF in repository is also realized here.  By
2028 all the year 2000 legacy SNF is transferred to repository.  By 2041, all SNF production goes to 
reprocessing, and no more SNF transfer to repository to the year 2100.  SNF in repository reach ~ 86,000 
tonnes by 2041 (including military & DOE 7000 tonnes).  Again, inventory of Pu (from reprocessed SNF)
at any point in time remain less than the current worldwide inventory of Pu of 150 tonnes. 
The case of 3.2% growth is similar to the 1.8% growth rate case as shown in Figures 8.4-11 to 15.  The 
reprocessing capacities, however, are different, where larger reprocessing capacities are needed to 
accommodate the increase in spent fuel production in this case.  Until the year 2055, reprocessing 
capacity is assumed to be the same as the previous scenarios, and beyond 2055 it is increased rapidly to 
catch up with the high SNF production rate as shown in Figure 8.4-12, where 2000 tonnes-iHM/yr
capacity is added every 4 years until the year 2087. Buildup of FRs/year is allowed to go up gradually
from 1.5 GWe/year in 2055 to about 7.3 GWe by 2095, as shown in Figure 8.4-13.  FR% reach about 
14% (lower than the 1.8% growth rate because of the faster growth rate and the lack of enough TRU to 
build CFR fast enough to respond to increased demand). With reprocessing, and transfer of spent fuel to 
repository, temporary storage requirements decline, and by about 2035, storage requirements are less than 
the storage requirements in 2000.  Eventually, storage requirements start to increase after a minimum in 
2045.  Direct disposal of large amounts of SNF in repository is also achieved.  By 2028, all of the year-
2000 legacy SNF is transferred to repository, and by 2062, all SNF production goes to reprocessing and 
no more transfer to repository to 2100. The SNF in repository reaches ~ 118,000 tonnes by 2062 
(including military & DOE 7000 tonnes).  Again, the Inventory of Pu (from reprocessed SNF) at any
point in time remains below 150 tonnes.
0
50
100
150
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090
Year
M
as
s 
(M
T)
Unused Pu
 Page 218
Figure 8.4-11. Thermal and fast reactor installed capacity for 3.2% growth 
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Figure 8.4-12. LWR SNF reprocessing capacity for 3.2% growth 
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Figure 8.4-13. LWR and FR capacity additions for 3.2% growth 
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Figure 8.4-14. Dynamics of waste accumulation in both temporary and permanent storage for 3.2%
growth
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Figure 8.4-15. Pu from reprocessed SNF but not used (3.2% growth ) 
8.4.3 Conclusions of scenarios results
In conclusion, the continuation of the current once-thru fuel cycle practice should be re-evaluated as the 
demand for nuclear energy increases in the U.S.  Potential consequences of the once-thru cycle include 
substantial increase in the number of geologic repository sites, continued accumulation of weapons-usable 
materials, and inefficient use of uranium resources.  However, advanced fuel cycles as presented above, 
can limit spent fuel storage and direct disposal.
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9. CONCLUSIONS AND PATH FORWARD
Reduce, Reuse, Recycle.
Reduce the number of repositories that cause so much controversy. 
Reuse transuranics to maximize energy derived from uranium.
Recycle to minimize waste generation and manage weapon-usable inventories. 
9.1. Top-level conclusions
Figure 9-1 summarizes our suggested high-level decision tree from a technical perspective.  The branches 
of the first several decisions are relatively clear, the bottom half are the subject of most of this report. 
Figure 9-1 (Figure 2-2). Suggested decision tree for selecting among recycle options
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Assuming that we plan on the continuation of nuclear power and that uranium resources are not an 
immediate crisis, Figure 9-2 illustrates that the nation must either establish the credibility of multiple 
repositories or establish the credibility of recycling.  Repeated recycling can accomplish AFCI objectives. 
Figure 9-2. The nation needs either multi-repositories or multi-recycling
Table 9-1 summarizes single-pass results, when there are no constraints imposed by finite capacity of 
separation or fuel fabrication plants.  None of these options are acceptable relative to AFCI program
goals.[DOE2005a]  Because of the insufficient benefits, we spend relatively little effort in this report on 
single-pass options.  Some improvement could be expected with advanced once-through concepts that 
increase the fuel burnup and thermal efficiency (e.g., VHTR); however, these options are not explicitly
considered in this report (see [Taiwo2005] for AFCI assessment of Gen IV options). 
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Table 9-1 (Table 5-1). Key Results for Single-Pass Cases 
(pink means option does not meet target, yellow means it partially meets target.) 
Targets (see
Chapter 3) 
UOX-
33
UOX-
100
MOX-
NpPu
MOX-
NpPuAm
IMF-
NpPu
IMF-
NpPuAmCm
IMF-
NpPuAm
(blended
core)
IMF-
NpPu/Am
(blended
core)
Long-term
heat (LTH)
improvement
10x to 200x
(to achieve
actual
repository
improvements
of 10-50x)a
0.95 1.17 1.07 1.12 1.98 1.82 1.61 1.67
Long-term
dose (LTD)
improvement
10-50x 0.90 1.12 1.35 1.41 2.09 1.96 1.57 1.63
Long-term
radiotoxicity
(LTR)
improvement
100x 0.89 1.38 1.12 1.18 2.46 2.39 1.79 1.85
Uranium ore 
use
improvement
1.15 short
term
50x long
term
0.88 0.97 1.09 1.07 1.15 1.14 1.13 1.14
Is option sustainable per 
repository limits
NO
Is option sustainable per 
uranium limits
NO
a. Program goal is to avoid a second repository for a century, implying the need for actual heat-limited
repository capacity improvement of 10-20, even 50x to match the DOE laboratory directors goal.  The LTH
metric in this study can overpredict heat-capacity improvements, so the goal for the metric is 10-200.
Single-pass-only recycling in LWRs does not accomplish AFCI objectives, they can be removed from the 
program.  We did not analyze VHTRs.  The program should emphasize multi-pass options.  There three 
types of multi-pass options, as follows: 
x Recycling in thermal reactors only
x Recycling in a symbiotic mix of thermal reactors and consumer fast reactors (CFR)
x Recycling in breeder fast reactors (BFR)
With a few exceptions, these will all require remote fabrication.  The possible exceptions are as follows: 
x MOX-NpPu for one and possibly more cycles.  Similarly for IMF-NpPu.  However, this does not
burn Am and therefore is only a “stop-gap” approach to recycling unless Am targets are added to
the mix.  Concentrating the Am in a few targets minimizes the amount of fuel that would require 
more expensive remote processing. 
x The assemblies for the blended core IMF-NpPuAm have the lowest Am content of any of the 
Am-recycle fuels; they should be checked for dose rates. 
Recycling in thermal reactors only – Although the strategy can be continued until uranium resources 
become a constraint, the benefits are limited because unburned TRU accumulates in the recycling fuel.
Eventually, the unburned TRU would be discarded; however, we believe that this could be deferred until 
the next century as 5-cycles of either multi-pass IMF or multi-pass MOX appear feasible (on paper).
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The multi-pass MOX-NpPuAm approach in this study varies the Pu/U ratio each cycle.  It may give better 
performance.  The multi-pass IMF-NpPuAm approach in this study uses blended cores – about 3/4 UOX 
pins and 1/4 IMF pins in each assembly, which results in ~98% of the heavy metal being in the UOX
pins.  (A variation puts the Am in 4 targets among 264 pins in each assembly.)  In FY2006 we will 
validate these results and further examine the multi-pass IMF option space.  The UOX fuel and UOX pins 
in the IMF blended core would be fabricated hands on. The MOX contains Np, Pu, and Am and there is 
little doubt it would require remote fabrication; see Chapter 5 and Appendix F. IMF with NpPuAm and 
Am targets would also require remote fabrication.  IMF-NpPu pins would probably qualify for glovebox
fabrication.
Both approaches meet the waste management objectives until unburned TRU is discarded; it appears that 
multi-pass IMF (which uses the blended core) accumulates waste management benefits almost twice as 
fast as multi-pass MOX. The IMF-pin component of fresh IMF assemblies is a relatively attractive
proliferation target; however, like other IMF concepts, this one succeeds in burning Pu and degrading the 
Pu vector faster than MOX.  Both meet the short-term uranium utilization objective (15% improvement)
but only toward the end of the century when there has been time and sufficient separation/fabrication 
capacity to reach cycle-2 for multi-pass IMF and cycle-4 for multi-pass MOX. Safety and economics
could prove dominated by the difference in TRU throughput (throughput of uranium and fission products
varies little) – multi-pass IMF has typically 1/2 to 1/3 of the TRU throughput of multi-pass MOX.
Building the infrastructure for thermal-only recycling (either MOX or IMF) provides much of the 
infrastructure for later CFR or BFR systems.  However, if fast reactors are not readied for potential 
deployment, the pure-thermal strategy would require that much additional time to convert to one of the 
other strategies. 
Other pure-thermal conclusions are as follows: 
x Using Pu/U in full core MOX leads to varying composition each cycle, with large recirculating Pu 
flows.  This means that the separation of MOX as the cycles evolve will require changes to the 
separation plant. 
x Fuel composition in IMF blends stays fairly constant.  The recirculating Pu flows in multi-pass IMF 
are typically 1/2 to 1/3 of multi-pass MOX.  The separation plant for of IMF as the cycles proceed 
can stay constant, the elemental composition of the feed changes little. 
x More than 80% of the fuel in the system at any given point in time (even at equilibrium) in multi-pass
IMF or multi-pass MOX is still UOX.  This means that the separation plants for thermal recycling
primarily handle UOX, even with multi-pass MOX or IMF scenarios.  When thermal recycling starts, 
the system is 100% UOX; this drops slowly to 80% as used UOX is processed and the TRU made
into IMF or MOX.  The 80% value can only be exceeded temporarily if separation and fuel 
processing is adequate to draw down the legacy UOX. 
x To reduce uranium throughput, the only effective leverage is burnup.  Recycling, per se, does not 
reduce uranium throughput.
x Can’t reduce fission product throughput on a per GWe basis. 
x To reduce plutonium throughput, use IMF.  If one overburned Pu in 1-pass IMF, recycling cannot be 
sustained, the residual unburned TRU would eventually be discarded and waste management
objectives not met.  Backing off to blended multi-pass IMF avoids this problem.
x Based on crude scaling analyses, we believe that MOX-NpPu and IMF-NpPu would be glovebox-
fabrication, all other recycle fuels (which all contain Am) would require remote fabrication. The
exception is part or all of the IMF blended cores.  In multi-pass IMF-NpPuAm, the 204 UOX pins (of 
264 total) would be hands-on; the 60 IMF-NpPuAm pins would be remote.  The final assembly is 
probably remote, but more work is needed.  In multi-pass IMF-NpPu with separate Am pins, the 200 
UOX pins are again hands-on, the 60 IMF-NpPu pins would be glovebox, the 4 Am target pins would 
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be remote, and more work would be required to know if the final assembly would be remote or
glovebox.
x If only looking at the Pu239 equivalent fraction in fresh fuel, avoid full-core IMF.  The Pu239-
equivalent fraction is 65-70%.  Indeed, the fraction of Pu is over 90%.  However, if one takes credit 
for the Pu “quality”, the picture changes.  The Pu239/Pu-total fraction for all the first pass fuels is the 
same as the UOX-51 output, 53%.  For multi-pass IMF, multi-pass MOX, and CFR, the Pu239/Pu-
total fraction steadily decreases.  It increases for BFR cases, evolving toward an equilibrium value of 
72%.
x To reduce the amount of recirculating weapons-usable material, use IMF, avoid BFR.  The flux of 
Pu239-equivalent/yr per GWe of fresh fuel is 0.26 for 5th pass IMF, 0.50 for 5th pass MOX, 0.36 for 
IMF-CFR, and 1.07 for BFR. 
x Among multi-pass pure thermal systems, IMF appears superior to MOX, see Table 5-2.  However, 
either only obtains ~17% improvement in uranium utilization and are therefore not sustainable from
the uranium perspective in the long term.  Although thermal recycling can be continued indefinitely,
eventually sufficient TRU accumulates so that the TRU would be discarded with corresponding waste 
management penalties.  However, this appears deferrable until the next century because 5 recycles 
appear practical.  Building the infrastructure for multi-pass thermal recycling establishes some of the 
infrastructure for later fast reactors.  And, using IMF would decrease the percent of CFR needed from
27% to 19%.
Recycling in a symbiotic mix of thermal reactors and CFR – On paper, this strategy can be continued 
until uranium resources become a constraint.  Unburned TRU never has to be discarded.  These options 
meet the waste management objectives provided the loss per recycle is acceptable and provided that one 
does not stop recycling.  As the CFR fuels would contain Np, Pu, Am, and Cm there is little doubt that 
they would require remote fabrication. 
We studied three cases: (1) using the TRU in discharged UOX in CFR, (2) using TRU from discharged 
MOX in CFR so that there are three types of fuels UOX, MOX, and CFR; and (3) using TRU from
discharged IMF in CFR, again with three types of fuels.  The three equilibria differ because of continuing
makeup from the thermal reactors, which themselves differ.
The IMF-CFR combination generally provides the best performance.  For example, the IMF-CFR 
symbiosis requires only 17% CFR in the fleet.  The MOX-CFR system has the highest recirculating TRU 
throughput and the composition of the recirculating fuel has high fractions of undesirable isotopes.  This 
could be good from the proliferation resistance perspective, but undesirable from other perspectives.
Separation and fabrication loss goals derived from the first pass of used UOX are sometimes not adequate 
for CFR systems.  Building the infrastructure for thermal/CFR symbiosis provides the experience and 
much of the infrastructure for later BFR systems.  However, the thermal reactor component of this system
would have to be phased out during transition to BFR; otherwise, the uranium utilization benefits are little 
better than pure thermal systems.  Symbiotic systems have the most agility; if CFR performance is poor, 
they can be de-emphasized.  If uranium begins to appear as a constraint, the breeding ratio of the fast 
reactors can be enhanced and eventually the thermal reactors phased out.  If symbiotic systems had to be 
terminated, both the CFR and IMF can burn down remaining TRU leaving a relatively clean exit.
Other CFR symbiotic conclusions are as follows:
x More than 70% of the fuel in the system (at equilibrium) in thermal/fast-consumer symbiosis cases is 
UOX.
x Can’t reduce fission product throughput on a per GWe basis. 
x To reduce Am and Cm throughput, use BFR or IMF.  Whatever the initial transuranic feed, the higher 
actinide content will increase slightly in the CFR. 
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x To reduce the required fraction of CFR in a thermal-CFR symbiotic system, use IMF.  IMF-CFR 
requires 19% CFR; MOX-CFR requires 20% CFR; and UOX-CFR requires 27% CFR.  Starting
recycling with IMF, therefore, reduces the need for CFR later. 
Recycling in BFR – This strategy can be continued indefinitely. Unburned TRU never has to be 
discarded.  These options meet the waste management objectives provided loss per recycle is acceptable 
and provide that one does not stop recycling.  As the fuels contain Np, Pu, Am, and Cm there is little 
doubt that they would require remote fabrication.  (To reduce the fraction of fuel requiring remote 
fabrication, segregation of Am and Cm in “targets” is theoretically possible in fast reactors, as in thermal
reactors; the separation technology would have to be capable of separating NpPu versus AmCm.)
We studied two cases: (1) using the TRU in discharged UOX to start BFR and (2) using the TRU in 
discharged IMF to start BFR.  The equilibrium BFR is the same; thermal reactors would be phased out. 
The recirculating TRU mass is relatively high and the Pu “quality” in that mass is also high, hence the 
known proliferation criticisms of this approach.  (The actual total system Pu inventory is lower than once-
through with the modest breeding ratio in this study, 1.07.  The BFR has a net Pu flux of 0.10 tonnes-
Pu/yr per GWe; UOX-51 creates Pu at 0.22 tonnes-Pu/yr per GWe.)  The same characteristics mean that 
the recirculating mass appears easier to handle and slightly higher separation loss rates could be tolerated 
relative to CFR, once the isotopic mix evolved toward the BFR equilibrium values.  If BFR systems had 
to be terminated, one would first want to convert the BFR into CFR to burn down as much TRU as 
possible.
Other BFR conclusions are as follows: 
x To increase the potential build rate of BFR, maximize its breeding ratio (esp. for early cycles), do not 
burn Pu239 in thermal reactors, and reprocess quickly to use fissile Pu241 in the BFR startup cycle.
The ratio of output-fissile/input-fissile in this study are 1.06 (UOX-to-BFR startup cycle), 1.65 
(UOX-to-IMF-to-BFR startup cycle), and 1.07 (BFR equilibrium cycle).  The high ratio for the IMF-
BFR startup cycle mitigates the burning of Pu239 in thermal reactors.  (BFR equilibrium cycle is the 
same for UOX-to-BFR and UOX-to-IMF-to-BFR.) 
x To reduce the Pu inventory in the entire system, avoid once-through.  UOX-51 makes Pu at 0.22 
tonnes-Pu/yr per GWe.  The next highest Pu production rate is the equilibrium BFR, 0.10 tonnes-
Pu/yr per GWe.  Thus, there is less Pu in a BFR system (with the design of a breeding ratio of 1.07) 
than in a once-through system!  Of course, the Pu in the UOX-51 system is “self protecting” because 
it is unprocessed used fuel, whereas the Pu in the BFR system is recirculating with lower levels of 
self-protection.
If the processing capacity is unlimited, Figure 9-3 shows the mass flux to a separation plant for the multi-
pass cases, compared to UOX-51.  The fission product (FP) per GWe is unchanged, of course.  The UOX 
and MOX cases have the highest uranium throughput.  BFR has the highest Pu throughput.  Figure 9-4 
looks at the same cases, but only the TRU elements.  The program needs a cost algorithm as a function of
the throughput of individual elements.  Note that for fixed waste management goals, as throughput
increases, tolerable separation and fabrication loss rates decrease.  Furthermore, safety and proliferation
risk would appear to scale with the active inventory. The BFR case has the highest TRU recirculating
inventory; it is mostly Pu, which makes handling and waste management goals easier than the other cases, 
but with higher proliferation issues.  The MOX and MOX/CFR have the highest Am recirculating 
throughputs.
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Figure 9-3. Throughput for selected cases, unlimited processing capacity (Figure 5-10 shows more cases) 
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Figure 9-4. TRU throughput for selected cases, unlimited processing capacity (Figure 5-13 shows more
cases)
Table 9-2 summarizes key results for multi-pass options when separation and fuel fabrication capacities 
are not limited.  There are two numbers in most cells of the table.  The first is the improvement factor this 
century (~5 recycles) if recycling then stops.  The second is the improvement if recycling never stops, i.e., 
the system reaches a true equilibrium.
 Page 228
Table 9-2. (Table 5-2) Key Results for Multi-Pass Cases.  First number in each cell is the improvement
factor this century (~5 cycles) if recycling stops.  The second number is the improvement if recycling
never stops (only feasible with fast reactors in the system).
Improvement
Targets (see
Chapter 3) 
Thermal
recycling with
MOX
Thermal
recycling with
IMF
Consumer fast
reactor (CFR)
with IMF 
thermal
recycling
Breeder fast
reactor (BFR)
Long-term heat 
(LTH)
improvement
10x to 200x (to
achieve actual 
repository
improvements of 
10-50x)
1.5x
Plateaus
near this 
value
2.9x
Plateaus
near this 
value
~4x
~50x at
99.5%
removal of 
TRU+Cs+Sr
~5x
~70x at
99.5%
removal of 
TRU+Cs+Sr
Long-term dose
(LTD)
improvement
10-50x reduction
in peak dose,
which is at 
500,000 years
after
emplacement
1.9x
Plateaus
near this 
value
3.0x
Plateaus
near this 
value
~4x
~60x at
99.5%
removal of 
TRU+U+Tc+I
~7x
~190x at
99.5%
removal of 
TRU+U+Tc+I
Long-term
radiotoxicity
(LTR)
improvement
100 reduction of
radiotoxicity at
1000 years after
discharge so that
waste is less toxic
than original
uranium ore 
1.9x
Plateaus
near this 
value
3.2x
Plateaus
near this 
value
~4x
~100x at 
99.5%
removal of 
TRU+U+Tc+I
~7x
~100x at 
99.5%
removal of 
TRU+U+Tc+I
Uranium ore use
improvement
1.15 short term
50x long term
1.17x
~1.2x
1.17x
~1.2x
1.32x
1.42x
2.0x
~100x
Pu239 equivalent
tonnes/yr per
GWe for fresh
fuel
As low as
possible
0.50
Slow
increase
0.26
Slow
increase
Not
estimated
0.36
Not
estimated
1.07
Pu239/Pu-total in
fresh fuel 
As low as
possible (value
for discharged
UOX-51 is 53%)
32% for 5th
cycle fuel 
Cannot
drop much
further
33% for 5th
cycle fuel 
Cannot
drop much
further
14% in CFR 
53% in IMF
14% in CFR 
53% in IMF
72%
72%
Avoid fully
remote fuel 
fabrication
For as much fuel
as possible 
True for the
80% of the fuel
that is UOX, 
untrue for
MOX-NpPuAm
itself
True for the ¾ 
UOX pins in
blended
assemblies, true 
for IMP-NpPu
(with separate
Am targets) 
No No
Minimize
throughput of
TRU (tonnes/yr
per GWe)
As low as
possible to
minimize safety
and economic
issus
0.94
Slowly
increase
0.34
Slowly
increases
Not
estimated
0.85
Not
estimated
1.45
Percent fuel that 
is new
As low as
possible
17% 17% 29% 100%
Percent of As low as Zero Zero 19% 100%
 Page 229
reactors that are
new
possible
Is option sustainable per repository
limits
NO, because unburned TRU must
eventually be discarded, but 
probably after this century
Yes, unburned TRU does not ever
have to be discarded, performance
depends on loss rates
Is option sustainable per uranium
limits
NO Yes
The LTH improvement factors for 5-cycles CFR and BFR come from Wigeland2004a as they use cycle-by-cycle 
compositions for those cases, which we did not use in this study.  The 5-cycle value for MOX (1.5x) is the same
in Wigeland2004a and here.
The 5-cycle uranium improvement factors for BFR are probably understated, they depend on the breeding ratio
(output-fissile/input-fissile) for the first few cycles, which was not optimized.
Fuel cycle time scales are long.  Even after a decision is implemented, e.g., recycling starts, it generally
takes decades before the impacts across the U.S. power plant fleet become significant.
Table 9-3 looks at anticipated decisions over the next several decades.  As one goes further into the list, 
the uncertainties increase. Key uncertainties are discussed below. 
Table 9-3. Status and Issues for Suggested Key Fuel Cycle Decisions in Decreasing Order of 
Readiness and Robustness 
Key Decisions Status and issues 
D1. Open 1st geologic 
repository
Established US policy, implementation delayed.  The basis for AFCI waste 
management calculations is YMP.  We see no reason why YMP would not
work well with a recycling strategy, but more work is warranted to confirm
this.
D2. Determine
credibility of recycling
There are only two sustainable high-level waste (HLW) approaches: multi-
recycling and multi-repositories; neither is known to be credible today.  This
decision would not commit the U.S. to recycling, only determine “can 
recycle.”
D3. Determine need 
for recycling and build
1st separation plant for 
UOX
If “should recycle” is established, the question is what separation plant should 
be built.  All recycle scenarios include a UOX separation plant(s) for existing 
UOX, for the >80% UOX in IMF and MOX scenarios, and for the >67% UOX 
in CFR scenarios.  Capacity should be 3,000 to 5,000 tonne/year to reduce at-
reactor inventories without over-building capacity. At present, we suggest the 
UREX+ plant should be configured to provide NpPu/Am/Cm.  (Alternative: 
NpPu/AmCm)  Purity of separated Cs-Sr and U should meet 10CFR61 
standards.  Tc and I should be set aside for either specialized waste forms,
specialized repositories, or transmutation targets. 
D4. Build 1st recycle-
fuel fabrication plant 
Following closely behind a first separation plant would be a first recycle-fuel
plant.  The main categories of options are IMF, MOX, fuels for consumer fast
reactors, fuels for breeder fast reactor.  The selection among these options 
depends on too many factors to down-select today.  We can say that non-
recyclable fuels should be given low priority; multiple recycles are required to 
meet AFCI program objectives.  We suggest analyses and tests that could 
improve each of the main options. 
D5. Build future 
separation and fuel 
fabrication plants
Having made D4, the next decisions will involve follow-on separation and fuel
fabrication plants.  The dynamics of managing the fuel cycle are difficult.
Assuming a 1-decade delay between decision and implementation, spacing
major decisions by 2-decades (as we have in this study) means there is 1-
decade of implementation and 1-decade observation between decisions.  There 
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is high potential to “outdrive our headlights.”
Comparison of existing results versus the four AFCI programmatic objectives indicate that over 99.5% of 
NpPuAm must be recycled but that Cm can be disposed.  Over 99% of Cs and Sr must be separated from
repository wastes to accomplish the repository head-load objective.  Preliminary long-term dose estimates
suggest that 90% of uranium should be recycled.  Similarly, it appears that the Tc and I dose must be 
reduced by 10x so that the long-term repository dose does not increase as more reactor-years worth of 
residual waste is emplaced; this is equivalent to saying that the dose reduction/mass-emplaced should be
at least as high as heat reduction/mass emplaced (aka Wigeland Factor).  The Tc and I reduction could in 
principle be accomplished by either transmutation (previous ANL work shows this is feasible but slow), 
specialized waste repositories, or specialized waste forms that receive associated regulatory credit for 10x 
slower dissolution/leaching than UOX. 
Tc and I do not have to be recycled to meet the long-term radiotoxicity objective; neither do short-lived
Cs and Sr.  Pu and Am have to be recycled to meet the objective to reduce LTR by 100x; further analysis
will clarify the separation targets.  In the critical 1000 to 100,000 time period, preliminary calculations 
indicate that Pu dominates LTR.  Thus, to reduce LTR by a factor of 100, Pu itself must be reduced by
almost a factor of 100.  Recovery of 99% of the Pu is therefore not sufficient for multi-pass recycling.
Table 9-4 provides current recycle targets for individual elements from the perspective of different 
possible goals.  The current program targets are based on discharged UOX-51.  There should now be a 
systematic re-evaluate the old goals to (a) reflect the 2005 AFCI program goals, (b) multi-pass recycling
per this report, and (c) how pyroprocessing systems could be optimized.  LTR analyses are only 
preliminary and have not been factored into this table. 
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Table 9-4 (Table 2-6). Suggested Separation Targets 
Recovery fraction (each recycle) Product purity (each recycle)
Current goal 
[Vandergrift2004]
Differences identified
in this study 
Current goal 
[Vandergrift2004]
Differences
identified in this
study
Uranium – 
potential
disposal
>90% 90% recovery is barely
adequate to reduce 
LTD by 10x, would
have to be 98% to 
reduce LTD by 50x.
Meet 10CFR61, e.g., <100 nCi-TRU/gram-
U, requiring decontamination factor from
Pu of > 105
Uranium – 
potential
recycle
Not specified Not adequate for IMF 
options.  Even 99%
recovery would only
make the U and Pu 
from UOX-51
comparable (0.17 and 
0.22 tonnes/yr per 
GWe)
“If uranium is
destined for recycle
in reactor fuel, its 
purity requirements 
are greater and would 
be governed by
ASTM C 877-98.”
Not analyzed
NpPu >99% Possibly not adequate
for MOX/CFR
symbiosis, goal of 
99.5% in DOE2005a 
appears adequate.
“The purity of this product stream is 
required to meet mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel 
specifications as described in ASTM C833-
01.”
Am >99.5% to
provide 100x
decrease in LTH 
Cm >99.5% to
provide 100x
decrease in LTH 
Appears adequate “Based on fast reactor recycle of all TRU, 
the lanthanide content of the Am/Cm
product must be <20 mg/g uranium plus 
TRU.”
Tc and I >95% to provide
20x decrease in
LTD
Recommend 98% to 
allow LTD reduction 
of 50x, comparable to 
LTH reduction. 
“If transmutation of 
Tc is the chosen 
option, the Tc
product must contain 
less than 16 μg of 
fissile actinides per g 
of Tc.”  4 μg for I. 
Not analyzed in
this report, but we 
do not see the 
basis for this 
Cs and Sr “97% recovery 
required for Cs
and Sr to make
their recovery 
equal to that of all 
other fission 
products.”
Recommend 99% to 
accommodate repeated 
recycling while 
maintaining high LTH 
benefits
Meet 10CFR61, e.g., <100 nCi-TRU/gram
of Cs-Sr product
Table 9-5 lists what we assess to be the six most important future unknowns, i.e., factors influencing 
major fuel cycle decisions.  These are defined in section 1.5.  Actions should be taken (a) decouple 
decisions from uncertain key decision factors by making options as robust as possible, (b) take actions 
that reduce uncertainties, and (c) prefer actions that cause favorable changes in factors, i.e., maximize
option space. 
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Table 9-5. Key Factors Influencing U.S. Fuel Cycle Decisions
Decision Factors How uncertainties could be reduced How affected option space 
can be maximized
F1. Growth of nuclear 
energy?
Success of opening Yucca Mtn, 
NP2010, and other DOE programs 
will clarify the potential for growth. 
Explore robustness and agility of options 
over range of nuclear growth scenarios. 
F2. Cost and 
acceptance of 
additional
repositories?
Explore the potential for (a) 
specialized repositories for Tc, I, 
Am, and (b) “standard” repositories 
for used nuclear fuel. 
Consider three scenarios: no additional 
repositories, only “specialized” 
repositories, and many repositories.  An 
Am-repository, for example, would 
decrease the need for CFR. 
F3. Which thermal
reactors succeed in 
the market place?
Ensure that VHTR fuels can be 
recycled so that either VHTR or 
LWR can fulfill required roles in 
sustainable fuel cycles.
Emphasize recyclable fuels, whether IMF 
or VHTR. 
F4. How much
uranium is available?
Update decades-old on-the-ground 
studies of uranium resources, both 
conventional and unconventional.
BFR should be kept within option space. 
F5. What proliferation
policies exist? 
The relative importance of different 
proliferation objectives may be
impossible to settle, therefore we 
need a suite of options that address
each, e.g. IMF to burn and degrade 
Pu, co-located separation and 
fabrication, co-located reactors to 
minimize transportation. 
Despite its undesirability to AFCI 
colleagues, estimate the cost of spiking 
fuels with Cs to meet the narrow 
definition of “spent fuel standard” to 
provide a cost/benefit comparison. 
F6. How much
penalty is “hot” fuel 
separation and 
fabrication?
We will not truly know without a 
detailed design of separation and 
fabrication facilities. 
Explore blended fuel assemblies, e.g., 
Am targets, so that most of the assembly
can be fabricated hands-on or in a 
glovebox.
Table 9-6 shows six development trees, which are analyzed in detail in Chapters 6-8.. 
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Table 9-6. Summary of Development Trees
Development
Tree
Motivation Major findings 
T1. Continue
once-through
until 2040, i.e.,
delay recycling
Explores continuation of once-
through for an additional 15 years.
Requires a major increase in SNF storage 
capacity. Allows time to resolve R&D issues,
but cost may exceed benefits. Delays “proof” 
of R&D to time when U resources may be 
more constraining., “fixes” more costly.
T2. Start multi-
pass IMF-
NpPuAm in 
2025
Attempts fastest possible reduction 
in LTH, LTD, and LTR using
thermal reactors and UREX+ 
separation technology, but an 
unproven fuel.
2-pass IMF tends to load YMP faster than 5-
pass MOX (or 5-pass IMF). End point in 2100 
not strongly influenced by 15-year “first 
recycle” approach. Fastest reduction in Pu
inventory.
T3. Start single-
pass MOX-
NpPu in 2025
Closest to current international 
practice and current technology,
while avoiding separation of Pu 
Not significantly different from T2 and T4 so 
long as recycling continues; larger TRU 
inventory if it stops. Best “step-wise” approach
to introduction of recycling technology. Most
cost-effective if Pu Disposition program
partners.
T4. Start multi-
pass MOX-
NpPuAm in 
2025
Attempts modest repository
benefits using thermal reactors,
UREX+ technology, and fuels 
relatively similar to current UOX 
and MOX-Pu. 
Not significantly different from T2 and T3 so 
long as recycling continues. Better energy
recovery from SNF than IMF. Less complex
transition than IMF, logical follow-on to
MOX-NpPu
T5. Start CFR in 
2025
Moves into fast reactors, skipping
recycling in thermal reactors.  The 
early fast reactor experience would 
set the stage for BFR when 
uranium resources warrant.
Tends to produce the least SNF & least demand
on YMP. End point in 2100 not strongly
influenced by 15-year “first recycle” approach. 
Runs risk of “out-driving headlights.”
T6. Start BFR in 
2025
Moves into fast reactor, skipping
recycling in thermal reactor.  Aims 
to accommodate a hypothetical
combination of limited uranium
resources and high nuclear growth. 
Best approach to coping with demand growth, 
but SNF penalty high if recycling stopped. End
point in 2100 not strongly influenced by 15-
year “first recycle” approach. Runs risk of 
“out-driving headlights.” 
9.2 Managing the Fuel Cycle System in spite of Uncertainties 
Managing the fuel cycle system in a real-time fashion will not be easy, with the potential to “out drive” 
our headlights.  Consider that managing the fuel cycle is metaphorically like driving a car or flying a 
plane.  There are few “control knobs” available: what types of reactors are built, what types of fuels are 
used, and the capacity of separation and fabrication plants.  All of the controls are very sluggish – with 
response times measured in decades. To compound the problem, there is no single driver; control is 
shared by government, industry, and regulators.  Worse, it is dark (uncertain) and our headlights only
illuminate a short distance into the future.
Therefore, two criteria in selecting among options should be robustness and agility.  Robustness measures
how much preferences stay constant if assumptions and future circumstances change.  Agility measures
the ease of adapting an option later if new circumstances warrant.
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As an example, we find that the blended multi-pass IMF approach in this study would be more robust 
than the full core multi-pass MOX approach in several ways.  One is that the chemical composition of 
recycled material changes significantly cycle-by-cycle for MOX, but not for IMF.  Separation and 
fabrication plants with fixed capabilities would therefore be able to handle a wider range of IMF 
situations than MOX. 
One final way we attempt to summarize the wide range of static and dynamic analyses is to identify four 
approaches that would increase our ability to drive or pilot the fuel cycle system.
1. Have a recycle strategy that could be implemented before the current reactor fleet retires in 2027-
2043 so that replacement reactors fit into the strategy. The reactors built in that time period will 
determine much of the fuel cycle for the rest of this century.
2. Establish multi-pass blended core IMF as a downward Pu control knob.  It can, for example, stabilize 
the Pu inventory even at 1.8% growth. And, for equivalent SNF throughputs, it can be implemented
faster than MOX (if the technology is available) because of the low TRU throughputs.  IMF options 
can be tuned from breeding/conversion ratios near zero to at least 0.6.  The capital investment of 
reactors would appear to far exceed that of separation and fabrication facilities.  If the IMF 
infrastructure is built and later not needed, thermal reactors can still be operated profitably.  IMF
appears a more effective and flexible control knob than MOX. 
3. Establish FR with flexible conversion ratio as a future control knob.  This “control knob” takes longer 
to become available because fast reactors must first be a significant (several percent) of the fleet..
The breeding ratio and conversion ratio (conceptually similar but not numerically the same) should be 
variable from ~0.25 to at least 1.3.  Unlike the IMF control knob, this one can substantially reduce 
uranium ore needs if breeding/conversion is over one.  However, deployment of FR should proceed
cautiously because once built there is high incentive to continue their operation.  IMF, and possibly
MOX, used in conjunction with CFR reduces the number of CFR needed and therefore is a logical
way to move into fast reactors.
4. Expand exploration of heterogeneous assemblies and cores, which appear to have advantages and 
agility.  The need for heterogeneous cores in fast reactors is well known.  Analyses suggest 
advantages for blended (heterogeneous) assemblies in thermal reactors.  In particular, the blended 
core multi-pass IMF approach in this study offers significant advantages as well as agility.  Even
better, perhaps, could be separating IMF-NpPu versus Am targets, so that little of the fuel would
require remote fabrication.  And, one could imagine turning down Pu consumption by reducing the 
fraction of IMP-NpPu pins while keeping the waste management benefits of Am targets. 
9.3. Path Forward 
We believe these analyses have addressed and clarified most.  However, in support of future down-
selection among options and the 2007-2010 Secretarial Recommendation on the need for a second
geologic repository, additional work is needed along these lines.  Within system analysis, we must
convert the Stella-based DYMOND model to another software platform to resolve software-limitations
we faced this summer.  In doing so, the system dynamic model will be combined with the economic
database.  The combined model is tentatively called VISION, for Verifiable Fuel Cycle Simulation. 
AFCI in general 
x Closer cooperation and cross-reviews among program elements.
x Work to clarify the six factors noted above. 
x Build consensus for D2 – determine the credibility of recycling.
x Improve the metrics for long-term dose, long-term heat, long-term radiotoxicity.
x Better integrate this work with proliferation resistance methodology and analyses.
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x Identify and track all mass flows, including zirconium, carbon (TRISO), and nitrogen (nitride
fuels).
Reactor and transmutation analyses
x Examine blended MOX strategies (such as the French MOX-UE concept) for potentially better
performance than MOX-Pu/U in this study.
x Examine and validate multi-pass IMF 
o E. Hoffman will explore design space of U-235 enrichment in non-IMF pins & ratio of IMF 
pins to UOX-pins, e.g., going up to 60 pins in 264 assembly (17x17).  Will concentrate on 3-
batch, 1500-day burnup
x Examine VHTR options analogous to the LWR options in this study.
x Fill in missing elements in matrix 
o UOX-MOX-BFR
o Single-pass IMF-NpPuAm (full core) 
o Single-pass MOX-NpPuAmCm
o Multi-pass MOX-NpPu 
o Multi-pass MOX-NpPuAmCm (is it really worth the effort to separate Cm?)
x Perform scoping analysis for symbiotic thermal-BFR cases to explore how BFR could be slowly
brought on line and how the symbiosis could maximize both waste management and uranium
performance.
x Examine reactor safety limits for multi-pass MOX and IMF. 
x VISION: Investigate wet-to-dry storage transition as function of heat and/or dose (replace fixed
X-year)
Separation and system analyses
x Separation experts and system analysis colleagues should update separation and recovery targets,
see Chapter 2 for our initial suggestions. 
x Cost algorithm as function of throughputs of individual elements 
x VISION: 1st order model of separation of individual elements with associated loss fractions 
x VISION: Consider a “button” to build reprocessing if and only if committed SNF > 3000 x 30 
years
Fuel fabrication and system analyses
x Fuel experts and system analysis colleagues should identify and start addressing issues associated
with heterogeneous assemblies.
x Cost algorithm as function of hands-on/glovebox/remote fabrication for pellets/pins and for 
assemblies.
x VISION: 1st order model of fabrication of pellets/pins versus assembles.
x Calculate representative dose rates for prototypical fuel pins and assembly options. 
Wine Cellar (how separation and fuel fabrication interact, where separated products are stored and 
blended into fuel fabrication) 
x Identify algorithms for modifying both input/output fuel compositions with different strategies 
such as Pu/U, U235 enrichment, Am/Pu.
x VISION: 1st order model of a wine cellar is needed. 
x VISION: Need algorithms for isotopic tracking of fuel
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APPENDIX A. ACRONYMS 
A Americium, used for brevity, e.g., MOX-NPAC = MOX-NpPuAmCm denotes MOX with Np,
Pu, Am, and Cm
Am Americium
AFCI Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative 
AMAD Activity Median Aerodynamic Diameter, a key parameter for aerosols and particulates 
ANL Argonne National Laboratory
BFR Breeder Fast Reactor 
BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory
BU Burned uranium, uranium that has been through a nuclear reactor at least once. 
BWR Boiling Water Reactor 
CFR Consumer Fast Reactor, breeding ratio and conversion ratio less than 1.  Previously called 
Converter Fast Reactor. 
C Curium, e.g., MOX-NPAC = MOX-NpPuAmCm denotes MOX with Np, Pu, Am, and Cm
Cm Curium
DOE Department of Energy
DU Depleted uranium, uranium containing less than 0.711% 235U, currently discarded during uranium
enrichment.
DYMOND   Dynamic Model of Nuclear Development, the system dynamic model used for calculations 
in Chapters 7 and 8. 
FP Fission products
FR Fast Reactors, either consumer (CFR) or breeder (BFR) depending on breeding ratio/conversion
ratio.
FY Fiscal Year
GFR Gas-cooled Fast Reactor
GTCC Greater Than Class C waste, waste that does not qualify for near-surface disposal per 10CFR61, 
but is not considered HLW.
GWe Giga-watt (electric)
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GWth Giga-watt (thermal), GWth times thermal efficiency gives GWe 
HM Heavy Metal, in this report, actinides and TRU 
HLW High Level Waste 
iHM initial Heavy Metal, the amount of heavy metal in fuel it is irradiated 
kt kilotonne, i.e., a giga-gram 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICRP International Commission for Radiological Protection 
IMF Inert Matrix Fuel, fuel without uranium, only TRU 
LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory
LFR Lead-cooled Fast Reactor
LTD Long-Term Dose, see section 3.1.2 
LTH Long-Term Heat, see section 3.1.1. 
LTR Long-Term Radiotoxicity, see section 3.1.3 
LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLW Low Level Waste, which is actually not a regulatory term.  In common language, we refer to 
LLW as waste qualifying for near-surface disposal per 10CFR61. 
LWR Light Water Reactor, either BWR or PWR 
MGR Monitored Geologic Repository
MOX Mixed Oxide fuel
MSR Molten Salt-cooled Reactor 
N Neptunium, used for brevity, e.g., MOX-NPAC = MOX-NpPuAmCm denotes MOX with Np, Pu, 
Am, and Cm 
Np Neptunium
NPP Nuclear power plant 
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
P Plutonium, e.g., MOX-NPAC = MOX-NpPuAmCm denotes MOX with Np, Pu, Am, and Cm
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Pu Plutonium
PUREX  Plutonium-Uranium Extraction, an aqueous separation technology that separates pure Pu from
dissolved used nuclear fuel. 
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor
SCWR Super-Critical Water Reactor
SFR Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor 
SNF Spent nuclear fuel 
SNL Sandia National Laboratories 
TR Thermal Reactors
TRU Transuranic elements
U Uranium
UREX Uranium Extraction, an aqueous separation technology that separates U and NpPu from dissolved 
used nuclear fuel.  Pure Pu is not separated. 
WU Weapons usable, per IAEA definition. 
VHTR Very High Temperature Reactor
VISION  Verifiable Fuel Cycle Simulation, planned successor for DYMOND during FY2006 
YMP Yucca Mountain Project 
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APPENDIX B. INPUT PARAMETERS
Table B-1 lists input parameters.  The combination of 97.2 GWe initial installed nuclear power, 51 GWth-
day/tonne-HM burnup, 90% capacity factor, 34% thermal efficiency gives a current used fuel rate of 1840 
tonnes/year, which is below the 2000 to 2100 tonnes/year in recent years.  The mismatch is caused by the 
value of burnup (51), which is a bit of an improvement versus the current average, which must be about 
45.  Therefore, we model the current fleet has having average burnup of 45 GWth-day/tonne-HM.
We note that many of these parameters are unimportant to the results in this study, but they are required to 
make the model work.  For example, the unit sizes of TR and FR only determine the number of each type
of reactor, not the total installed capacity (determined by growth rate) nor mass throughputs (determined
by capacity and fuel burnup). 
Table B-1. Default Values of Input Parameters
Parameter Default value Alternatives
considered in 
current studies 
Future
considerations,
e.g., VISION
ENERGY
Initial installed capacity 97.2 GWe 
Energy growth rate 1.8%/year 0%/year
3.2%/year
Year energy growth starts 2010 (probably unrealistic) 
ENRICHMENT and MINING 
Uranium enrichment capacity Unlimited, whatever 
required to fuel thermal
reactors
 Discrete plants
(low priority)
Uranium enrichment Whatever required to meet
fuel recipe, typically 4.3%
for 51 GWth-day/t burnup
Uranium tails 0.2%
Time spent in mining 1 year
Time spent in enrichment 
processes
1 year
REACTORS
Initial number of U.S. reactors 103
Growth rate of reactors Starting in 2010, whatever 
required to meet energy
growth plus reactor 
retirements
Thermal reactor type LWR Study other
thermal reactors
such as VHTR
Fast reactor type SFR Study other fast
reactors such as
lead and gas 
cooled
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Parameter Default value Alternatives
considered in 
current studies 
Future
considerations,
e.g., VISION
Reactor size (thermal) 0.95 GWe Need to rethink how
to match legacy
reactors (average size 
< 1 GWe) but then
have realistic sizes for 
new reactors 
Reactor size (fast) 0.60 GWe 0.32 GWe for the 
fast reactor 
transition analyses
in Chapter 8 
Reactor capacity factor 
(thermal)
90%
Reactor capacity factor (fast) 82.2% 95% in the fast 
reactor transition
analyses in 
Chapter 8 
Reactor thermal efficiency
(thermal)
34%
Reactor thermal efficiency
(fast)
38%
Reactor burnup (thermal),
GWth-day/tonne-HM
Set by fuel recipe, e.g. 45 
for current fleet 
Reactor burnup (fast), GWth-
day/tonne-HM
Set by fuel recipe 
Cycle length (thermal) 1 year (33 or 51 burnup)
1.5 year (100 burnup)
Cycle length (fast) 1 year
Number of batches (thermal) 5 (33 or 51 burnup)
3 (100 burnup)
Number of batches (fast) 4
Minimum at-reactor storage
time before processing 
(thermal)
5 years
Minimum at-reactor storage
time before processing (fast)
2 years
Consider making 
a function of heat
rate as function of 
time
Retirement of existing reactors 103/17 or ~6/yr starting in 
2027, last existing reactor 
retires in 2044. 
Construction time 5 years
Licensing time 2 years
Reactor lifetime (TR or FR) 60 years
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Parameter Default value Alternatives
considered in 
current studies 
Future
considerations,
e.g., VISION
SEPARATION PLANTS 
Separation plant capacity and 
date for thermal reactors
3 kt-SNF/yr in 2025 +
3 kt-SNF/yr in 2040 + 
3 kt-SNF/yr in 2060 + 
3 kt-SNF/yr in 2080
Varied in some 
parameter studies
Separation plant capacity and 
date for fast reactors 
Unlimited, i.e. whatever 
required to keep fast 
reactor going 
For each plant, 
specify range of 
allowable input 
compositions,
e.g., plant-1 would
be tuned to
processing UOX. 
Lifetime (thermal) Unlimited Finite lifetime 
Lifetime (fast) Unlimited Finite lifetime 
Time mass spends in
separation plant (thermal)
1 year
Time mass spends in
separation plant (fast) 
1 year
Loss rate for separation+fuel 
fabrication plant
0.2%/pass thru plant 
Loss rate for separation+fuel 
fabrication plant
0.2%/pass thru plant 
Varied in some 
parameter studies
Differentiate
separation versus 
fuel fabrication
losses
FUEL FABRICATION PLANT 
Fuel fabrication plant capacity
and date for thermal reactors
Production rate of MOX or 
IMF is constrained by Pu
availability.  (If available 
Np, Am, or Cm are
inadequate to meet the fuel
recipe, DU is substituted.)
If Pu-limited supply of
MOX/IMF is inadequate,
UOX is substituted
 Discrete plants
Fuel fabrication plant capacity
and date for fast reactors 
Unlimited, i.e., whatever 
required to keep fast 
reactors going 
 Allow either
unlimited (i.e. at-
reactor) or 
discrete
centralized plants 
Lifetime (thermal) N/A
Lifetime (fast) N/A
Specified lifetime 
for discrete plants 
Time mass spends in
fabrication plant (thermal) 
1 year
Time mass spends in
fabrication plant (fast) 
1 year
Loss rate for fuel fabrication
plant
Included in a single value 
for separation+fabrication 
(see above) 
 Differentiate 
separation vs. fuel 
fabrication losses 
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Parameter Default value Alternatives
considered in 
current studies 
Future
considerations,
e.g., VISION
REPOSITORY
Initial SNF inventory in 2000 29,624.00 tonnes at 33 
GWth-day/t burnup
13,612.92 tonnes at 50 
GWth-day/t burnup
Total=43,236.92
Receiving rate and date at 
geologic repository
400 tonnes in 2012
600 tonnes in 2013
1200 tonnes in 2014
2000 tonnes in 2015
3000 tonnes in 2016 and 
thereafter
 Update when
YMP status is
better known.
Repository capacity Unlimited
Maximum retrieval rate Unlimited
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APPENDIX C. TRANSMUTATION RECIPES 
This appendix documents the fuel composition recipes (input and 5-year after discharge) for the 
calculations in this study. All units in the following tables are mass fractions; the total of heavy metal 
(actinides, U, TRU) and fission products equals 1.  Some totals deviate slightly due to round-off errors. 
With two exceptions, all calculations were performed by AFCI transmutation analysis colleagues at ANL.
The multi-pass IMF calculations were done by AFCI fellow Andrew Goldmann, during his summer at the 
INL.  Those calculations are documented in Goldmann2005.  The UOX-100 case was calculated by M. 
Todosow at BNL.
C.1 UOX Isotopics 
The system dynamics calculations utilize two types of LWR fuels with typical medium- and high-burnup 
PWR fuel as shown in Tables C-1 and C-2.  The medium burnup fuel has an initial enrichment of 3.2% 
U-235 and a discharge burnup of 33,000 MW-day/tonne. The high burnup fuel has an initial enrichment
of 4.2% U-235 and a discharge burnup of 50,000 MW-day/tonne. The depletion calculations were 
performed using the ORIGEN-2 [ORIGIN1980] computer code.  ANL has performed ORIGEN2 
calculations [Kim2003b] using the one-group cross sections that were provided with the code.  No 
separate WIMS8 [WIMS8] cell calculations were performed to obtain new cross sections at those 
burnups.  Another set of calculations was performed by BNL for the ultra-high burnup UOX fuel with 
100 GWd/tonne, validated by calculations at ANL.  In this case, ANL performed the WIMS8 cell 
calculations to estimate the one-group cross sections for ORIGIN2 calculations,[Kim2004] instead of 
using the cross sections provided with ORIGIN2 (which did not provide reasonable results). WIMS8 
calculations used 172-group, JEF2.2-based cross section library which has been previously determined to 
provide accurate modeling of the important Pu-239, Pu-240, and Pu-241 resonances.  ANL results for this 
ultra-high burnup UOX calculation were compared to BNL results listed here, and the two sets of results 
were found to be comparable.
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Table C-1. Once-Through Recipes for Input Fresh Fuel
Once-through
MASS FRACTIONS UOX-33 UOX-51 UOX-100
Burnup (GWth-
day/tonne-HM) 33 51 100
U234 0.0003 0.0003 0.0000
U235 0.0320 0.0430 0.0850
U236
U238 0.9678 0.9567 0.9150
U 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Table C-2. Once-Through Recipes for 5-years after discharge 
Once-through
MASS FRACTIONS UOX-33 UOX-51 UOX-100
Burnup (GWth-
day/tonne-HM) 33 51 100
Ra226 1.04E-13 2.68E-13 1.10E-14
Ra228 9.10E-20 1.81E-19 0.00E+00
Ac227 2.67E-14 1.17E-13 2.26E-15
Ac228 9.50E-24 1.89E-23 0.00E+00
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Once-through
MASS FRACTIONS UOX-33 UOX-51 UOX-100
Th228 3.09E-12 2.34E-11 2.13E-10
Th229 2.05E-13 2.78E-12 5.02E-14
Th230 3.19E-09 5.10E-09 5.96E-10
Th231 3.28E-14 3.11E-14 0.00E+00
Th232 7.19E-10 1.25E-09 1.89E-09
Th234 1.37E-11 1.34E-11 1.24E-11
Pa231 2.66E-10 9.65E-10 4.55E-11
Pa233 1.16E-11 2.11E-11 5.90E-11
U232 1.34E-10 9.90E-10 1.12E-08
U233 1.89E-09 3.26E-09 3.71E-09
U234 1.60E-04 1.84E-04 6.64E-05
U235 8.06E-03 7.65E-03 9.35E-03
U236 3.87E-03 5.71E-03 1.25E-02
U238 9.44E-01 9.21E-01 8.56E-01
Np237 3.41E-04 6.21E-04 1.74E-03
Pu238 1.16E-04 3.07E-04 1.19E-03
Pu239 5.13E-03 6.15E-03 7.73E-03
Pu240 2.26E-03 2.92E-03 3.97E-03
Pu241 9.62E-04 1.38E-03 1.96E-03
Pu242 4.73E-04 8.64E-04 1.52E-03
Pu244 1.25E-08 2.86E-08 7.01E-08
Am241 2.90E-04 4.38E-04 6.55E-04
Am242m 3.48E-07 8.34E-07 2.90E-06
Am242 4.16E-12 9.98E-12 3.74E-11
Am243 7.90E-05 1.98E-04 4.71E-04
Cm242 5.83E-09 1.32E-08 2.72E-08
Cm243 2.13E-07 6.83E-07 1.67E-06
Cm244 1.83E-05 7.08E-05 2.48E-04
Cm245 1.03E-06 5.72E-06 3.07E-05
Cm246 9.56E-08 7.29E-07 5.57E-06
Cm247 8.40E-10 9.97E-09 1.21E-07
Cm248 4.33E-11 7.70E-10 1.45E-08
C14 2.63E-11 4.05E-11 7.92E-11
Sr90 4.77E-04 7.00E-04 1.41E-03
Zr93 7.19E-04 1.09E-03 2.18E-03
Tc99 7.86E-04 1.14E-03 1.99E-03
I129 1.83E-04 2.75E-04 4.58E-04
Cs135 3.06E-04 6.60E-04 1.37E-03
Cs137 1.07E-03 1.62E-03 3.04E-03
Ra 1.20E-13 3.89E-13 1.11E-12
Ac 2.67E-14 1.17E-13 2.26E-15
Th 3.92E-09 6.39E-09 2.72E-09
Pa 2.77E-10 9.86E-10 1.05E-10
U 9.56E-01 9.34E-01 8.78E-01
Np 3.41E-04 6.21E-04 1.74E-03
Pu 8.93E-03 1.16E-02 1.64E-02
Am 3.70E-04 6.38E-04 1.13E-03
Cm 1.97E-05 7.80E-05 2.86E-04
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Other Actinides 5.99E-07 1.91E-06 0.00E+00
Total actinides 0.9659 0.9474 0.8974
Sr 8.28E-04 1.23E-03 2.52E-03
Zr 3.49E-03 5.30E-03 1.11E-02
Tc 7.87E-04 1.14E-03 1.99E-03
I 2.39E-04 3.59E-04 5.94E-04
Cs 2.54E-03 3.95E-03 7.20E-03
Other FP 2.62E-02 4.07E-02 7.92E-02
Total FP 0.0341 0.0526 0.1026
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C.2 Transmutation in LWR: MOX and IMF isotopics 
In all cases, it was assumed that the recycled material originated from spent UO2 irradiated in a
commercial PWR that produces the LWR-UOX spent fuel with 50 GWd/tonne in Table C-2. The
plutonium, neptunium, and americium (in some cases curium) were assumed to be recycled in a similar
system a finite number of times, using a MOX or IMF fuel assembly.  Different isotopic vectors can be in 
the charged assembly, including Pu+Np (first tier of a double-tier MOX/IMF-FR system), Pu+Np+Am
(single or multipass MOX), or Pu+Np+Am+Cm in single pass IMF.  The isotopic vector of Pu+Np+Am
in the charged assembly in recycle N was derived solely from discharged assemblies in recycle N-1.  In 
the MOX and IMF cases, the mass of TRU charged in the fresh recycled assembly was adjusted to meet
the same operational requirements (full-power days of irradiation) in each recycle.  Consequently, the 
mass of spent fuel processed to produce a given assembly varied from one recycle to the next.  Notice that 
the burnup achieved by the IMF fuel (about 550 GWd/tonne in the first pass) well exceeds that for the 
MOX fuel(50 GWd/tonne) As mentioned above for the ultra high burnup UOX calculations, for
transuranic recycling in LWRs, the WIMS8 code was utilized for the mass flow analyses.  The transuranic 
material initially irradiated in the MOX or IMF fuel was assumed harvested from UO2 which had been 
enriched to 4.2 wt.% U-235, irradiated to 50 GWd/tonne, and cooled for 5 years.
Unlike the other cases, the multi-pass IMF cases were generated using the suite of Monteburns, MCNP, 
and ORIGEN2.[Goldmann2005]  These calculations are also unique in that there is a blend in each
assembly – part UOX and part IMF pins, as given in Table C-3.  And, the burnup is decreased each cycle
to compensate for the degradation of the TRU mixture in the IMF pins, see Table C-4. 
Table C-3. IMF Blended Cores 
IMF/UOX blends IMF/UOX/Am blends 
Where is the Am? In the IMF fuel In separate Am targets
# UOX pins/assembly 204 (77.3%) 200 (75.8%) 
# IMF pins/assembly   60 (22.7%)   60 (22.7%) 
# Am pins/assembly     4 ( 1.5%)
U mass fraction in assembly (i.e. 
the heavy metal in UOX) 
~98% (exact value depends on 
which IMF cycle)
~98%
TRU mass fraction in IMF pins ~2% <2%
Am mass fraction in Am targets ~0.2%
Both cases also have 24 guide tubes and 1 instrument tube for a total of 289 pins (17 x 17)
Table C-4. IMF Blended Core Burnup Parameters
Cycle 1 2 3 4 5
Full power days for IMF-
NpPuAm
1500 1440 1380 1380 1350
Full power days for IMF 
NpPu/Am targets 
GWth-day/tonne burnup 64.82 62.13 59.45 59.35 58.00
GWth-day/tonne burnup
The isotopic vector for the recycled transuranics is provided in Tables C-5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 [Stillman2004a,
Stillman2004b, Goldmann2005]
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Table C-5. IMF Recipes for Input Fresh Fuel 
Fuel type IMF
Composition NpPu NpPuAmCm Np Pu Am (blended core)
Cycle 1 1 1 2 3 4 5
Burnup (GWth-
day/tonne-HM) 633.2 553.8 64.8 62.1 59.4 59.4 58.0
U234 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
U235 0.0418 0.0417 0.0416 0.0416 0.0415
U236 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
U238 0.9409 0.9395 0.9380 0.9365 0.9355
Np237 0.0503 0.0476 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
Pu238 0.0250 0.0236 0.0004 0.0010 0.0012 0.0013 0.0014
Pu239 0.5041 0.4764 0.0077 0.0060 0.0060 0.0061 0.0062
Pu240 0.2385 0.2254 0.0035 0.0037 0.0038 0.0040 0.0041
Pu241 0.1122 0.1061 0.0018 0.0019 0.0019 0.0019 0.0020
Pu242 0.0699 0.0661 0.0011 0.0027 0.0038 0.0046 0.0052
Am241 0.0338 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
Am242m 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Am243 0.0151 0.0003 0.0009 0.0012 0.0014 0.0016
Cm242 0.0000
Cm243 0.0001
Cm244 0.0054
Cm245 0.0004
Cm246 0.0000
U 0.0000 0.0000 0.9831 0.9815 0.9800 0.9784 0.9773
Np 0.0503 0.0476 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
Pu 0.9497 0.8976 0.0145 0.0153 0.0166 0.0179 0.0188
Am 0.0000 0.0490 0.0009 0.0016 0.0019 0.0021 0.0023
Cm 0.0058
Fission products
Table C-6. IMF Recipes for 5-years after Discharge 
Fuel type IMF
Composition NpPu NpPuAmCm Np Pu Am (blended core)
Cycle 1 1 1 2 3 4 5
Burnup (GWth-
day/tonne-HM) 633.2 553.8 64.8 62.1 59.4 59.4 58.0
Ra226 7.86E-13 9.48E-13
Ra228 5.55E-21 5.30E-21
Ac227 1.90E-13 1.93E-13
Ac228 5.79E-25 5.54E-25
Th228 3.14E-11 2.93E-11
Th229 3.94E-12 3.91E-12
Th230 2.85E-08 3.67E-08
Th231 1.26E-15 1.49E-15
Th232 3.85E-11 3.73E-11
Th234 2.92E-17 2.54E-17
Pa231 1.62E-09 1.64E-09
Pa233 4.61E-10 5.22E-10 3.09E-11 3.18E-11 3.15E-11 3.21E-11 3.17E-11
U232 1.35E-09 1.26E-09 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
U233 4.48E-08 5.47E-08 4.75E-09 5.31E-09 4.92E-09 5.27E-09 4.87E-09
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Composition NpPu NpPuAmCm Np Pu Am (blended core)
Cycle 1 1 1 2 3 4 5
U234 2.40E-03 3.27E-03 2.01E-04 2.21E-04 2.31E-04 2.37E-04 2.45E-04
U235 3.10E-04 3.66E-04 6.49E-03 6.94E-03 7.67E-03 7.78E-03 8.30E-03
U236 2.01E-04 2.04E-04 5.60E-03 5.54E-03 5.46E-03 5.42E-03 5.40E-03
U238 2.01E-06 1.75E-06 9.03E-01 9.03E-01 9.05E-01 9.04E-01 9.03E-01
Np237 1.36E-02 1.54E-02 9.10E-04 9.35E-04 9.27E-04 9.47E-04 9.35E-04
Pu238 3.80E-02 5.46E-02 1.00E-03 1.21E-03 1.30E-03 1.37E-03 1.44E-03
Pu239 1.42E-02 2.88E-02 5.95E-03 5.98E-03 6.13E-03 6.22E-03 6.27E-03
Pu240 8.35E-02 1.10E-01 3.67E-03 3.81E-03 3.97E-03 4.09E-03 4.29E-03
Pu241 3.64E-02 5.05E-02 1.89E-03 1.87E-03 1.93E-03 1.99E-03 2.04E-03
Pu242 1.10E-01 9.94E-02 2.67E-03 3.75E-03 4.53E-03 5.12E-03 5.63E-03
Pu244 5.04E-06 4.02E-06 6.44E-07 1.38E-06 2.12E-06 2.87E-06 3.56E-06
Am241 1.30E-02 2.11E-02 6.64E-04 6.59E-04 6.89E-04 7.19E-04 7.45E-04
Am242m 4.14E-05 1.15E-04 3.31E-06 3.37E-06 3.68E-06 4.04E-06 4.46E-06
Am242 4.95E-10 1.38E-09 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Am243 2.64E-02 2.70E-02 8.76E-04 1.21E-03 1.40E-03 1.56E-03 1.66E-03
Cm242 1.57E-06 2.53E-06 2.86E-08 2.93E-08 3.11E-08 3.30E-08 3.54E-08
Cm243 1.43E-04 2.66E-04 9.88E-06 1.04E-05 1.00E-05 1.04E-05 1.04E-05
Cm244 1.90E-02 2.36E-02 6.34E-04 1.00E-03 1.15E-03 1.30E-03 1.34E-03
Cm245 1.91E-03 3.47E-03 1.69E-04 2.69E-04 2.90E-04 3.15E-04 3.21E-04
Cm246 6.49E-04 1.07E-03 4.42E-05 7.31E-05 7.33E-05 7.73E-05 7.14E-05
Cm247 1.51E-05 3.16E-05 1.07E-06 1.85E-06 1.76E-06 1.84E-06 1.64E-06
Cm248 1.40E-06 3.91E-06 1.24E-07 2.09E-07 1.87E-07 1.96E-07 1.59E-07
C14 4.87E-10 4.26E-10 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Sr90 3.76E-03 3.33E-03 7.69E-04 7.50E-04 7.28E-04 7.26E-04 7.11E-04
Zr93 8.58E-03 7.59E-03 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Tc99 1.32E-02 1.17E-02 1.43E-03 1.39E-03 1.34E-03 1.34E-03 1.32E-03
I129 3.90E-03 3.49E-03 3.61E-04 3.46E-04 3.33E-04 3.33E-04 3.24E-04
Cs135 1.05E-02 9.31E-03 8.01E-04 7.60E-04 7.38E-04 7.45E-04 7.36E-04
Cs137 2.04E-02 1.78E-02 2.00E-03 1.93E-03 1.86E-03 1.86E-03 1.81E-03
Ra 9.48E-13 1.10E-12 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Ac 1.90E-13 1.93E-13 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Th 2.86E-08 3.67E-08 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Pa 2.08E-09 2.16E-09 3.09E-11 3.18E-11 3.15E-11 3.21E-11 3.17E-11
U 2.91E-03 3.84E-03 9.16E-01 9.15E-01 9.18E-01 9.17E-01 9.17E-01
Np 1.36E-02 1.54E-02 9.10E-04 9.35E-04 9.27E-04 9.47E-04 9.35E-04
Pu 2.82E-01 3.44E-01 1.52E-02 1.66E-02 1.79E-02 1.88E-02 1.97E-02
Am 3.95E-02 4.82E-02 1.54E-03 1.88E-03 2.10E-03 2.29E-03 2.41E-03
Cm 2.18E-02 2.84E-02 8.59E-04 1.36E-03 1.52E-03 1.70E-03 1.74E-03
Other Actinides 4.61E-04 8.59E-04 1.34E-03 8.97E-04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 6.93E-05
Total actinides 0.3598 0.4402 0.9354 0.9371 0.9406 0.9408 0.9418
Sr 6.60E-03 5.84E-03 7.70E-04 7.50E-04 7.28E-04 7.26E-04 7.11E-04
Zr 4.29E-02 3.79E-02 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Tc 1.32E-02 1.17E-02 1.43E-03 1.39E-03 1.34E-03 1.34E-03 1.32E-03
I 5.12E-03 4.59E-03 3.61E-04 3.46E-04 3.33E-04 3.33E-04 3.24E-04
Cs 5.00E-02 4.41E-02 3.18E-03 3.04E-03 2.93E-03 2.94E-03 2.87E-03
Other FP 5.22E-01 4.56E-01 5.88E-02 5.74E-02 5.40E-02 5.48E-02 5.30E-02
Total FP 0.6401 0.5597 0.0646 0.0629 0.0594 0.0601 0.0582
 Page 255
Table C-7. IMF/Am Target Recipes for Input Fresh Fuel 
Fuel type IMF
Composition Np Pu with Am targets (blended core) 
Cycle 1 2 3 4 5
Burnup (GWth-
day/tonne-HM)
U234 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
U235 0.0418 0.0417 0.0417 0.0416 0.0416
U236 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
U238 0.9408 0.9398 0.9383 0.9371 0.9361
Np237 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
Pu238 0.0004 0.0010 0.0011 0.0012 0.0012
Pu239 0.0078 0.0059 0.0058 0.0059 0.0059
Pu240 0.0035 0.0037 0.0036 0.0037 0.0039
Pu241 0.0019 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018
Pu242 0.0011 0.0027 0.0037 0.0045 0.0051
Am241 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007
Am242m 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Am243 0.0003 0.0009 0.0014 0.0017 0.0019
Cm242 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
Cm243 0.0418 0.0417 0.0417 0.0416 0.0416
Cm244 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Cm245 0.9408 0.9398 0.9383 0.9371 0.9361
Cm246 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
U 0.9829 0.9818 0.9803 0.9790 0.9780
Np 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009
Pu 0.0147 0.0150 0.0161 0.0171 0.0179
Am 0.0009 0.0016 0.0020 0.0023 0.0026
Cm 0.9829 0.9818 0.9803 0.9790 0.9780
Fission products 0 0 0 0 0 
Table C-8. IMF/Am Target Recipes for 5-years after Discharge
Fuel type IMF
Composition Np Pu with Am targets (blended core) 
Cycle 1 2 3 4 5
Burnup (GWth-
day/tonne-HM) 66.1 63.4 60.7 60.6 59.2
Ra226
Ra228
Ac227
Ac228
Th228
Th229
Th230
Th231
Th232
Th234
Pa231
Pa233 3.06E-11 3.09E-11 3.05E-11 3.06E-11 3.05E-11
U232 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
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Composition Np Pu with Am targets (blended core) 
Cycle 1 2 3 4 5
U233 4.58E-09 5.10E-09 5.41E-09 4.57E-09 4.92E-09
U234 1.99E-04 2.15E-04 2.23E-04 2.28E-04 2.29E-04
U235 6.19E-03 6.52E-03 7.21E-03 7.27E-03 7.38E-03
U236 5.63E-03 5.58E-03 5.52E-03 5.50E-03 5.50E-03
U238 9.03E-01 9.02E-01 9.04E-01 9.03E-01 9.02E-01
Np237 9.00E-04 9.11E-04 8.97E-04 9.00E-04 8.97E-04
Pu238 9.76E-04 1.13E-03 1.18E-03 1.21E-03 1.24E-03
Pu239 5.89E-03 5.86E-03 5.91E-03 5.94E-03 6.01E-03
Pu240 3.66E-03 3.66E-03 3.72E-03 3.89E-03 3.90E-03
Pu241 1.84E-03 1.78E-03 1.80E-03 1.83E-03 1.86E-03
Pu242 2.70E-03 3.73E-03 4.48E-03 5.06E-03 5.52E-03
Pu244 6.69E-07 1.41E-06 2.16E-06 2.91E-06 3.62E-06
Am241 6.40E-04 6.23E-04 6.34E-04 6.51E-04 6.67E-04
Am242m 3.01E-06 3.01E-06 3.15E-06 3.36E-06 3.55E-06
Am242 0 0 0 0
Am243 9.28E-04 1.35E-03 1.65E-03 1.90E-03 2.14E-03
Cm242 2.61E-08 2.65E-08 2.77E-08 2.87E-08 3.02E-08
Cm243 9.46E-06 1.01E-05 9.73E-06 9.79E-06 9.74E-06
Cm244 6.80E-04 1.06E-03 1.22E-03 1.36E-03 1.46E-03
Cm245 1.56E-04 2.21E-04 2.23E-04 2.37E-04 2.57E-04
Cm246 3.93E-05 5.56E-05 5.49E-05 5.55E-05 5.96E-05
Cm247 9.42E-07 1.37E-06 1.29E-06 1.27E-06 1.34E-06
Cm248 1.12E-07 1.52E-07 1.37E-07 1.37E-07 1.40E-07
C14 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Sr90 7.79E-04 7.61E-04 7.40E-04 7.38E-04 7.35E-04
Zr93 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Tc99 1.45E-03 1.41E-03 1.36E-03 1.36E-03 1.36E-03
I129 3.67E-04 3.51E-04 3.37E-04 3.37E-04 3.37E-04
Cs135 7.99E-04 7.49E-04 7.26E-04 7.28E-04 7.34E-04
Cs137 2.04E-03 1.96E-03 1.89E-03 1.89E-03 1.89E-03
Ra
Ac
Th
Pa 3.06E-11 3.09E-11 3.05E-11 3.06E-11 3.05E-11
U 9.15E-01 9.15E-01 9.17E-01 9.16E-01 9.15E-01
Np 9.00E-04 9.11E-04 8.97E-04 9.00E-04 8.97E-04
Pu 1.51E-02 1.62E-02 1.71E-02 1.79E-02 1.85E-02
Am 1.57E-03 1.98E-03 2.29E-03 2.55E-03 2.81E-03
Cm 8.86E-04 1.35E-03 1.51E-03 1.67E-03 1.79E-03
Other Actinides 1.12E-03 1.41E-03 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
Total actinides 0.9345 0.9366 0.9392 0.9391 0.9393
Sr 7.79E-04 7.61E-04 7.40E-04 7.38E-04 7.36E-04
Zr
Tc 1.45E-03 1.41E-03 1.36E-03 1.36E-03 1.36E-03
I 3.67E-04 3.51E-04 3.37E-04 3.37E-04 3.37E-04
Cs 3.21E-03 3.07E-03 2.96E-03 2.96E-03 2.96E-03
Other FP 5.97E-02 5.92E-02 5.54E-02 5.55E-02 5.54E-02
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Total FP 0.0655 0.0648 0.0608 0.0609 0.0607
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Table C-9. MOX Recipes for Input Fresh Fuel 
Fuel type MOX  
Composition Np Pu Np Pu Am 
Cycle 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Burnup 
(GWth-day/
tonne-HM)
51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
U234 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
U235 0.0071 0.0068 0.0058 0.0050 0.0043 0.0037 0.0033 0.0030 0.0028 
U236 0.0053 0.0050 0.0043 0.0037 0.0032 0.0028 0.0025 0.0022 0.0021 
U238 0.8563 0.8139 0.6966 0.5970 0.5152 0.4482 0.3959 0.3585 0.3358 
Np237 0.0066 0.0083 0.0111 0.0122 0.0122 0.0117 0.0106 0.0090 0.0069 
Pu238 0.0033 0.0041 0.0183 0.0351 0.0513 0.0657 0.0765 0.0826 0.0831 
Pu239 0.0661 0.0835 0.1124 0.1315 0.1425 0.1480 0.1502 0.1510 0.1516 
Pu240 0.0313 0.0395 0.0743 0.1060 0.1345 0.1598 0.1808 0.1967 0.2068 
Pu241 0.0147 0.0186 0.0270 0.0286 0.0280 0.0272 0.0274 0.0294 0.0337 
Pu242 0.0092 0.0116 0.0247 0.0380 0.0506 0.0623 0.0722 0.0799 0.0849 
Am241  0.0059 0.0181 0.0309 0.0418 0.0504 0.0565 0.0601 0.0613 
Am242m  0.0000 0.0003 0.0007 0.0012 0.0016 0.0018 0.0020 0.0020 
Am243  0.0026 0.0070 0.0112 0.0151 0.0187 0.0221 0.0256 0.0289 
U 0.8689 0.8259 0.7069 0.6058 0.5228 0.4548 0.4018 0.3638 0.3407 
Np 0.0066 0.0083 0.0111 0.0122 0.0122 0.0117 0.0106 0.0090 0.0069 
Pu 0.1245 0.1572 0.2566 0.3392 0.4070 0.4630 0.5071 0.5395 0.5602 
Am 0.0000 0.0086 0.0254 0.0428 0.0581 0.0706 0.0805 0.0877 0.0922 
Table C-10. MOX Recipes for 5-years after Discharge 
Fuel type MOX 
Composition Np Pu Np Pu Am 
Cycle 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Burnup
(GWth-day/ 
tonne-HM)
51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Ra226 2.81E-13 3.29E-13 7.63E-13 1.28E-12 1.80E-12 2.26E-12 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Ra228 3.07E-19 2.92E-19 2.51E-19 2.17E-19 1.88E-19 1.65E-19 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Ac227 9.02E-14 9.52E-14 1.87E-13 2.97E-13 4.06E-13 5.03E-13 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Ac228 3.20E-23 3.05E-23 2.62E-23 2.26E-23 1.97E-23 1.72E-23 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Th228 1.34E-11 1.36E-11 2.40E-11 3.65E-11 4.85E-11 5.91E-11 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Th229 1.74E-12 1.85E-12 3.09E-12 4.47E-12 5.75E-12 6.85E-12 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Th230 7.77E-09 9.79E-09 2.44E-08 4.16E-08 5.85E-08 7.36E-08 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Th231 1.77E-14 1.82E-14 1.76E-14 1.62E-14 1.47E-14 1.34E-14 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Th232 1.62E-09 1.54E-09 1.33E-09 1.15E-09 1.00E-09 8.79E-10 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Th234 1.20E-11 1.14E-11 9.81E-12 8.40E-12 7.25E-12 6.31E-12 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Pa231 7.30E-10 7.75E-10 1.54E-09 2.46E-09 3.36E-09 4.17E-09 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Pa233 1.48E-10 1.94E-10 2.81E-10 3.23E-10 3.35E-10 3.30E-10 3.06E-10 2.64E-10 2.04E-10 
U232 5.67E-10 5.76E-10 1.02E-09 1.55E-09 2.06E-09 2.51E-09 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
U233 1.77E-08 2.33E-08 3.98E-08 5.37E-08 6.48E-08 7.32E-08 6.82E-08 7.67E-08 8.69E-08 
U234 5.05E-04 6.92E-04 1.77E-03 3.00E-03 4.19E-03 5.25E-03 3.40E-03 3.99E-03 4.68E-03 
U235 4.35E-03 4.47E-03 4.33E-03 3.98E-03 3.63E-03 3.30E-03 3.15E-03 2.94E-03 2.81E-03 
U236 5.12E-03 4.88E-03 4.23E-03 3.68E-03 3.23E-03 2.86E-03 2.60E-03 2.38E-03 2.25E-03 
U238 8.28E-01 7.88E-01 6.75E-01 5.79E-01 4.99E-01 4.34E-01 4.02E-01 3.64E-01 3.40E-01 
Np237 4.37E-03 5.72E-03 8.27E-03 9.50E-03 9.86E-03 9.71E-03 9.10E-03 7.84E-03 6.07E-03 
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Composition Np Pu Np Pu Am 
Cycle 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Pu238 6.07E-03 9.23E-03 2.31E-02 3.81E-02 5.22E-02 6.44E-02 7.86E-02 8.45E-02 8.57E-02 
Pu239 4.11E-02 5.68E-02 8.65E-02 1.06E-01 1.18E-01 1.24E-01 1.33E-01 1.33E-01 1.31E-01 
Pu240 2.86E-02 3.75E-02 6.98E-02 9.99E-02 1.27E-01 1.51E-01 1.78E-01 1.94E-01 2.05E-01 
Pu241 1.15E-02 1.36E-02 1.88E-02 2.08E-02 2.16E-02 2.20E-02 3.06E-02 3.30E-02 3.71E-02 
Pu242 9.88E-03 1.24E-02 2.50E-02 3.76E-02 4.94E-02 6.04E-02 7.35E-02 8.16E-02 8.75E-02 
Pu244 2.19E-07 2.25E-07 2.77E-07 3.12E-07 3.40E-07 3.65E-07 4.14E-07 4.58E-07 5.16E-07 
Am241 5.24E-03 9.06E-03 2.01E-02 3.06E-02 3.94E-02 4.64E-02 4.81E-02 5.13E-02 5.25E-02 
Am242m 4.92E-05 1.51E-04 4.68E-04 8.36E-04 1.19E-03 1.49E-03 1.86E-03 2.03E-03 2.11E-03 
Am242  5.89E-10 1.81E-09 5.60E-09 1.00E-08 1.42E-08 1.79E-08 9.55E-06 1.07E-05 1.23E-05 
Am243 2.08E-03 3.52E-03 7.34E-03 1.12E-02 1.48E-02 1.82E-02 2.25E-02 2.60E-02 2.95E-02 
Cm242 2.37E-07 6.16E-07 1.58E-06 2.61E-06 3.54E-06 4.34E-06 1.85E-03 1.84E-03 1.75E-03 
Cm243 1.12E-05 2.89E-05 5.10E-05 6.47E-05 7.32E-05 7.84E-05 9.53E-05 9.38E-05 8.87E-05 
Cm244 8.41E-04 1.68E-03 2.68E-03 3.38E-03 3.96E-03 4.45E-03 6.17E-03 6.59E-03 6.89E-03 
Cm245 1.27E-04 2.97E-04 4.18E-04 4.73E-04 5.10E-04 5.41E-04 5.99E-04 6.35E-04 6.78E-04 
Cm246 6.14E-06 1.44E-05 1.44E-05 1.35E-05 1.30E-05 1.28E-05 1.40E-05 1.57E-05 1.88E-05 
Cm247 1.21E-07 3.26E-07 3.19E-07 2.94E-07 2.79E-07 2.73E-07 2.98E-07 3.38E-07 4.08E-07 
Cm248 9.16E-09 2.84E-08 2.70E-08 2.43E-08 2.29E-08 2.21E-08 2.42E-08 2.76E-08 3.38E-08 
C14 3.96E-11 3.95E-11 3.95E-11 3.94E-11 3.94E-11 3.94E-11 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Sr90 3.62E-04 3.58E-04 3.49E-04 3.46E-04 3.44E-04 3.43E-04 4.04E-04 4.04E-04 4.03E-04 
Zr93 7.71E-04 7.68E-04 7.60E-04 7.58E-04 7.58E-04 7.58E-04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Tc99 1.12E-03 1.12E-03 1.13E-03 1.13E-03 1.14E-03 1.14E-03 1.19E-03 1.19E-03 1.19E-03 
I129 3.52E-04 3.55E-04 3.56E-04 3.59E-04 3.63E-04 3.65E-04 3.82E-04 3.83E-04 3.82E-04 
Cs135 9.36E-04 9.44E-04 9.61E-04 9.73E-04 9.81E-04 9.87E-04 1.04E-03 1.04E-03 1.04E-03 
Cs137 1.63E-03 1.63E-03 1.63E-03 1.63E-03 1.64E-03 1.64E-03 1.93E-03 1.93E-03 1.93E-03 
Ra 3.50E-13 3.99E-13 8.87E-13 1.47E-12 2.05E-12 2.57E-12 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Ac 9.02E-14 9.52E-14 1.87E-13 2.98E-13 4.06E-13 5.03E-13 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Th 9.42E-09 1.14E-08 2.58E-08 4.28E-08 5.95E-08 7.45E-08 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Pa 8.79E-10 9.69E-10 1.82E-09 2.78E-09 3.70E-09 4.50E-09 3.06E-10 2.64E-10 2.04E-10 
U 8.38E-01 7.98E-01 6.86E-01 5.90E-01 5.11E-01 4.46E-01 4.12E-01 3.73E-01 3.50E-01 
Np 4.37E-03 5.72E-03 8.27E-03 9.50E-03 9.86E-03 9.71E-03 9.10E-03 7.84E-03 6.07E-03 
Pu 9.71E-02 1.30E-01 2.23E-01 3.02E-01 3.68E-01 4.22E-01 4.93E-01 5.26E-01 5.46E-01 
Am 7.37E-03 1.27E-02 2.79E-02 4.27E-02 5.54E-02 6.61E-02 7.25E-02 7.94E-02 8.41E-02 
Cm 9.86E-04 2.02E-03 3.17E-03 3.94E-03 4.56E-03 5.08E-03 8.73E-03 9.17E-03 9.43E-03 
Other Actinides 3.76E-05 8.85E-05 1.71E-04 2.38E-04 2.90E-04 3.31E-04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Total actinides 0.9482 0.9483 0.9483 0.9484 0.9484 0.9485 0.9951 0.9951 0.9951
Sr 6.39E-04 6.30E-04 6.14E-04 6.09E-04 6.05E-04 6.03E-04 4.04E-04 4.04E-04 4.03E-04 
Zr 3.80E-03 3.78E-03 3.74E-03 3.73E-03 3.73E-03 3.73E-03 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Tc 1.12E-03 1.12E-03 1.13E-03 1.13E-03 1.14E-03 1.14E-03 1.19E-03 1.19E-03 1.19E-03 
I 4.70E-04 4.73E-04 4.74E-04 4.78E-04 4.82E-04 4.85E-04 3.82E-04 3.83E-04 3.82E-04 
Cs 4.22E-03 4.23E-03 4.26E-03 4.28E-03 4.30E-03 4.31E-03 2.97E-03 2.97E-03 2.97E-03 
Other FP 4.15E-02 4.15E-02 4.15E-02 4.14E-02 4.14E-02 4.13E-02 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Total FP 0.0518 0.0517 0.0517 0.0516 0.0516 0.0516 0.0049 0.0049 0.0049
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C.3 Transmutation in fast reactor systems 
Transmutation in low conversion ratio fast reactor is based on a compact fast burner reactor design that 
can achieve low conversion ratios.[Smith2003]  This design is the basis for all transmutation options that 
used TRU from UOX, MOX or IMF spent fuel into a burner fast reactor.   The other type of fast reactors 
used in this study, that is the breeder fast reactor, has a different design from the consumer fast 
reactor.[Hill2002] 
The ANL suite of fast reactor analysis codes was used to evaluate reactor operating parameters of either 
fast reactor designs. Specifically, the MC2-2, REBUS-3, and DIF3D codes were used.  For each fuel 
composition, the MC2-2 code [MC2] is used to obtain regional group constants based on ENDF-V data 
by performing a critical buckling search (fundamental mode calculation).  REBUS-3 is a fuel cycle 
analysis code [REBUS] for fast reactors which couples the DIF3D multigroup neutron flux code system 
[DIF3D] to a multigroup depletion code. In those designs the enrichment search option of the REBUS-3 
code is used to compute equilibrium cycle compositions for each reactor design. The REBUS-3 code 
takes the user defined TRU feed (recycled transuranics from UOX, MOX, or IMF), the base feed 
(depleted uranium), the reactor operating cycle, and the fuel loading scheme and determines the necessary 
fuel enrichment and equilibrium discharge compositions (spent fuel composition) to assure criticality at 
the end of cycle (EOC).  To get the detailed composition for key isotopes at discharge or a number of 
years after discharge, ORIGEN2 depletion calculations are performed using a one group cross-section set 
that is provided by the detailed REBUS-3/DI3D calculations.  Thus, for each TRU isotopic vector from 
UOX, MOX, or IMF, the detailed MC2-2 and REBUS-3/DIF3D calculations, followed by the ORIGEN-2 
depletion calculations are performed to provide the spent fuel vector for both startup and equilibrium 
cores of the fast reactors.  Those vectors (recipes) are given in Tables C-11, 12, 13, 14.[Stillman2004, 
Hoffmann2004, Hoffmann2005a] 
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Table C-11. CFR Recipes for Input Fresh Fuel 
Fuel type Consumer Fast Reactor (CFR) 
System UOX/CFR symbiosis MOX/CFR symbiosis IMF/CFR symbiosis 
Cycle Startup Equilibrium Startup Equilibrium Startup Equilibrium 
Burnup (GWth-
day/tonne-HM) 176.6 176.9 175.6 176.3 117.55 128.28 
U234 0.0001 0.0030 0.0001 0.0066 0.0001 0.0045 
U235 0.0042 0.0012 0.0021 0.0017 0.0032 0.0015 
U236 0.0031 0.0025 0.0015 0.0023 0.0024 0.0026 
U238 0.5030 0.3661 0.2512 0.1969 0.3879 0.3778 
Np237 0.0233 0.0165 0.0222 0.0131 0.0209 0.0096 
Pu238 0.0116 0.0267 0.0270 0.0588 0.0547 0.0393 
Pu239 0.2333 0.1819 0.1824 0.1163 0.0207 0.0575 
Pu240 0.1104 0.1952 0.1361 0.1828 0.1265 0.1363 
Pu241 0.0520 0.0438 0.0513 0.0359 0.0525 0.0270 
Pu242 0.0323 0.0723 0.0439 0.0862 0.1596 0.1531 
Am241 0.0166 0.0249 0.1793 0.1008 0.0696 0.0361 
Am242m 0.0000 0.0142 0.0005 0.0587 0.0002 0.0236 
Am243 0.0074 0.0237 0.0800 0.0712 0.0608 0.0538 
Cm242 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 
Cm243 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 
Cm244 0.0026 0.0154 0.0197 0.0442 0.0317 0.0447 
Cm245 0.0002 0.0041 0.0026 0.0119 0.0032 0.0117 
Cm246 0.0000 0.0022 0.0000 0.0059 0.0000 0.0059 
U 0.5104 0.3728 0.2549 0.2075 0.3936 0.3864 
Np 0.0233 0.0165 0.0222 0.0131 0.0209 0.0096 
Pu 0.4396 0.5199 0.4407 0.4801 0.4139 0.4132 
Am 0.0240 0.0629 0.2598 0.2307 0.1306 0.1136 
Cm 0.0029 0.0219 0.0225 0.0627 0.0352 0.0626 
Fission products 0.0000 0.0059 0.0000 0.0059 0.0059 0.0043 
Table C-12. CFR Recipes for 5-years after Discharge 
Fuel type Consumer Fast Reactor (CFR) 
System UOX/CFR symbiosis MOX/CFR symbiosis IMF/CFR symbiosis 
Cycle Startup Equilibrium Startup Equilibrium Startup Equilibrium 
Burnup (GWth-
day/ tonne-HM) 176.6 176.9 175.6 176.3 117.55 128.28 
Ra226 2.65E-13 2.00E-12 5.65E-13 4.33E-12 7.30E-13 3.12E-12 
Ra228 9.72E-20 7.40E-20 4.96E-20 7.08E-20 7.62E-20 8.36E-20 
Ac227 1.34E-14 1.64E-13 1.56E-14 3.52E-13 2.49E-14 2.60E-13 
Ac228 1.02E-23 7.73E-24 5.17E-24 7.39E-24 7.96E-24 8.73E-24 
Th228 5.47E-09 5.06E-09 6.39E-09 5.09E-09 6.17E-09 3.85E-09 
Th229 3.25E-11 4.13E-11 3.42E-11 4.28E-11 3.26E-11 3.28E-11 
Th230 1.10E-08 6.30E-08 2.69E-08 1.37E-07 3.18E-08 9.77E-08 
Th231 7.74E-15 3.68E-15 4.33E-15 6.11E-15 6.99E-15 5.06E-15 
Th232 6.59E-10 5.00E-10 3.38E-10 4.80E-10 5.18E-10 5.64E-10 
Th234 6.46E-12 4.69E-12 3.26E-12 2.52E-12 5.09E-12 5.19E-12 
Pa231 1.22E-10 1.42E-09 1.43E-10 3.06E-09 2.27E-10 2.26E-09 
Pa233 4.56E-10 3.31E-10 5.05E-10 2.91E-10 4.72E-10 2.24E-10 
U232 2.90E-07 2.64E-07 3.41E-07 2.67E-07 3.29E-07 2.02E-07 
U233 4.37E-08 1.17E-07 5.29E-08 2.35E-07 5.95E-08 1.70E-07 
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System UOX/CFR symbiosis MOX/CFR symbiosis IMF/CFR symbiosis 
Cycle Startup Equilibrium Startup Equilibrium Startup Equilibrium 
U234 9.67E-04 3.56E-03 2.71E-03 7.80E-03 2.87E-03 5.40E-03 
U235 1.91E-03 9.11E-04 1.07E-03 1.51E-03 1.73E-03 1.25E-03 
U236 2.99E-03 2.27E-03 1.56E-03 2.20E-03 2.36E-03 2.55E-03 
U238 4.49E-01 3.26E-01 2.27E-01 1.75E-01 3.54E-01 3.61E-01 
Np237 1.32E-02 9.59E-03 1.47E-02 8.43E-03 1.37E-02 6.51E-03 
Pu238 1.55E-02 2.32E-02 5.08E-02 5.32E-02 4.68E-02 3.18E-02 
Pu239 1.42E-01 1.12E-01 1.12E-01 7.59E-02 3.72E-02 5.75E-02 
Pu240 1.03E-01 1.64E-01 1.24E-01 1.57E-01 1.09E-01 1.26E-01 
Pu241 2.18E-02 2.47E-02 2.35E-02 2.15E-02 2.33E-02 1.70E-02 
Pu242 3.10E-02 6.28E-02 4.76E-02 7.71E-02 1.38E-01 1.34E-01 
Pu244 2.20E-07 4.63E-07 2.45E-07 5.22E-07 6.99E-07 9.48E-07 
Am241 1.82E-02 2.34E-02 1.12E-01 6.36E-02 5.13E-02 2.79E-02 
Am242m 1.14E-03 1.37E-02 9.63E-03 5.67E-02 3.68E-03 2.43E-02 
Am242  1.37E-08 1.65E-07 1.16E-07 6.81E-07 4.42E-08 2.92E-07 
Am243 7.81E-03 2.15E-02 5.69E-02 5.34E-02 5.33E-02 5.74E-02 
Cm242 3.18E-06 3.37E-05 2.64E-05 1.39E-04 1.01E-05 5.94E-05 
Cm243 5.54E-05 1.08E-04 3.93E-04 3.64E-04 2.14E-04 1.59E-04 
Cm244 3.19E-03 1.31E-02 2.38E-02 3.56E-02 2.76E-02 3.76E-02 
Cm245 6.24E-04 4.06E-03 4.76E-03 1.13E-02 5.86E-03 1.19E-02 
Cm246 3.96E-05 2.18E-03 2.85E-04 5.89E-03 3.48E-04 6.27E-03 
Cm247 9.95E-07 1.00E-04 6.24E-06 2.52E-04 7.29E-06 2.63E-04 
Cm248 4.17E-08 7.34E-06 2.54E-07 1.83E-05 2.84E-07 1.95E-05 
C14 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Sr90 1.22E-03 1.16E-03 1.13E-03 1.10E-03 7.18E-04 5.68E-04 
Zr93 2.55E-03 2.47E-03 2.41E-03 2.35E-03 1.52E-03 1.19E-03 
Tc99 4.44E-03 4.39E-03 4.36E-03 4.31E-03 2.82E-03 2.04E-03 
I129 1.37E-03 1.28E-03 1.24E-03 1.16E-03 6.85E-04 5.81E-04 
Cs135 7.78E-03 7.76E-03 7.76E-03 7.72E-03 5.07E-03 3.56E-03 
Cs137 6.30E-03 6.31E-03 6.31E-03 6.33E-03 4.17E-03 2.88E-03 
Ra 2.84E-11 2.80E-11 3.34E-11 3.05E-11 3.25E-11 2.29E-11 
Ac 1.35E-14 1.64E-13 1.57E-14 3.53E-13 2.50E-14 2.60E-13 
Th 1.72E-08 6.86E-08 3.36E-08 1.43E-07 3.85E-08 1.02E-07 
Pa 5.79E-10 1.75E-09 6.48E-10 3.35E-09 6.99E-10 2.48E-09 
U 4.55E-01 3.33E-01 2.32E-01 1.87E-01 3.61E-01 3.70E-01 
Np 1.32E-02 9.59E-03 1.47E-02 8.43E-03 1.37E-02 6.51E-03 
Pu 3.13E-01 3.86E-01 3.58E-01 3.84E-01 3.54E-01 3.67E-01 
Am 2.72E-02 5.86E-02 1.79E-01 1.74E-01 1.08E-01 1.10E-01 
Cm 3.91E-03 1.95E-02 2.93E-02 5.35E-02 3.40E-02 5.63E-02 
Other Actinides 1.23E-04 2.34E-04 8.86E-04 7.23E-04 4.81E-04 4.38E-04 
Total actinides 0.8128 0.8075 0.8132 0.8077 0.8712 0.9098
Sr 2.10E-03 2.00E-03 1.94E-03 1.88E-03 1.22E-03 9.77E-04 
Zr 1.33E-02 1.29E-02 1.26E-02 1.24E-02 8.03E-03 6.16E-03 
Tc 4.44E-03 4.39E-03 4.36E-03 4.31E-03 2.82E-03 2.04E-03 
I 1.80E-03 1.69E-03 1.65E-03 1.53E-03 9.04E-04 7.67E-04 
Cs 2.10E-02 2.10E-02 2.10E-02 2.09E-02 1.38E-02 9.63E-03 
Other FP 1.44E-01 1.51E-01 1.45E-01 1.51E-01 1.02E-01 7.07E-02 
Total FP 0.1871 0.1925 0.1867 0.1924 0.1288 0.0902
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Table C-13. BFR Recipes for Input Fresh Fuel 
Fuel type Breeder Fast Reactor (BFR) 
System UOX to BFR UOX to IMF to BFR 
Cycle Startup cycle Equilibrium cycle Startup cycle Equilibrium cycle 
Burnup (GWth-
day/tonne-HM) 66.1 66.1 66.1 66.1 
U234 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 
U235 0.0039 0.0004 0.0029 0.0004 
U236 0.0022 0.0003 0.0014 0.0003 
U238 0.8667 0.8859 0.7404 0.8859 
Np237 0.0061 0.0007 0.0089 0.0007 
Pu238 0.0030 0.0010 0.0233 0.0010 
Pu239 0.0606 0.0789 0.0088 0.0789 
Pu240 0.0287 0.0258 0.0538 0.0258 
Pu241 0.0135 0.0027 0.0223 0.0027 
Pu242 0.0084 0.0014 0.0678 0.0014 
Am241 0.0043 0.0013 0.0296 0.0013 
Am242m 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Am243 0.0019 0.0003 0.0259 0.0003 
Cm242 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Cm243 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
Cm244 0.0007 0.0002 0.0135 0.0002 
Cm245 0.0001 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 
Cm246 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
U 0.8729 0.8868 0.7447 0.8868 
Np 0.0061 0.0007 0.0089 0.0007 
Pu 0.1142 0.1099 0.1760 0.1099 
Am 0.0062 0.0017 0.0555 0.0017 
Cm 0.0007 0.0002 0.0150 0.0002 
Fission products 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0008 
Table C-14. BFR Recipes for 5-years after Discharge 
Fuel type Breeder Fast Reactor (BFR) 
System UOX to BFR UOX to IMF to BFR 
Cycle Startup cycle Equilibrium cycle Startup cycle Equilibrium cycle 
Burnup (GWth-
day/tonne-HM) 66.1 66.1 65.7 66.1 
Ra226 1.75E-13 1.94E-13 6.09E-13 1.94E-13 
Ra228 1.03E-19 1.59E-20 6.95E-20 1.59E-20 
Ac227 1.48E-14 1.68E-14 3.15E-14 1.68E-14 
Ac228 1.07E-23 1.66E-24 7.25E-24 1.66E-24 
Th228 1.85E-09 3.11E-10 3.35E-09 3.11E-10 
Th229 2.02E-11 4.19E-12 3.43E-11 4.19E-12 
Th230 5.37E-09 4.65E-09 2.12E-08 4.65E-09 
Th231 7.95E-15 8.55E-16 6.51E-15 8.55E-16 
Th232 5.95E-10 9.00E-11 4.05E-10 9.00E-11 
Th234 1.14E-11 1.16E-11 1.01E-11 1.16E-11 
Pa231 1.22E-10 1.31E-10 2.64E-10 1.31E-10 
Pa233 1.42E-10 2.50E-11 2.18E-10 2.50E-11 
U232 9.24E-08 1.54E-08 1.67E-07 1.54E-08 
U233 1.86E-08 6.75E-09 3.81E-08 6.75E-09 
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System UOX to BFR UOX to IMF to BFR 
Cycle Startup cycle Equilibrium cycle Startup cycle Equilibrium cycle 
U234 3.44E-04 2.02E-04 1.54E-03 2.02E-04 
U235 1.97E-03 2.11E-04 1.61E-03 2.11E-04 
U236 2.20E-03 3.28E-04 1.51E-03 3.28E-04 
U238 7.95E-01 8.08E-01 7.00E-01 8.08E-01 
Np237 4.11E-03 7.26E-04 6.32E-03 7.26E-04 
Pu238 3.98E-03 1.02E-03 2.00E-02 1.02E-03 
Pu239 7.55E-02 8.53E-02 4.41E-02 8.53E-02 
Pu240 2.89E-02 2.80E-02 4.98E-02 2.80E-02 
Pu241 5.34E-03 2.46E-03 9.39E-03 2.46E-03 
Pu242 8.05E-03 1.57E-03 5.99E-02 1.57E-03 
Pu244 2.86E-08 5.46E-09 1.79E-07 5.46E-09 
Am241 5.39E-03 1.87E-03 2.30E-02 1.87E-03 
Am242m 1.80E-04 7.78E-05 9.77E-04 7.78E-05 
Am242 2.16E-09 9.34E-10 1.17E-08 9.34E-10 
Am243 2.00E-03 3.60E-04 2.32E-02 3.60E-04 
Cm242 5.07E-07 2.10E-07 2.70E-06 2.10E-07 
Cm243 8.32E-06 2.91E-06 7.20E-05 2.91E-06 
Cm244 7.26E-04 1.47E-04 1.11E-02 1.47E-04 
Cm245 1.38E-04 3.93E-05 2.41E-03 3.93E-05 
Cm246 8.12E-06 1.43E-05 1.41E-04 1.43E-05 
Cm247 1.66E-07 5.32E-07 2.67E-06 5.32E-07 
Cm248 6.90E-09 3.80E-08 1.06E-07 3.80E-08 
C14 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 
Sr90 4.78E-04 4.90E-04 3.20E-04 4.90E-04 
Zr93 9.70E-04 1.01E-03 6.47E-04 1.01E-03 
Tc99 1.60E-03 1.68E-03 1.08E-03 1.68E-03 
I129 4.83E-04 5.32E-04 2.86E-04 5.32E-04 
Cs135 2.73E-03 2.86E-03 1.84E-03 2.86E-03 
Cs137 2.15E-03 2.25E-03 1.46E-03 2.25E-03 
Ra 9.69E-12 1.79E-12 1.78E-11 1.79E-12 
Ac 1.48E-14 1.68E-14 3.16E-14 1.68E-14 
Th 7.84E-09 5.07E-09 2.50E-08 5.07E-09 
Pa 2.64E-10 1.56E-10 4.82E-10 1.56E-10 
U 8.00E-01 8.09E-01 7.04E-01 8.09E-01 
Np 4.11E-03 7.26E-04 6.32E-03 7.26E-04 
Pu 1.22E-01 1.18E-01 1.83E-01 1.18E-01 
Am 7.57E-03 2.31E-03 4.72E-02 2.31E-03 
Cm 8.82E-04 2.04E-04 1.38E-02 2.04E-04 
Other Actinides 3.45E-05 1.06E-05 2.34E-04 1.06E-05 
Total actinides 0.9341 0.9304 0.9552 0.9304
Sr 8.27E-04 8.49E-04 5.50E-04 8.49E-04 
Zr 5.04E-03 5.25E-03 3.38E-03 5.25E-03 
Tc 1.60E-03 1.68E-03 1.08E-03 1.68E-03 
I 6.32E-04 6.96E-04 3.73E-04 6.96E-04 
Cs 7.33E-03 7.67E-03 4.97E-03 7.67E-03 
Other FP 5.04E-02 5.34E-02 3.44E-02 5.34E-02 
Total FP 0.0659 0.0696 0.0448 0.0696
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APPENDIX D. ISOTOPE COEFFICIENTS USED IN 
CALCULATING METRICS 
This appendix documents the isotope coefficients and parameters used in this study for long-term heat 
(LTH), decay energy, long-term dose (LTD), long-term radiotoxicity (LTR), ingestion and inhalation 
dose conversion factors, neutrons per second, and bare-sphere critical masses. 
D.1. Long-term heat and decay energy 
The long-term heat (LTH) is defined as the heat released by waste in the period between when ventilation 
of the repository stops (i.e. repository closure) and 1500 years.  The start of this interval is, by definition, 
when heat is no longer actively removed from the repository.  The end of this interval is the time of 
approximate between-drift temperatures in Wigeland’s relatively early calculations of repository thermal 
response.  The LTH is simply the time integral of the inventory of each isotope, and its daughter isotopes, 
times the decay heat (watts/gram) of those isotopes. Accounting for heat from daughters is often critical, 
e.g., Pu241 decaying to Am241.  Table D-1 provides the values calculated for this study, the units are 
watts-years per gram of isotope at time of emplacement.  We calculated the most important coefficients 
two ways – by a system dynamic simulation of the isotope decay changes and by simple spreadsheet 
approximations.  Also, the values for Pu238, Pu239, Pu240, Pu241, and Am241 matched those provided 
by ANL colleagues within 1%.  The decay energy values used are shown in Table D-2; we took them 
from an official waste management assessment at Hanford.  Note that for fission products, Cs-137/Ba-
137m and Sr-90/Y-90, the Hanford data base includes the contribution of the short-lived daughter, so that 
we did not have to account separately for them. 
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Table D-1. Long-Term Heat (LTH) Interval Values 
Unit
Long-Term Heat Intervals 
(Watts-years/g at time of emplacement) 
Interval
50 to 1500 
years
100 to 1500 
years
300 to 1500 
years
Ra 226 70.29 67.26 55.04 
Ra 228 0.28 0.00 0.00 
Ac 227 0.23 0.05 0.00 
Ac 228 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Th 228 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Th 229 8.77 8.44 7.17 
Th 230 1.30 1.27 1.13 
Th 231 2.09 2.02 1.73 
Th 232 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Th 234 0.26 0.25 0.22 
Pa 231 2.09 2.02 1.73 
Pa 233 0.44 0.42 0.36 
U 232 92.83 57.35 8.36 
U 233 0.44 0.42 0.36 
U 234 0.26 0.25 0.22 
U 235 0.00 0.00 0.00 
U 236 0.00 0.00 0.00 
U 238 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Np 237 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Pu 238 48.81 32.95 6.95 
Pu 239 2.74 2.64 2.26 
Pu 240 9.46 9.11 7.73 
Pu 241 61.48 56.42 39.15 
Pu 242 0.17 0.16 0.14 
Pu 244 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Am 241 59.65 54.57 37.84 
Am 242m 137.70 117.77 56.04 
Am 242 49.09 33.14 6.99 
Am 243 8.89 8.57 7.29 
Cm 242 49.05 33.12 6.98 
Cm 243 24.95 9.23 2.32 
Cm 244 20.52 10.76 7.75 
Cm 245 12.89 12.58 11.17 
Cm 246 13.09 12.59 10.63 
Cm 247 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cm 248 0.76 0.74 0.63 
Sr-90 11.88 3.61 0.03 
Tc-99 0.01 0.01 0.01 
I-129 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cs-135 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cs-137 5.69 1.79 0.02 
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Table D-2. Decay Energy Parameters 
Table A-1 Conversion Factors for Generational 
Radiological Calculations, from the Hanford 
Site Solid Waste Acceptance Criteria, HNF-EP-
0063 Rev 11 
Chain Mass Decay energy (W/g) 
Ra 226 N+2 226 2.85E-02 
Ra 228 N 228 3.79E-02 
Ac 227 N+3 227 3.63E-02 
Ac 228 N 228 not included 
Th 228 N 228 2.68E+01 
Th 229 N+1 229 6.50E-03 
Th 230 N+2 230 5.82E-04 
Th 231 N+3 231 not included 
Th 232 N 232 2.66E-09 
Th 234 N+2 234 9.88E+00 
Pa 231 N+3 231 1.44E-03 
Pa 233 N+1 233 not included 
U 232 N 232 7.08E-01 
U 233 N+1 233 2.81E-04 
U 234 N+2 234 1.79E-04 
U 235 N+3 235 5.99E-08 
U 236 N 236 1.75E-06 
U 238 N+2 238 8.51E-09 
Np 237 N+1 237 2.07E-05 
Pu 238 N+2 238 5.68E-01 
Pu 239 N+3 239 1.93E-03 
Pu 240 N 240 7.07E-03 
Pu 241 N+1 241 3.27E-03 
Pu 242 N+2 242 1.17E-04 
Pu 244 N 244 5.33E-07 
Am 241 N+1 241 1.15E-01 
Am 242m N+2 242 4.49E-03 
Am 242 N+2 242 not included 
Am 243 N+3 243 6.44E-03 
Cm 242 N+2 242 1.22E+02 
Cm 243 N+3 243 1.81E+00 
Cm 244 N 244 2.83E+00 
Cm 245 N+1 245 5.72E-03 
Cm 246 N+2 246 1.01E-02 
Cm 247 N+3 247 2.87E-06 
Cm 248 N 248 5.27E-04 
Sr-90   90 9.29E-01 
Zr-93   93 2.84E-07 
Tc-99   99 1.02E-05 
I-129   129 8.19E-08 
Cs-135   135 4.38E-07 
Cs-137   137 4.17E-01 
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D.2. Long-term dose 
R. Halsey (LLNL) has provided late-2004 DOE-RW dose numbers from the nominal Yucca Mountain 
scenario, listed in Table D-3.  Compared to previous results, these numbers (which may continue to 
evolve) show lower long-term dose to the maximally exposed individual of the public, in part because the 
transportation of Pu and Np is lower than previously estimated.  Figure D-1 graphs these results by 
grouping the uranium and TRU isotopes into the four decay chains.   
Table D-3. YMP Dose Results provided by DOE-RW in late 2004 
Time (yr) 1.00E+04 2.00E+04 5.00E+04 1.00E+05 2.00E+05 5.00E+05 8.00E+05 1.00E+06
Mean
Annual
Dose,
mrem/yr 1.60E-05 2.50E-05 1.50E-05 1.20E-01 1.50E+01 3.10E+01 2.50E+01 2.20E+01
Max of 
RNs,
mrem/yr 1.20E-05 2.10E-05 1.00E-05 8.30E-02 9.50E+00 1.30E+01 7.30E+00 7.50E+00
Am243 4.30E-16 4.60E-16 3.10E-16 6.60E-09 6.70E-09 3.00E-10 2.70E-10 3.10E-10 
C14 2.50E-06 1.50E-06 2.20E-08 4.50E-08 2.70E-11 4.60E-19 1.50E-25 1.50E-25 
I129 1.10E-06 2.30E-06 2.00E-06 9.90E-04 3.40E-01 2.10E-01 6.20E-02 5.20E-02 
Np237 8.80E-08 5.60E-07 1.80E-06 8.30E-02 9.50E+00 1.30E+01 7.30E+00 7.50E+00 
Pa231 2.80E-11 3.40E-10 1.20E-08 4.30E-03 5.00E-01 3.30E+00 5.90E+00 5.00E+00 
Pu239 5.40E-13 1.20E-12 1.10E-08 9.40E-06 2.60E-01 1.30E-03 2.80E-04 2.90E-04 
Pu240 1.30E-13 1.50E-13 7.70E-12 3.30E-09 6.00E-08 6.50E-11 7.60E-12 1.10E-11 
Tc99 1.20E-05 2.10E-05 1.00E-05 5.50E-03 8.10E-01 2.10E-01 2.40E-02 1.10E-02 
Th229 3.30E-09 2.70E-08 3.40E-07 3.70E-03 7.90E-01 3.10E+00 2.10E+00 1.30E+00 
U233 4.70E-09 2.50E-08 2.00E-07 7.70E-03 7.10E-01 8.10E-01 6.40E-01 5.20E-01 
U234 2.50E-09 5.80E-08 1.10E-07 5.00E-03 1.00E+00 6.50E-01 2.70E-01 1.90E-01 
U236 2.20E-10 4.90E-09 1.10E-08 6.00E-04 1.40E-01 2.00E-01 1.50E-01 9.40E-02 
U238 4.30E-10 7.30E-09 1.30E-08 9.40E-04 1.70E-01 1.60E-01 1.20E-01 1.40E-01 
Pu242 1.30E-16 3.60E-16 2.00E-11 9.40E-08 7.30E-02 3.20E+00 1.90E+00 1.60E+00 
Th230 2.20E-11 7.20E-10 1.40E-08 3.50E-05 3.20E-02 3.50E-01 2.40E-01 1.50E-01 
Am241 5.30E-17 2.00E-17 1.60E-18 3.50E-19 4.30E-26 4.30E-26 4.30E-26 4.30E-26 
Pu238 1.90E-25 1.80E-25 1.80E-25 1.80E-25 1.80E-25 1.80E-25 1.80E-25 1.80E-25 
Ac227 2.40E-11 2.80E-10 9.90E-09 3.60E-03 3.70E-01 2.50E+00 4.60E+00 3.90E+00 
Cs137 5.30E-26 5.30E-26 5.30E-26 5.30E-26 5.30E-26 5.30E-26 5.30E-26 5.30E-26 
Pb210 9.20E-11 2.80E-09 6.10E-08 1.50E-04 1.30E-01 1.40E+00 9.30E-01 5.40E-01 
Ra226 8.60E-11 3.10E-09 5.80E-08 1.20E-04 1.40E-01 1.50E+00 1.10E+00 7.00E-01 
Sr90 5.30E-26 5.30E-26 5.30E-26 5.30E-26 5.30E-26 5.30E-26 5.30E-26 5.30E-26 
U232 7.30E-26 7.30E-26 7.30E-26 7.30E-26 7.30E-26 7.30E-26 7.30E-26 7.30E-26 
Total 1.57E-05 2.55E-05 1.47E-05 1.16E-01 1.50E+01 3.06E+01 2.53E+01 2.17E+01 
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Figure D-1. Hypothetical repository dose, data from Halsey2004 
To obtain metrics for this study, we analyzed these results and estimated how much of the mass of each 
isotope (at 10,000, 50,000, etc. years after emplacement) stems from the mass of each isotope at the time 
of emplacement.  For example, much of the mass of Np-237 (hence the dose from Np-237 at X years after 
emplacement) stems from Pu-241 and Am-241 at the time of emplacement.  By assuming linearity, we 
can therefore estimate dose/mass of isotopes prior to emplacement.  Linearity is, we emphasize, suspect 
for Np-237 because of Np solubility limits in the YMP dose calculations.  Nonetheless, some insights can 
be gained from this analysis.  Indeed, we tend to find that the reduction in LTD is not too far from the 
reduction in LTH.  Assuming that more GW-years worth of waste is emplaced in the repository 
corresponding to the LTH reduction, the actual amount of Np in the repository does not vary much.  So, 
the Np solubility issue may not significantly impact these results. 
Thus, the long-term dose (LTD) is defined as the maximum dose to a member of the public at various 
times in the future from transportation of isotopes that are released from waste in the YMP repository.  
Table D-4 provides values for this study, the units are mrem/yr at a future time per gram of isotope at 
time of emplacement. 
We calculated the LTD coefficients two ways – by a system dynamic model of the four decay chains and 
by simple spreadsheet approximation.  We also verified that we arrive back at the starting point when 
taking the composition for used nuclear fuel times the LTD parameters, i.e., we get back to the totals in 
Table D-3. 
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Table D-4. Long-Term Dose (LTD) Coefficients 
Hypothetical dose (mrem/yr) at some future time per g at time of emplacement
At
10,000
years
At
20,000
years
At
50,000
years
At
100,000 
years
At
200,000 
years
At
500,000 
years
At
800,000 
years
At
1,000,000 
years
Pa 233 1.5E-14 4.9E-14 2.0E-13 2.2E-09 1.5E-07 1.6E-07 7.3E-08 4.0E-08 
U 233 1.5E-14 4.9E-14 2.0E-13 2.2E-09 1.5E-07 1.6E-07 7.3E-08 4.0E-08 
U 234 6.6E-17 1.6E-15 5.9E-15 1.3E-10 3.1E-08 8.6E-08 5.2E-08 3.1E-08 
U 235 9.7E-20 1.2E-18 4.1E-17 1.5E-11 1.6E-09 1.1E-08 2.0E-08 1.7E-08 
U 236 4.0E-19 8.2E-18 1.8E-17 9.6E-13 2.2E-10 3.2E-10 2.4E-10 1.5E-10 
U 238 6.8E-21 1.2E-19 2.5E-19 1.7E-14 3.6E-12 9.1E-12 8.3E-12 7.0E-12 
Np 237 5.8E-16 3.7E-15 1.4E-14 5.7E-10 6.7E-08 1.0E-07 6.1E-08 5.7E-08 
Pu 238 6.6E-17 1.6E-15 5.9E-15 1.3E-10 3.1E-08 8.6E-08 5.2E-08 3.1E-08 
Pu 239 1.2E-21 2.7E-21 2.5E-17 2.3E-14 5.8E-10 8.2E-12 1.6E-11 1.7E-11 
Pu 240 2.6E-19 7.2E-18 1.8E-17 9.6E-13 2.2E-10 3.2E-10 2.4E-10 1.5E-10 
Pu 241 5.5E-16 3.5E-15 1.3E-14 5.4E-10 6.3E-08 9.7E-08 5.8E-08 5.4E-08 
Pu 242 1.3E-22 4.3E-21 3.5E-19 4.3E-15 1.2E-09 5.3E-08 3.1E-08 2.6E-08 
Pu 244 2.6E-19 7.2E-18 1.8E-17 9.6E-13 2.2E-10 3.2E-10 2.4E-10 1.5E-10 
Am 241 5.5E-16 3.5E-15 1.3E-14 5.4E-10 6.3E-08 9.7E-08 5.8E-08 5.4E-08 
Am 242m 5.5E-17 1.3E-15 4.9E-15 1.1E-10 2.6E-08 8.0E-08 4.9E-08 3.0E-08 
Am 242 5.5E-17 1.3E-15 4.9E-15 1.1E-10 2.6E-08 8.0E-08 4.9E-08 3.0E-08 
Am 243 7.8E-22 2.3E-21 2.4E-17 2.3E-14 5.8E-10 8.2E-12 1.6E-11 1.7E-11 
Cm 242 6.6E-17 1.6E-15 5.9E-15 1.3E-10 3.1E-08 8.6E-08 5.2E-08 3.1E-08 
Cm 243 1.2E-21 2.7E-21 2.5E-17 2.3E-14 5.8E-10 8.2E-12 1.6E-11 1.7E-11 
Cm 244 2.6E-19 7.2E-18 1.8E-17 9.6E-13 2.2E-10 3.2E-10 2.4E-10 1.5E-10 
Cm 245 5.5E-16 3.5E-15 1.3E-14 5.4E-10 6.3E-08 9.7E-08 5.8E-08 5.4E-08 
Cm 246 1.3E-22 4.3E-21 3.5E-19 4.3E-15 1.2E-09 5.3E-08 3.1E-08 2.6E-08 
Cm 247 7.8E-22 2.3E-21 2.4E-17 2.3E-14 5.8E-10 8.2E-12 1.6E-11 1.7E-11 
Cm 248 2.6E-19 7.2E-18 1.8E-17 9.6E-13 2.2E-10 3.2E-10 2.4E-10 1.5E-10 
Tc-99 1.5E-13 2.6E-13 1.2E-13 6.9E-11 1.0E-08 2.6E-09 3.0E-10 1.4E-10 
I-129 5.7E-14 1.2E-13 1.0E-13 5.1E-11 1.8E-08 1.1E-08 3.2E-09 2.7E-09 
D.3. Long-term radiotoxicity and dose conversion factors 
The LTR is related to the LTD, except that LTR is strictly a measure of hazard of the material in question 
and LTD incorporates the amount of material that transports to potential recipients.  LTR is therefore 
simpler and independent of location, geochemistry, etc.  However, LTR is not a measure of risk and has 
no regulatory value in the U.S. repository program.  Its primary value is simplicity and comparison 
against benchmarks such as natural uranium ore. 
Calculation of LTR metrics is conceptually straightforward, simply the inventory of all isotopes that arise 
from an initial isotope, times their respective dose conversion factors.  Table D-5 lists the dose conversion 
factors we used; they come from the International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP).  (It 
also lists accident release fractions, discussed below.)  The ICRP database provides dose factors in units 
of Sv/Bq, these were converted to Sv/kg.  The inhalation and ingestion dose factors are for the tissue-
weighted “Effective Dose Equivalent” or EDE, for adult members of the public, integration time periods 
to 70 years age. 
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Table D-5. Dose and Safety Parameters 
The ICRP Database [ICRP] 
Half-life Inhalation (Sv/kg) 
Halflife
(seconds) 
Halflife
(years) F M S
Ingestion 
(Sv/kg)
Maximum 
Atmospheric 
Accidental 
Release
Fraction to 
Containment 
per NUREG-
1465 (LWR) 
Ra 226 5.05E+10 1.60E+03 N/A N/A N/A 1.02E+07 0 
Ra 228 1.81E+08 5.75E+00 N/A N/A N/A 6.96E+09 0 
Ac 227 6.87E+08 2.18E+01 N/A N/A N/A 2.94E+09 0 
Ac 228 2.21E+04 6.99E-04 N/A N/A N/A 3.57E+10 0 
Th 228 6.04E+07 1.91E+00 9.10E+11 9.70E+11 1.21E+12 2.18E+09 0 
Th 229 2.32E+11 7.34E+03 1.89E+09 8.66E+08 5.59E+08 3.86E+06 0 
Th 230 2.43E+12 7.70E+04 7.47E+07 3.21E+07 1.05E+07 1.57E+05 0 
Th 231 9.19E+04 2.91E-03 1.53E+09 6.10E+09 6.49E+09 6.69E+09 0 
Th 232 4.43E+17 1.41E+10 4.46E+02 1.83E+02 1.01E+02 9.33E-01 0 
Th 234 2.08E+06 6.60E-02 2.14E+09 5.65E+09 6.60E+09 2.91E+09 0 
Pa 231 1.03E+12 3.28E+04 not defined 2.45E+08 5.94E+07 1.24E+06 0 
Pa 233 2.33E+06 7.39E-02 not defined 2.53E+09 3.00E+09 6.68E+08 0 
U 232 2.27E+09 7.20E+01 3.17E+09 6.18E+09 2.93E+10 2.61E+08 0 
U 233 5.00E+12 1.59E+05 2.08E+05 1.29E+06 3.44E+06 1.83E+04 0 
U 234 7.72E+12 2.45E+05 1.29E+05 8.09E+05 2.17E+06 1.13E+04 0 
U 235 2.22E+16 7.04E+08 4.16E+01 2.48E+02 6.80E+02 3.76E+00 0 
U 236 7.39E+14 2.34E+07 1.27E+03 7.66E+03 2.08E+04 1.13E+02 0 
U 238 1.41E+17 4.47E+09 6.22E+00 3.61E+01 9.95E+01 5.60E-01 0 
Np 237 6.75E+13 2.14E+06 1.30E+06 6.00E+05 3.13E+05 2.87E+03 0.006 
Pu 238 2.77E+09 8.77E+01 6.97E+10 2.91E+10 1.01E+10 1.46E+08 0.006 
Pu 239 7.59E+11 2.41E+04 2.76E+08 1.15E+08 3.68E+07 5.75E+05 0.006 
Pu 240 2.06E+11 6.54E+03 1.01E+09 4.22E+08 1.35E+08 2.11E+06 0.006 
Pu 241 4.54E+08 1.44E+01 8.77E+09 3.43E+09 6.48E+08 1.83E+07 0.006 
Pu 242 1.19E+13 3.76E+05 1.60E+07 6.97E+06 2.18E+06 3.49E+04 0.006 
Pu 244 2.61E+15 8.26E+07 7.22E+04 3.08E+04 9.84E+03 1.58E+02 0.006 
Am 241 1.36E+10 4.32E+02 1.22E+10 5.33E+09 2.03E+09 2.54E+07 0.005 
Am 242m 4.80E+09 1.52E+02 3.31E+10 1.33E+10 3.96E+09 6.83E+07 0.005 
Am 242 5.77E+04 1.83E-03 3.29E+11 5.08E+11 5.98E+11 8.97E+09 0.005 
Am 243 2.33E+11 7.38E+03 7.08E+08 3.02E+08 1.11E+08 1.48E+06 0.005 
Cm 242 1.41E+07 4.46E-01 4.05E+11 6.38E+11 7.23E+11 1.47E+09 0.005 
Cm 243 8.99E+08 2.85E+01 1.32E+11 5.92E+10 2.86E+10 2.86E+08 0.005 
Cm 244 5.72E+08 1.81E+01 1.71E+11 8.08E+10 3.89E+10 3.59E+08 0.005 
Cm 245 2.68E+11 8.50E+03 6.29E+08 2.67E+08 1.02E+08 1.33E+06 0.005 
Cm 246 1.49E+11 4.73E+03 1.11E+09 4.77E+08 1.82E+08 2.39E+06 0.005 
Cm 247 4.92E+14 1.56E+07 3.09E+05 1.34E+05 4.81E+04 6.52E+02 0.005 
Cm 248 1.07E+13 3.39E+05 5.66E+07 2.36E+07 7.55E+06 1.21E+05 0.005 
C-14 1.81E+11 5.73E+03 3.30E+04 3.30E+05 9.56E+05 9.56E+04 Not defined 
Sr-90 9.19E+08 2.91E+01 1.21E+08 1.89E+08 8.15E+08 1.55E+08 0.120 
Zr-93 4.83E+13 1.53E+06 2.32E+03 9.30E+02 3.07E+02 1.02E+02 0.005 
Tc-99 6.72E+12 2.13E+05 1.82E+02 2.51E+03 8.15E+03 4.01E+02 0.005 
I-129 4.95E+14 1.57E+07 2.35E+02 9.80E+01 6.40E+01 7.18E+02 0.750 
Cs-135 7.26E+13 2.30E+06 2.94E+01 1.32E+02 3.66E+02 8.52E+01 0.750 
Cs-137 9.47E+08 3.00E+01 1.48E+07 3.12E+07 1.26E+08 4.18E+07 0.750 
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Table D-6 lists the resulting LTR values calculated for this study. 
Table D-6. Long-Term Radiotoxicity (LTR) Coefficients (mrem/g) 
0 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000 10,000,000 
Ra 226 1.02E+09 1.77E+09 3.55E+09 2.48E+09 5.03E+07 2.39E-12 3.48E-203   
Ra 228 6.96E+11 2.51E+11 2.42E+06 1.50E-44         
Ac 227 2.94E+11 2.35E+11 1.28E+10 2.87E-03 9.65E-130       
Ac 228 3.57E+12 4.91E+09             
Th 228 2.18E+11 4.91E+09 1.27E-08 1.73E-184         
Th 229 3.86E+08 4.85E+08 4.81E+08 4.42E+08 1.89E+08 3.06E+04 4.72E-34   
Th 230 1.57E+07 1.58E+07 1.83E+07 4.26E+07 8.68E+07 3.91E+07 1.17E+04 6.36E-32 
Th 231 6.69E+11 1.89E+08 3.50E+08 3.52E+08 2.86E+08 3.52E+07 2.91E-02 4.25E-93 
Th 232 9.33E+01 3.35E+02 4.39E+02 4.39E+02 4.39E+02 4.39E+02 4.39E+02 4.39E+02 
Th 234 2.91E+11 1.13E+06 1.14E+06 1.22E+06 3.20E+06 1.62E+07 2.57E+06 1.30E-05 
Pa 231 1.24E+08 1.89E+08 3.50E+08 3.52E+08 2.86E+08 3.52E+07 2.91E-02 4.25E-93 
Pa 233 6.68E+10 1.85E+06 2.04E+06 3.82E+06 1.50E+07 1.63E+07 3.29E+05 3.68E-12 
U 232 2.61E+10 3.45E+10 1.45E+10 2.40E+06 3.71E-32       
U 233 1.83E+06 1.85E+06 2.04E+06 3.82E+06 1.50E+07 1.63E+07 3.29E+05 3.68E-12 
U 234 1.13E+06 1.13E+06 1.14E+06 1.22E+06 3.20E+06 1.62E+07 2.57E+06 1.30E-05 
U 235 3.76E+02 3.80E+02 4.07E+02 7.22E+02 3.54E+03 1.42E+04 1.57E+04 1.56E+04 
U 236 1.13E+04 1.13E+04 1.13E+04 1.12E+04 1.12E+04 1.12E+04 1.09E+04 8.48E+03 
U 238 5.60E+01 6.03E+01 6.03E+01 6.05E+01 6.34E+01 2.16E+02 1.61E+03 1.75E+03 
Np 237 2.87E+05 2.89E+05 2.89E+05 2.90E+05 3.20E+05 8.64E+05 1.61E+06 8.42E+04 
Pu 238 1.46E+10 1.35E+10 6.61E+09 6.56E+06 3.17E+06 1.62E+07 2.57E+06 1.30E-05 
Pu 239 5.75E+07 5.75E+07 5.73E+07 5.59E+07 4.31E+07 3.20E+06 1.57E+04 1.56E+04 
Pu 240 2.11E+08 2.11E+08 2.09E+08 1.90E+08 7.34E+07 1.54E+04 1.09E+04 8.48E+03 
Pu 241 1.83E+09 2.10E+09 2.23E+09 5.28E+08 3.17E+05 8.61E+05 1.62E+06 8.42E+04 
Pu 242 3.49E+06 3.49E+06 3.49E+06 3.48E+06 3.42E+06 2.90E+06 5.63E+05 1.75E+03 
Pu 244 1.58E+04 1.58E+04 1.60E+04 1.75E+04 2.68E+04 3.26E+04 3.24E+04 3.08E+04 
Am 241 2.54E+09 2.50E+09 2.16E+09 5.10E+08 3.17E+05 8.61E+05 1.62E+06 8.42E+04 
Am 242m 6.83E+09 1.12E+10 5.51E+09 6.16E+06 3.21E+06 1.39E+07 2.23E+06 3.01E+02 
Am 242 8.97E+11 1.13E+10 5.53E+09 6.08E+06 3.21E+06 1.39E+07 2.23E+06 3.03E+02 
Am 243 1.48E+08 1.48E+08 1.47E+08 1.40E+08 8.77E+07 4.60E+06 1.57E+04 1.56E+04 
Cm 242 1.47E+11 1.35E+10 6.66E+09 6.72E+06 3.17E+06 1.62E+07 2.57E+06 1.30E-05 
Cm 243 2.86E+10 2.24E+10 2.49E+09 5.61E+07 4.33E+07 3.20E+06 1.57E+04 1.56E+04 
Cm 244 3.59E+10 2.44E+10 9.30E+08 1.90E+08 7.36E+07 1.67E+04 1.09E+04 8.48E+03 
Cm 245 1.33E+08 1.35E+08 1.51E+08 2.23E+08 1.21E+08 8.65E+05 1.62E+06 8.45E+04 
Cm 246 2.39E+08 2.38E+08 2.35E+08 2.07E+08 5.81E+07 2.94E+06 5.70E+05 1.75E+03 
Cm 247 6.52E+04 6.53E+04 6.59E+04 7.16E+04 1.16E+05 2.16E+05 2.15E+05 1.49E+05 
Cm 248 1.21E+07 1.21E+07 1.21E+07 1.21E+07 1.19E+07 9.88E+06 1.59E+06 3.08E+04 
Sr-90 1.55E+10 1.22E+10 1.43E+09 7.12E-01 6.52E-94       
Tc-99 4.01E+04 4.01E+04 4.01E+04 4.00E+04 3.89E+04 2.90E+04 1.55E+03 2.96E-10 
I-129 7.18E+04 7.18E+04 7.18E+04 7.18E+04 7.18E+04 7.15E+04 6.87E+04 4.62E+04 
Cs-135 8.52E+03 8.52E+03 8.52E+03 8.52E+03 8.49E+03 8.27E+03 6.30E+03 4.18E+02 
Cs-137 4.18E+09 3.32E+09 4.15E+08 3.87E-01 1.90E-91       
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Of the data in Table D-5, we only used the ingestion dose factors in this study.  Ingestion would be the 
exposure pathway for waste in a repository.  We considered also looking at inhalation, e.g., accidents 
during fuel cycle operations, during transportation, and during at-surface storage.  Indeed, one criticism of 
recycling is that the reactor accident source terms would supposedly increase because of the buildup of 
TRU isotopes.  So, we also assembled inhalation dose factors and maximum accident release fractions for 
reactor accidents.  As described below, a preliminary analysis indicates that  this is not a problem. 
For the inhalation factors, two additional parameters must be specified to estimate the dose factor, the 
Activity Median Aerodynamic Diameter (AMAD) and the lung clearance class. 
The former specifies the diameter of the particles entering the lung.  “Most aerosols encountered in 
practical situations consist of a distribution (frequently log-normal) of particle sizes.  The properties of the 
aerosol must therefore be characterised by some average of the properties for the individual particle sizes 
in the distribution.  In recent ICRP reports the aerodynamic properties of an aerosol are specified in terms 
of the Activity Median Aerodynamic Diameter (AMAD).  The AMAD is the median aerodynamic 
diameter of the distribution, thus 50% of the activity in the aerosol is associated with particles which have 
aerodynamic diameters in excess of the AMAD.”[ICRP]  The AMAD is typically used instead of the 
physical diameter because it is a better representation of how particle move in air flow.  For the inhalation 
dose factors, the value of AMAD was set to 1 micron. 
The latter pertains to how and how quickly the lung expels particles.  “In the case of the 31 elements for 
which information on lung absorption is given in ICRP Publication 71, dose coefficients are given for the 
three absorption Types (F, M and S), together with a recommended default when no specific information 
is available on the chemical form of the radionuclide.  The default Types are given in Table 2 of 
Publication 72.  Inhalation dose coefficients for radionuclides of the additional 60 elements have been 
calculated on the basis that compounds assigned to lung inhalation Classes D [days], W [weeks] and Y 
[years] in ICRP Publication 30 (Parts 1-4) have been assigned to absorption Types F, M and S 
respectively, as in ICRP Publication 68.  Information is given in the relevant original ICRP Publication 
(Table 2 of Publication 72) on the chemical forms appropriate to the different inhalation Classes/Types.  
This information is summarised here in a special table based on Annexe F of Publication 68.” 
As noted above, Table D-5 includes maximum atmospheric accident release fractions from light water 
reactors per the NRC.  There are default values if no specific reactor and fuel values are available.  We 
averaged the separate values for BWR and PWR, they differ slightly.  Figure D-2 graphs the release 
fractions as a function of elemental atomic number.  The TRU all have low release fraction, 0.005 and 
0.006.  In contrast, the volatile fission products, Xe, I, Cs have maximum release fractions well over 0.1.  
These, of course, dominate reactor accident consequences, not the TRU.  As shown in Chapter 5 of the 
main report, the fission products changes little per fission energy released.  Thus, it would not appear that 
accumulation of TRU isotopes would impact reactor accident source terms.  It is, of course, an issue for 
the separation and fuel fabrication plants themselves, a topic for future work. 
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Figure D-2. Maximum LWR Release Fractions, data from [NRC1995] 
D.4. Proliferation resistance parameters 
The last set of isotope-specific coefficients used in this study are in Table D-7.  These relate to 
proliferation issues, and so we used the data from the so-called TOPS report.[NERAC200, NERAC2001].  
Isotopes below Th232 are not of concern. 
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Table D-7. Proliferation Resistance Isotope Parameters, data from [NERAC2000] 
Neutrons/ sec-kg 
Bare Sphere Critical Mass 
(kg) 
Th 232 nil infinite 
Th 234 not included not included 
Pa 231 nil 1.62E+02 
Pa 233 not included not included 
U 232 not included not included 
U 233 1.23E+00 1.64E+01 
U 234 not included not included 
U 235 3.64E-01 4.79E+01 
U 236 not included not included 
U 238 1.10E-01 infinite 
Np 237 1.39E-01 5.90E+01 
Pu 238 2.67E+06 1.00E+01 
Pu 239 2.18E+01 1.02E+01 
Pu 240 1.03E+06 3.68E+01 
Pu 241 4.93E+01 1.29E+01 
Pu 242 1.73E+06 8.90E+01 
Pu 244 not included not included 
Am 241 1.54E+03 5.70E+01 
Am 242m not included not included 
Am 242 not included not included 
Am 243 9.00E+02 1.55E+02 
Cm 242 not included not included 
Cm 243 not included not included 
Cm 244 1.10E+10 2.80E+01 
Cm 245 1.47E+05 1.30E+01 
Cm 246 9.00E+09 8.40E+01 
Cm 247 not included not included 
Cm 248 not included not included 
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APPENDIX E. DYMOND STATUS 
This appendix summarizes the status of DYMOND and some of its updated features that influence results 
in Chapters 7 and 8. 
DYMOND now ensures mass balance of each transuranic element (Pu, Np, Am, Cm), controls the 
production of fuel and reactors by “elemental flow control” per Table E-1, and selects among available 
fuel for reprocessing according to the rules in Table E-2.  Table E-3 lists available fuel options currently 
in DYMOND. 
Table E-1. Elemental flow control approximations for thermal reactor recycling, i.e., what controls 
the availability of MOX or IMF fuel 
For MOX For IMF 
If TRU fuel 
not available 
Use UOX fuel Use UOX fuel 
U Use enriched U to meet recipe Not needed 
Pu Require sufficient Pu to meet recipe; 
There is neither excess nor shortfall of Pu. 
Np Replace shortfall with depleted U 
Excess accumulates 
Makeup mass with IMF matrix 
Am Replace shortfall with depleted U 
Excess accumulates 
Makeup mass with IMF matrix 
Cm None needed in current recipe, but would makeup 
shortfall with depleted U 
Excess accumulates 
Makeup mass with IMF matrix 
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Table E-2. Priority in sending material to reprocessing or geologic disposal 
Priority in sending thermal 
reactor fuel to reprocessing 
and subsequently to thermal 
reactors
Priority in sending 
discharged fuel to geologic 
disposal
Priority in sending 
thermal reactor fuel to 
reprocessing and 
subsequently to fast 
reactors
Associated 
defaults
x SNF emplaced in geologic 
disposal may be retrieved. 
x Separation capacity is 
controlled by user input 
(histogram) 
x Geologic disposal capacity is 
unlimited. 
x Rate of SNF acceptance at 
geologic disposal is limited 
(default value is 3000 
MT/year); applies to the total 
of all unprocessed SNF. 
x Rate of HLW (residue after 
reprocessing) acceptance at 
geologic disposal  is not 
limited 
Priority 1. SNF that has gone through 
the least number of passes 
(hence discharged UOX is 
processed before 1PstP pass 
MOX, which is processed 
before 2Pnd P pass MOX, etc.) 
2. SNF that is youngest 
3. SNF that has been emplaced 
in geologic disposal 
1. HLW 
2. SNF that is oldest. 
3. SNF that has gone through 
the most number of recycle 
passes
1. SNF that has gone 
through the most 
number of recycle 
passes
Alternative cases 
explicitly allowed 
in DYMOND 
x Switch to disallow any 
emplaced SNF from being 
retrieved. 
x Switch to make separation 
capacity unlimited. 
x Switch to disallow any SNF 
to be sent to repository (if 
sure to be following 
continuous recycling) 
x Switch to send X-pass fuel to 
repository where X is the 
terminal number of recycle 
passes, e.g., 1-pass IMF. (if 
sure to be following X-pass 
limited recycle) 
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Table E-3. Available DYMOND cases 
Case Neutronics data 
available?
Implemented in 
DYMOND? 
Once-through at 33 MW-day burnup Yes Yes 
Once-through at 51 MW-day burnup Yes Yes 
O
nc
e-
th
ru
Once-through at 100 MW-day burnup Yes Yes 
1-pass IMF-NpPu Yes Yes 
1-pass IMF-NpPu & Am target Yes Yes 
1-pass IMF-NpPuAm Yes Yes 
1-pass IMF-NpPuAmCm Yes Yes 
N-pass IMF-NpPu Not yet planned 
N-pass IMF-NpPu & Am target Yes Yes 
N-pass IMF-NpPuAm Yes Yes 
IM
F
N-pass IMF-NpPuAmCm Not yet planned 
1-pass MOX-NpPu Yes Yes 
1-pass MOX-NpPuAm Yes Yes 
1-pass MOX-NpPuAmCm Not yet planned 
N-pass MOX-NpPu Not yet planned 
N-pass MOX-NpPuAm with constant U 
enrichment (but variable U/Pu ratio) 
(data thru N=5, extrapolation to N=8) 
Yes Yes 
N-pass MOX-NpPuAm with variable U 
enrichment 
FY06 (from 
transmutation 
analysis) 
FY06
M
O
X
N-pass MOX-NpPuAmCm Not yet planned 
UOX, then convertor fast reactor (CR =0.25) 
with continuing makeup from thermal reactor 
Yes Yes 
UOX, then breeder FR (CR=1.15), isolated 
from thermal reactors 
Not yet planned 
1-pass IMF-NpPu, then CFR Yes Yes  
1-pass IMF-NpPu, then BFR Yes Yes  
1-pass MOX-NpPu, then CFR Yes Yes 
1-pass MOX-NpPu, then BFR Not yet planned 
Fa
st
 R
ea
ct
or
 
UOX, then CFR(CR=0.25), then 
BFR(CR=1.15)
Combination of 
other cases 
Yes
VHTR – once-thru, then TRU goes to LWR 
recycle 
Yes Yes 
VHTR-IMF analog Fall 2005 Fall 2005 V
H
TR
VHTR-MOX analog Fall 2005 Fall 2005 
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APPENDIX F. RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION WHEN 
HANDLING MINOR ACTINIDES FOR NUCLEAR FUEL 
F.1 Introduction 
A question has been raised about the means to safely handle fuel materials for nuclear fuels incorporating 
minor actinides.  The methods employed to protect personnel when handling radioactive materials are 
commensurate with the radioactive decay energy, intensity and type of radiation.  The approaches may be 
classified as a) contact handling, b) ventilation control, c) sealed enclosures, d) semi-remote handling, and 
e) remote handling.  The first three approaches allow human handling directly, usually wearing gloves 
and perhaps using simple tools (i.e., tongs, forceps).  Very weak radiation sources of low specific activity, 
such as natural uranium, are handled by hand contact in well ventilated areas, either open areas of mill 
buildings, process facilities, or well-ventilated lab rooms.  Small amounts of alpha particle emitters can be 
handled in fume hoods that provide ventilation control.  As radiation levels increase, then sealed 
enclosures, such as gloveboxes, are used.  These provide excellent alpha particle protection and some 
protection against low energy gamma and x-ray radiation.  Shielded gloveboxes and leaded gloves 
provide higher protection against gamma and x-ray radiation.  As the gamma and/or x-ray radiation 
intensity increases, these design features are insufficient radiological protection (Shuck, 1966).  At that 
point, “semi-remote” equipment, such as in-glovebox tongs and manipulators can be used to reduce 
radiological exposure (NE, 1962), although these reduce dexterity, thereby increasing exposure time for 
completing the task.  High energy radiation sources require thick shielding walls or a considerable 
distance from the source to the operator to reduce radiation levels to safe values.  The high energy 
radiation sources are handled using electrically or mechanically controlled remote equipment, operated 
from remote stations.  This increasing personnel protection comes with penalties – for example, using a 
factor of one to define the time to carry out an operation on an open lab bench with low-activity materials, 
then in-hood work is about 1.2, glovebox work is in the 1.5 to 3 range, and hot cell operations are 3 to an 
indefinite upper range (Stewart, 1981).   
These pages will set practical limits on transitions between these five methods of personnel protection. 
F.2 Contact handling 
Cember (1996) states that handling radioactive materials in a laboratory room begins with a separated 
area of the lab room, on a benchtop.  Cember states that if the material has a low radiation level and 
cannot release a gas, vapor or aerosol in a quantity exceeding one Annual Limit on Intake (ALI), then 
handling with open trays on benchtops allows adequate safety.  Actual exposure to ALI inhalation values 
over a year result in a committed effective dose equivalent of 5 rem.  The ALIs have been set by the 
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and are also specified in the US Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR, 2004) for a variety of radioactive materials; the ALI value for the given 
actinide radionuclides of interest here are generally in the ‘small fraction of a microcurie’ range.  The 
actinides of concern are all classified as ‘very high radiotoxicity’ (IAEA, 1973).  If the emitted radiation 
could result in a measurable external dose, then additional precautions of portable shielding and tongs or 
reach tools can be used to reduce occupational exposure.  Cember implies that no special ventilation 
control beyond that for a typical laboratory space is needed at < 1 ALI for materials that do not release 
gas, vapor or aerosol.  Considering that the US Department of Energy (DOE) has also set an 
Administrative Control Level (ACL) of 0.5 rem/year effective dose equivalent (DOE, 2004), then the ALI 
would be reduced from 1 ALI at 5 rem to 0.1 ALI at 0.5 rem.  Other DOE regulations state that general 
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occupancies shall be designed for radiation exposure as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) and 
maintained at radiation levels below 0.5 mrem/h for 2,000 hour work years (CFR, 2002), or 1 rem/year 
exposure.
F.3 Ventilation control 
Cember (1996) stated that if the radioactive material can release gas, vapor or aerosol in the range of 1 to 
10 ALI, the usual practice is to use a fume hood to provide for radiological protection.  Considering the 
US DOE limitations, the lower limit would be less than 0.1 ALI.  The IAEA (1981) more generously 
recommended a range for fume hood work with radium, plutonium, and americium of 10 microcuries to 1 
millicurie.  The IAEA did have a qualifier that if the dry box work was dusty, then the limit would be 0.1 
microcurie to 0.01 millicurie (this would be on the order of ~ 10 to 1000 ALI for most actinide nuclidess).  
The fume hood sweeps the radioactive material release with the air drawn in to the hood, removing the 
inhalable material from the worker’s breathing zone.  The fume hood may filter its releases, but gas and 
vapor are not easily captured, and there is high air flow to treat.  Also, fume hoods are susceptible to air 
flow issues, such as those created by the person standing in front of the sash, quick hand movements in 
and out of the hood, placement of room air ventilation ducts too close to the hood, and people walking 
past the hood passing too close to the front of the hood thus creating eddies that could allow the release of 
small amounts of airborne material out of the hood. 
F.4 Sealed enclosures 
If the radioactive material is over 10 ALI, or large amounts of air flow for a hood are not available or 
practical in the laboratory (Cember, 1996), or there is an environmental protection reason to 
confine/contain rather than dilute, disperse and vent the material, or an inert atmosphere is needed for 
material purity or safety, then the glovebox enclosure is the next engineering solution.  The IAEA (1981) 
recommended moving to the glovebox at over 1 millicurie of Ra, Pu, Am, etc.  The same qualifier from 
the fume hood discussion was given; if the work was dry and dusty then the transition limit would be 0.01 
millicurie.  This is on the order of 1,000 ALI for most actinides.  The glovebox is a complete enclosure 
that allows workers to manipulate radioactive and hazardous materials with their hands, using flexible 
gloves – without high exposure to themselves or unfiltered release of material to the environment.  The 
glovebox is capable of modest differential pressure and may use air, inert gas, or vacuum as an 
atmosphere.  The glovebox may serve multiple functions – it can protect workers from exposure, protect 
the environment from material release, and it may protect the process material from air and humidity as 
well (DOE, 2003).  Gloveboxes, gloves, and their windows work well to shield against alpha particles and 
low energy beta particles.  Early in the exploration of nuclear energy, gloveboxes were a trademark of the 
nuclear industry and were considered to be good protection against alpha radiation (Ferguson, 1964).  
There is no longer an industry monopoly on gloveboxes; various types are now used in medical, life 
science, pharmaceutical, semiconductor manufacturing, and other industries. 
An unshielded glovebox can be used for handling ‘low exposure’ plutonium (10 w/o Pu-240, 0.9 w/o Pu-
241, balance Pu-239) up to the criticality mass limit of a dry process glovebox, which can be kilograms 
(Louwrier, 1976).  Uranium and plutonium are low specific activity elements with low spontaneous 
fission rates.  Their main radiological hazard is inhalation of these low solubility (long term lung 
retention) alpha particle emitters.
F.5 Semi-remote enclosures 
If the radioactive material over 10 ALI emits penetrating radiation (e.g., gamma rays or energetic beta 
particles), then the glovebox steel walls, gloves, and windows may not provide adequate dose protection 
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to the glovebox worker.  In the past, the US DOE design guidance was to consider use of remote handling 
equipment when exposures to the hands and forearms would approach yearly limits, or where 
contaminated puncture wounds could occur; appropriate shielding was required to minimize radiation to 
the skin and eyes (DOE, 1989).  That guidance is no longer official, but it is still prudent from ALARA 
considerations.
Consider the example of an isolation glovebox used for removing actinides from irradiated plutonium 
samples (Schuman, 1957).  The sample contained about 20 Curies of beta/gamma actinide activity and 1 
Curie of alpha activity.  The glovebox had 9-inch steel shielding on four sides but plexiglass walls in front 
and on top.  Through-wall manipulators and tongs penetrated the plexiglass sides to conduct the 
separations work.  In processing the sample (~1 day), operators each received 200 mrem.  Such a dose 
would not be allowed any longer in the US DOE complex.  The dose could have been reduced by 
additional precautions of front face shielding, but the implication is clear that 1E+01 Curie levels of 
actinides pose radiation exposure concerns in gloveboxes.
The federal annual limit for worker dose in the US DOE is 5 rem effective dose equivalent, with 15 rems 
for the lens of the eye, the sum of deep dose equivalent for external exposure plus committed dose 
equivalent to organs or tissues must be under 50 rems, and a shallow dose to the skin and extremities also 
has a limit of 50 rems (CFR, 2002).  However, in a standard the US DOE also states that a limit of 2 
rem/year is feasible and approval from a DOE Secretarial Officer is required to exceed that level.  
Furthermore, the US DOE has also set an Administrative Control Level (ACL) of 0.5 rem/year effective 
dose equivalent “As a challenging and achievable goal for personnel exposure in facilities” (DOE, 2004).  
Some level of ACL has been adopted at national laboratories and other DOE-operated facilities; for 
example, the INL uses 700 mrem/year as an ACL (INL, 2005).  The INL does not have an ACL for 
extremities, the 50 rem/year is used for extremity dose.  For a new facility, taking 500 mrem/year as the 
ACL and using a typical 2,000-hour work year, a maximum dose of 0.25 mrem/h is allowable.  The 
radiation protection ALARA considerations call for whatever reductions are possible from that average 
dose.
If the material above 10 ALI emits gamma radiation that can penetrate the box walls, or beta radiation 
that can penetrate the windows and gloves, or neutrons that can penetrate any of the glovebox materials, 
then the glovebox can be fitted with radiation shielding to provide personnel radiological protection.  The 
IAEA (1981) stated that shielded gloveboxes can accommodate radioactive materials in the millicurie to 
thousands of Curies range, but cautioned that this span was highly dependent on the energy of gamma 
rays emitted.  Strong gammas produce too much exposure to allow hands-on work.  As an initial 
assumption, the range was set as 10 to 1,000,000 ALI.  For some actinides, 1E+06 ALI is still millicuries, 
while for some others it is multiple Curies.  An example of a very heavily shielded glovebox with a 
~1E+09 ALI (Nichols, 1963) housed up to 1 gram of Cm-244 (specific activity = 82 Ci/g).  However, that 
appears to be a rather high value that was only accommodated by a specialized, highly shielded glovebox.  
Cm isotopes that emit neutrons would now be handled in hot cells.   
The typical approach to shielding a glovebox is to build a general stainless steel-walled glovebox shell, 
then layer lead sheets onto the outer walls of the box for gamma shielding, either gluing or clamping the 
sheets, overlapping and perhaps melt bonding sheets together to reduce radiation streaming, then welding 
on another thin layer of stainless steel sheet to the glovebox as an outer cover over the lead.  As an 
example, some gloveboxes in the TA-55 plutonium facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory used 0.25 
inch-thick lead sheet on a 0.125 inch-thick stainless steel glovebox shell and then a 0.0625 inch-thick 
stainless steel cover over the lead.  The lead sheet does not extend completely to the window frame or the 
glove port rings, so there are some areas of reduced shielding that allow the potential for radiation 
streaming in this approach.  A thicker window – usually leaded glass rather than lexan - is framed in 
metal, the frame is gasketed and bolted to the steel shell. 
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The shielded glovebox design briefly described above is rather standard.  However, if the radiation hazard 
is high, gloveboxes can be built with thicker shielding layers.  For example, a glovebox for chemical 
analysis of radioactive liquids at INL uses ~1 inch thick shielding.  For neutron shielding, a neutron 
thermalizer may be used (e.g., hydrogenous material such as polyethylene or water) and a neutron 
absorber such as boron carbide or boral (boron carbide mixed in aluminum) may be sandwiched with the 
lead used for gamma shielding.  The glovebox windows, which may be constructed of lexan or other 
plexiglass for low radioactivity boxes, are usually lead oxide or lead silicate impregnated silica glass for 
radiation protection when penetrating radiation is confined in the glovebox.  The gloves are ‘leaded’ by 
impregnating the glove material (neoprene, hypalon, etc.) with lead oxide powder to give some fraction of 
a mm of effective Pb shielding to the worker’s hands, which are closest to the radioactive material.  A 
typical glove is the North (see northsafety.com) lead-loaded hypalon dry box glove with 0.1 mm Pb 
equivalent for attenuation of soft gammas.  The definition of ‘soft gamma’ varies, but can be assumed to 
be in the keV range, usually the upper bound of ‘soft’ is considered to be 200-300 keV, and certainly 
under 0.5 MeV.  Glove work poses some concerns that are not easily solved: gloves reduce touch 
sensitivity and dexterity (so there is the chance of glove abrasion, puncture, or damage), gloves can 
become slippery when wet and operator perspiration in the anti-contamination hand gloves inside the 
glovebox gloves is very uncomfortable.  The operator’s sense of heat within the glovebox is greatly 
reduced, and the person may be under strain when operating the glovebox station (e.g., small hands in 
large gloves, arms in gloveports are poor ergonomic conditions) (Garden, 1962).  Selection of leaded 
versus non-leaded gloves is not always obvious – radiological ALARA considerations must be balanced 
against glove durability and the extra “in-box” time required by reduced dexterity (Cournoyer, 2004).  
Leaded gloves tend to have shorter lifetimes than typical gloves (Dodoo-Amoo, 2003) and crack more 
easily than non-leaded gloves (Carmack, 2005). The designer defines what process or processes are to be 
carried out in the glovebox and designs the shielding to meet the yearly DOE ACL, plus a safety factor to 
avoid overexposures.  For new facilities, the ACL would probably be 0.5 rem/year. 
An important case history of actinide handling in shielded gloveboxes was given by Louwrier (1976).  
Handling 2.5 g increments of americium oxide and aluminum powder for cermet pellet batch preparation 
in a lead shielded glovebox, with leaded gloves and using tongs of 20-cm length to preclude glove contact 
with the material, resulted in the doses in Table F-1. 
Table F-1. Doses from handling americium oxide in shielded gloveboxes (take from Louwrier, 1976) 
In-box gamma 
dose rates 
Corresponding
finger/hand doses 
preparation and blending of powder 600 mrem/h 150-200 mrem 
separation and weighing 800 mrem/h 400-600 mrem 
loading powder in can 500 mrem/h 300-500 mrem 
cold pressing pellets 200 mrem/h   30-  50 mrem 
dimension control, transfer to furnace 200 mrem/h 100-150 mrem 
discharging furnace, quality control checks 200 mrem/h 150-200 mrem 
The finger/hand dose to prepare 132 pellets with a total of 27.5 grams of americium oxide was 19.6 rems.  
This is a significant fraction of the yearly 50 rem allowed for doses to the extremities, especially since 
only 132 pellets were fabricated.  Typical fuel fabrication facilities with 4% enriched uranium oxide have 
had worker extremity doses less than 25% of the annual exposure limit, as measured by finger ring 
dosimeters (Sanders, 1975).  Louwrier’s exposure of 19.6 rems is 39% of the yearly limit.  Louwrier 
(1976) also described some work with gram amounts of americium-curium; a spent isotopic power 
source, containing 3.3 g of Am-241 (10.7 Ci, J dose=495 mrem/h [1E+09 ALI]), 18 mg of Cm-242 
(61 Ci, 2.4 mrem/h dose is 9% J and 91% neutron), and 380 mg of Pu-238 (6.6 Ci, J dose=30 mrem/h), 
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was separated into constituent elements.  The alpha radiation is not described since it was well-shielded.  
This Am-Cm work was judged to have high gamma radiation despite the low gamma energy, and was 
placed in a shielded cell with master-slave manipulators on the primary working side and leaded gloves 
on the opposite side.  On the primary side, there was a lead sheet and a water-containing wall for radiation 
shielding, and a leaded glass viewing window.  The work was performed solely with the manipulators 
rather than the gloves because of the high dose rate, and resulted in an exposure rate of < 1 mrem/h to the 
operators.  The cell had an additional 2 mm thickness of lead shielding applied to the glove side assure 
future safe handling of Am-243.  After that shielding augmentation, a test was performed using 5.7 
micrograms of Cf-252 to simulate 1.2 grams of Cm-244.  The neutron dose-rate outside the cell on the 
glove side (through the lead shielding) was 30 mrem/h and outside on the manipulator side (through the 
water and lead shielding wall) at the front of the cell was 0.4 mrem/h.   
This operating experience shows that the hand doses with modest amounts of Am oxide were quite high 
even with use of 20-cm tongs.  Also, as glovebox wall thickness increases with extra shielding, reach into 
the glovebox (normally ~26 inches is the design standard, based on the length of a person’s arms) is 
reduced; hence the usability of the glovebox is reduced.  Louwrier’s experience shows that despite the 
higher allowable exposure to hands, leaded gloves cannot offer nearly the same level of hand protection 
as the shielded glovebox walls offer to the body.  Although every effort is made to provide shielding 
protection, and the 50 rem/year extremities limit is not reduced to lower values by other DOE 
documentation, the leaded gloves at ~0.1 mm shield thickness do not offer the same level of radiation 
protection as the thicker lead sheeting clad on the glovebox walls.  ALARA considerations for the 
extremities dose also affect the time operators work with the high Curie levels in shielded gloveboxes.  At 
the Materials and Fuels Complex at INL, in-box work with materials reading over 100 mrem/h requires 
the operator to wear finger dosimeter rings to better record the dose to the hands.  Working with such a 
high radiation level is rare at INL and steps are taken preserve ALARA.  The staff endeavors to reduce 
the frequency that the evolutions occur and samples for chemical analysis are often diluted to reduce the 
radiation level.  As an initial assignation, based on the practical operating experience described above, the 
transition point for moving from a shielded glovebox to a hot cell is on the order of 1 Ci, which for some 
of the actinides would be 1M ALI, and for higher hazard actinides would be 1E+09 ALI or greater.
F.6 Remote handling 
As the materials to be handled increase in radioactivity, the glovebox cannot provide adequate 
radiological protection.  The next step is the hot cell, also referred to as a shielded cell or “cave”.  
Basically, a small hot cell is a robust walled glovebox with metal manipulator arms rather than gloves for 
handling the higher radioactive materials.  The hot cell can be designed to accommodate the highest 
radiation level of material considered in a given process or operation.  The radiation source term has been 
described in the past as some number of “MeV-Curies”.  The energy of the penetrating radiation is used 
with the Curie radioactivity measurement to define the shielding needed.  Some early hot cells were 
designed for 100 Ci at 1 MeV gamma energy for analytical chemistry applications, 10,000 to 100,000 Ci 
at 1 MeV for post irradiation examination work, and up to 1,000,000 Ci at 1 MeV gamma energy for 
spent fuel handling work.  The smallest hot cell facility noted during literature review was the INL Test 
Reactor Area cell 2, a lightly shielded cell for metallography and photography, was found to provide 
protection for a maximum of 10 Curies of Co-60 but some walls required temporary shielding for 
operator protection when operating above 2.5 Curies (Wagner, 1993).  In general, the cell wall concrete 
thickness increases with increasing source term.  The typical design practice has been to define the hot 
cell operator’s allowable dose (such as 5 rem/year with 2,000 work hours/year), use a safety factor of 10 
on that value, then determine the required concrete shield wall thickness to reduce the penetrating 
radiation source term to that dose level (Ferguson, 1964).  The concrete walls would be several feet thick 
for hot cells, necessitating use of augmented reach tools.  Hot cell windows are then designed to provide 
the same level of protection as the walls (Northrup, 1965).  Other design steps were outlined by Long 
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(1978): the floor area and wall thickness would be established based on the process requirements, then the 
shielding window would be determined so that it offered similar radiological shielding as the concrete 
walls of the same thickness, followed by manipulator equipment selection based on process requirements, 
area to be covered, heaviest load to be lifted, versatility required, and if an airtight seal was needed at the 
manipulator wall penetration.
The hot cell viewing windows are multiple panes of lead silicate glass with mineral oil or zinc bromide to 
allow better optical transmission between panes.  Tools are all remote manipulators, which have a 
reasonable reliability.  As an example of manipulator reliability, a data point on metal tape driven units at 
the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) of the INL is given.  The hot cell is roughly ~30 years old that 
has 21 left-right manipulator stations, and at any given time there may be three individual manipulators 
down for maintenance due to broken drive tapes or other problems.  Tape slippage from a pulley and tape 
breakage are two of the most common problems of manual manipulator units (Smith, 1957).  Considering 
work on a two-manipulator station basis, with three manipulators down at different stations, such faults 
give a 14% outage rate for the mature equipment, or 86% availability of the hot cell between maintenance 
outages to repair the manipulators.  The design of the MFC hot cell is such that if the center of the cell is 
handling a 1,000 rem/h object, the inside wall is exposed to ~100 mrem/h, and the operators at 
manipulator stations are typically exposed to less than 0.1 mrem/h (Houser, 2005).   
Likar (1988) pointed out that defense high level waste to be remotely handled at the Waste Isolation Pilot 
Plant would have canister surface dose rates of up to 15,000 rem/h.  The hot cell purpose is to unpack 
canisters of radioactive material from shipping casks, inspect the canisters and overpack any damaged or 
leaking canisters, place canisters into facility casks for long term storage, and transfer the facility casks to 
an emplacement machine that places each cask in a position underground.  The remote equipment has 
been designed to tolerate the high dose rate. 
F.7. Conclusions 
Table F-2 gives the suggested radioactivity ranges for moving through the approaches of successive levels 
of greater protection when handling actinide elements.  The transition points given in the table are 
approximate, but for the multi-gram quantities of actinides to be mixed in to fuel, fully remote hot cell 
handling is warranted despite the costs of hot cells and the difficulty of handling 4.3-m fuel pins in cells. 
Table F-2. Suggested progression of enclosures for handling radioactive materials 
Work environment Level of Radioactivity Qualitative level 
laboratory benchtop < 0.1 ALI sub-nano to nanocuries 
laboratory fume hood 0.1 to 10 ALI nano to microcuries 
unshielded glovebox enclosure 10 to 1,000 ALI (a) micro to millicuries 
shielded glovebox enclosure 10 to 1,000,000 ALI milli to unity curies 
hot cell > 1,000,000 ALI  unity to megacuries 
(a) The glovebox may protect at levels greater than 1000 ALI if the emitted radiation is alpha or beta 
rather than gamma or neutron.  If the radiation is penetrating, then a shielded glovebox may need to 
be used at a small ALI value. 
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APPENDIX G. SAFETY AND RELIABILITY ISSUES IN 
FABRICATION OF RECYCLE FUEL 
UIntroductionU.  A question has been posed in the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI) about using 
recycled uranium fuel with the addition of actinide wastes in reactors so that the excess neutrons in the 
reactor core will fission or transmute the actinide wastes in the recycled fuel.  With the consumption of 
the long-lived actinides placed into recycle fuel, then there is less high level waste to store in an 
underground repository.  This paper examines several safety and reliability issues of fabricating new fuel 
pellets and assemblies with the addition of the minor actinides in the uranium fuel. 
UBackgroundU.  In the present uranium fuel cycle in the United States, the “fresh” fuel originating from 
uranium mines and enrichment for reactor use is composed mainly of U-238, ~5% of U-235, and ~0.04% 
U-234 (Rice, 1994).  Therefore, with these long-lived radionuclides, the fuel is low specific activity.  It is 
a low radiological hazard and has low dose rates.  Table G-1 gives the radioactivity of unirradiated 
uranium dioxide fuel.  The typical safety precautions in a fuel fabrication facility are mainly for 
laboratory-type cleanliness.  Gloves are worn to protect hands from surface contamination and to keep 
skin oils, skin cells, etc., from the fuel.  Hats or caps might be worn to prevent hairs from getting into the 
process, and lab coats are worn to protect against contamination of clothing and from clothing 
contamination of the fuel.  General area ventilation is used in portions of the fabrication buildings where 
the uranium is in solid form.  When handling uranium dioxide in powder form for individual fuel pellet 
manufacture, gloveboxes and respirators are used to prevent inhalation of fuel particles and control 
contamination by fuel dust.  Uranium is a heavy metal, and most heavy metals have some level of 
chemical toxicity when inhaled (Klaassen, 2001; ATSDR, 2004; ATSDR, 1990; ATSDR, 1999).  Heavy 
metals are generally not soluble in water and do not clear from the lungs easily when inhaled.  While their 
radioactivity is low, these are alpha particle emitters.  Depositing alpha particle energy in the lungs is very 
damaging. 
Typically, meeting the 10CFR20.1201 occupational dose limit of 5 rem/year in the existing “once-
through” fuel fabrication plants is not difficult if inhalation of dust is precluded.  These plants use 
gloveboxes for dusty operations and ventilation control in other portions of the fuel fabrication line 
(Brodsky, 1985).   
If uranium is recycled and some of the actinide elements are included in the recycled fuel, then 
concentrations of more highly radioactive elements will be present.  Table G-2 lists the actinides from 
irradiated uranium fuel (Benedict, 1981).  Note in Table G-2 that most of the principal decay modes are 
alpha particles, often in the 5 MeV range, accompanied by low energy gamma emission, with a few 
isotopes decaying by beta particles emission.  Also note the annual limits on intake (ALIs) for airborne 
matter are also in the microCurie range for nearly all of these isotopes. 
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Table G-1a. Uranium radioactivity 
Isotope Half-life (years) Principal decay 
U234 2.46E+5 alpha at ~4.7 MeV 
U235 7.04E+8 alpha at ~4.4 MeV 
U238 4.47E+9 alpha at ~4.1 MeV 
note: specific activity of natural uranium (0.72% by weight U-235) is ~7.1E-07 Ci/gram 
and for 5% enriched uranium the specific activity is ~2.6E-06 Ci/gram (from 10CFR71, 
Table A-4).  These are low specific activity mixtures of uranium; protection must be 
provided to not inhale these alpha-particle emitters but otherwise they are not particularly 
dangerous to handle. 
Table G-1b. Uranium chemical toxicity as a carcinogenic heavy metal 
Source Value Value
NIOSH 0.20 mg/mP3 P NIOSH IDLH   10 mg/mP3 P as U 
OSHA 0.25 mg/mP3 P
ACGIH 0.20 mg/mP3 P
AIHA Not listed  
These values are for U and insoluble compounds, the listed mass as U.  The high density 
of uranium means that dust must be suppressed or confined to meet the ~0.2 mg level. 
The existing fuel fabrication processes would have to be enhanced with radiation protection if the “minor 
actinides’ of americium, neptunium, and especially curium were included in recycled fuel.  There is some 
experience in the world with mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication, where the chemical and radioactive 
toxicity of plutonium required confinement.  Glovebox lines are typically used in MOX fuel fabrication 
plants because of the chemical and radiotoxicity of plutonium.  There has also been some work with 
reprocessed uranium.  The experiences of this work have been surveyed to find any reliability or safety 
issues that should be addressed as the US considers the idea of fuel fabrication with reprocessed uranium. 
There are several issues addressed here.  These include the differences between typical fuel fabrication 
presently performed and the inclusion of actinide elements in the handling process.  The main differences 
are radiation and chemical composition.  Each of these is addressed below. 
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Table G-2. Actinide element radioactivity 
Isotope
Half-life
(years) Principal decay mode 
Decay 
product
Specific
activity 
(Ci/g)
ALI
(PCi)
Np237 2.14E+06 100% alpha at ~4.7 MeV Pa-233 7E-04 5E-01 
Np238 2.117 days 100% beta at 0.26 MeV Pu-238 2.6E+05 2E+03 
Pu236 2.87 ~100% alpha at ~5.7 MeV 
SF=3.39E+04 n/s-g 
U-232 527 2E-02 
Pu238 87.7 ~100% alpha at ~5.4 MeV 
SF=2.588E+03 n/s-g 
U-234 17 7E-03 
Pu239 2.41E+04 100% alpha at ~5.1 MeV U-235 0.06 6E-03 
Pu240 6.56E+03 ~100% alpha at ~5.1 MeV 
SF=9.087E+02 n/s-g 
U-236 0.23 6E-03 
Pu241 14.4 99% beta at 20 keV Am-241 110 3E-01 
Pu242 3.75E+05 ~100% alpha at ~4.8 MeV 
SF=1.718E+03 n/s-g 
U-238 4E-03 2E-02 
Am241 432.7 100% alpha at ~5.4 MeV Np-237 3.2 6E-03 
Am242 16 hours 82.7% beta at 0.18 MeV 
17.3% electron capture 
Cm-242 
Pu-242 
8.1E+05 8E+01 
Am242m 152 ~99.5% gamma at 0.04 MeV 
SF=1.247E+02 n/s-g 
Am-242 9.7 6E-03 
Am243 7.37E+03 100% alpha at 5.2 MeV Np-239 0.19 6E-03 
Cm242 162.8 days ~100% alpha at ~6 MeV 
SF=2.10E+07 n/s-g 
Pu-238 3,400 3E-01 
Cm-243 29.1 ~99.74% alpha at 5.7 MeV 
0.26% electron capture 
SF=1.22E+03 n/s-g 
Pu-239 
Am-243 
52 9E-03 
Cm244 18.1 ~100% alpha at ~5.7 MeV 
SF=1.080E+07 n/s-g 
Pu-240 82 1E-02 
Cm245 8.5E+03 ~100% alpha at ~5.3 MeV 
SF=3.875E+01 n/s-g 
Pu-241 0.17 6E-03 
Cm246 4.76E+03 ~100% alpha at ~5.3 MeV 
SF=9.448E+06 n/s-g 
Pu-242 0.31 6E-03 
U234 2.46E+05 100% alpha at ~4.7 MeV Th-230 6.2E-03 7E-01 
U235 7.04E+08 100% alpha at ~4.4 MeV Th-231 2.1E-06 8E-01 
U236 2.342E+07 100% alpha at ~4.5 MeV Th-232 6E-05 8E-01 
U237 6.75 days 80% beta at 0.24 MeV 
40% gamma at 64.5 keV 
Np-237 8.2E+04 2E+03 
U238 4.47E+09 ~100% alpha at ~4.1 MeV 
SF=1.36E-02 n/s-g 
Th-234 3.3E-07 8E-01 
Table notes: specific activity of natural uranium (0.72% by weight U-235) is ~7.1E-07 Ci/gram and for 5% 
enriched uranium the specific activity is ~2.6E-06 Ci/gram (from 10CFR71, Table A-4).  These are low 
specific activity mixtures of uranium; protection must be provided to not inhale these alpha-particle emitters 
but otherwise they are not dangerous to handle.   
References: Lederer, 1978; Baum, 2002; spontaneous fission values over 1E+01 were cited, values were from 
report LA-UR-01-5572, September 2001 
Annual Limits of Intake (ALI) are inhalation values taken from 10CFR20, Appendix B “Annual Limits on Intake 
(ALIs) and Derived Air Concentrations of Radionuclides for Occupational Exposure; Effluent Concentrations; 
Concentrations for Release to Sewerage”, January 1, 2004.  ALI values are in units of microCuries, and lung 
clearance class W was selected for consistency when multiple values were listed.
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G.1 Issues of radiation 
These alpha emitters, with some low energy gamma emission and a few fairly strong spontaneous fission 
isotopes (especially Cm-242 and Cm-244) present several handling problems (Louwrier, 1976) beyond 
typical uranium: 
decay heat 
radiolysis of solutions 
radiation damage of solids 
personnel exposure 
Another issue is that the low energy gammas sometimes emitted by the alpha emitters and perhaps also 
the alpha particles themselves will interact with oxygen in hot cells.  Even if a hot cell or glovebox uses 
an inert atmosphere (e.g., argon, nitrogen) there can be small amounts of inleakage oxygen since these 
enclosures operate at slightly negative pressure for particulate contamination control.  The maximum 
permissible oxygen content is suggested to be in the 25 to 50 ppm range (ANS, 1988).  The concern with 
oxygen is molecular dissociation.  When oxygen molecules are dissociated, elemental or free radical 
oxygen atoms are created.  These atoms generally recombine quickly with any nearby oxygen molecules 
to form ozone molecules.  In a similar manner, nitrogen molecules can be dissociated, allowing nitrogen 
radicals to form nitrogen oxides (NOBx B).  Nitric acid (HNOB3 B) molecules can also be formed from ozone, 
oxygen radicals, and atmospheric humidity (Batchelor, 1982).  Ozone is chemically very corrosive and is 
highly detrimental to plastics, such as electrical insulation, sleeves on manipulators, containers, etc., and 
also to rubber gloves used in gloveboxes.  For that reason, hypalon (chloro-sulfonated polyethylene) 
gloves are favored for their resistance to ozone degradation (Louwrier, 1976).  Ozone has also been 
known to attack metal.  Hot cells or automated gloveboxes would need to be monitored for the ppm 
oxygen concentration.  If the oxygen level increased, then there would be concerns about ozone creation 
and ozone degradation of materials. 
Renard (1995) points out that incorporating actinides, especially curium, into a MOX fuel line may not be 
the best use of the line because of the contamination and retrofitting the line to accommodate the extra 
radioactivity and criticality concerns.  Using americium and curium targets in a reactor core rather than 
blending these actinides into the fuel have some advantages.   
Decay heat.  The decay heat given off by actinides is a concern for shielded enclosures since these inert-
atmosphere enclosures are not well ventilated and require special provisions to remove heat.  A typical 
hot cell temperature should not exceed 30 C (86 F) and it is already heated by the intense lighting in the 
cell (the windows reduce the light intensity by more than half, so the lights must produce high luminosity) 
and other heat sources, such as motors, friction in machining parts, welders, and other equipment 
(Wahlquist, 1998).  Inert gases may not cool as well as air when it is draw through an electrical motor 
casing.  Electrical equipment is generally favored in hot cells due to the non-contaminating nature of 
electrical power (versus hydraulic or pneumatic power), but keeping electrical equipment cool is an 
important issue to guarantee reliable operation and long motor lifetimes.  Wahlquist (1998) notes some 
types of motors may not be suitable for the very low humidity gas environment of a hot cell.  High 
temperatures in the glovebox or cell tend to degrade electrical insulation in motors and wiring, reducing 
the useful life of the equipment, and high temperatures also place demands on lubricants for manipulators 
and on television cameras that might be in use.  High temperatures can degrade gloves and window seals 
in gloveboxes.  Some hot cells have cooling systems, refrigeration systems that allow the in-cell gas or 
metal parts of a machine to transfer heat to the refrigerant.  These are rated to remove some level of 
kilowatts.  If actinides increase the in-cell heating, changes would be needed to bring the temperature 
back down within normal limits.   
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Recalling that U-235 is ~1E-06 watts/gram, the specific heat values for several of the actinides of interest 
are listed below in watts/gram (Ferguson, 1963): 
Pu-238  0.555 
Pu-240  0.007 
Pu-241  0.004 
Pu-242  0.0001 
Am-241 0.106 
Am-242 1000. 
Am-242m 0.003 
Am-243 0.006 
Am-244 88,000. 
Cm-242 122. 
Cm-243 1.47 
Cm-244 2.91 
Cm-245 0.006 
Cm-246 0.0072 
Obviously, the Cm-242 and Am-242 isotopes have high heat emission that must be dealt with in the 
design of the facility (Am-244 is very high; however, it is quite rare).  Pillon (2003) stated that work with 
minor actinides would require continuous forced cooling throughout the fabrication facility.  Forced 
cooling would be necessary for the fuel assemblies during pellet loading and pin mounting to keep the 
long, thin-walled pin structural material temperatures low enough to avoid damage during handling and 
storage.  One possibility to consider was discussed in Weissert (1968); completed fuel pins of Th-232/U-
233 were placed into fuel assemblies under water.  The fuel element assembling machine operated in a 
canal for the pilot plant at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 
Radiolysis of solutions.  Two materials are added to the powder before compaction.  The first material is 
called “binder”.  It is usually a liquid adhesive, added to ‘cement’ the powder so that the fuel powder 
handles better for pressing into pellet form in a press.  The second material is a lubricant, which is added 
to allow more positive and uniform compaction of the power in the press.  Proper compaction results in a 
uniform density pellet, which is needed for consistent nuclear and thermal properties in the reactor core.  
There are some materials that can serve as both a binder and lubricant; since the liquid is expelled from 
the pellet during furnace heating at ~1700 C in the pellet sintering process, the liquid is not an impurity 
concern.  Mobil #6 motor oil has been used as a combination binder and lubricant in the US (Carmack, 
2005).  Cochran (1999) stated that a binder sometimes used is polyvinyl alcohol.  Alpha particles are 
short-range radiation, but they are directly adjacent to the binder and lubricant and are energetic enough 
to affect these materials.  When hydrocarbons like alcohol and oil are bombarded with alpha particles, the 
molecular chains can be broken and they can release smaller hydrocarbons, namely hydrogen and 
methane.  Such gases pose a concern in air filled gloveboxes or hot cells.   
Pillon (2003) discussed that for an industrial scale of pellet production, pellet pressing required lubricants, 
but the minor actinide radioactivity causes the lubricant to break down and lose lubrication properties.
The green pellets (the pressed pellets before heating in the sintering furnace) also can become 
mechanically unstable due to binder-lubricant degradation.  The proposed solution was to use a separate 
binder and develop press dies that are automatically lubricated before each pellet rather than adding 
lubricant to the pellet material.  This adds complexity to the machine, but the alternative is to allow 
fabrication of high numbers of substandard units that must be scrapped.  This would mean that some 
material continues to traverse the fabrication line.  Allowing material to “ride the circuit” means extra 
inventory is present and susceptible to accident events. 
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Radiation damage.  Typically, alpha particles do not create damage in metals, and are too short range to 
be a concern for windows.  Alpha particles may break down the lubricants in manipulators, especially the 
lube in the end effector joints close to the emitter.  There are some concerns for gamma rays and beta 
radiation emitted by the actinides, although low energy gammas generally do not affect the metal 
components in hot cells (Wahlquist, 1998).  Gamma radiation can have severe damaging effects on 
lubricants.  Another example of a susceptible component in a hot cell is a television camera lens.  Feraday 
(1981) stated that estimated dose rates to cameras in a remote fabrication hot cell would be < 2 rad/hour 
and this was acceptable for work with thorium-uranium fuels, where U-232 has some hard gamma ray 
emission in its decay chain.  If a new facility to handle actinides in fuel is designed, then the radiation to 
cameras would be accounted for in the design.  If an existing facility; that is, a MOX facility, began 
handling minor actinides, the additional radiation levels must be evaluated for the additional exposures 
and resulting damage from exposure.  The spontaneous fission neutrons are another concern.  Overall, 
robotic equipment in factories has exhibited high reliability in the 97% availability range (Nof, 1985), but 
the service lifetime of industrial robots is only 12 to 15 years (UN, 2002).  The source documentation did 
not specify if the 12-15 year lifetime was based on obsolescence or wear out.  The Materials and Fuels 
Complex at the INL has a large hot cell with 21 manipulator stations.  The hot cell has operated for over 
30 years (Houser, 2005).  At any given time, there may be up to three manipulators out of service waiting 
for maintenance, or 18 operable stations out of a total of 21 stations gives 86% availability.  Since some 
hot cell equipment has lifetimes of 30+ years, then perhaps factory retooling for new products and 
obsolescence are the dominant factors in robot lifetimes.   
Remote manipulator “boots”, that is, the sleeve-like covers over the in-cell portion of manipulator tools, 
are a source of continual concern for cell confinement integrity and contamination control.  The boots are 
actually part of the seal for the manipulator penetration through the thick concrete wall, so they comprise 
a weak spot in the hot cell confinement boundary.  Robinson (1969) stated that small particles of 
P
244
PCmB2 BOB3 B at a curium hot cell facility were capable of burning pinholes through polyurethane boot 
material.  Others noted that boot lifetimes in actinide processing hot cells were on the order of 10 months 
(Samsel, 1970), meaning annual replacement was standard procedure.  Either more resilient materials are 
needed, or a changeout device is needed to make the boot replacement as quick as possible.  If curium 
particles can damage the manipulator boots, then filters are also at risk.  Some method of particle capture 
is needed ahead of the hot cell’s gas filter banks. 
Personnel exposure.  Roepenack (1987) stated that the low energy gamma radiation of Pu and Am 
handled in MOX fabrication was negligible as long as the materials were held in bulky configurations.  In 
bulk configurations there is high self-absorption and self-shielding.  When the powders are spread out 
over widespread areas there is little self-shielding and the low energy gammas can contribute 
considerably to the glovebox operator’s dose rate.  The situation would be worse with actinides adding 
more gammas and also spontaneous fissions to challenge the shielding.  Bemden (1981), Leblanc (1982), 
and Carmack (2005) also stated that dust is known to accumulate in the “powder” section of fuel 
fabrication lines.  The powder section is where the uranium dioxide in a loose powder form is mixed and 
blended, then compacted into pellet form; this portion of fuel fabrication is always performed in some 
type of enclosure to control the spread of dust and protect personnel from dust inhalation and radiation 
exposure from dusts.  When there are low energy gamma emitters accumulating with this fuel dust, the 
increasing radiation level versus a fixed shield wall thickness begins to pose an exposure concern for 
personnel working in and near the gloveboxes that house the powder section of the fuel fabrication line 
(Draulans, 1985).  In fact, the powder tends to spread everywhere within the enclosure and in general is 
tedious to clean up (Carmack, 2005).  Dust can also accumulate in the filters and ventilation systems of 
gloveboxes and hot cells.  Some of the actinide dusts, especially Cm-244, would be difficult to detect 
through the shield walls because they have weak gamma emissions, but they pose a significant concern 
because they emit neutrons from spontaneous fission (Haggard, 1996).  Typically, with low specific 
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activity uranium, the dust accumulation concern dwells on criticality rather than radiation exposure.  The 
actinides have relatively high critical mass limits, as shown in Table G-3, the lowest being 13 grams of 
Am-242m in water.  The fabrication processes should be dry, so criticality mass limits are in the kilogram 
range which should allow reasonable size batches of fuel.  The criticality safety “double contingency” 
precautions of mass limits and geometry/moderator limits have served well in the fuel fabrication industry 
and would be needed with mixtures of non-fissile and fissile isotopes.  Mixtures of oxide materials will 
need to be addressed for criticality safety issues, especially the spontaneous fission isotopes.  The fuel 
dust would have to be regularly and thoroughly cleaned if gloveboxes are used to house an automated 
process line for fuel with actinides.  Otherwise, any personnel intervention for surveillance or 
maintenance would expose the person to a high dose.  Design provisions must be made to remotely 
decontaminate such gloveboxes. 
Table G-3. Subcritical mass limits for non-fissile and fissile actinide nuclides 
Mass limit (kg) of nuclide 
Isotope Chemical 
form 
Water
reflector
Steel
reflector
Np   30   20 Np237
NpOB2 B 140   90 
Pu     4     3 Pu238
PuOB2B   11     7 
Pu239 (fissile) Pu     0.450  
Pu   20     15 Pu240
PuOB2B   70     45 
Pu241 (fissile) Pu     0.200  
Pu242 Pu   60     40 
Am   24     16 Am241 
AmOB2 B   40     32 
Am242m (fissile) Am     0.013  
Am   35     25 
AmB2 BOB3 B   50     37 
Am243 
AmOB2 B   60     45 
Cm243 (fissile) Cm     0.090  
Cm     5     3 
CmB2 BOB3 B     7     5 
Cm244 
CmOB2 B     7     5 
Cm245 (fissile) Cm     0.030  
Cm247 (fissile) Cm     0.900  
Table taken from ANSI, 2005. 
Pillon (2003) discussed that for curium, powder metallurgy processes that generate dust must be avoided.  
Direct synthesis of dust-free spherical particles was proposed.  Vibrocompaction to form pellets for 
sintering was suggested.  Robinson (1969) discussed that low gas flow was important for reducing curium 
contamination, but with low gas flow, alternate cooling had to be installed in a curium hot cell.  Pillon 
(2003) discussed the solution-gelation (sol-gel) approach to fuel fabrication.  However, alpha particle 
radiation, especially from curium isotopes, degrades the solution in the sol-gel process.  Pillon stated that 
the process must be performed rapidly to be successful.  Based on that information, any unplanned 
process delays (power outages, equipment tripping off-line, instrument noise, etc.) mean retaining the 
material in the processing stream longer. 
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Renard (1997) described that 0.165 kg of americium oxide in a container gave an equivalent dose
(0.0344 mSv/h) to 13.2 kg of plutonium oxide in a container.  In a MOX facility, the storage cans and 
storage cavity rooms would need additional shielding if the americium supply increased.  As shown in 
Table 2, Pu-241 decays to Am-241 with a 14-year half-life.  Therefore, as more Pu-241 is bred, then more 
Am-241”grows in,” increasing the americium quantity.  Such increases need to be tracked and addressed, 
so actinide handling is more complicated than fresh uranium handling.  Renard (1995) stated that 
neptunium recycling could occur without difficulty in existing MOX glovebox lines, that americium 
would require more shielding for safety, which was costly and cumbersome but feasible, and that curium 
recycling would give a factor of 100 increase in the neutron source.  This increased neutron source would 
require such thick shielding that it precluded recycle fuel work in existing MOX plants; remote handling 
was suggested.  Renard (1995a) suggested that the limitations in recycle were not in fuel fabrication since 
hot cells could provide adequate personnel protection, but in the core physics-neutronics issues of placing 
the actinide blended fuel in the reactor. 
G.2. Issues of composition 
Yoshimochi (2004) described fabrication of a MOX fuel with 3% americium oxide included.  For that 
work they concluded that they required hot cell operation because handling the gamma-emitting 
americium in a glovebox was difficult.  The fuel pellets were fabricated beginning with typical powder 
metallurgy - mixing, granulating, and pressing.  The apparatus used in this fabrication was housed in 
stainless steel box enclosures (i.e., caissons) within a hot cell, presumably to confine dust contamination 
as well as reduce operator dose.  The apparatus typically produced uranium oxide fuel and was remotely 
controlled by an operator at a control panel.  The powder was weighed and an organic binder was blended 
into the mixture inside a ball mill that uses 10-mm diameter tungsten balls.  The resulting pellet density of 
that initial batch was only 88% of theoretical density after sintering.  The cause of the low density was 
traced to the fact that UOB2 B and Am-PuOB2B powders have different morphologies and did not uniformly 
homogenize in the ball mill after the typical 4 hour milling time, despite attempts of enhance blending.  
Experimentation showed that the mixture required at least 10 hours of milling time to obtain a sintered 
pellet of 94.5% theoretical density.  This is not a safety problem, but it does lengthen the time that powder 
form is being handled in the process, and may lead to more dust production.  There may be other means 
besides ball milling available to mix the powders.  Another issue occurred during the fabrication work.  A 
large uranium spot was observed in one of the pellets; poor mixing was ruled out since the ball mill time 
had been more than doubled.  The uranium spot was believed to have come from residue from a previous 
run of the powder feeder for UOB2 B pellet production.  Therefore, complete cleaning of the equipment prior 
to fabricating batches of actinide bearing fuel would be necessary to prevent residues from previous fuel 
batches from entering in to the new process.   
Croixmarie (2003) also experienced the mixing issue when fabricating americium in magnesia targets.  
When the densities of the magnesia powder granules and the spheres composed of Am, Ce, Pu, Y, and Zr 
oxides were very different, mixing led to agglomeration and segregation.  Increasing the magnesia 
granule size to 50-71 microns produced good mixing and produced pellets with greater than 95% 
theoretical density, no cracks, and the preferred random distribution of isolated spheres.   
Krellmann (1993) described that MOX fuel pellets needed to be dried very thoroughly to remove any 
residual moisture prior to placing the pellets in a fuel pin.  Moisture would bond well with sub-
stoichiometric plutonium oxide, leaving hydrogen trapped in the fuel pin.  Then, under reactor core heat 
and radiolysis conditions the hydrogen would react to form zirconium hydride on the fuel pin walls, 
leading to localized damage of the pin.  Drying over 350 C in vacuum or in a dry inert gas was 
recommended.   
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G.3. Safety and reliability 
Fullwood (1980, 1984) prepared a preliminary risk assessment for a fuel fabrication plant, both a 
reference MOX plant and a recycle plant with Am, Np, and Cm actinides incorporated into the MOX fuel.  
The MOX plant was postulated to have 1,078 Curies per kilogram of fuel powder (mainly from Pu-241 
and Pu-238) and the recycle plant 1,408 Curies/kilogram (increases mainly from Cm-244, Cm-242, Am-
241, and Np-239).  The plant capacity was 600 metric tons of heavy metal per year.  Preliminary hazards 
were identified as: powder leaks, filter failures, fire in the powder receiving area, powder overheating 
during processing, criticality, pellet press hydraulic fluid fire, solvent fire/explosion, pellet grinder failure, 
and improper fuel pin welding resulting in aerosol release.  Scrap recovery in the plant also had several 
hazards, including criticality concerns, hydrogen explosions, solvent fires, red oil explosions, resin 
fire/explosion, and filter failures.  External events included aircraft crash into the powder area, 
earthquake, and a tornado that reversed air flow in the facility.  The fuel fabrication plant used thick 
concrete walls and remote handling.  Fullwood’s conclusion was that the hazard was well handled by the 
shielding and remote handling design, so the reference and recycle plant risks were identical at 6E-04 
fatalities per GWe capacity-year from radiological releases, and industrial risks to workers were 1.1E-02 
fatalities per GWe capacity-year.  Occupational radiation doses were about equal between operators and 
maintainers, with most maintenance being performed remotely. 
G.4. Conclusion 
The fuel fabrication industry has enjoyed relatively easy fuel assembly since uranium is a low specific 
activity material.  Moving to mixed oxide fuel increased the radiation hazard because of plutonium 
isotopes and their emissions, so MOX fuel fabrication required more shielding and enclosures of the 
process beyond the uranium processes.  Moving to actinide inclusion in fuel poses another increasing 
level of difficulty.  The operating experience thus far shows that handling the americium and curium has 
been performed in hot cells to provide for personnel protection and good confinement against 
environmental release.  Renard (1995) stated that curium could probably not be handled in gloveboxes 
unless the boxes were specially shielded for that neutron emitter.  Americium and curium appear to be the 
most challenging isotopes to handle during recycling.  One recycle introduces a limited amount of 
radionuclides bred in the core, such as the plutonium isotopes.  Additional recycle sessions would 
increase the concentrations of these radionuclides and their decay products.  If a hot cell is used, it 
appears that multi-recycling fuel fabrication work can be performed safely.  If an automated glovebox line 
is used, extensive glovebox shielding and remote reach tools would have to be provided to accommodate 
multiple recycling stages.   
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